Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon

257 Pages·2012·1.57 MB·English

by  Toshi Yoshihara

Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age
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STRATEGY IN THE
SECOND NUCLEAR AGE
Power, Ambition,
and the Ultimate Weapon
TOSHI YOSHIHARA
and
JAMES R. HOLMES
Editors
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS
WASHINGTON, DC
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(cid:2)2012GeorgetownUniversityPress.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmay
bereproducedorutilizedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,
includingphotocopyingandrecording,orbyanyinformationstorageandretrieval
system,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher.
libraryofcongresscataloging-in-publicationdata
Strategyinthesecondnuclearage:power,ambition,andtheultimateweapon/
ToshiYoshiharaandJamesR.Holmes,editors.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-1-58901-928-7(pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Nuclearwarfare. 2.Nuclearweapons—Governmentpolicy. 3.Strategic
forces. 4.Security,International. I.Yoshihara,Toshi. II.Holmes,JamesR.,
1965–
U263.S773 2012
355.02(cid:2)17—dc23
2012001503
(cid:3)(cid:3) Thisbookisprintedonacid-freepapermeetingtherequirementsoftheAmerican
NationalStandardforPermanenceinPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials.
15 14 13 12 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Firstprinting
TheviewsvoicedinthisvolumedonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheUS
governmentoranyotherinstitutionwithwhichtheauthorsareaffiliated.
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CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
ToshiYoshiharaandJamesR.Holmes
2 AfterProliferation:DeterrenceTheoryandEmerging
NuclearPowers 17
JoshuaRovner
3 SouthAfrica’sNuclearStrategy:Deterring‘‘TotalOnslaught’’
and‘‘NuclearBlackmail’’inThreeStages 37
HelenE.PurkittandStephenF.Burgess
4 TheFutureofChineseNuclearPolicyandStrategy 53
ChristopherT.Yeaw,AndrewS.Erickson,and
MichaelS.Chase
5 NorthKorea’sNuclearWeaponsProgram:Motivations,
Strategy,andDoctrine 81
TerenceRoehrig
6 ChangingPerceptionsofExtendedDeterrenceinJapan 99
JamesL.Schoff
7 ThinkingabouttheUnthinkable:Tokyo’sNuclearOption 115
JamesR.HolmesandToshiYoshihara
8 TheInfluenceofBureaucraticPoliticsonIndia’s
NuclearStrategy 133
AnupamSrivastavaandSeemaGahlaut
9 TheFutureofIndia’sUnderseaNuclearDeterrent 161
AndrewC.Winner
– v –
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vi CONTENTS
10 Pakistan’sNuclearPosture:ThinkingabouttheUnthinkable? 181
TimothyD.Hoyt
11 RegimeType,NuclearReversals,andNuclearStrategy:
TheAmbiguousCaseofIran 201
ScottA.JonesandJamesR.Holmes
12 Conclusion:ThinkingaboutStrategyintheSecond
NuclearAge 225
ToshiYoshiharaandJamesR.Holmes
Contributors 241
Index 245
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
ToshiYoshiharaandJamesR.Holmes
T
HISISABOOKABOUTSTRATEGYinitsbroadestsense.Twocenturiesago,thePrussian
generalandmilitarytheoristCarlvonClausewitzcraftedaworkmanlikeyetseminal
‘‘general concept of strategy,’’ which he defined as ‘‘the use of an engagement for
thepurposeofthewar.’’Thisisstrategyforthebattlefieldcommander.Clausewitz
scopesoutfromthisnarrowcastvisionofbattleasacompact,self-containedevent
that advances political aims. Yet strategy also involves coordinating engagements,
‘‘eachofthemwiththeothersinordertofurthertheobjectofthewar.’’1Incurrent
USmilitaryparlance,theresponsibilityforrelatingoneengagementtothenextfor
political purposes is the province of ‘‘operational,’’ theater-level commanders. But
by consciously limiting his field of view to the ‘‘conduct of war,’’ Clausewitz
excludesarangeofcriticalendeavorsfromhistreatise.Hetermsthese‘‘preparations
for war’’—namely, the processes of raising, training, equipping, moving, and sus-
tainingarmedforces.2Heacknowledgestheirexistence,thensetsthemaside.
