Strategic Alliances for Social Investment

198 Pages·2010·1.24 MB·English

Strategic Alliances for
Social Investment
Final Report
January 19, 2005–February 16, 2010

May 31, 2010
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International
Development. It was prepared by RTI International.
Strategic Alliances for Social Investment
Final Report

Cooperative Agreement No. 520-A-00-04-00204-00
January 19, 2005–February 16, 2010

Prepared for
Ms. Isabel Stout
United States Agency for International Development/Guatemala

Prepared by
RTI International1
3040 Cornwallis Road
Post Office Box 12194
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194

RTI International is one of the world’s leading research institutes, dedicated to improving the human condition by turning knowledge into practice. Our
staff of more than 2,800 provides research and technical expertise to governments and businesses in more than 40 countries in the areas of health

and pharmaceuticals, education and training, surveys and statistics, advanced technology, international development, economic and social policy,
energy and the environment, and laboratory and chemistry services. For more information, visit www.rti.org.
RTI International is a trade name of Research Triangle Institute.
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views
of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States
Government.

1 RTI International is a trade name of Research Triangle Institute.
Table of Contents
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................iii
List of Annexes ................................................................................................................iii
List of Acronyms .............................................................................................................. v
1. Background .............................................................................................................. 1
2. Key Results, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations .......................................... 3
2.1 Management Structure ....................................................................................... 3
2.2 Alliance Building ................................................................................................. 8
2.3 Role of GOG in Alliance Project Development ................................................. 16
2.4 Development, Review, and Approval of Alliance Projects ................................ 18
2.5 Management of Alliance Projects ..................................................................... 22
2.6 Monitoring of Alliance Projects ......................................................................... 25
2.7 Technical Activities and Projects Funded by Alianzas/Guatemala ................... 28
2.8 Benefits of Alianzas/Guatemala-funded Projects ............................................. 30
2.9 Sustaining Alliances ......................................................................................... 33
3. Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 35
3.1 Alliances ........................................................................................................... 35
3.2 M&E ................................................................................................................. 36
3.3 Alliance Project Sustainability .......................................................................... 37
List of Tables
Table 1. Alliance Partners ........................................................................................... 14
Table 2. Summary of Leveraging Performance .......................................................... 30

List of Annexes
Annex A: Alianzas/Guatemala Partners List
Annex B: Alianzas/Guatemala Grants Tracker
Annex C: Alianzas/Guatemala Indicators and Performance Monitoring Plan
Annex D Technical Areas Supported by Alianzas Project Grants (by LLR)
Annex E: Projects Funded by Alianzas/Guatemala
Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

RTI gratefully acknowledges the role of University Research Co., LLC (URC), a subcontractor on the
Strategic Alliances for Social Investment project, in contributing to the health section of this report.

