Storia e Politica

211 Pages·2017·1.55 MB·Italian

Anno V, n. 1 – 2013

Storia e Politica
Rivista quadrimestrale

Università degli Studi di Palermo
Dipartimento di Studi Europei (D.E.M.S.)
Anno V n. 1 Gennaio-Aprile 2013

Ricerche/Articles
Anna Li Donni – Carmelo Provenzano
Reciprocity as source of Coordination and
Spontaneous Cooperation 1
!
Francesco Tigani
Pantopia. Nella trama di utopie, totalitarismi e internet 27

Piero Venturelli
Tassonomie delle forme di governo... considerazioni
critiche sull’Esprit des lois di Montesquieu. 71

Interventi/Remarks

Gabriella Portalone Gentile
Chiesa e Mafia 112

Note e discussioni/ Notes and Discussions
Terenzio Maccabelli
Duce dell’economia? L’antisemitismo
di Maffeo Pantaleoni 151
Maria Lepori
Banditismo e fazioni nobiliari
nella Sicilia del Seicento 167
Recensioni/Reviews
F. Lucarini, La carriera di un gentiluomo. Antonio Salandra e la
ricerca di un liberalismo nazionale (1875-1922), (S. Ciurlia); H.
Bergson, Il significato della guerra, (M. Corselli); B. Gariglio, I
cattolici dal Risorgimento a Benedetto XVI. Un percorso dal Pie-
monte all’Italia, (R. Marsala); M. T. Giuffrè, Per vie di Mistero.
Angelina Lanza Damiani e la scrittura di sé. Novecento rosmi-
niano in Sicilia, (C. Giurintano); Stefania Panebianco and Rosa
Rossi (edited by), Winds of Democratic Change in the Mediter-
ranean? Processes, Actors and Possible Outcomes, (O. Urso); G.
Palombella, È possibile una legalità globale? Il Rule of law e la
governance del mondo, (L. Martines). 179

Dalla quarta di copertina/ Back cover 200
Ricerche/Articles
ANNA LI DONNI AND CARMELO PROVENZANO

RECIPROCITY AS SOURCE OF COORDINATION AND
SPONTANEOUS COOPERATION

1. Introduction
Many economic contract are incomplete and problems of po-
tential opportunism arise (MacLeod and Malcomson 1998). A
contract is incomplete if important aspects are not contracted
in a way that can be verified by a third party. For example, in
many labour relationships performance is to a large degree
not enforceable. Facing such a problem, standard economic
theory appears inadequate to offer optimal solutions. These
solutions may be found by raising interest in anthropological
and social presupposition of the economic theory.
The diffusion of the use of reciprocity as an alternative or
complementary category to standard economic behaviours is
connected to the creation and development, during the last
thirty years, of experimental economics and behavioural eco-
nomics (Bruni 2006). In reality, apparently unselfish actions
have been regarded for a long time in economics as selfishly
motivated, for example Pantaloni’s concept of the “selfishness
of the species” introduced at the end of the 19th century, to
explain apparently altruistic actions, which he held to be also
to the greater personal good in the future (Pantaleoni 1889).
Moreover, such behaviours were not considered of significance
to explain economic interactions, since in the study of eco-
nomics the actions considered relevant were always those di-
rected towards self-interest.
The characteristics of the standard idea of economics ra-
tionality can be artificially laid out by looking at the assump-
Storia e Politica, V n. 1, 2013, pp. 1 - 26
Anna li Donni and Carmelo Provenzano

