Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality

226 Pages·2012·1.024 MB·English

by  Steven French (auth.), Elaine Landry, Dean Rickles (eds.)

Structural Realism
THEWESTERNONTARIOSERIES
INPHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE
ASERIESOFBOOKSINPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICSANDNATURALSCIENCE,
HISTORYOFSCIENCE,HISTORYOFPHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,EPISTEMOLOGY,
PHILOSOPHYOFCOGNITIVESCIENCE,GAMEANDDECISIONTHEORY
ManagingEditor
WILLIAMDEMOPOULOS
DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofWesternOntario,Canada
DepartmentofLogicandPhilosophyofScience,UniversityofCalifornia/Irvine
AssistantEditors
DAVIDDEVIDI
PhilosophyofMathematics,UniversityofWaterloo
ROBERTDISALLE
PhilosophyofPhysicsandHistoryandPhilosophyofScience,
UniversityofWesternOntario
WAYNEMYRVOLD
FoundationsofPhysics,UniversityofWesternOntario
EditorialBoard
JOHNL.BELL,UniversityofWesternOntario
YEMINABEN-MENAHEM,HebrewUniversityofJerusalem
JEFFREYBUB,UniversityofMaryland
PETERCLARK,St.AndrewsUniversity
JACKCOPELAND,UniversityofCanterbury,NewZealand
JANETFOLINA,MacalesterCollege
MICHAELFRIEDMAN,StanfordUniversity
CHRISTOPHERA.FUCHS,PerimeterInstituteforTheoreticalPhysics,
Waterloo,Ontario
MICHAELHALLETT,McGillUniversity
WILLIAMHARPER,UniversityofWesternOntario
CLIFFORDA.HOOKER,UniversityofNewcastle,Australia
AUSONIOMARRAS,UniversityofWesternOntario
JÜRGENMITTELSTRASS,UniversitätKonstanz
THOMASUEBEL,UniversityofManchester
VOLUME77
·
Elaine M. Landry Dean P. Rickles
Editors
Structural Realism
Structure, Object, and Causality
123
Editors
ElaineM.Landry Dr.DeanP.Rickles
UniversityofCalifornia UniversityofSydney
DavisCalifornia UnitforHistory&PhilosophyofScience
USA SydneyNewSouthWales
[email protected] F07CarslawBldg.
Australia
[email protected]
ISSN1566-659X
ISBN978-94-007-2578-2 e-ISBN978-94-007-2579-9
DOI10.1007/978-94-007-2579-9
SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergLondonNewYork
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2011943742
(cid:2)c SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.2012
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Preface
Itstillseemsreasonabletoassumethatscientificrealism,insomeformorother,is
themajoritypositionamongstbothpracticingscientistsandphilosophersofscience.
However, as Jarrett Leplin quipped some years ago, realism is “[l]ike the Equal
RightsMovement...amajoritypositionwhoseadvocatesaresodividedastoappear
aminority”(ScientificRealism,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985,p.1).Within
the broader church of scientific realism, structural realism too has splintered into
many diverse denominations, often underpinned by quite distinct motivations and
argued for using quite different defences. There is, then, no monolithic position
known as ‘structural realism.’ But there is a general convergence on the idea that
a central role is to be played by relational aspects over object-based aspects of
ontology—whether this reflects a fundamental fact about the world (the ontolog-
ical thesis)—as opposed to our engagement with it (the epistemological thesis)—
introduces still further divisions. Still further divisions within these divisions are
createdinthetaskofestablishingwhatisactuallymeantbyeachofthesetheses.
Structural realism (if not quite labeled such) has been around in some form or
othersinceatleastaslongagoasPoincaré’sfamouscommentaboutNaturehiding
thetruenaturesofobjects,leavingusinsteadwiththeirtheirprojectionsintheform
of structural shadows. Perhaps if we looked closely enough, we could find earlier
versionsofit.Kant’stheoryofthedivisionbetweenphenomenaandnoumenacer-
tainlycomesveryclosesincephenomenawill,bytheirverynature,involverelations
(ifonlybetweenobserverandthequalitativepropertiesofasystem)asaninevitable
consequence.
However,inmorerecenttimes,largelythankstoitsintegrationwiththemesfrom
the philosophy of physics (especially physical symmetries and group theory), it
has evolved and broadened considerably from this earlier epistemological stance.
Forexample,thepositionspawnedanontologicalversion,accordingtowhich‘the
shadows’areallthatexistsatafundamentallevel.Whetherobjectscanbeentirely
eliminatedfromone’sontology,infavourofaworldofpurestructure,isasubject
