Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance.

27 Pages·2005·0.14 MB·English

Comparative Political Studies
Volume 39 Number 1
1CK0oe.lm1e1mp7ae7rna/0 t/i0 vS1eu0 Pi4no1gl4 if0toi0cr5a El2 uS8r3tou2pd1ei9es February 2006 101-127
© 2006 Sage Publications
Suing for Europe 10.1177/0010414005283219
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hosted at
Adversarial Legalism and http://online.sagepub.com
European Governance
R. Daniel Kelemen
Lincoln College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Thisarticle developsaconceptual frameworklinkingprocessesofregional
integrationwithtransformationsinlitigation.Theanalysisfusestheworkof
AmericanpubliclawscholarsandEuropeanintegrationexpertstoexamineif,
how,andwhyanAmerican“adversariallegalism”–styleisdevelopinginthe
EuropeanUnion(EU),whythisiscausallylinkedtoprocessesofintegration,
andwhatthismeansfordemocracyintheEU.Thearticleprovidesasystematic
andcomparativecross-sectoranalysisofEUpolicytorevealboththechangein
rights available to citizens and how these affect legal claims and democracy.
Keywords:EuropeanUnion;law;judicialization;EuropeanCourtofJustice;
litigation
M
anyEuropeansviewAmericanlegalandregulatorystylewithanair
of detached amusement. They view the proliferation of ambulance-
chasinglawyers,class-actionlawsuits,massivedamageawards,and,more
generally, adversarial, litigious relationships between regulators, regulat-
edindustries,andinterestgroupsasdistinctivelyAmericanphenomenafrom
whichtheyare,thankfully,immune.Theliteratureoncomparativeregula-
torypolicysupports thiscommon wisdom,showingthattheUnitedStates
Author’sNote:TheauthorthanksKarenAlter,RoderickBagshaw,ErhardBlankenburg,Tanja
Börzel,RachelCichowski,LisaConant,PaulCraig,ElizabethFisher,DavidHine,Christopher
Hodges, Robert Kagan, Xavier Lewis, Duncan Liefferink, Walter Mattli, Christopher
McCrudden,ClaudioRadaelli,MartinShapiro,andAlecStoneSweetfortheircomments,as
wellasparticipantsinseminarsandpanelsattheEuropeanCommission,UniversityofOxford,
theUniversityofAmsterdam,theUniversityofWashington,andtheAmericanPoliticalScience
AssociationConvention.TheauthoralsothanksTimoIdemaandOliverMunnfortheirresearch
assistanceandthankstheZilkhaFundatLincolnCollegeandtheDepartmentofPoliticsand
InternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford,forfinancialsupportforthisproject.Pleasead-
dresscorrespondencetoR.DanielKelemenatLincolnCollege,UniversityofOxford,Oxford,
OX1 3DR, United Kingdom; e-mail: [email protected]
101
102 Comparative Political Studies
does rely on a particularly adversarial, legalistic regulatory style, distin-
guished by its emphasis on detailed rules, substantial transparency re-
quirements,adversarialproceduresforresolvingdisputes,costlylegalcon-
testation involving many lawyers and frequent judicial intervention in
administrative affairs (Kagan, 2001). Although most Europeans may feel
secureintheirimmunitytothis‘AmericanDisease,’thereareincreasingindi-
cationsthattheAmericanlegalstyleisspreadingacrossEurope.Adebate
has emerged among scholars of comparative law and public policy as to
whetherAmericanlegalstyleistakingholdinEuropeandsupplantingestab-
lished national styles. Some scholars have argued that patterns of law and
regulationacrossEuropeareconvergingonanAmericanmodel(Galanter,
1992; Kelemen & Sibbitt, 2004; Shapiro, 1993; Shapiro & Stone, 1994;
Trubek et al., 1994; Wiegand, 1991), whereas others have argued that
entrenched national legal institutions and cultures will block convergence
(Kagan,1997;Legrand,1996;vanWaarden,1995).
