Structural Power in the Global Age: Why Modernity is Ending and Globality Prevails

171 Pages·2022·3.174 MB·English

by  Xuewu Gu

Global Power Shift
Xuewu Gu
Structural
Power in the
Global Age
Why Modernity is Ending and
Globality Prevails
Global Power Shift
Series Editor
Xuewu Gu, Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Managing Editor
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn, Bonn,
Germany
Advisory Editors
G. John Ikenberry, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Canrong Jin, Renmin University of Beijing, Beijing, China
Srikanth Kondapalli, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Beate Neuss, Chemnitz University of Technology, Chemnitz, Germany
Carla Norrlof, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
Dingli Shen, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Kazuhiko Togo, Kyoto Sanyo University, Tokyo, Japan
Roberto Zoboli, Catholic University of Milan, Milano, Italy
Ample empirical evidence points to recent power shifts in multiple areas of
international relations taking place between industrialized countries and emerging
powers, as well as between states and non-state actors. However, there is a dearth
of theoretical interpretation and synthesis of these findings, and a growing need for
coherent approaches to understand and measure the transformation. The central
issues to be addressed include theoretical questions and empirical puzzles: How can
studies of global power shift and the rise of ‘emerging powers’ benefit from existing
theories, and which alternative aspects and theoretical approaches might be
suitable? How can the meanings, perceptions, dynamics, and consequences of
global power shift be determined and assessed? This edited series will include
highly innovative research on these topics. It aims to bring together scholars from
all major world regions as well as different disciplines, including political science,
economics and human geography. The overall aim is to discuss and possibly blend
their different approaches and provide new frameworks for understanding global
affairs and the governance of global power shifts.
All titles in this series are peer-reviewed.
This book series is indexed in Scopus.
Xuewu Gu
Structural Power
in the Global Age
Why Modernity is Ending and Globality
Prevails
Xuewu Gu
Center for Global Studies
University of Bonn
Bonn, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany
ISSN 2198-7343 ISSN 2198-7351 (electronic)
Global Power Shift
ISBN 978-3-031-15466-9 ISBN 978-3-031-15467-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15467-6
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Preface: Modernity, Globality, and Structural
Power
The purpose of this book is to provide a globality-oriented and structural power-
founded perspective of human life and international relations in the “Global Age.”
In the style of Martin Albrow,1 I argue that the Global Age is rapidly supplanting
the Modern Age. Things that are taking place in the twenty-first century cannot
any longer be efficiently described, understood, and explained with the concept of
modernity, which originated more than 500 years ago when Spain was postulated as
the first “modern state” of the world in 1492.2
This is particularly true when it comes, for example, to grasp the logic of the enor-
mous transformative impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on global economics;
the high degree of compatibility of “Global Navigation Satellite Systems” of the
United States, China, Russia, and the EU; the global race for 5G, or the devastating
failure of NATO troops in Afghanistan. The reason is simple: The Global Age is, as
distinct from the Modern Age, coined by globality of things with “its own shape and
key characteristics.” “Seeking to fit global phenomena into the frame of modernity
only compounds the sense of dissonance and fragmentation”, 3 as Albrow anticipated
almost thirty years ago.
However, the inability of modernity to precisely reflect human life in the
Global Age is not mainly attributed to its ignorance of the “dichotomy ratio-
nality/irrationality” or its character as “a time reference” that “highlights innovation
and obsolescence, shifts and rejects the useless old, applauds purpose and control
and hence expansion”,4 as Albrow has assumed. Rather, it has largely to do with the
ethnocentric character that is inherent in the concept of modernity from birth on. In
the proper meaning of the word, the figure of modernity belongs to categories of
thought of cultural exceptionalism. Indeed, the concept of modernity was a product
of Eurocentrism. Like all ethnocentric products, be it American exceptionalism,
1 Albrow, Martin: The Global Age. State and Society beyond Modernity, Stanford 1996.
2 Dussel, Enrique: Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism, in: Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1,
No. 3, 2000, p. 470, accessed on January 10, 2022.
3 Albrow: The Global Age, p. 119.
4 Ibid., p. 25, p. 83.
v
vi Preface:Modernity,Globality,andStructuralPower
orientalism, or the Chinese concept of “Tianxia,” Eurocentrism has proven, refer-
ring to Enrique Dussel’s critique on it, “provincial and regional”,5 if not parochial
and narcissistic. Continuing to use such an ethnocentric concept to expound issues
in a globalized world is neither rational (anyway rationality is said to be the basic
principle of modernity) nor factually founded.
