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“Zahavi delivers a critical phenomenological account of the subjectivity of experience that shows how y
Investigating the First-Person Perspective
phenomenology is not just a description but an analysis that can contribute to explanations of
consciousness, self, and intersubjectivity. Staying deftly on target, Zahavi challenges higher-order a
Investigating the First-Person Perspective
n
representational theory and standard theory-of-mind approaches to social cognition. He pushes the
phenomenological envelope and engages in an original way with traditional analytic philosophy of mind d
and more recent lines of thought that are drawn from the cognitive sciences. To the list of classic phe- Dan Zahavi
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O nomenologists from whom Zahavi draws we need to add one more: Zahavi himself.” e
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Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Shaun Gallagher, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida h What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social
Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copen- construct—or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion?
o
hagen and the author of Self-Awareness and Alterity in Husserl’s “Zahavi’s book is a valuable contribution to the current interdisciplinary discussion of consciousness. The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned
o
Phenomenology. In simple and direct language, he gives us a full phenomenological investigation of subjectivity and by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years.
d
selfhood.” Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues
that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding
David Carr, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Philosophy, Emory University of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of
experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that
A Bradford Book none of these three notions can be understood in isolation.
“In this very timely book, Dan Zahavi offers a wealth of illuminating discussions centered on an integrated Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the
investigation of self, self-awareness, and experience that take the first-personal or subjective dimensions first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential
of consciousness seriously. Expertly rooted in philosophical phenomenology of both the Austro-German Z Dan Zahavi givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhoodexplores a number of
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and French traditions, but also engaging in a critical dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and h phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of con-
developmental psychology and psychiatry, he masterfully develops his case by raising precise questions and a sciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary
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painstakingly evaluating argumentative lines to possible answers.” discussions in consciousness research.
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O Philosophical phenomenology—as developed by Husserl,
Eduard Marbach, Professor of Phenomenology and of Philosophy of Mind, University of Bern, Switzerland Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others—not only
addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates
over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework
“This work takes a huge step forward in bringing phenomenological philosophy to bear on contemporary for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need—given
issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is a work of major importance that no one the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in
thinking about the philosophy and science of consciousness can afford to neglect.” subjectivity—for an account of the subjective or phenomenal
O O dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers
Evan Thompson, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use
phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central impor-
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“This book is a masterful demonstration that in order to understand the nature of selfhood, it is necessary tance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental
to distinguish various levels of self-awareness as well as to consider how these levels become articulated, psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with
starting with the direct, embodied experience of being alive in the world. With great scholarship and other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi,
clarity, Zahavi brings back the central importance of the first-person perspective.” phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary
relevance.
Philippe Rochat, Professor of Psychology, Emory University
The MIT Press •Massachusetts Institute of Technology •Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 •http://mitpress.mit.edu
Subjectivity and Selfhood
Subjectivity and Selfhood
Investigating the First-Person Perspective
Dan Zahavi
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any elec-
tronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales
promotional use. For information, please email [email protected] or
write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge,
MA 02142.
This book was set in Sabon by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong.
Printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Zahavi, Dan.
Subjectivity and selfhood: investigating the first-person perspective / Dan Zahavi.
p. cm.
“A Bradford book.”
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0-262-24050-5 (hc : alk. paper)
