Table Of ContentSupreme emergency
Supreme emergency
How Britain lives with the Bomb
Andrew Corbett
Manchester University Press
Copyright © Andrew Corbett 2022
The right of Andrew Corbett to be identified as the
author of this work has been asserted by them in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988.
Published by Manchester University Press
Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL
www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library
ISBN 978 1 5261 4736 3 hardback
First published 2022
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Cover credit: CPOA(Phot) Tam McDonald/MOD
Cover design: Abbey Akanbi, Manchester University
Press
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Contents
Acknowledgements vi
Abbreviations vii
Introduction: an insider’s view 1
1 The War Game, a case study 6
2 Government, public and total war (1915–40) 18
3 Government, public and total war (1940–45) 36
4 From the Second World War to continuous at-sea
deterrence 55
5 The Polaris replacement decision 98
6 Ethical considerations and wicked issues 144
7 British nuclear deterrence in the 21st century 177
Conclusion: dirty hands and the supreme emergency 224
Bibliography 228
Index 254
Acknowledgements
No book is ever an individual effort – I may have done the writing,
but I would not have done much of that without the patient support
and guidance of Professor David Whetham and Professor Wyn
Bowen, for which I am very grateful. I am very grateful to those
senior policy-makers who gave so freely of their time to discuss
some deeply visceral issues so openly with me. I hope I have done
justice to the depth of feeling and moral engagement which they
shared. I’d also like to extend my thanks to Dr Kristan Stoddart for
his encouragement and ruthlessly constructive advice on this draft.
Obviously the remaining errors and omissions are entirely my fault.
I could not have achieved any of this without endless encourage-
ment from my wife Dr Cynthia Larbey, who helped me persuade
myself into doing this project and has supported me throughout,
including those fruitless evenings trying to find out why the refences
do not match any more; I would like to thank Cynthia for that and
so many things.
Abbreviations
ABM anti-ballistic missile
ACAE Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy
AEBC Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology
Commission
ANF Atlantic nuclear force
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BBFC British Board of Film Censors (now Classification)
BNDSG British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group
CASD continuous at-sea deterrence
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CO commanding officer
COS Chiefs of Staff
DAC Direct Action Committee
DHSS Department of Health and Social Security (since
2001, responsibility largely under Department of
Work and Pensions)
DOPC Defence Overseas Policy Committee
DS19 (MOD) Defence Secretariat 19
DSMA Defence and Security Media Advisory Committee
DUS(P) deputy under-secretary (policy)
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
HC Deb. House of Commons Debates
HL Deb. House of Lords Debates
HLG (NATO) High Level Group
INF intermediate-range nuclear forces
viii Abbreviations
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
IVF in vitro fertilisation
LRTNF long-range tactical nuclear forces
MLF (NATO) Multi-Lateral Force
MOD Ministry of Defence
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
MRC Medical Research Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCAWT National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear
Weapons Tests
NPG (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OR (Air Staff) Operational Requirement
RAF Royal Air Force
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review
SIOP single integrated operating plan
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile
SSBN ship – submersible, ballistic, nuclear
TNA The National Archives
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAC BBC Written Archive Centre
Introduction
An insider’s view
I am not an ethicist, but I have given a great deal of thought to
the morality of the use of force and, in particular, the concept of
nuclear deterrence. I have served in Polaris and Trident ballistic-
missile submarines (ship – submersible, ballistic, nuclear or SSBN)
on and off since 1986, including command of two Vanguard Class
submarines, HMS Vengeance and HMS Vanguard, between 2003
and 2007. I therefore have had ample opportunity, and motivation,
to reconcile the full potential of my personal responsibilities with
some kind of moral compass.
I was always content with the ethical and strategic aspects
of my responsibilities, and I would discuss them with my ship’s
company, but I could never be sure that I could articulate them in
terms of which the Ministry of Defence (MOD) would approve.
So, I asked within my ‘command chain’; fruitlessly. In hindsight,
frustration at the inability of the MOD to provide official guidance
to the commanding officer of an SSBN ultimately led me here; if the
MOD cannot articulate the official rationale for the UK’s Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent to its own SSBN commanding officers, what
does that say for its ability to make a coherent argument in public?
In the absence of formal guidance, I considered the available con-
temporary academic literature. The rather binary options available
seemed initially to be that either all those involved in the business of
deterrence were acting immorally, or there was a shortfall in the lit-
erature. I do not accept that all of the very honourable professionals
with whom I served are merely immoral, or too stupid to notice, or
too hypocritical to care. Nor are they amoral in the Machiavellian
realist sense; neither I, nor they, accept that there are no appropriate