Thisarticlelinksthisemergingdebateonstylesofgovernancewiththelit-
eratureonEuropeanintegration,arguingthatashifttowardAmericanlegal
styleisoccurringintheEuropeanUnion(EU)andthatitsspreadisinextrica-
blylinkedtotheprocessofEuropeanintegration.Europeanintegrationen-
couragesthespreadofadversariallegalismasamodeofgovernancethrough
two related mechanisms. The first involves the process through which the
economicliberalizationassociatedwiththeEU’sSingleMarketundermines
cooperative,informal,andopaqueapproachestoregulationatthenational
level. To achieve their regulatory objectives in a liberalized environment,
nationalpolicymakersarepressuredtorelyonmoreformal,transparentreg-
ulationsandprivateenforcement,oftenattheEUlevel.Thesecondmecha-
nism stems from the policy-making dynamics lawmakers encounter when
they reregulate at the EU level. The EU is a highly fragmented regulatory
statewithapowerfuljudiciary.Thefragmentationofpowerbetweeninstitu-
tionsattheEUlevelencouragestheadoptionoflawswithstrict,judicially
enforceablegoals,deadlines,andtransparentproceduralrequirements.Also,
giventheEU’slimitedimplementationandenforcementcapacity,EUlaw-
makershaveanincentivetoempowerprivatepartieswithjusticiablerights
and rely on adversariallegalismasameans of decentralizedenforcement.
Far from advocating thespread of adversariallegalism,EU policy makers
professtheircommitmenttoadoptingflexible,informalapproachestogov-
ernance.AlthoughtheEUdoesemployavarietyofinformal,flexiblepolicy
instruments,theimpactofsuchinitiativesisovershadowedbythelessdis-
cussedbutmorepervasivespreadofadversariallegalismacrossanumberof
policyareas.
Kelemen / Suing for Europe 103
The shift toward adversarial legalism in European governance involves
changesinthethreeinstitutionalvariablesidentifiedintheintroduction to
thisspecialissue.Adversariallegalismreliesonanexpansionintherangeof
EU rights, the empowerment of national and EU courts, and the enhance-
mentofaccesstojusticeforprivateparties.Thenormativeimplicationsof
thespreadofadversariallegalismareambiguous.Althoughmanyobservers
wouldviewthisshiftastheregrettablespreadofanAmericandisease,others
would view it as enhancing transparency, access to justice, accountability,
andpublicparticipation.Theexpansionofrightsstrengthensdemocracy,and
enhancedaccesstojusticeconstitutesavitalformofdemocraticparticipa-
tion,ifnottheformthatcriticsoftheEU’sdemocraticdeficithaveinmind.
Ultimately,anynormativeassessmentmustweighthegainsintermsoftrans-
parency, rights, and access to justice for previously marginalized groups
againstthedeadweightlossesinvolvedinincreasedlegalexpenses,slower
policy-makingprocesses,anddiminishedcooperationbetweenstakeholders
inaffectedpolicyarenas.Likeothercontributionstothisspecialissue,this
articlerecognizesthatincreasedaccesstojusticecanenhancethequalityof
democracy; however, this article raises a note of caution concerning the
undesirablesideeffectsofopeningthecourtroomdoors.
Theremainderofthisarticleisdividedintothreesections.Thefirstsec-
tiondetailsmyexplanationforthespreadofAmericanlegalstyleacrossthe
EUandconsidersrivalarguments.Next,Iturntoaninitialempiricalassess-
ment of the argument, discussing both overarching trends and develop-
ments in four policy areas. The finalsection considers normative implica-
tionsofthisphenomenon,particularlyconcerningthenatureandqualityof
democracy.
Explaining the
Spread of Adversarial Legalism
Given the significant differences in regulatory styles across member
statesandpolicyareas(Richardson,1982),anyefforttomakebroadgeneral-
izationsaboutthesestylesisproblematic.Nevertheless,anumberofcom-
monattributesdodistinguishtraditionalEuropeanregulatorystylesfromthe
Americanstyle(Kagan,2001).Theapproachestoregulationthatlongpre-
dominated across Western Europe were more informal, cooperative, and
opaqueandreliedlessonlawyersandcourtsthanthoseintheUnitedStates.
