Table Of ContentAleksandr A. Svechin
STRATEGY
Edited by Kent D. Lee
Introductory essays by
Andrei A. Kokoshin
Valentin V. Larionov
Vladimir N. Lobov
Jacob W. Kipp
East View Information Services
Minneapolis, Minnesota
3020 Harbor Lane N.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55447 USA
Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin. Strategy.
A translation of: Strategiia. Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927
Edited by Kent D. Lee.
Prefaces by Andrei A. Kokoshin, Valentin V. Larionov, Vladimir N Lobov, Jacob
W. Kipp
ISBN 1-879944-33-2
Copyright (c) 1991 East View Information Services, Inc. All rights reserved. No
part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, electrotrostatic, magnetic, tape,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the express written
consent of the publisher.
First published in 1992. Fourth printing 2004.
Printed in Canada.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).
CONTENTS
From the Editor
Introductory Essays
Origins of the Intellectual Rehabilitation of A. A. Svechin
A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov
The Significance of Svechin's Military-Theoretical Legacy Today
V.N.Lobov
General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare:
Military History and Military Theory
Jacob W. Kipp
Preface to the First Edition
Preface to the Second Edition
Introduction
1. Strategy in a Number of Military Disciplines
Strategy and Politics
1. Politics and Economics
2. The Political Goal of Warfare
3. Plans for Safeguarding Domestic Security
4. The Economic Plan of the War
5. The Diplomatic Plan
6. Political Policy During Wartime
Preparing the Armed Front
1. Initial Principles
2. Building the Armed Forces
3. Military Mobilization
4. Preparing Border Theaters
5. The Operational Plan
Combining Operations for Achieving the Ultimate Goal of the
War
1. The Forms of Conducting Military Operations
2. Communications
3. An Operation with a Limited Goal
4. The Strategic Line of Conduct
Command
1. Strategic Leadership
2. Methods of Command
Appendices
Critique and Bibliography
1.
A.Vol'pe
Critique and Bibliography
2.
V. Novitskii
What Is Mobilization and Is It Really Permanent?
3.
I. Modlin
Bibliography
Index
FROM THE EDITOR
The intellectual rehabilitation of Aleksandr A. Svechin comes long overdue,
correcting a historical injustice that has continued for nearly six decades. The
publication of the premier work of his lifetime—the second edition of Strategy
— in the English language now moves this rehabilitation effort into the
international sphere, where historians and political scientists in many different
lands will finally have an opportunity to judge him for his contributions. We
think that this judgment will be quite favorable.
Svechin himself was tremendously influenced by the writings and analyses of
the contemporary and classic European figures of his day. Struggling against the
growing intellectual xenophobia and dogmatism that gradually dominated the
Soviet military science establishment in the 1920s and 1930s, Svechin remained
a cosmopolitan in the best sense of the word. To study war between states—an
activity utterly antithetical to xenophobia—requires a deep understanding of
other states' experiences and histories. Svechin's rich and integrated approach to
this question put him head and shoulders above the rest of his colleagues. For
this he paid dearly; first with his career, and ultimately with his life. It is a sad
fate that he shares with far too many of Russia's best and brightest.
The publication of Strategy today, in the early 1990s, would be incomplete
without some explanation of how it came about. Svechin's book, above all,
represents his concept of the best approach to national security for the Soviet
state. It is therefore quite logical that its rebirth should be linked to changes in
current Soviet concepts of national security. Indeed it is.
Perhaps the most basic issue facing Mikhail Gorbachev upon his emergence as
Soviet leader in early 1985 was the crushing Soviet defense burden, a gargantuan
ball-and-chain on Soviet domestic and foreign policy development. New
approaches to security were desperately required, approaches that would allow
for resources to be shifted toward more productive ends. Foremost was required
a change in the essence of Soviet military doctrine, which despite its claims to
defensiveness was nonetheless based on an unambiguously offensive military
strategy, which created and/or maintained enemies abroad (thus keeping the
Soviets firmly in the grasp of the "security dilemma," which required ever-
increasing defense expenditures) and well as bled the Soviet economy white as
the technological imperatives of modern warfare in and of themselves demanded
more resources.
