Table Of ContentAbstract of a thesis entitled
'Suspension of Judgement: Agrippa and
submitted by
Yung Yeuk Yu
for the degree of Master of Philosophy
at the University of Hong Kong
in February 2001
It is believed that Agrippa (c.100 B.C. —
100 A.D.) formulates or
assembles five general patterns of argument forms, known as the Five Modes,
to induce epochs (i.e., suspension of judgement), in which people neither posit
nor reject anything. Since then the Five Modes and the notion of epoche have
remained the core legacy of Pyrrhonian scepticism (or Pyrrhonism for short).
By pursuing the Five Modes and epoche, I attempt to set Pyrrhonism against its
background and indicate its importance and relevance to philosophical
enterprise and approach.
I incorporate in Chapter Two a textual study of the Five Modes from
two ancient sources, namely Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. I also
argue that the Pyrrhonist can induce epoche on the strength of the Five Modes
without the necessity of committing to the notion of akatalepsia (i.e., inability
to comprehend).
In Chapter Three I discuss the Agrippan problem posed by the Five
Modes. The Agrippan problem is a lively issue in philosophy. The Pyrrhonian
attack on the Dogmatic account of criterion found in Sextus' Outlines of
Pyrrhonism (PH) demonstrates how the Five Modes constrain theories of
epistemic justification and block every way out of the epistemic predicament of
belief justification. I go through Barnes's modern version of the Agrippan
problem and address various contemporary responses to the problem, including
Fogelin's remark that 'If the Agrippa problem cannot be resolved, there is no
reason to suppose that knowledge of the kind sought by justificationalist
philosophers exists', and Chisholm's contention that the problem could be
resolved only by begging the question.
In Chapter Four I review the philosophical debate between Frede,
Burnyeat and Barnes over the nature and scope of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The
disagreement centres on the scope of epochs and the interpretation of PH113,
the passage in which Sextus mentions two senses of dogma and explains in
what sense the sceptic does not dogmatize. The debate proceeds as if PH 113
specifies the scope of epochs and then in turn defines the scope of Pyrrhonian
scepticism until Barnes points out that PH I 13 is silent on the status of
ordinary beliefs and so 'epoche may be broad or narrow'. After assessing each
interpretation and examining the arguments put forward, I conclude that
Barnes's interpretation is more plausible.
Finally, I offer some concluding remarks in Chapter Five by discussing
the insight and assets bequeathed to us by the Pyrrhonist. The discussion
focuses on the nature of philosophy and the philosophical approach. I draw on
the different views of Sextus, Wittgenstein, Strawson and Husserl on the nature
of philosophy and the philosophical approach.
Suspension of Judgement: Agrippa and
by
Yung Yeuk Yu
B.A. H.K.U.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Philosophy
at the University of Hong Kong
February 2001
Declaration
I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due
acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a
thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other
institution for a degree, diploma or other qualification.
Signed
Yung Yeuk Yu
i
Acknowledgements
This thesis is an attempt to explore deep into the heart of Pyrrhonian
scepticism. The process of researching and writing is painstaking. But it is
worthwhile. Intellectual achievement gives satisfaction. I am indebted to
increasing amount of scholarly works on the subject. My greatest gratitude
goes to Prof. F. C. T. Moore, my supervisor, without his inspiration and
support after his retirement from the department nothing would have been
possible.
ii
Contents
Declaration
Acknowledgements ii
Table of Contents iii
Foreword iv
Chapter One
Overview 1
Chapter Two
Agrippa and the Five Modes 4
Chapter Three
The Agrippan Problem: A Pyrrhonian Challenge to Epistemic Justification... 37
Chapter Four
61
Chapter Five
Concluding Remarks on Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Philosophy 118
Glossary 133
Bibliography 135
iii
Foreword
There is a controversy over the interpretation of Pyrrhonian scepticism,
the protagonists being Frede, Bumyeat and Barnes. This controversy is
exemplary for its high level of scholarship, but also because of the way in
which the participants, while debating detailed points about the texts of Sextus
Empiricus (and others), explicitly look to the broadest questions about
philosophy, its nature and its history. At the heart of this thesis is a critical
review of the debate (which comes down on the side of Barnes). I attempt to
situate the Pyrrhonist in the conclusion, showing how he may lead us to rethink
scepticism and philosophy as well.
In this thesis, Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, a work
frequently referred to, is abbreviated as PH (according to the Latin title), and
similarly his Against the Mathematicians is abbreviated as M. Though there are
several translations of the PH into English, the main one used is Annas and
Barnes [1994]. Mates [1996] and Sextus Empiricus [1933-49] are also
consulted. (For full bibliographic details please see the bibliography.)
References to Greek words are normally given, where necessary, in the
conventional transcription system into the Roman alphabet, including macrons
to mark long vowels, to avoid ambiguity. For the reader's convenience, a short
glossary of these words is given at the end of the thesis, with the relevant
definitions as given in a standard Greek-English dictionary. In some cases, such
as the word dogma, there is a scholarly controversy about the appropriate
definitions. These are indicated and sometimes discussed and documented in
the body of the text.
I have adopted the spelling 'Pyrrhonian' in this thesis. Some writers
prefer 'Pyrrhonean', a spelling that is retained in this thesis only within
quotations. 'Pyrrhonian scepticism' and 'Pyrrhonism' are used interchangeably;
'Pyrrhonian sceptic' and 'Pyrrhonist' are also used in the same manner.
iv
CHAPTER ONE
Overview
YRRHONIAN SCEPTICISM (or Pyrrhonism for short) is an ancient
form of scepticism which originated in Hellenistic philosophy in the
4th century B.C.. Pyrrho of Elis (c.365-270 B.C.) is thought to be the
founder. This thesis focuses on the Five Modes of Agrippa, a set of arguments
which has been described as the soul of Pyrrhonian scepticism.l The Five
Modes and the notion of epoche (suspension of judgement) are the point of
departure.
The Five Modes are patterns of inducing epoche. There is a review of the
controversy between Frede, Burnyeat and Barnes on how we should give
content to the Pyrrhonian epoche in Chapter Four. The review is philosophical.
It evaluates conflicting interpretations of epoche and arguments are examined in
detail.
This thesis aims at a critical evaluation of Pyrrhonian scepticism and its
relevance to philosophy. I do touch upon some historical matters related to the
Five Modes and Pyrrhonian scepticism in Chapter Two. The discussion of
historical matters is preparatory and it helps give a comprehensive treatment of
the subject. It should be made clear in the discussion that this is not a historical
1 Barnes [1990] p.ix
1
