Strategy in the southern oceans : a South American view

84 Pages·8.16 MB·English

by  Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse.

STUDIESllN
CONTEMPORARY
MARITIME POLICY
AND STRATEGY
SERIES
Studies in Contemporary Maritime Policy and Strategy
Strategy in the
Edited by Professor Geoffrey Till, Royal Nav al College, Greenwich
Southern Oceans
Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View
Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse
Soviet Seapower in Northern Waters: Facts, Motivations, Impacts and A South American View
Responses
Edited by John Kristen Skogan and Arne Olav Brundtland
Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse
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Pinter Publishers, London
in association with John Spiers
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© Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, 1989
First published in Great Britain in 1989 by
Pinter Publishers Ltd
in association with John Spiers
25 Floral Street, London WC2E 9DS
All rights reserved. No part of this pu?Iication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any other means
To my husband, Bruce
without the prior permission of the copyright holder. Please
direct all enquiries to the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
I would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to the The John D. and
Catherine T. Foundation of Chicago, Illinois. The individual research and
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
writing grant they awarded me to write on the future of inter-American
ISBN 0-86187-017-4 defence during 1987-8 made this book, which is part of the research,
possible.
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Biddies Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn
Contents
List of maps viii
Preface by Geoffrey Till lX
Introduction Xl
1. South American perceptions and the value of the sea
2. Case Study One: Bolivia's outlet to the Pacific Ocean 11
Loss of the Bolivian littoral 11
Renewal of claims for a Pacific outlet: 1910-76 16
Bolivia and the development of the Pacific issue: 1977-87 23
The determination of national interests and the Bolivian
claim 29
Foreign and defence policies of Bolivia's neighbours
Peru, Chile, Argentina and Brazil 32
Global implications of the Bolivian issue 52
Conclusion: the Pacific outlet for Bolivia and the strategic
value of the eastern South Pacific. 64
3. Case Study Two: Argentina and Brazil in the western
South Atlantic 71
General overview 71
Traditional postures of Argentina and Brazil relating to
the western South Atlantic 79
Crisis and war in the western South Atlantic 94
Changes in the perceived value of the western South
Atlantic after the Falkland/Malvinas War of 1982 104
Conclusion: perceived strategic value of the western
South Atlantic 124
4. Conclusion. South America and the sea: A view from the south 135
Bibliography 147
Index 151
Maps Series Editor's Prefa ce
This book is the first in the Studies in Contemporary Maritime Policy and
1. Limits to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Strategy series. The series as a whole will be addressing the maritime
(IATRA) 2
dimension of international security and takes as a departure point the very
2. Bolivia's borders before the 1879 War 13
close inter-relationship to be found between events at sea and events on
3. Results of the Pacific War of 1879 16
land.
4. Pacific coastline: southern Peru to northern Chile 18
What goes on at sea is always a reflection of what goes on at land.
5. Bolivia (with railroads to the coast) 20
Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse shows us the many connections there are
6. Geopolitical projections of Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Brazil and
between the domestic, political and economic circumstances of the countries
Argentina 33
of South America, their security conceptions and their attitudes towards the
7. Chile's Pacific aperture 39
sea. It strongly influences the positions they take on access to the sea and
8. The 'Chilean sea' 41
jurisdiction over it. For this reason the coastal parts of the South American
9. Brazilian traditional geopolitical projections 46
landmass and the islands to be found in southern waters have been .a focus
10. Golbery's geopolitical division of South America 48
of international conflict, a conflict moreover that has not necessarily been
11. Latin America's potential conflict situations 53
restricted to local powers. This is a particular example but it shows that a
12. The South Atlantic area 73
concentration on maritime affairs offers scholars and statesmen a new
13. Treaties that affect the South Atlantic 75
dimension and approach to international affairs, by the analysis of which
14. The Brazilian 'frontage' theory of Antarctic sectors 82
they can hope to understand the whole field of international politics.