Accordingly, the conceptual foundations had to be laid first. Such was the
background to "new thinking'' and "reasonable sufficiency," buzzwords that
almost seem quaint now, in the aftermath of the monumental events of 1989 and
1990. Many commentators in the USSR weighed in with their contributions to
these concepts, but a select few approached the issue in a unique way. Defensive
thinking in the USSR, they argued, has important historical roots that cannot be
ignored. Such thinking was legitimate back then (if wrongly and ultimately
suppressed), and the very same geopolitical and economic factors make it
legitimate today. Their line of argument was perhaps Byzantine, but the USSR is
nothing if not a 20th century Byzantium. As Western observers we cannot forget
that much of the Soviet national security elite even in the late 1980s still spoke a
language of Lenin, justifying current actions and policy prescriptions in terms of
chosen Lenin quotes. Svechin, Lenin's historical contemporary, not only
provided the "new-thinkers" a source of useful quotes and arguments by
themselves, but also proved to be a source of genuine intellectual stimulation as
his fascinating legacy began to be uncovered and appreciated.
In the struggle with "old-thinkers" adamantly opposed to direct challenges
(such as those made by Alexei Arbatov) in national security policymaking, the
Svechin experience offered a way to deliver the same arguments through the
back door. The use of Svechin—especially in 1988 and 1989—was one of the
few ways for challengers to establish a dialogue in place of the two monologues.
By citing Svechin, challengers to the status quo paid homage to Soviet military
history, which helped them penetrate the rigid nature of Soviet military science,
the no-man's land (for "incompetent civilians," at least) in which the
requirements for national defense are set and budgetary issues established.
It would be wrong, however, to create the impression that Aleksandr Svechin
was simply a convenient Trojan horse for those who would radically change
Soviet national security policy. In fact, as his long-suppressed writings began to
be rediscovered, a growing number of Soviet analysts and officers began to find
inherent worth in much of their content. Most important was Svechin's
intellectual approach, or method. As the introductory essays below state, and as
the text of Strategy itself shows, Svechin's method was underlined by a spirit of
critical inquiry, pluralism and civility of dialogue, elements often lacking in
Soviet society and culture. So even if his particular insights are not remembered
(which, the reader may conclude, are intriguing and ought well be), his method
should. This method alone compels us to read Svechin, and keep him on our
shelf next to Clausewitz and the other classics for many years to come.
With this background in mind, the reader may have a bit clearer notion of the
assemblage of this book. Dr. Andrei Kokoshin, who writes jointly the first
preface with Professor General-Major (ret.) Valentin Larionov, was the first and
most important participant in the Soviet security debate to use Svechin, first
gradually by means of citation, 1 and then later by several biographical and
analytical articles. General Larionov, who comes to us already distinguished as
perhaps the most outstanding Soviet military intellectual of the postwar period, 2
was one of the first Soviet military men to recognize Svechin's legacy favorably
in the postwar period. General of the Army Vladimir N. Lobov, who wrote his
essay just prior to being elevated to the supreme position of Chief of the General
Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, has been the most influential active-duty
Soviet military leader responsible for Svechin's renaissance within the Soviet
military. His articles on the relevance of the debates and actors of the 1920s for
the current Soviet debate, as well as his biographical essays on Svechin written
with Kokoshin, have cast a bright spotlight on Svechin, his method and his ideas.
In doing so, he has provided Svechin with the kind of vindication that only a
Soviet state figure can offer, since it was the Soviet military and state
establishment of the 1920s and 1930s that destroyed Svechin intellectually and
physically.
Dr. Jacob Kipp of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, a highly
respected historian of Soviet military and security affairs, rounds out the
prefaces with an incisive assessment of Svechin's intellectual development and
legacy. In addition to catholic interests and expertise that Svechin himself would
have admired, Dr. Kipp brings to the book the necessary perspective of a
Western scholar intimately familiar with Russian and Soviet history as well as
with the classics of Western military-historical thought.
In addition to the introductory essays by these appropriate commentators, the
book also offers the reader a notion of how Svechin's work was accepted by his
own contemporaries. Accordingly, we have included three book reviews in the
appendix. All of them appeared in the journal Voina i revoliutsiia [War and
Revolution], the Red Army's premier military-theoretical journal of the time
(succeeded today by the respected Voennaia mysl' [Military Thought]). In
reading them one must keep in mind the atmosphere of the time. Svechin and his
ideas were clearly under attack by the military establishment—most importantly
Mikhail Tukhachevskii—which was solidly behind the Stalinist rush to quickly
industrialize the USSR, and in addition was enthralled with the notion of the
militant expansion of communism, perhaps even with the help of the Red Army.
So compelling was Svechin's book that the foremost Soviet military journal
chose to review it not once, but twice, the only book ever given such treatment
in the military press of the USSR. This, moreover, came within just months of a
massive, four-author review of the first edition of Strategy. The attention alone
Svechin garnished is worthy of note, and helps give those unfamiliar with him
some idea of his import in the eyes of his colleagues. He was not an obscure
professor writing books that no one cared about.