tions which are usually implicit in the most famous “game” in
economics: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. This explains by way of
example the problem of coordination, which has always con-
stituted a major theme in economics. In this game, the eco-
nomic agents do not achieve the optimal outcome by behaving
rationally, even though this outcome is achievable. The moral
is that selfish behaviour does not always lead us to a better
situation. In reality, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played out in
countless situations: pollution, traffic congestion, and, in gen-
eral, to the difficultly of cooperation without contracts (which
we may define as spontaneous).
However, the aim of this essay is not to represent the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma as a demonstration that the failure of reci-
procity leads to spontaneous cooperation, quite the opposite.
The game tells us that interaction leads us to non-reciprocity
specifically because the players, being selfish, do not manage
to sign a contract. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is thus praise of
reciprocity rather than criticism of it.
Among the first laboratory experiments, which deserve
mention, are those which tend to reproduce interactions like
those in the Prisoner’s Dilemma where the results obtained
show that certain agents defect and others cooperate (Samu-
elson 2005). Moreover, other thorough and far-reaching ex-
perimental-economic analyses have discussed the concept of
traditional individual rationality and have presented behav-
iours motivated by reciprocity as relevant and not marginal.
(Fehr et al. 1993; 1997; Fehr and Falk 1999; Fehr and
Gächter 2000; Gächter and Falk 2002; Croson 1996; Guth,
Klose, Konigstein and Schwalbach 1998; Keser and Winden
2000). Among these, the Gift-Exchange game introduced by
Fehr et al. (1993) shows reciprocity is an important govern-
ance device.
In the following section the concept of reciprocity as a
source of spontaneous cooperation is dealt with in more de-
tail, and following that, in the third section, the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma and the Gift-Exchange Game will be considered. In the
fourth section, the interplay between reputation and reciproci-
ty is analysed. The fifth section suggests a theoretical ap-
proach based on frames and relational signals in order to un-
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Reciprocity as source of coordination and spontaneous cooperation

derstand the difference between gain-maximiser agents and
agents oriented towards the norms of reciprocity. Lastly, the
fifth section draws certain conclusions.

2. Reciprocity as a source of coordination and cooperation

Trust plays a crucial role in agents’ different interaction strat-
egies. There is, however, no unanimous consensus in econom-
ic and sociological literature about the meaning of the term
trust. There is some consensus that trust is an instrument for
the governance of relations, which contributes to prosperity
by reducing transaction costs, but this is not a rigorous defi-
nition of the concept. It is actually an important function of
trust. The general notion of trust may, rather, be composite
and it is close to the notion of uncertainty or risk in the sense
of the possibility that things could go wrong, as is usual in lit-
erature. Trust may mean to accept risk or uncertainty about
the quality of goods, competence or the intentions of other
persons as well as about anything that might arise in the fu-
ture and increase one’s own vulnerability. The object of trust
may be the systems of nature, God or other institutions, and
then it is called confidence: whereas when agents trust in
people, we are then in the presence of behavioural trust
(Luhmann 1979; 1995; Zucker 1986).
In this chapter, I will concentrate specifically on behav-
ioural interpersonal trust in a specific other agent, that in a
first approximation may be identified as the « willingness to
increase one’s vulnerability to another whose behaviour is not
under one` s control » (Zand 1972:30). This means that gen-
eralized trust is left out of consideration. Furthermore, I will
deal with trust in relation to the possibility of opportunism.
Indeed another important distinction in behavioural trust is
that between competence trust and intentional trust. Trust in
a person’s ability to provide a technically competent perfor-
mance has to be distinguished from trust in a person’s char-
acter or moral disposition, because unlike the latter, the for-
mer kind of trust is not directly related to the concept of op-
portunism. If a worker does not honour his commitment, it
may be from incompetence or force majeure or from opportun-
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Anna li Donni and Carmelo Provenzano

ism, and whatever action on the part of his manager may be
appropriate depends on which. For example, a manager may
develop a worker’s skills by training, or may improve his moti-
vation, or exert control.
I focus on this last type of trust (intentional trust) which
consists of accepting or neglecting the possibility that the oth-
er party may exploit opportunities for opportunism even if it is
in his interest to do so. In other words, one party trusts in the
intentions of the other if he believes that the party being of-
fered temptations to defect do not lead to reductions in the
partner’s trustworthiness (Nooteboom 1996; 2000). Here, the
distinction introduced from Noorderhaven (1996) between sit-
uational trust and character trust is relevant. “Situational
trust” can be associated with the “opportunistic-core model”
developed by Traditional Economics and it is based on the
perception that the other party cooperates because it in his
interest to do so. This kind of trust depends on the character-
istics of the situation rather than those of the other party,
who is assumed opportunistic. This notion is close to the con-
cept of “reputation”, which is also incorporated in an “oppor-
tunistic-core” theory like Transaction Cost Economics. Agents
guard their reputation because it influences future trading
opportunities, and it has this influence because agents guard
it (Axerlod 1984). “Character trust” is based, instead, on the
perception that other party is inherently trustworthy and that
he will discharge fiduciary obligations and responsibilities he
has taken on because he has made a commitment. In such a
concept, trustworthiness is identified as a tendency to live up
to explicit and implicit commitments expressed, respectively
by written or oral communication or by merely being present
at a specific place and time.
Thus, human beings are not only opportunistic, but are al-
so inherently trustworthy and vary in decency, fairness, and
moral commitment, and these variations will presumably lead
to character trust differentials. As a result, one cannot trust
everybody because this is not rational.
Moreover, trust has been defined as to accept risk, vulner-
ability and uncertainty, as well as a subjective probability that
something will not go wrong but trust is not perfectly calcula-
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Reciprocity as source of coordination and spontaneous cooperation