Systems of regulation prevalent across Europe, ranging from the cor-
poratismfoundinAustria,Sweden,andGermany(Lehmbruch&Schmitter,
1982),tothedirigismeofFrance(Suleiman,1978),tothechummycoopera-
104 Comparative Political Studies
tive style of British regulation (Vogel, 1986), all relied heavily on closed
policy-making networks and empowered regulators to pursue informal
meansofachievingregulatoryobjectives.Networkinsidershadnoneedto
resort to litigation. Outsiders had greater incentives to do so but typically
found courts unwilling to block policy initiatives developed within elite
networks.
The confluence of two developments has sparked a shift toward adver-
sariallegalisminEuropeanregulatorystylesincethemid-1980s.First,the
economicliberalizationresultingfromthe1992SingleMarketinitiativeand
ongoing efforts to complete the Single Market undermined traditional
approaches to regulation at the national level. Many national regulations
have been struck down by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as illegal
nontariffbarrierstotrade,andotherinformalregulatorypracticesareregu-
larlyattackedfortheirlackoftransparencyandlegalcertainty.Thegrowing
diversity of players in liberalized markets has subverted informal, opaque
systemsofregulationthatreliedoninsidernetworksandtrust.Astraditional
approaches break down, national regulators seek new means by which to
pursue their regulatory goals, better suited to the liberalized environment.
Followingafundamentalinsightofthesociologyoflaw,onewouldexpect
that as the social distance and distrust between regulators and regulated
actorsinmarketsincreases,lawsandregulatoryprocesseswillbecomemore
formal, transparent, and legalistic (Black, 1976). As a result, some move-
ment toward adversarial legalism would have been likely even had re-
regulationbeenconductedexclusivelyatthenationallevel.IntheEU,how-
ever,muchofthereregulationthathascomplementedtheconstructionofthe
SingleMarkethasoccurredattheEUlevel.
ThehighlyfragmentedinstitutionalstructureoftheEUhasencouraged
therelianceonadversariallegalismasamodeofgovernance.Democracies
vary considerably and systematicallyin the specificityof the legalobliga-
tions(statutes,contracts,courtrulings)andintheirrelianceonlitigationasa
means of enforcement (Kagan, 2001). Comparative research suggests that
thefragmentationofpoliticalpowerisaprimarycauseofjudicialempower-
ment in general (Ferejohn, 2002; Ginsburg, 2003; Shapiro, 1981) and of
adversariallegalismasapolicystyleinparticular(Kagan,2001;Kelemen&
Sibbitt,2004).Politicalfragmentationcreatesagencyproblemsandsimulta-
neouslyoffersatemptingsolutiontothem.Wherepoliticalauthorityisfrag-
mented,legislativeprincipalswillhavedifficultyassemblingthecoalitions
necessarytocontrolexecutiveagentstowhomtheyhavedelegatedpower.
Political fragmentation also enhances the durability of legislation and ju-
dicial independence. Anticipating difficulties in controlling bureaucracies
expost,lawmakers’sdraftdetailedstatutesthatlimitbureaucraticdiscretion
Kelemen / Suing for Europe 105
and establish causes of action that enable private parties to enforce legal
normsincourt(McNollgast,1999).