Our book also includes a bibliography of Svechin's published works, which
we have tried to make as comprehensive as possible. Any omissions are solely
the fault of the editor.
Throughout the book we have adhered to the transliteration style of the U.S.
Library of Congress; in a few cases (Trotsky rather that Trotskii, Yudenich rather
than Iudenich) we have deviated to reflect more traditonal spellings. The editor
has endeavored to represent the correct spelling and diacritical marks of foreign
(especially French and German) proper names. We beg forgiveness if and where
we have failed.
Finally, enormous thanks are due to a number of key individuals. We begin
with acknowledging our deep debt to the responsible U.S. government officials
who initiated in the late 1980s a major effort to translate a number of Soviet
military-theoretical classics from the 1920s in a rare, historically-based attempt
to understand current Soviet policy. Such foresight in our government is all too
rare, and we applaud it. The first draft of this book came from that series; we
hope other manuscripts will be published soon.
Mary Albon, now of the Charter 77 Foundation, brought coherance to the
entire manuscript and most of the prefaces and essays. It was a great pleasure to
work with her, and she raised numerous critical and substantive points that
would have otherwise eluded the editor. To the extent mat the editor has not
managed to obfuscate passages originally made clear by Mary, the reader will
also thank her greatly.
A number of translators deserve acknowledgement for their role in bringing
two of the prefaces and all of the book reviews into the English language. They
are: Harry Orenstein, Jack Anderson, Sergei Mikheev and V. Blokhin.
Much of the work regarding the prefaces, bibliography and the greater effort
of East View Publications to assemble the complete collected works of Svechin
was conducted in Moscow. Accordingly, enormous credit goes to Vladimir
Frangulov and Yuri Usachev of East View's Moscow office. Similar credit goes
to Major-General (ret.) Yuri Kirshin and Aleksandr Kavtaradze.
Typesetting, proofing, printing and advertising services were provided by the
highly qualified staff at Kocina Communications, including especially Don and
Damon Kocina. With their help we hope to put Minneapolis on the map as a
center for high-quality publishing in the area of international affairs.
The editor also wishes to thank Dr. Ted Warner of the RAND Corporation,
who in his capacity as adjunct professor of political science at Columbia
University's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences provided an opportunity for
the editor to examine in a seminar paper the importance of the role of historical
interpretation in the formulation of current Soviet military policy, and thus make
an acquaintence with Svechin.
A final thank-you also needs to be given to Professor Marshall Shulman,
former director of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of
the USSR, for his role in encouraging his students to pay attention to and follow
up on events that make one's nose twitch. For the editor, such a "nose-twitching"
event was the footnoted and somewhat cryptic references to Svechin in the
aformetioned article by Kokoshin and Larionov some four years ago. This book
is a consequence of that effort to follow up, and we hope that the reader will not
be disappointed that we did.
Kent D.Lee
November 1,1991
___________________
1
See especially his article with Larionov "Kurskaia bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitel'noi doktriny"
[The Battle of Kursk in light of modern defensive doctrine], Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i mirovaia
ekonomika, no. 8 (August 1987), pp. 32-40.
2
In particular as one of the fundamental forces behind Sokolovskii's Voennaia strategiia [Military Strategy]
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962 (1st edition), 1963 (2nd edition) and 1968 (3rd edition)), as well as the only
author to win the coveted Frunze Prize (given annually for the best military book) for his works ladernaia
strategiia [Nuclear Strategy] (Moscow: 1965) and Problemy koalitsionnoi voiny [Problems of Coalition
Warfare] (Moscow: 1970). Unfortunately these latter books remain classified and off limits to Western
researchers.
3
See General-Major A. Prokhorov and Lieutenant-Colonel V. Larionov, "Protiv rashiritel'nogo tolkovaniia
predmeta i soderzhaniia sovetskoi voennoi nauki" [Against an expanded interpretation of the subject and
content of Sovet military science], Voennaia mysl', no. 12 (December 1959), pp. 56-65.
4
See Colonel-General V. N. Lobov, "Aktual'nye voprosy razvitiia teorii sovetskoi voennoi strategii 20-kh-
serediny 30-kh godov" [Urgent question in the development of Soviet military strategy in the 1920s and
mid-1930s], Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 2 (Febru ary 1989), pp. 41-50; also Kokoshin, A. A. and V.
N. Lobov, "Predvidenie (General Svechin ob evoliutsii voennogo iskusstva)" [Foresight (General Svechin
on the evolu tion of military art)], Znamia, no. 2 (February 1990), pp. 170-182.