iv Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report
List of Acronyms

AOTR Administrative Officer Technical Representative
APROFAM Asociación Pro-Bienestar de la Familia (Pro-Family
Wellness Association)
ASAZGUA Asociación de Azucareros de Guatemala (Guatemalan
Sugar Producers Association)
CA Cooperative Agreement
CAM Central America and Mexico
CBO Community Based Organization
CEFI Consejo de Empresas, Fundaciones e Instituciones
Privadas de Guatemala (Private Guatemalan Companies,
Foundations and Institutions Council)
CentraRSE Centro de Acción para la Responsabilidad Social en
Guatemala (Center for Corporate Social Responsibility in
Guatemala)
COED Cooperación para la Educación (Cooperation for Education)
COP Chief of Party
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DHS Demographic Health Survey
FANCAP Fundación para la Alimentación y Nutrición de Centro
América y Panamá (Central American Nutrition Foundation)
FBO Faith Based Organization
FOG Fixed Obligated Grant
FP Family Planning
FRCL Fundación Ramiro Castillo Love (Ramiro Castillo Love
Foundation)
FUNCAFE Fundación del Café (Coffee Foundation)
FUNDAZUCAR Fundación del Azúcar (Sugar Foundation)
FUG Fondo Unido Guatemala
FUNSEPA Fundación Sergio Paiz (Sergio Paiz Foundation)
GDA Global Development Alliance
GOG Government of Guatemala
IMSALUD Instituto Multidisciplinario para la Salud (Multi-disciplinary
Institute for Health)
IR Intermediate Result
LAC Latin America & the Caribbean
LLR Lower Level Result
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation
MCH Maternal and Child Health
MMR Maternal Mortality Ratio
MOE Ministry of Education
Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report v
MOH Ministry of Health
MOU Memoranda of Understanding
NGO Non-governmental Organization
OP Operational Plan
PAHO Pan-American Health Organization
PMP Performance Monitoring Plan
PPP Public Private Partnership
PR Public Relations
PSA Public Service Announcement
PSAG Private Sector Advisory Group
RH Reproductive Health
RTI Research Triangle Institute
SEGEPLAN Secretaría de Planificación (Planning Secretariat)
SO Strategic Objective
SOSEP Secretaría de Obras Sociales de la Esposa del Presidente
(First Lady’s Secretariat for Social Work)
SPUH Saint Peter’s University Hospital
STC Save the Children USA
TA Technical Assistance
TELGUA Telecomunicaciones de Guatemala (Guatemalan
Telecommunications)
TRC Technical Review Committee
UNESCO United Nation’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNICEF United Nation’s International Children’s Fund
URC University Research Co.
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
UVG Universidad del Valle de Guatemala
WHO World Health Organization
WINGS Women’s International Network for Guatemalan Solutions
vi Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report
1. Background
At the beginning of the decade, Guatemala exhibited some of the worst education and
health statistics in the region according to the Ministry of Education (MOE) and
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data, despite intense efforts by the Government of
Guatemala (GOG) and international donor agencies to improve coverage, efficiency,
quality, and equity in these sectors. Education achievement indicators given by the
Municipal Education Progress Index were very poor, owing to low levels of elementary
school completion, low coverage rates in preprimary and secondary school, and low
quality of education. The majority of Guatemala’s population was under 21, with 4 out of
10 people under the age of 15 in 2000. The net enrollment for elementary school was
89% for children ages 7–12. For young adults between 13 to 15 years old, 29% were
regularly attending school; for those between 16–18 years of age, only 17% were
enrolled. These indicators were even more dramatic in departments with high percentages
of indigenous populations. For example, the net enrollment rates for students between 16
to18 years old were only 4% in Totonicapán, and for students ages 13 to16, only 9% were
in enrolled in Alta Verapaz.
The dismal indicators were predicated by numerous factors, most significantly: lack of
preprimary schools; poor teacher preparation and few opportunities for updating their
professional knowledge; lack of materials; and lack of public funding, as well as adequate
financial support from parents. An additional factor is the lack of secondary schools,
primarily in rural areas: Secondary schools are usually located in the main urban centers
but not in rural areas, leaving young people in these regions without opportunities to
continue their studies. Many young Guatemalan students also are forced to leave school
to earn money and help support their families.
Much like education, Guatemala’s health and nutrition indicators were also dramatically
low. The infant mortality rate of 39 per 1,000 live births was the highest in Central
America. The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) of 153 deaths per 100,000 live births for
the country and 211 per 100,000 live births among indigenous women were among the
highest in the western hemisphere. Of women who died during child birth, 65% of births
were delivered by unskilled attendants; 50% of women died at home. Only Haiti
exceeded the total fertility rate of 4.4, and the contraceptive prevalence rate was 43%
among women ages 15 to 49 in union—the second lowest in the Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC) region. Chronic malnutrition affected 49% of all children under 5 years
of age, leading to a stunting rate ranked highest among LAC countries.
In part, the inadequate social sector services resulted from very low levels of public
funding. The Guatemalan public sector struggled to address the shortfall between
available resources and the demand for meeting basic needs. The Guatemalan Peace
Accords (signed December 28, 1996) resulted in a major influx of bilateral and
development cooperation funding for a number of years. This coincided with a period of
Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report 1
relative peace and economic prosperity in the hemisphere. However, development funds
started waning by 2002, broadly coinciding with a diminishing strategic regional focus on
LAC after the events of September 11, 2001, and the Iraq War. At the same time, it was
also clear that many corporations and foundations were simultaneously implementing
interventions and mechanisms for investing their corporate social responsibility (CSR)
funds that converged in principle with USAID’s Strategic Objectives (SO) for the region.
There were substantial flows of private social investment funds and in-kind contributions
in Guatemala from diverse sources such as large private corporations, local private
foundations, faith-based organizations (FBOs) and other charitable givers, small
businesses, and individuals. In the early 2000s, many of the leading private sector
organizations involved in social investment initiatives in Guatemala were exploring ways
to promote CSR, coordinate their social investment efforts, and increase their impact.
This presented an excellent opportunity to build on and foster the growing CSR
movement and channel disparate flows of resources into public-private partnerships
(PPPs) for more efficient and effective social investment. Considering the private sector’s
evident interest in participating in medium-to-long term, sustainable, development
initiatives and the magnitude of their investments, the context provided an opportunity to