15. The 'Argentine sea' and the Argentine Antarctic claims 85
Traditional maritime theorists of course have tended to reverse the
16. Antarctic claims of Argentine, Chile and the United Kingdom 87
relationship, stressing instead the impact that events at sea have had on
17. The Beagle Channel islands 89
events on land. It is certainly true that maritime developments have a
18. Argentina perceptions of Chile's goals in the South Atlantic 91
profound effect upon the politics, both domestic and international, the
19. Possible mineral deposits in the South Atlantic 120
economy and the security of virtually all the countries of the world, directly
20. The oil route 121
or indirectly. So far, though, most academic analysis of this effect has
21. Fishing in the South Atlantic 122
tended to concentrate upon how this applies to a handful of the world's
22. Relative strategic value of the western South Atlantic 126
leading maritime powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union,
23. Relative strategic value of the western South Atlantic 'diamond' 130
Britain, France and so on. Leaving aside treatments of French and British
maritime policy, however, it is surprising to see the extent to which the
perspectives of even the other Europeans on maritime matters have
generally been neglected by scholars.
Still more does this apply to the majority of seas which in fact lie outside
the main area of East-West confrontation. As Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse
remarks in her book, this is certainly true of the world's southern waters,
which until very recently have remained an area of growing economic and
international importance but have not yet become a significant area of
academic analysis. It is one of the main aims of this series to rectify this state
of affairs by encouraging scholars to address maritime affairs in what
Europeans, Americans and Russians might regard as the rest of the world.
The rationale for this is that partly because of the growing economic
X STRATEGY JN THE SOUTHERN OCEANS
importance of ocean resources and oceanic shipping and perhaps p~rtly
because of the effects of dwindling bipolarism in political and military
Introduction
behaviour, such waters will certainly attract more attention in the future
than they have for some time. For evidence of this, we need look no further
than the dramatic growth in the international importance of the convoluted
affairs of the Gulf or the remarkable expansion in the size and potential of
some Third World navies.
At the same time, though, it would be foolish to deny that traditional Much has been written on Latin America as a subsystem of the international
East-West security concerns remain, even in the improved international community, and yet most references to the region seem to concentrate on
climate of recent times. Indeed the maritime consequences of such an the area of the Caribbean and Central America, leaving South American
improvement are in themselves a particularly important area for further issues largely untouched. The 1982 Anglo-Argentine War was an exception
thought. Maritime arms control and the future relationship between na~al in that it attracted the attention of world public opinion to this region for a
programmes and budgetary constraints are emerging as some of the topics limited time.
of the 1990s that will surely supplement earlier, if continuing, concerns By and large, at the end of the 1980s the attention awarded to South
about the maritime policies of the world's main sea powers. The series will of America seems to be limited to the analysis of problems such as those of
course seek to address these issues too. external debt, the transition to and the maintenance of democracy and
Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, an Argentine scholar by birth but one very issues relating to drug-trafficking between this region and the rest of the
familiar with European and American perspectives on her subject, is international community.
uniquely well-qualified to cover the subject and to launch the series. Like all South America has traditionally been regarded as an area remote from
authors in the series, of course, she alone is responsible for the contents of world concerns and isolated from the principal crisis scenarios in the East
West struggle of the post-Second World War years. For decades, the only
her book.
references to this region were made in the context of its domestic policies,
US hemispheric influence and concerns, insurgencies, social and economic
Professor Geoffrey Till,
Royal Naval College, Greenwich, disorder and, more recently, its role in international drug-trafficking. It
follows that few serious researches have been undertaken in issues different
London
from the above. One such area of academic neglect is that of international
security issues relating to South America (both within the region and
between the region and the rest of the world).
The 1982 South Atlantic War riveted world public opinion to this issue
and there was much discussion at the time on strategic considerations and
values that could change the perceptions relating to the South Atlantic, sub
Antarctic and Antarctic regions. Suddenly, the world at large was interested
in South American power projections, levels of development and the
·intrinsic value of this remote part of the world. Clearly, an international
need emerged at the time to understand the essence of decision-making in
South American governments so as to determine national interests and the
potentiality of conflict that those interests indicate.