Yetprewarpreparationscovermuchcrucialground.PeterParet,aleadingcom-
mentator on Clausewitz, takes note of his ‘‘defiantly simplistic’’ formulation and
pointsoutthatit‘‘canbeamendedorexpandedwithoutdifficulty’’toincludefunc-
tionsnotstrictlyrelatedtothebattlefield.ForParet‘‘strategyisalsobasedon,and
may include, the development, intellectual mastery, and utilization of all of the
state’s resources for the purpose of implementing its policy in war.’’3 In a similar
vein,MichaelHoward,anotherleadingClausewitzscholar(havingcotranslatedOn
War with Paret), widens the concept of strategy. Howard notes that owing to
Clausewitz’s far-reaching influence, ‘‘throughout the nineteenth century, ‘strategy’
becamegenerallyequatedinthe publicmindwithoperationalstrategy’’(emphasis
intheoriginal).4Conflatingstrategywithoperationsrepresentsagraveoversight,in
Howard’sjudgment.
Accentuatingstrategy’soperationaldimensiontotheexclusionofallotherslike-
wise slights its critical logistical, technological, and social dimensions—and thus
impoverishes both scholars’ and practitioners’ understanding of strategy. Howard
observesthattheseotherdimensionsassumenewimportancewhenoperationalart-
istryfailsoneormoreofthebelligerents.Indeed,itiscommonplaceforextraneous-
seemingfactorstodecidetheoutcomeofatrialofarms.Hepointsoutthatduring
theAmericanCivilWar,theskillanddaringofRobertE.Leecouldnotyieldvictory
– 1 –
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2 TOSHI YOSHIHARA AND JAMES R. HOLMES
fortheConfederacyaslongasequalresolveanimatedbothUnionandConfederate
leadersand citizens.It wasthe socialand logisticaldimensions thatallowed Presi-
dentAbrahamLincolntorallyapopulacethatmighthavedespairedatearlybattle-
field reverses and to amass crushing material superiority in the field. Howard
concludesthat‘‘allotherfactorsbeingequal,numbers ultimatelyproveddecisive’’
in the Civil War, and thus enabled the North to overcome the South’s impressive
featsofarms(emphasisintheoriginal).5
Strategy,then, involvesfar morethan battlesand engagements.Thisis especially
trueofnuclearstrategy,whichispremisedonfieldinghigh-technologyenginesofwar
in peacetime to conduct wartime operations that no one wants to conduct. In this
spirit,thepresentvolumestraddlesParet’sandHoward’sintersectionbetweenprepa-
rationsforandtheconductofwar.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,wedefine‘‘strategy’’
as‘‘thepoliticalandmilitaryuseornonuseofdisruptivenucleartechnology.’’Wedo
sobecausethenonuseofdoomsdayweaponryhasbeenthegoalofnuclearstrategy
sincethedawnoftheatomicage.Wecontend,nevertheless,thatthestatesexamined
inthechaptersthatfollowseevalueintheuseofnuclearweaponsforbothdeterrence
andcombat.Althoughtheemphasisvariesfromchaptertochapter,allthecontribu-
torspayspecialheedtothelogistical,technological,andsocialdimensionsofstrategy
alongsidethespecificsofforcestructureandoperations.
Ifstrategyisthethemeofthisvolume,rationalityandinteractionemergeastwo
metathemes. We define rationality broadly as the intellectual and policymaking
processwherebyleadersrelatemilitarymeanstopoliticalendsthroughthemedium
ofstrategy.InClausewitzianterms,theyestimatethevalueofthepoliticalgoalsat
stake.Doingsoletsthem‘‘discover’’howmanylivesandhowmuchnationaltrea-
sure theymust expend toattain thesegoals, and forhow long. Themore pressing
thegoals, thegreaterthe‘‘magnitude’’ and‘‘duration’’of the efforta nationmust
maketoachievethem.6
Rationalityisafragilething,subjecttocountlessinterveningfactors.Inalllikeli-
hoodcompetitorswillassigndifferentvaluestotheirnationalinterestsandpolitical
stakes.Inleaders’eyes,highstakesmaywarrantextremelyriskypoliciesandstrate-
gies.Relativelymeagerstakesmayleaveevenapreponderantlypowerfulstateata
disadvantage in terms of political resolve. Moral factors are also at work. What
reasonablepeopleconsiderbeyondthepaleinpeacetime,theymayseeasthinkable
ifnotpraiseworthyduringcrises,whenoptionsnarrow,thestrainondecisionmak-
ersisintense,andtimegrowsshort.Ortherearelimitsontheaccuracyofhuman
perceptions. Flawed yet deeply held assumptions deriving from history, tradition,
andprevailingcircumstancesmaybehardtomodifyorundounderextremestress.