unite efforts toward common goals.
The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Country Plan for Guatemala
developed in the mid-2000s, under the Central America and Mexico (CAM) Regional
Strategy, addressed Guatemala’s development challenges through a social investment
approach. The plan prioritized advancing Guatemala’s efforts to increase investment in
health, nutrition, and education. It also mitigated the impact of reduced USAID funding
by increased leveraging of USAID dollars through alliances and other strategic
mechanisms.
The USAID-funded Guatemala Strategic Alliance for Social Investment (Alianzas)
Project was a 5-year cooperative agreement (CA) managed by RTI International that
forged public-private strategic alliances to increase access to and improve the quality,
equity, efficiency, and use of basic health, nutrition, and education services.
Alianzas/Guatemala began on January 19, 2005, and operated until February 16, 2010.
For every US$1 invested by USAID in health and education, Alianzas/Guatemala was
required to raise at least US$2 from the private sector for investment, at least half of
which had to be in cash, with the balance in in-kind resources (e.g., equipment, supplies,
media, transportation, labor, etc.). Alianzas/Guatemala leveraged funds and resources
from the private sector, brokered collaboration among entities interested in financing
social sector interventions and service-delivery organizations, and allocated resources to
providers of basic health, nutrition, and education services for the poor. Funding has been
leveraged from a broad base of private sector partners, including implementing partners
that have provided both cash and in-kind funding. In accordance with USAID’s
Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP), the CA’s results contributed to the following
USAID Intermediate Results (IRs):
2 Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report
• IR 3.1 Increased and improved social sector investments
• IR 3.2 Increased access and improved quality of education
• IR 3.3 Increased use of quality maternal, child, and reproductive health services
Funds leveraged by Alianzas/Guatemala from private sector funding partners were
combined with investment funds provided by USAID and programmed into grants. The
grants were awarded through a competitive review process to local and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foundations working in Guatemala’s health
and education sectors.
RTI’s subcontractor and managing partner under this CA was University Research Co.,
LLC (URC). URC provided technical assistance in health and nutrition, NGO
strengthening, sustainability, and monitoring and oversight of health activities.
As a result of its previous work in Guatemala, RTI developed considerable expertise in
building strategic alliances and in leveraging private sector resources for education,
health, and nutrition investments. This expertise was leveraged when two of the CA’s
modifications (which covered the CAM region) expanded the program’s work to other
LAC countries. Modification number 3 supported private sector partnerships with
USAID/Nicaragua from March 15, 2006, through December 15, 2009, for health and
education activities. Modification number 7 launched the Alianzas/El Salvador program
that began September 28, 2006, and operated until October 31, 2009, to finance new and
expanded health activities targeted to the country’s poorest communities in rural and
marginal urban areas.
2. Key Results, Lessons Learned, and
Recommendations
Below we summarize the major results, lessons learned, and recommendations under the
Alianzas/Guatemala program.
2.1 Management Structure
The Alianzas/Guatemala program model intended to limit the management costs of
building and managing alliances to 39% of the total program budget, reserving the
remaining 61% of the budget for investment funds for health and education alliances.
This ratio varied slightly over the course of the program. Modification number 2 to the
CA provided funding for higher education and scholarships, but with limited financial
increase for management costs, resulting in a decrease of management costs to 37% (with
63% for investment). Modification number 16 reallocated costs from family planning
(FP)/reproductive health (RH) investment funds to cover increased management costs,
resulting in a ratio of 40% management and 60% investment. Modification number 25
Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report 3
increased funding and reallocated costs between management and investment funds,
bringing the ratio back to the original 39% management and 61% investment.
To minimize management costs, RTI proposed a lean management team at the
application stage, led by a strong organizational manager as Chief of Party (COP), who
was responsible for technical oversight and management. The COP was supported by a
financial manager and three senior managers, one each for health and education to
support technical activities, and a resource mobilization and alliance manager for
building alliances between partners and seeking cash and in-kind investments. The
proposed COP withdrew his candidacy during the pre-award stage, and RTI replaced him
with a candidate who had extensive contacts in the Guatemalan private sector, as well as
experience building and managing alliances.
During the first year it became clear that the proposed organizational structure was not
meeting the needs of the newly evolving program. The mix of skills and abilities on the
team duplicated roles for alliance building, while leaving gaps in monitoring and
evaluation (M&E, the proposed to-be-determined position had not yet been filled) and
program management, including grants management. To address these factors, several
changes were made to the project structure as follows:
1) The resource mobilization and alliance manager position was dropped since this
function was largely covered by the COP’s role, with support from the technical
managers.
2) RTI recruited a senior grants manager to coordinate home office and USAID
support for program administration, grants management, waivers, procurement,
and some financial support.
3) A grants coordinator was added to the team to track the grant evolution process
and manage all grants paperwork, as well as to provide capacity-building support
for grantees on budgets and grant applications.
4) The M&E work was subcontracted out to the Inversiones Ipanema firm (see more
detail in Section 2.6).
Within the technical areas, a few additional changes were made over the life of the
program. Both the health and education technical areas each started out with one staff
member, who was responsible for developing alliances and overseeing technical
implementation of projects. The first person who filled the health manager position,
recruited by managing partner URC, was a technical expert in nutrition, with extensive
experience working with the Ministry of Health (MOH). Although a highly qualified
health professional, her transition to working with the private sector and developing
activities in other health technical areas such as FP proved challenging. Upon her
departure, the position remained vacant for seven months while the COP filled the role of
developing alliances for health. During this time, RTI and URC reconfigured the position
with the assistance of a consultant, splitting it between two people—a technical expert in
RH and a medical doctor experienced in working with the private sector. The new
4 Alianzas/Guatemala Final Report