When examined at this level, South America seems to present two areas
of interest to the community at large: those problems that can destabilize the
societies in the region per se - be they related to the restoring and
maintaining of democracy or to the potential regional crises that might lead
to confrontation between the countries in question - and those problems
that could impinge on the interests and movements of extra-regional powers
and/ or organizations actively or passively present in South America.
Not surprisingly, the second area of interest seems to have a strong
Xll STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN OCEANS INTRODUCTION Xlll
maritime component and reflects, at first glance, a high potential for unheard-of cooperation, serving as a model for wider integration within
international conflict based on questions that either refer to the sea or are South America.
based on the sea. This book is an attempt to deal with some of the Whatever the result - conflict or cooperation in the maritime spaces
perceptions and values that South American countries award to the sea. surrounding South America - the strategic value of the eastern South
To find these values, I shall analyse the future local, regional and Pacific and the western South Atlantic will suffer changes and will need to
international implications of two issues that have strong maritime compo be revalued. Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View
nents on the eastern South Pacific and the western South Atlantic littorals. hopes to contribute to this process.
On the Pacific coast of South America, I shall deal with the potential
conflict present in the Bolivian endeavour to obtain a Pacific Ocean outlet,
and on the Atlantic coast of South America, with the problems emerging
from the situation of the western South Atlantic that affect local actors,
particularly Brazil and Argentina. Here special reference will be made to the
situation generated by the dispute over the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands and
its dependencies, and how this could change the strategic value of the South
Atlantic and the sub-Antarctic regions.
Both issues mentioned above are similar. They are both complex and
unresolved, the result of violent territorial disputes since the early years of
independence in South America. They comprise areas of considerable
natural resources, either actual or potential, and demonstrate the complex
nature of South American geopolitics. Related issues that impinge on the
evolution of both issues include the political stability of the countries
involved; the process by means of which the countries determine their
national interests; the perceived threats to their national securities; the
regional socio-economic evolution; and changes in the value of the sea and
in jurisdiction applied to the sea.
In the analysis of these two cases, this book hopes not only to throw light
on the strategic value attached by the South American countries to their
surrounding oceans, but, perhaps more importantly, to demonstrate that
South America is undergoing a process of gradual but dramatic change in
its pattern of behaviour vis-a-vis the international community, and that the
sea is a vital piece in this scenario.
Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View is, then, a
book about changes. It attempts to demonstrate a new-found tendency in
South America to straddle between traditional views governing the relation
ships between littoral countries and the maritime spaces facing them, on the
one hand, and the new need to use the sea as a vehicle to further, not
constrain, interactions between the subregion and the world, on the other.
The traditional pattern of behaviour of South American states (as exem
plified in their geopolitics) allows for speculation relating to the possible
projection of these two cases. In this light, both seem to head to inevitable
conflict in future. But, on the other hand, there also is a new-found need in
South America to bridge the gap that isolates the region from the rest of the
world and that propitiates the beginning of integration and cooperation
arrangements among countries that have been historic competitors. In this
sense, the analysis of both cases might not fuel conflict but instead lead to an
r_-·,· •
'
I:, 1;.'
1 South American perceptions and the
value of the sea
It is interesting to note how low a priority has been traditionally awarded by .
security analysts to the South American subsystem. A particular example is
provided by almost al\ literature on the value of the South Atlantic and
South Pacific areas. When these are mentioned, and they were referred to
only rarely before 1975, the general gist of the theories always refers to the
area outside the area marked by Article 4 of the Rio Treaty. The South
Atlantic, in a universal appreciation, has a limited strategic value, and what
there is being thought to lie in the area nearest the African coast. The South
Pacific also is seen as important in the area nearest to the Southeast Asian
coast.
This underestimation of the importance of southern waters is equally true
when referring to the territorial value of South America as such. The
implications of political and/ or economic changes in South America are
undervalued in most world studies of defence, foreign policy and strategic
studies.
It can be said that this great asymmetry in values and knowledge has led
to serious mistakes in perception. At this point a need arises to understand
the logic behind the determination of national interests in South America on
a global basis before we focus on the strategic value that South American
nations place on the surrounding seas.