Global Age calls for Global Thought. Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic has virtual-
ized and is still virtualizing how authentically we are situating in an “epochal shift”
with huge uncertainty about whether and to what extent the “modernity” reached
by industrialization, urbanization, and democratization could survive. Possibly, the
war of Russia on Ukraine and its geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences could
accelerate the shift from the Modern Age to the Global Age. Those who predicate,
however, that the war could generate “The End of Globalization”6 should pay more
attention to the fact that it is the intrinsic nature of capitalism to expand globally,
driven by its congenital impetus to accumulate profits endlessly. As long as countries,
especially the leading nations in the world including China with its state-steered capi-
talism, refuse to return to a socialistic planning economy or to agricultural autarky
leading to a massive loss of wealth and security, they have no choice but to stick to
capitalism.
Globality is, however, the DNA of capitalism. A high degree of globality of capital
is the root of the prosperity of human life at the present. Even though processes of
globalization generating globality of things may weaken or suffer from interruptions
by political conflicts on and off, global dimensions of our life already reached by
the global penetration of capitalism, accelerated and reinforced by digital revolution,
and telecommunication innovations will remain persistent.
Globality is both a condition reference and a thought category. In terms of state
or condition of things, globality always manifests itself typically in reference to
space. It can only be defined with reference to a geographic space, constituting
its defining and distinguishing characteristic. As such, it refers to the geographical
“reach” of an ideational, material, or institutional element of worldly human existence
or co-existence across the globe. This understanding allows us to address the Glob-
ality of “Things” meaning everything has a certain degree of globality, low or high,
depending on its spatial reach on earth. Accordingly, a large spectrum and diversity
of terms can be applied depending on the object of analytical inquiry: for example,
globality of democracy, globality of beer, globality of 5G technologies, globality of
computers, globality of the German language, globality of Chinese cuisine, glob-
ality of fresco painting, or globality of Bauhaus architecture. Because any expansion
process can be accelerated or throttled by human activities, the degree of globality
can be shaped and managed by human action.
In terms of thought, globality presents itself as an interpreting concept, a narra-
tive, and an analytical approach to address issues with a global-epochal range. As
5 Dussel: Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism, p. 469.
6 Posen, Adam S.: The End of Globalization? What Russia’s War in Ukraine Means for the World
Economy, in: Foreign Affairs, March 17, 2022, accessed on March 20, 2022, at: https://www.for
eignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-03-17/end-globalization.
Preface:Modernity,Globality,andStructuralPower vii
Tilman Mayer pointed out, globality “means a reflective process that conveys how
we can see the world in a new way.”7 What makes it distinct from modernity is its
global-horizontal perspective and spatial-extraverted mentality. These characteristics
contrast strikingly with modernity with its nation-orientated mentality, its attachment
for the past to justify efforts for Fortschritt, and its habitus to gauge non-European
issues by European standards. It is, therefore, hard to envisage that the concept of
modernity could bring with it the power necessary for taming the intellectual chal-
lenges of “The Global Age.” The logic that a new age necessitates a new concept of
thought promises, indeed, the end of modernity both as a narrative and an analytical
approach to address issues with global-epochal range.
Globality, however, does not “happen” out of thin air. In fact, globality is itself the
result of the global implementation of an originally local element. It may constitute
a product, an idea, an institution, or an organization. It is rare that these sorts of
things expand independently or automatically. On the contrary, an idea, product, or
institution, by and large, can only expand and be implemented when it is driven by
a certain force or power.
This book is challenging the academic and societal tendency to view international
power-related phenomena dichotomously between hard and soft power. I assume
that a power source, independent from hard and soft power, does exist. It is invisible,
structure-manipulating, and effectively leveraging. It is this very “third power” that
drives and shapes power phenomena in the “Global Age” more energetically than
hard and soft power, particularly when it comes to the final outcomes of power
competition and the prevailing of political preferences among competing actors.
The presumption waged here adopts the “structural power” term originally
conceptualized by Susan Strange.8 It is, however, derived most fundamentally from
the observation of a particular political phenomenon that appears to eschew explana-
tion by the dichotomy between hard and soft power: the phenomenon of decoupling
between power resources at the disposal of states on the one hand, and their power to
assert themselves at international level on the other. Increasingly states which have
impressive hard power, as well as those with ostensibly sufficient soft power, prove
incapable of asserting their state preferences at international level. Conversely, there
are increasing instances of states with weaker positions in terms of both classic power
forms that manage to either assert their will against seemingly more powerful actors
or undermine the latter’s objectives. The fact that the much weaker Ukraine has been
in the position to pit itself against the superpower Russia provides proof for this kind
of phenomenon.
This book is an attempt to verify the posited hypotheses regarding globality and
structural power by applying them to a set of selected global phenomena particularly
from the domains of geopolitics (Belt & Road Initiative, Afghanistan, Iran conflict,
7 Mayer, Tilman: Humanity, Globality, and Politics, in: Ludger Kühnhardt and Tilman Mayer (eds.):
The Bonn Handbook of Globality, Heidelberg 2019, p. 1409.