ThetransferofregulatoryauthoritytotheEUlevelhasincreasedthefrag-
mentation of politicalauthority. Authority in many policy areas isdivided
verticallybetweentheEUandmemberstategovernmentsandhorizontallyat
theEUlevelbetweentheCouncil,theParliament,theCommission,andthe
ECJ.Thisfragmentationofpowerhasencouragedtheproductionofdetailed
laws withstrictgoals, deadlines, and procedural requirements and has en-
couragedanadversarial,judicializedapproachtoenforcement(Franchino,
2004;Kelemen,2004;Prechal,1995).Ironically,memberstategovernments
havesupportedthisapproachbecausetheydoubtoneanother’scommitment
to implementation and seek to facilitate enforcement actions against non-
compliant states (Majone, 1995). The European Parliament favors this
approach,asitdistrustsmemberstatesandseekstolimittheirdiscretionand
encourage the Commission or private parties to take enforcement actions
against laggard states (Franchino, 2004; Kelemen, 2004). More generally,
widespreadcriticismsoftheEU’s‘democraticdeficit’anddistrustofdistant
Eurocratshavegeneratedpublicdemandsfortransparencyandpublicpartic-
ipationinregulatoryprocesses(Harlow,1999;Vogel,2003).Satisfyingthese
demandshasrequiredfurtherformalizationofEUregulationsandadminis-
trativeprocedures.
Finally,thefragmentationofpowerintheEUhasenhancedthepowerand
assertivenessoftheECJ.DivisionsbetweentheCouncil,theParliament,and
theCommissionmakeitdifficultforthesepoliticalbranchestoactinconcert
toreinintheECJ.TheECJcantakeanassertivestanceinenforcingEUlaw
against noncompliant member states with little fear of political backlash
(Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, 1998). Knowing that the ECJ and many na-
tionalcourtsareindependentandassertive,EUlawmakersregularlyenlist
themasagentsofpolicyenforcement,invitingtheCommissionandprivate
partiestoenforcecommunitylawincourt.
EU treaties, secondary legislation, and expansive ECJ interpretations
havealsocreatedanumberoflegallyenforceablerightsforprivateparties.
Pursuingpolicyaimsthrougharightsstrategyhasseveraladvantagesinthe
EUcontext.Aboveall,itisinexpensive.ByestablishingEUrightsandrely-
ingonprivatepartiestoenforcethem,EUlawmakerscanavoidthecostof
fundingtheextensiveEurocracyandlarge-scaleprogramsthatwouldother-
wise be necessary to implement and enforce policy. By presenting policy
goalsasindividualrightsthatprivateactorsandgovernmentsareobligedto
respect,theEUcanreadilyshiftthecostsofcompliancetotheprivatesector
and member state governments. The creation of these individual rights
has enabled private parties to bring litigation against governments before
106 Comparative Political Studies
nationalcourtsandaccesstheEUjudicialsystemviathepreliminaryruling
procedure,althoughtheimpactofsuchlitigationhasvariedacrossmember
statesandpolicyareas(Alter,2001;Cichowski,2006;Conant,2002).With
time,thenumberandscopeofEUrightsislikelytoproliferateastheEU’s
institutionalstructureencourageswhatEskridgeandFerejohn(1995)have
termedvirtuallogrollinginwhichthelegislatureandthejudiciarydeferto
oneanother’srights-creatingpreferences.
The argument set out above challenges existing orthodoxies concern-
ing EU governance and prominent arguments concerning the resilienceof
national legal styles and patterns of policy diffusion. First, although the
EuropeanCommission(CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,2001a)
andscholars(Héritier,2002;Radaelli,2003)emphasizetheEU’sroleinpro-
motingnew,flexiblemodesofgovernancerelyingonvoluntaryagreements,
frameworkdirectives,softlaw,self-regulation,andtheopenmethodofcoor-
dination,myargumentsuggeststhatweshouldactuallyobserveEUinvolve-
mentpushingnationalpolicystylesinamoreformal,adversarialdirection.