Just as world strategic considerations and balance-of-power equations
provide the superpowers with an enlarged concept of what their national
interests should be, the history and geography of South America have
formed the foreign and defence policies of the region.
Large territories, low populations, undetermined national boundaries,
difficult terrains and a Spanish colonial tradition combine to constitute the
core of the problem in South America. This picture is further confused by
external and hegemonic influences on the region and by the teaming up of
outlawed groups such as international drug-traffickers and guerrilla move
ments. External influences at its simplest divide South America into two
political areas: (1) the Andean and Amazon basin countries which come
under US influence and follow the US lead traditionally; and (2) the
southern cone countries which pursue a policy of pragmatic independence
of the United States, although they still fall under its general influence.
This area division in South America can be said to develop from Latin
America's international value vis-a-vis the rest of the world. This value is
perceived as constantly changing: during and after the Second World War,
for example, South America was commonly regarded as a valuable wartime
2 STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN OCEANS THE VALUE OF SOUTHERN WATERS 3
reserve of foodstuffs and raw materials for the United States and its allies.
New technologies have eliminated these geographical considerations, and
since South America is remote from nuclear war scenarios, it is today
relatively unimportant as a strategic objective for major foreign powers. An
example of this is shown in the reports related to the region, such as the
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London which, in the 1988
Strategic Survey Report, only noted three priorities for South America:
debt, drugs and democracy; and for Central America the peace-keeping
process.
That is why, in evaluating the strategic importance of the area, the US
government makes a distinction between two kinds of Latin American
countries. Successive US administrations have generally recognized that the
most important area of US concern is the Caribbean, and that term is
intended to include Colombia and Venezuela, as well as Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean islands. In a strategic sense, the Americans tend
to believe that the boundary between North and South America is the
OCEAN Amazon basin.
PACIFICO The southern cone of South America is therefore of only peripheral
NORTE
interest to the United States, apart from its traditionally having been under
US hemispheric dominance. During the 1970s the strategic value of South
America was determined less by Cold War perspectives than by energy
crises and economic considerations. Oil and mineral resources in the Andes,
the up.per Amazon basin and the southernmost tip of the continent, mostly
in Patagonia and the Magellan Strait as well as on the South Atlantic
continental shelf, brought about renewed interest in the area. Politically, the
area's relationship to the drug market and the potential for external
conflicts such as the Falklands War have exacerbated this interest.
OCEANO It is interesting to note the pattern that external influences have had in
PACIFICO South America over the past fifty years: the Second World War and its
DEL SUR
aftermath had a major effect on the fortunes of many foreign powers involved
in the area. This was particularly true for the Allies and the Axis countries,
whose positions of dominance were gained during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries when they moved into Latin America to fill the power
vacuum left by the Spaniards. After 1945, Great Britain, France and
Germany suffered major setbacks; the major beneficiary of this situation was
the United States, whose presence dramatically increased in the subcontinent.
However, the upsurge in US economic, military and political presence in
Map 1. Limits to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IA TRA)
[otherwise called the Rio Treaty] signed in 1947 between the United States and a Latin America after the Second World War did not last long. During the
limited number of Latin American countries. Source: F.M. Milia et al., La 1970s and under a US policy of benign neglect, the US share of the Latin
Atlantartida: Un espacio geopolitico (Buenos Aires: 1978). American market decreased steadily as Germany, Italy and Japan recovered
some of their economic influence. The US economic and military aid
programme stabilized the trade decline during the 1960s but frequent
tutelary and managerial interventions by US administrations sometimes
counteracted the benefits that the United States derived from its efforts to
buy influence in the area.