8 Strange, Susan: States and Markets, London 1988; Strange, Susan: The Retreat of the State. The
Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge 1996; Strange, Susan: Political Economy
and International Relations, in: Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.): International Relations Theory
Today, Oxford 1997, pp. 154–174.
viii Preface:Modernity,Globality,andStructuralPower
Afghanistan War, competition for a new world order) and technology (Global Navi-
gation Satellite Systems, 5G infrastructure, race for international standards, and ICT
rivalry). Instead of systematically examining each of these subjects as such, it focuses
on extracting theoretical meanings from these cases to demonstrate the logic of glob-
ality and structural power, partly from global-horizontal perspectives, partly through
a structural-vertical lens.
Especially in this last regard, a verification of the hypotheses regarding the exis-
tence of structural power in the Global Age and how it emerges and takes effect bears
far-reaching potential for developing a new theory of power that expands its conven-
tional understanding with a new dimension, underpinned by empirical research.
Consequently, this endeavor could lead to replacing the established dichotomy
between hard and soft power with a trichotomy of hard, soft, and structural power,
which fosters a more differentiated perspective on the phenomenon of power and
facilitates its respective conceptualization in the Global Age.
The resultant epistemic gain may provide for a new ontology of power that not
only expands common explanatory approaches but also could raise societal aware-
ness of the co-constitutive role of relevant structures within a given context for the
actual development of power. Both with regard to political science research and to
the societal applicability, research on structural power dedicated to testing the under-
lying hypothesis for verification or falsification promises a manifold and fruitful
perspective.
The ongoing supplanting of the Modern Age by the Global Age doesn’t mean that
the features characterizing the conditions of modernity would vanish from our lives.
On the contrary, many physical, ideational, and institutional elements constituting
the conditions of modernity will not only remain alive but also continue to thrive.
Running water, electricity, developed road systems, modern schools, universities,
rationality, secularity, sovereignty, social insurance systems, and health care systems
have been the mainstay of the conditions of modernity and will still play a decisive
role in human life in the Global Age. But modernity as a concept of thought is losing
its power to reflect and interpret the globalized world precisely and meaningfully.
In a world where global supply chains, global migration, global financial flows,
global warming dynamics, global satellite navigation, global technological transfer,
and global cyber connectivity dominate human activities, ethnocentric and nation-
concentrated figures like the concept of modernity have no room left. The days for
modernity as an intellectual narrative or postulate are numbered.
In this context, the increasing efforts of forces, especially populist politicians
and cramped security officials in different countries, to de-globalize the world and
to decouple nations, often in the name of national security, are to be seen as the
last attack of the mentality of modernity on globality. Globalization and the spirit of
globality are suffering from reversals not because the logic of capitalism has changed,
but because the forces that have captured the ruling power in national capitals are
those that are not ready to say adieu to the Modern Age and to embrace the Global
Age candidly.
We are witnesses to the war between Russia and the West. In a certain manner, it is
a war between the Modern Age and the Global Age, at least relating to the weapons
Preface:Modernity,Globality,andStructuralPower ix
used by both sides, even the Western countries are not theoretically aware of this fact.
The power of the sanctions exposed by the West on Russia is mostly derived from
globalized structures especially globalized financial structures and globalized supply
chains, while Putin mostly relies on hard power. Indeed, Putin declared the war on
Ukraine with tanks, missiles, and bombers. In contrast to him, the West declared the
war on Russia with structural power in terms of financial and technological leverages.
To put it another way, the war is fought by Russia with weapons of the Modern Age
and by the West with weapons of the Global Age. Alone due to this factor, the West
is on the “right side” of history. In fact, this strategy works. The fight against the
militarily powerful Russia without utilizing NATO troops at the front is becoming a
full-scale victory for the West.
If Napoleon Bonaparte, who recognized the effect of soft power much earlier than
most by saying “the pen is mightier than the sword,” was still alive, he would have
tried to advise Russia’s president to be careful with using his missiles as a sword
against the West. But now, it could be too late for Vladimir Putin to realize “the banks
are more powerful than tanks” in the Global Age. This should serve as a lesson for all
those who fail to understand the tide changes. Modernity is giving way to globality
even though the way is, as Mao Zedong once mused on the “Long March,” “winding,
but promising.”
This book grew out of my teaching and research with my team at the Center for
Global Studies at the University of Bonn over the last ten years. A lot of ideas and
suggestions from my assistants and students are integrated into this book. From the
initial conception of this book to its final manuscript, I have tremendously benefited
from many brainstorming discussions and exchanges with them. Particularly Clara
Dinkelbach, Christiane Heidbrink, Ying Huang, Philip Nock, Hendrik Ohnesorge,
and Andrej Pustovitovskij deserve my special acknowledgment. I can only express
my deepest thanks to them. It is their help that made this book possible. Thanks also
to student assistant Emilia Dette who assisted me in the formatting of the manuscript.
Certainly, I am solely responsible for the text with all its possible deficiencies and
flaws.
Bonn, Germany Xuewu Gu