1. Self (Philosophy). 2. Consciousness. 3. Subjectivity. 4. Self-knowledge, Theory of.
I. Title.
BD438.5.Z34 2006 126—dc22 2005047918
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
1 | Self-Awareness and Phenomenal Consciousness 11
I Varieties of Self-Awareness 13
II Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness 17
III A One-Level Account of Consciousness 20
IV The Problem of Infinite Regress 25
2 | The Concept(s) of Consciousness in Early Phenomenology 31
I Three Concepts of Consciousness 31
II The Stream of Consciousness 32
III Inner Consciousness and Self-Awareness 37
IV Some Shortcomings 44
3 | The Structure of Time-Consciousness 49
I Subjectivity of Experience 50
II Temporality 55
III The Internal Object Account 59
IV Urbewußtseinand Self-Affection 65
4 | Reflection and Attention 73
I Natorp’s Challenge 73
II The Criticism of Reflective Phenomenology 76
III A Hermeneutical Alternative 78
|
vi Contents
IV Pure and Impure Reflection 86
V Reflection and Alteration 89
VI Reflective versus Hermeneutical Phenomenology 96
5 | Consciousness and Self 99
I The Non-egological Challenge 99
II Different Notions of Self 103
III The Narrative Concept of Self 106
IV The Self as an Experiential Dimension 115
V Empirical Implications 132
VI A Sense of Self 146
6 | Self and Other 147
I Expression and Empathy 148
II Embodied Subjectivity and Internal Otherness 156
III Beyond Empathy 163
IV The Transcendence of the Other 168
V A Multidimensional Approach 174
7 | Theory of Mind, Autism, and Embodiment 179
I Theory of Mind 179
II Theory-Theory of Self-Awareness 183
III Autism 189
IV A Critical Rejoinder 197
V Autism Revisited 215
Notes 223
References 241
Index 261
Acknowledgments
This book is the result of prolonged interest in and work on the nature of
consciousness, self-consciousness, selfhood, and intersubjectivity. Much of
its foundational research has taken place in an interdisciplinary setting at
the Center for Subjectivity Research, a Center of Excellence located at the
University of Copenhagen and funded by the Danish National Research
Foundation.
I have learned much from my discussions with the following people, many
of whom have also read and commented on parts of the manuscript: Rudolf
Bernet, John Brough, Jonathan Cole, Steven Crowell, Ingolf Dalferth, John
Drummond, Shaun Gallagher, Arne Grøn, Thor Grünbaum, Jim Hart, Lisa
Käll, Uriah Kriegel, Dieter Lohmar, Alva Noë, Søren Overgaard, Josef
Parnas, Michael Quante, Philippe Rochat, David Rosenthal, Charles Siewert,
Galen Strawson, and Evan Thompson.
I have had the opportunity to present material from the following text
during lectures at various universities, including Rutgers, Stony Brook,
Oxford, Warwick, CREA (Paris), Stockholm, Marburg, Boston College,
Leuven, McGill, Köln, University College Dublin, Chicago, Boston Univer-
sity, New School University, Geneva, Helsinki, Würzburg, Kyoto, Tokyo,
Kent, Jyväskylä, and Heidelberg. I have profited, in every instance, from the
ensuing discussions and comments I have received.
I am very grateful to the Danish National Research Foundation, whose
generous funding permitted me to write this book. I offer a special thanks
to Institutionen San Cataldo for granting me a wonderful month at their
monastery in Italy that allowed me to develop its composition.
Finally, I would like to thank Kristina Mommens, whose diligent proof-
reading of the manuscript provided countless grammatical and linguistic
improvements.
Introduction
What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct—or
perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? If something like a self exists,
what role does it play in our conscious life, and how and when does it emerge
in the development of the infant? What might such psychopathological and
neuropsychiatric disorders as schizophrenia or autism reveal about the
fragility of self-identity and self-coherence? As this brief list of questions indi-
cates, the contemporary discussion of the self is highly interdisciplinary in
nature (see, e.g., Gallagher and Shear 1999; Zahavi 2000; Kircher and David
2003).
The legitimacy of the concept of self has recently been questioned by both
neuroscientists and philosophers. Some have argued that the self is nothing
but an illusion created by an interplay of various subsystems and modules
in the brain (Dennett 1991; Wegner 2002; Metzinger 2003a). Others have
claimed that the concept of self is a Eurocentric invention with limited his-
torical relevance (Berrios and Marková 2003). In contrast, the hypothesis to
be defended in the following chapters is that the notion of self is crucial for
a proper understanding of consciousness, and consequently it is indispens-
able to a variety of disciplines such as philosophy of mind, social philoso-
phy, psychiatry, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
It would, of course, be something of an exaggeration to claim that the
concept of self is unequivocal and that there is widespread consensus about
what, exactly, it means to be a self. Quite to the contrary, the concept is cur-
rently used in a manifold of rival senses and it is a simple fact that the concept
connotes different things in different disciplines—sometimes radically dif-
ferent things. What is urgently needed is a clarification of the relationship
between these sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary notions and
aspects of selfhood. Moreover, such a taxonomic clarification is essential in