4 STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN OCEANS THE VALUE OF SOUTHERN WATERS 5
These interventions increased the opportunities for such non-hemispheric influence. One manifestation of these new features in the foreign policies of
powers as the USSR and several European countries to embark on South American countries was a renewed interest in international fora such
economic and political offensives in both overt and covert ways. These new as the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS).
trade relationships encouraged Latin American countries to risk alienating Another result of these policies was a more concrete interest in the
the United States, while new ideologies were received with enthusiasm. possibilities that the effective control and exploitation of the seas could
A good example of what happened is provided by the record of US arms provide in their uncertain future development.
sales to South America. Before 1967 the United States was the dominant The United Nations and the subregional organization of the OAS,
supplier, but in that year Congress imposed restrictions on the export of became not only important world fora for South American governments
arms to South America, which led some countries to change their arms but also as arenas where they could experience the political impact of Third
buying patterns. The main beneficiaries of this new pattern of trade were World countries. In an atmosphere in which exaggerated national expec
Britain, France and the Soviet Union. In part, the US policy of withdrawing tations were mixed with desperate economic conditions, South American
aid and military assistance resulted from a renewed cycle of military coups countries noted that among countries on comparable levels, those that
in South America. The usual US reaction to this sort of government was adopted a neutral position often enjoyed greater international prestige than
influenced by an overall belief that coup governments (especially Left those which committed themselves to a superpower.
leaning ones) would face international isolation and that this isolation This situation reinforced the desire of many South American countries to
probably would interrupt vital economic aid to impoverished countries pursue economic diversification and independence, and encouraged smaller
wholly dependent on US sales patterns. But the isolation theory failed to countries to seek. active participation in the non-aligned movement in an
take into account regional trends then prevalent in southern cone countries effort to gain increased prestige in the international arena. The regional
and others of the Andean region. Isolation techniques applied against Chile, forum of the OAS however was often seen as serving principally the
and to a lesser extent against Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and interests of the United States.
Bolivia, were ultimately not successful because they led to a further The same principle affected those countries that had significant coastlines
deterioration of effective communication between these countries and the or which were so hampered by the deprivation of an ocean outlet that they
United States. To some extent countries like Brazil and Argentina, by became obsessed with such an issue. Traditional rivalry and competition
· participating in US aid programmes, engaged in a dialogue with the US over territorial issues became extended to include the sea. Thus South
government. These dialogues - always somewhat conflictive - were American geopolitics increasingly began to focus on the maritime compo
significantly affected by the termination of the aid relationship. nent of their national interests and sovereignty.
The withdrawal of US military assistance had similar consequences. The The appeal of diversification and independence that enjoyed popularity
United States traditionally enjoyed a dominant position in military sales to during the late 1960s and 1970s was short-lived. South American countries
most Latin American countries, but the 1967 congressional restrictions on realized that they had expected much more in the way of economic
military credit assistance and the US reluctance to sell sophisticated assistance and trade than they were in fact receiving. They were, and still are
weapons to Latin America led to a complete reversal of Latin American in principle, interested in maintaining good relations with both East and
buying patterns. In the late 1960s indignant South American republics West, but now the South American countries were much more cautious in
began buying arms from Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, West their dealings ,with the USSR, China, Japan and the European countries.
Germany, Spain, Israel and the USSR. The decline in US military sales, Today, South American states also seek increased economic relations
training assistance and military mission personnel, together with an increase with the United States, although it remains true that any US move to
in European military contacts with the regional military establishment, provide less economic and military assistance, or to react in a hostile way to
made the deterioration in US relations with South America even more South American actions - as evidenced in the South Atlantic War -
significant than the loss of credit sales. The situation was further aggravated inevitably exacerbates relations between these countries and the United
by the emphasis of the Carter administration on human rights issues during States and encourages increased penetration by non-hemispheric powers
the 1970s when communication was almost disrupted. and regional instability, as can be seen in Central America and the
The loss of communication with the United States and the ensuing return Caribbean in the 1980s. Penetration by non-hemispheric powers in Latin
of non-hemispheric powers' influence in South America also facilitated America, much increased since 1969, is evident in the economic sphere
increased South American interest in commercial, financial and political where crucial investmen,ts in important sectors of the economy are domi
diversification. These countries became more interested in operating in an nated by one or more outside investors. This penetration is also evident in
international arena and demonstrating their independence from US the military establishment of a number of countries. These rely on outside