Table Of ContentSTRATIFICATION IN COGNITION
AND CONSCIOUSNESS
ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH provides a forum for scholars
from different scientific disciplines and fields of knowledge who study conscious-
ness in its multifaceted aspects. Thus the Series will include (but not be limited to)
the various areas of cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, linguistics,
brain science and philosophy. The orientation of the Series is toward developing
new interdisciplinary and integrative approaches for the investigation, description
and theory of consciousness, as well as the practical consequences of this research
for the individual and society.
EDITOR
Maxim I. Stamenov
(Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
EDITORIAL BOARD
David Chalmers (University of Arizona)
Gordon G. Globus (University of California at Irvine)
Ray Jackendoff (Brandeis University)
Christof Koch (California Institute of Technology)
Stephen Kosslyn (Harvard University)
Earl Mac Cormac (Duke University, Durham NC)
George Mandler (University of California at San Diego)
John R. Searle (University of California at Berkeley);
Petra Stoerig (Universität Düsseldorf)
Francisco Varela (C.R.E.A., Ecole Polytechnique, Paris)
Volume 15
Bradford H. Challis and Boris M. Velichkovsky (eds)
Stratification in Cognition and Consciousness
STRATIFICATION IN
COGNITION
AND CONSCIOUSNESS
BRADFORD H. CHALLIS
University of Tsukuba and Organon, Inc.
BORIS M. VELICHKOVSKY
Technical University, Dresden
JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA
TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
8 American National Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48–1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Stratification in cognition and consciousness / edited by Bradford H. Challis, Boris M.
Velichkovsky.
p. cm. -- (Advances in consciousness research, ISSN 1381-589X ; v. 15)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Information processing. 2. Categorization (Psychology) 3. Visual perception. 4. Recollection
(Psychology) 5. Memory. I. Challis. Bradford H. II. Velichkovsky, B.M. (Boris Mitrofanovich) III.
Series.
BF444.S73 1999
153--dc21 99-29157
ISBN 90 272 5135 5 (Eur.) / 1 55619 195 2 (US) (Pb; alk. paper) CIP
© 1999 – John Benjamins B.V.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other
means, without written permission from the publisher.
John Benjamins Publishing Co. • P.O.Box 75577 • 1070 AN Amsterdam • The Netherlands
John Benjamins North America • P.O.Box 27519 • Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 • USA
Table of Contents
Contributors vii
An introduction to stratification, cognition and consciousness 1
BorisM.VelichkovskyandBradfordH.Challis
Part I
Verticaldimensionofvisualprocessing
Seeing and doing: Two selective processing systems in vision 13
A.DavidMilner
1. Vertical modularity in the visual system 19
BruceBridgeman
2. Stages of processing in visual search and attention 43
JamesE.Hoffman
3. Separate memories for visual guidance and explicit awareness:
The roles of time and place 73
SarahH.CreemandDennisR.Proffitt
Part II
Stratificationofmemorytasks
Levels of encoding and retrieval. 97
FergusI.M.Craik
4. Stratification of memory retrieval processes on perceptual tests 105
BradfordH.Challis
5. Memory and awareness: Is memory information stratified into
conscious and unconscious components? 129
WilliamP.Banks,Yung-PinChenandMatthewW.Prull
vi TABLEOFCONTENTS
6. Conscious and automatic uses of memory in cued recall and
recognition 173
DouglasL.Nelson,VanesaM.McKinneyandDavidJ.Bennett
7. From levels of processing to stratification of cognition:
Converging evidence from three domains of research 203
BorisM.Velichkovsky
Part III
Levelsofretrievalexperience
Retrieval experience: A new arena of psychological study 229
HenryL.RoedigerIII
8. Levels of awareness and varieties of experience 237
JohnM.GardinerandMartinA.Conway
9. Assessing the nature of retrieval experience: Advances and
challenges 255
SuparnaRajaram
IndexofSubjects 277
IndexofNames 287
Contributors
William P. Banks Martin A. Conway
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Pomona College University of Bristol
Claremont, CA 91711 Bristol, BS81TN
USA UK
David J. Bennett Fergus I.M. Craik
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Simmons College University of Toronto
Boston, MA 02115 Toronto, Ontario
USA Canada M5S 1A1
Bruce Bridgeman Sarah H. Creem
Department of Psychology Psychology Department
University of California, Santa Cruz University of Virginia
Santa Cruz, CA 95064 Charlottesville, VA 22903
USA USA
Bradford H. Challis John Gardiner
Institute of Psychology Psychology Department
University of Tsukuba City University
Tsukuba, Japan Northampton Square
and London EC1V 0HB
Organon Inc. UK
Clinical Development Department
James E. Hoffman
West Orange, NJ 07052
Department of Psychology
USA
University of Delaware
Yung-Pin Chen Newark, DE 19716
Department of Mathematics USA
Smith College
Northampton, MA701063
USA
viii CONTRIBUTORS
Vanessa M. McKinney Matthew W. Prull
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of South Florida Stanford University
Tampa, FL 33620 Stanford, CA 94305-2130
USA USA
A. David Milner Suparna Rajaram
School of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of St Andrews SUNY at Stony Brook
St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JU Stony Brook, NY 11794-2500
Scotland, UK USA
Douglas Nelson Henry L. Roediger III
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of South Florida Washington University
Tampa, FL 33620 St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
USA USA
Dennis R. Proffitt Boris M.Velichkovsky
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of Virginia Dresden University of Technology
Charlottesville, VA 22903 D-01062 Dresden
USA Germany
An introduction to stratification,
cognition and consciousness
Boris M. Velichkovsky Bradford H. Challis
Do we really need a new word in our psychological vocabulary, like one in the
title of this volume? What do we mean by stratification? Turning to the
dictionary, one finds that stratification refers to a description of some structure
as characterized by a succession of tabular layers or strata, from earth’s crust or
sky to people. As well, one finds that stratification as a research strategy has,
sometimes, an obvious heuristic value. For instance, geologists infer the origin
and age of substances from their relative localization in layers of some
congregation.Insocialsciences,placementofpeopleaccordingtosomecriterion
level,suchaseducationorwealth,isusedtopredictattitudesandbehavior.Now
it is only one step to explain what sense it makes to use this term in hard core
experimental psychology and neurosciences.