Second, other scholars have suggested that impediments to litigation en-
trenchedinnationalinstitutionsandlegalculturesacrosstheEUwillblock
thespreadofadversariallegalismingeneral(Kagan,1997)andofEUrights
litigation specifically (Alter & Vargas, 2000; Burke, 2004; Conant, 2002;
Harlow,1999). Thesearguments identifyavarietyof institutionalimpedi-
mentstolitigation—suchasrestrictiverulesofstanding,inadequatefinan-
cialsupportandincentives,theabsenceofclassactions—anddeeplyembed-
ded norms concerning the role of law and lawyers that all seem to make
Europeinhospitableterrainforthegrowthofadversariallegalism.Asaresult
ofsuchimpediments,theimpactofadversariallegalismandEUrightscre-
ationwillvaryacrossmemberstatesandpolicyareasandisunlikelytogen-
eratemanyofthenotoriousexcessesoftheU.S.system.Nevertheless,these
authorshaveoverestimatedthestrengthofthesebarriers,manyofwhichare
alreadycrumbling.Finally,eventhosewhoagreethatadversariallegalismis
ontheriseacrossEuropemightattributethistoadifferentsetofcausesthan
those identified here. The most common explanations for the diffusion of
policystylesacrosscountriesarebasedonregulatorycompetitionoremu-
lation. Regulatory competition (i.e., race-to-the-bottom pressure) has not
driventheEUtoadoptadversariallegalismasawayofenhancingitscompet-
itiveness.Quitetothecontrary,adversariallegalismoftenimposesfargreater
coststhanmoreinformalapproachestoregulation.NorisAmericanregula-
torystylespreadingprimarilythroughaprocessofsociallearningoremula-
tion.AlthoughmanyU.S.lawsandpoliciesmaybeviewedaslaudablemod-
els, most European policymakers view adversarial legalism as anathema.
Thus,theexplanationforthespreadofadversariallegalismpresentedabove
Kelemen / Suing for Europe 107
bothchallengesargumentsthatemphasizeinstitutionalbarrierstolitigation
anddiffersfromthosetypicallyassociatedwithpolicydiffusion(Kelemen&
Sibbitt,2005).
Assessing the
Spread of Adversarial Legalism
Theprimaryaimofthisarticleisnottoexplainvariationinchangeoflegal
styleacrossmemberstatesorpolicyareas,thoughexplainingsuchvariation
is certainly important. The aim, rather, is to examine whether adversarial
legalismisemergingasaprevalentmodeofgovernanceacrossawiderange
ofpolicyareas,toexplainthephenomenon,andtoassessitsnormativeimpli-
cations.Inpursuitofthisbroadambition,thissectionbeginsbyanalyzinga
seriesofgeneraldevelopmentsinEUlawandregulationthatsuggestashift
toward adversarial legalism. Next, the assessment turns to case studies of
fourdisparatepolicyareas—environmentalpolicy,securitiesregulation,anti-
discrimination law, and consumer protection. These policy areas were se-
lectedtoreflectthewiderangeofareasofregulatorypolicy,botheconomic
andsocial,inwhichtheEUisinvolvedandthustodemonstratethebreadthof
thephenomena. Although thecaseselectionisnotbasedonamostdiffer-
entsystemsdesigninastrictsense,thecomparisonsenableustoexamine
whether and how the EU encourages adversarial legalism in policy areas
characterizedbydifferentlegalnorms,institutions,andactors.
Overarching Trends
A number of overarching developments evidence the spread of adver-
sariallegalismasamodeofgovernanceintheEU.First,thesteadyexpansion
ofthecatalogueofEUrightsandthepersistenttendencyofEUlawmakersto
draftaction-forcinglawsrepletewithjusticiableprovisionshaveexpanded
thebasesforlegalaction.Second,theEuropeanCommissionhastakenan
adversarial,legalisticapproachtoenforcement.Third,theEUactivelyseeks
toexpandaccesstojusticeandencouragesprivatepartiestoenforcecommu-
nitylawthroughnationalcourts.Finally,thelegalservicesindustryacross
Europeisexperiencingatransformationthatwillstrengthenthelegalinfra-
structureforadversariallegalism.
TherangeofindividualrightsprotectedunderEUTreatiesandsecondary
legislation has expanded dramatically. In addition to well-known treaty-
basedrightssuchasfreemovementorequaltreatment,theEU’slegislative
actorsandtheECJhaveestablishedawidecatalogueoffundamentalhuman
andcitizenshiprightsalongwithahostofissuespecificrightsforworkers,
108 Comparative Political Studies
consumers, shareholders, immigrants, and others (De Búrca, 1995; Engel,
2001;Kelemen,2003;StoneSweet,2000).