Indeed,suchstrategicaxiomsmaybecomeevenmoreentrenchedinleaders’minds
in times of crisis and war. They provide an intellectual reserve to tap when events
ruleoutcarefuldeliberation.
Interactionpitsmultiplerationalyetimperfectactorsagainstoneanother.Stabil-
ityandpredictabilityarerarewhentwoormore‘‘livingforces’’wrestlefortactical
and strategic advantage.7 Asymmetries between capabilities tend to release the
brakeson restraint.Contests betweenthe veryweakand the verystrong canprod
oneorbothsidestocontemplatenuclearandnonnuclearescalation.Evenbetween
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INTRODUCTION 3
powers with evenly matched nuclear capabilities, differences in conventional mili-
tarypowercanskewtherationalcalculus.Inshort,dexteritywillbeatapremium.
Classic nuclear strategists have wrestled with these questions. Lawrence Freed-
man, for instance, observed that it became plain in the 1950s that ‘‘the sole long-
termroleofnuclearweaponswastodetertheirusebytheenemy.’’Thus‘‘thestory
ofthedecadesofnuclearstrategy...isofagradualreturntothesimpleviewthat,
inconditionsofnuclearstalemate,arsenalsofthesetremendouslypowerfulweapons
tendtocanceleachotherout.’’8ThomasSchellingpostulatedaninternational‘‘tra-
dition’’for thenonuseof nuclearweapons, namely,‘‘ajointly recognizedexpecta-
tionthattheymaynotbeusedinspiteofdeclarationsofreadinesstousethem,even
inspiteoftacticaladvantagesintheiruse.’’9Suchfactorspresumablyreinforcestable
deterrence.
However,ColinGraywarnedthattherewere‘‘distinctiveUSandSovietnational
stylesinnuclearstrategy’’andthatthesewaysofwar‘‘mayinteractinactualarmed
conflictwithfatalconsequencesfortheUnitedStates.’’10Strategiccultureplayedits
partinnuclearstrategyandinteractions.AnddespiteSchelling’sappealtointerna-
tionalmoresdiscouragingtheuseofnuclearweapons,BernardBrodiebewailed‘‘the
lossofthedefensivefunctionasaninherentcapabilityofourmajoroffensiveforces’’
(emphasis in the original). The US Strategic Air Command, for instance, did ‘‘not
becomeashieldifdeterrencefails.’’Thesuccessofnuclearstrategythusdepended
on‘‘ourhavingtheinitiative’’and‘‘onourhittingfirst.’’11
Even in a stable bipolar system, then, powerful incentives work against pure
rationalitywhileamplifyingtheescalatorydynamicsintrinsictocompetitiveinterac-
tion. Patrick Morgan worries about the uneven, constantly shifting character of
deterrence:‘‘Whilecertainabstractelementsofdeterrencehavesomethingofauni-
versalcharacter,thedegreeandnatureofitschallengesandimplementationareso
uneven and varied, the operational conceptions of deterrence and the specifics of
bothchallengeandresponsearesoelaborate,thatitisinevitablylodgedinthevary-
ing national and political character of conflicts, shaped by the social and cultural
detail of the motivations, perceptions, and analyses that drive challenges and
responses.’’12
Morgan’scautionarywordstakeonaddedcogencyasnewnuclearactorsenter
the arena, which compounds the dilemmas that have vexed the likes of Schelling,
Freedman,Brodie,andGray.Wehopethechaptersthatconstitutethisvolumewill
helppolicymakersmaintainenoughstrategicflexibilitytocopewiththechallenges
of this new nuclear era, and thus to act judiciously yet with alacrity when strife
threatens.
AMoreComplexNuclearGeometry
Nuclearstrategyisinflux,asitalwayshasbeen.FromtheearliestdaysoftheCold
War,thenuclearweaponstatesdebatedadizzyingarrayofconcepts,doctrines,and
strategies for employing an ever-evolving array of strategic and tactical weaponry.
Despiteallthat,ColdWarnuclearrivalryremainedlargelypredictable.Tworoughly
comparable blocs of states, both led by nuclear-armed hegemons, faced off. The
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