As the matter of fact, this understanding fits a number of approaches in
contemporary cognitive research. Quite straightforward, this is the levels of
processingapproachbyCraik&Lockhart (1972)whichpostulatesseveralkinds
of processing that can be ordered along the dimension of “depth” of respective
activities:from“shallow”physicalprocessingto“deep”semantic.Clearly,Craik
and Lockhart emphasize a variation of encoding in their approach. In other
conceptions of memory, the emphasis is rather on a variation of retrieval tasks.
Still,wewouldplaceTulving’s(1985)memorysystemsview(procedural,perceptual,
semantic, episodic) under the same general umbrella. The memory systems have
different characteristics in terms of their cognitive structure and function,
development, and associated brain systems, in keeping with the idea of
stratification. In addition, different states of consciousness (anoetic, noetic,
autonoetic) are associated with different memory systems, again reflecting the
notion of stratification. In this vein, stratification is where Craik and Lockhart
2 BORISM.VELICHKOVSKYANDBRADFORDH.CHALLIS
meetTulvingandSchacter(e.g.,Schacter&Tulving,1994)—asfarasthelasts
speak about hierarchical relationships among subsystems of human memory.
Not only memory is suspected to be stratified in one or another sense (see
Velichkovsky, 1990). Some generic information processing models may be
interpretedinahierarchicalwayastheyoftenpresuppose“bottom-up”and“top-
down” interactions among layers of representation such as features, letters,
words,andconcepts(LaBerge,1995;Posner,1978;Shiffrin&Schneider,1977).
Similar ideas can be found in studies of consciousness and higher-order
cognition,especiallyiftheyareconsideredintheneuropsychologhicalcontextof
frontal lobes functions (Stuss, 1991). On the other end, stratification may be
helpful to elucidate organization of “sensorimotor intelligence”: there is a long
and fruitful tradition of hierarchical explanations with respect to motor control
(Bernstein, 1996) and the notion of stratification has been already used in
connection with action mechanisms (de Jong & Sanders, 1990).
Thus, closer inspection reveals that the notion of stratification plays a role
in various models and theories related to experimental psychology and neuro-
science, although to date, this role has not been well articulated and identified.
Indeed, stratification does not appear to be an integral part of some prominent
paradigms in cognitive research. Two major paradigms easily come to mind.
One is based on the computer metaphor of the 60s. It treats cognitive
architecture as a closed circuit of memory stores, in an analogy with the
relationship of parts of a conventional computer. All parts are necessary for the
fluent functioning of the device, and any history of developmental or
evolutionary stages is hardly conceivable in the case. The only meaningful
context of stratification would be a weak one, in terms of the temporal
successionofinformationprocessing;forinstance,anyinputinformationshould
beregisteredinsome formofsensorystoresbeforeiteventuallyreaches amore
durable internal container. Interestingly, consciousness is not of primary interest
within this paradigm either, perhaps only as a synonym for selective attention,
i.e. as a hypothetical mechanism with limited processing capacity (a view that
creates difficulties and paradoxes in the explanation of even the simplest
phenomena such as masking or stroboscopic motion, see Dennett, 1991).
Thesecondparadigmisthatofmodularityofmindordomainspecificityof
cognitive mechanisms, spelled out as a new manifesto by Fodor (1983) and
others.Doubledissociationsareatthefocusofinterestfortheproponentsofthis
approach and such dissociations have been looked for with vigor awarded by
editors of major journals (see Goldberg, 1995). Processing capacity was itself
partitioning, as for example in the model of Wickens (1984) who postulated
severalparallelsystemswiththeirownindependentcapacities.Inasimilarvein,