DespiterecurrentcommitmentsfromEUlawmakerstosimplifyingEU
regulationandmovingtonew,flexibleapproaches,EUregulationremains
onthewhole,highlydetailedandprescriptiveandplacesincreasingempha-
sisonproceduralformalityandtransparency(Prechal,1995;Senden,2004).
AspartofthedrivetorelaunchtheSingleMarketinthemid-1980s,theCom-
missionandthememberstatescalledforanewapproachtoregulationthat
promisedtomoveawayfromamodelinwhichdirectivesharmonizedrules
in painstaking detailand to a model based on minimal harmonization and
mutual recognition. Examining an original dataset of directives adopted
from1958to1993,Franchino(2006)findsthattheshifttothenewapproach
wasindeedassociatedwith,“amoderateshifttowardshorter,moreconcise
legislation”sincetheearly1980s.However,themovementtowardsimpler
legislationwasshortlived.Withtheadventofthecodecisionprocedure,Par-
liamentaddedprecisiontodirectivesandenhancedpossibilitiesforjudicial
oversight,withtheaimofreducingdiscretionfortheCommissionandmem-
berstateadministrations.(Franchino,2006).
TheprecisionofEUlawisbackedbyacoerciveapproachtoenforcement.
TheCommissionhasstrengtheneditsenforcementactivitiesradicallysince
the mid-1980s (Börzel, 2003). For years, the Commission only pursued
infringementcaseswhenmemberstatesblatantlyfailedtotransposedirec-
tives into their national legal systems. During the 1980s, the Commission
expanded theforms of noncompliance inregard towhich itpursued cases
andinitiatedproceedingsagainstmemberstatesthatcompliedonpaperbut
notinpractice.Also,theCommissionandtheECJoftensupportstrictinter-
pretationsofdirectives,findingmemberstatestobeinnoncomplianceeven
incaseswhereEUdirectivesappearedtoprovidememberstateswithconsid-
erablediscretion.Inrecentyears,theCommissionregularlyinitiatesnearly
1,000infringementproceduresannually(Börzel,2003;Commissionofthe
EuropeanCommunities,2004b).Althoughthevastmajorityofcasesareset-
tledbeforebeingformallyreferredtotheECJ,thenumberofinfringement
casesbroughttotheECJhasrisensteadily,withtheaveragenumberofcases
broughtpermemberstateperyearmorethandoublingsincethemid-1980s
(seeFigure1).
AtMaastricht,thememberstatesgrantedtheCommissiontheauthorityto
requestthattheECJimposepenaltypaymentsonmemberstatesthatfailedto
complywithECJrulingsininfringementcases(Article228).Since1997,the
Commissionhasinitiatedmorethan100ofthesecases.Thethreatofsanc-
tionshas proven extremely effectiveinpressuring errant member statesto
complywithEUlaw,andmostsuchcasesaresettledbeforetheECJrules.
Kelemen / Suing for Europe 109
Figure 1
AverageNumberofArticle226Referralstothe
EuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ)PerMemberState,1978to2003
16.0
14.0
CJ
mber of Art 226 Referrals to the E116802....0000 AMLEivCneeemJr aapbrgee (errA MNSvetuearmmategbbeee rrN oSuft maAtbrete) 2r 2o6f ARret f2e2rr6a lRs etofe ErrCalJs ptoer
Nu
Average 4.0
2.0
0.0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Source: Börzel, 1999; Comission of the European Communities, 2004b
However,theECJhasimposedpenaltiesonthreeoccasions,mostrecently
imposingarecord20millionEuropenaltyonFranceforviolatingEUfisher-
iesregulations,coupledwithrollingpenaltiesof57.8millionEuroevery6
monthsuntilFrancecomplies(Minder,2005,July13).