ofcurrentdebate,andoneheavilydiscussedinseveralofthechaptersthatfollow.
Thereiseven,thankstovanFraassen,ananti-realist(empiricist)counterpartto
structural realism according to which one can agree with the structuralist aspects
of structural realism but question the realist’s characterisation of science in terms
v
vi Preface
of aim thesis having to do with “grasping” (in something like the correspondence
sense)theunobservablepartsoftheworld,justasmuchastheobservableparts.
Therehasalsobeensomemergingbetweenthediscussionsofstructureframed
inthecontextofpuremathematicsandthosetakingplaceinthephysicalsciences.
Still more recently, structural realism has been applied within the social sciences.
However, with this expansion of the forms and applications of structural realism
therehaveemergednewchallenges.Ithasreachedthestatusofamaturepositionin
thephilosophyofscience.Buttherearelingeringissuesstemmingfromtheprecise
characterisationofstructure,objects,andrelationsandtheinclusionofcausalityand
modalityinstructuralrealistpositions.
Howdowetalkaboutcausationinapurelystructuralworld?Objectsareusually
viewed as the causes and the generators of change in the world; hence, given the
structural realist’s prioritization of relations over objects it is natural to ask about
how causality fits into structuralism. Does the structural realist’s world have suffi-
cient resources to provide an adequate account of causal relations, or are objects
a necessary condition of an adequate account of causation? What about deeper
modal aspects of the world, as bundled into the concept of a law of Nature? Can
suchnecessitysuperveneonanontologyofpurestructure?Thisbookisaboutthese
intertwinedaspects,onthepreliminarytaskofgettingcleareronjustwhatstructural
realistsmeanbystructure,andhowitrelatestotheobjectsthatarepartofourfolk
ontology.
Thebookisorganizedintothreeparts(thoughwithmuchthematicoverlapping
amongstthem):
• PartIexaminesthevariousframeworks(syntacticversussemantic)for,andthe
variousinterpretations(epistemicversusonticversusmethodological)of,struc-
turalrealism,inadditiontosomeofthestandardmotivationsunderlyingthese.
• PartIIcriticallyexaminesthedifferingframeworks,interpretations,andmotiva-
tionsofstructuralrealismandexaminestheirimpactonwhatscientifictheories
sayaboutthenatureofobjectsandrelations(andviceversa).
• PartIIIprobestheissueofwhatcanbesaidaboutwhatconceptionofobject(if
any)isneededtounderwritetheconceptofacausallyconnected,law-governed
world.
This map corresponds roughly to the themed sessions of a 2007 workshop from
which most of the chapters were drawn. However, in their conversion from talks
to chapters, they have been significantly revised and updated and, we think, offer
a faithful reflection of the current state of the art with respect to the problems and
prospectsofstructuralrealism.
Acknowledgements
Thecontributionstothisvolumegrewoutofaworkshoponstructuralrealismheld
in Banff, Canada, August 28–30, in 2007. We are grateful to the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the International Collaboration on
Complex Interventions, and the University of Calgary for generous financial sup-
port for this workshop. Dean Rickles would like to thank the Australian Research
CouncilforfundingtheAustralianResearchFellowshipunderwhichthisbookwas
completed.
vii

Contents
PartI FrameworksforStructuralRealism
1 ThePresentationofObjectsandtheRepresentationofStructure .... 3
StevenFrench
2 MethodologicalStructuralRealism............................... 29
ElaineM.Landry
3 HowNottoBeaRealist......................................... 59
IoannisVotsis
4 MiraclesandStructuralRealism................................. 77
JohnWorrall
PartII StructuralRealismandtheNatureofObjectsandRelations
5 UnderdeterminationasaPathtoStructuralRealism ............... 99
KatherineBradingandAlexanderSkiles
6 KindsofObjectsandVarietiesofProperties ......................117
AntigoneM.Nounou
7 Time,Observables,andStructure................................135
DeanP.Rickles
PartIII ModalityandCausalityinStructuralRealism
8 OnticStructuralRealismandModality...........................149
NoraBerenstainandJamesLadyman
9 AddingModalitytoOnticStructuralism:AnExploration
andCritique...................................................169
StathisPsillos
ix