Enforcement litigationbrought bytheCommissionconstitutesonlythe
tipoftheEUlitigationiceberg.RecognizingthelimitsontheCommission’s
capacitytoenforceEUlawsingle-handedly,theCommission,theCouncil,
and above all, the European Parliament have consistently encouraged the
empowermentofprivateactorstoenforceEUlawthrough thecourts.The
EUhaslongreliedonprivatepartiestoserveastheeyes,ears,andultimately,
the long arm, of community law (Alter, 2001; Schepel & Blankenburg,
2001).Decentralizedenforcementbyprivatepartiesbeforenationalcourts
relyingontheArticle234(exArt.177)preliminaryreferenceprocedurehas
grownsteadilythroughtheyears(seeFigure2).
The increased frequency of referrals for preliminary rulings to theECJ
fromnationalcourtsisanaturalbyproductoftheexpandedscopeofEuro-
peanlawandthegrowthintradeandotherformsofexchange(i.e.,move-
mentofpersons)betweenmemberstates(Fligstein&StoneSweet,2001).
110 Comparative Political Studies
However,theincreasedfrequencyofsuchdecentralizedlitigationisalsothe
consequence of a deliberate political strategy. The EU’s effort to promote
dialogueamongEuropeancourtsandtobuildacommon‘judicialarea’dates
back decades (Alter, 2001) and intensified dramatically in recent years.
ProddedonbyaCommissioncommunicationemphasizingobstaclestojus-
tice and the need to ensure “equal access to rapid, efficient and inexpen-
sivejustice”(CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,1997),theTam-
pereEuropeanCouncilaskedtheCommissiontolaunchaseriesofjudicial
cooperationinitiativestocreatea“Europeanareaofjustice”basedontrans-
parency,democraticcontrol,andaccesstojustice(CommissionoftheEuro-
peanCommunities,1999a).
The EU is actively working to expand financial support for private en-
forcement and to spread awareness of the potential for private parties to
enforceEUlaw.In2002,theCounciladoptedaRegulation(EuropeanCom-
munity,2002)concerningjudicialcooperationincivilmatters,onecentral
aimofwhichistoimproveaccesstojusticeacrosstheEU.Pursuanttothis
regulation, the Commission proposed an access to justice directive (Com-
mission of the European Communities, 2002a) that would have required
memberstatestoprovidelegalaidtoindividualswhocouldnotmeetthecost
of litigation in cross-border disputes and fund litigation by public interest
organizations.TheParliamentstronglysupportedtheproposalandcalledfor
theguaranteeoflegalaidtobeextendedtoallcivilandcommercialcases,not
justthosewithacross-borderdimension.TheCouncilultimatelyadopteda
watereddowndirective(European Community,2003a) thatwaslimitedto
cross-borderdisputesandonlyguaranteedaidfor‘naturalpersons’(notfor
publicinterestgroups).Nevertheless,thisdirectiveconstitutesanimportant
steptowardharmonizinglegalaidrules,andwithongoingpressurefromthe
CommissionandParliament,furtherdevelopmentsarelikely.
TheECJalsohasworkedtoempowerlitigants,mostfamouslythroughits
establishment of the doctrines of supremacy (European Court of Justice
[ECJ],1964)anddirecteffect(ECJ,1963)anditsdevelopmentofthedoc-
trine of state liability (ECJ, 1991). In a series of rulings beginning with
Francovich, the ECJ has developed a doctrine of state liability that estab-
lishesconditionsunderwhichmemberstatescanbeheldliablefordamages
sufferedbyindividualsasaresultofthememberstate’sfailuretoimplement
communitylaw.Moregenerally,aseriesofECJdecisionshaveincreasedthe
levelandrangeofdamagesthatlitigantscanclaimundercommunitylaw.For
instance, in Von Colson (ECJ, 1984), the court emphasized that damages
functionnotonlyasaformofredressbutalsoasadeterrenttofutureharm.In
MarshallII(ECJ,1993),theECJruledthatmemberstatesmustallowfull
compensation for damages concerning violations of the Equal Treatment