ble. In other words, trust is not only blind; it also does not al-
ways obey traditional axioms and neoclassical calculation
rules. Trust can also be based on things like friendship and
kinship as well as reciprocity arising from relational invest-
ment. If an agent makes a gift to another, he has effected an
investment in a relationship, which has an immediate return
in the form of a relationship credit. Indeed, his counterpart
feels obliged to return this favour. Generally, the social con-
tract relies on unspecified implicit obligations between people,
which depend on shared systems of meaning, belief, and eth-
ics. Economic exchange includes non-contractual elements
and trust may be defined as “reciprocal trust” (or “trust based
on reciprocity”). This notion, a graduation of the “character
trust” concept, emphasizes the relationship between trust and
relationship investment and lies primarily in the anthropolog-
ical and sociological meanings of reciprocity.
Kolm (1994) defines reciprocity as a series of bi-directional
transfers independent of one another yet interconnected. In-
dependence requires that each transfer is in itself voluntary,
in the sense that no one transfer is a prerequisite for the oc-
currence of the next, as there is no external obligation what-
ever in the mind of the transferring agent. This feature differ-
entiates reciprocity from economic exchange, where the
agents are not free, but are obliged by law or third parties to
comply with contract obligations. Moreover, reciprocity should
be distinguished from acts of pure altruism, which consist in
isolated and one-directional transfers. Reciprocity leads us to
the strategic dimension of the interaction between agents. If
agents do not receive reciprocity, they will end all relation-
ships. In this case, unlike in the case of exchange, the logic of
the transfer is changed. On the contrary, in the exchange re-
lationship, the transaction is effected only after the parties
have achieved an agreement and have determined the price of
equilibrium. In the relationship of reciprocity, one transfer is
made (in place and time) before the other transfer, and the
parties acting in this way have simply an expectation, not a
right, to receive the transfer. One could say that reciprocity
takes the intermediate position between economic exchange
and pure altruism and that reciprocal trust lies between blind
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Anna li Donni and Carmelo Provenzano

trust and perfect rational trust. In summary, the idea that re-
ciprocal trust is a relationship between agents characterized
by reciprocity – in the sense both of mutual commitment and
of freedom - radically changes the nature of interaction strat-
egy.
Aristotle uses the term “antipeponthós” to communicate
the concept of commercial relationships and relationships be-
tween citizens, because in all the relationships within the po-
lis (or city-state) the idea of proportionality and conditions is
involved.
As Gloria Vivenza explains very well:

Aristotle uses the term reciprocity (antipeponthós, in Nicomachean
Ethics) to talk about exchange in general. But in all the forms of
counter-exchange there is a clear meaning of the term relativity: to
give back in proportion (precisely antipeponthós) holds the communi-
ty (koinonía) together (sunéchei). In short, then, the factor which
binds together the relationships between citizens or participants in
the same community is giving back in proportion to how much one
has received; commercial exchange is a particular category of this
reciprocity (Vivenza 2004: 78.)

Another word used by Aristotle with the meaning of reciproci-
ty is “antiphílesis” or “antiphilía”, which denotes reciprocal af-
fection, feelings, or requiting love with love of the same kind
and intensity. The prefix anti- always denotes a response.
The Latin etymology is similar: “reciprocation” or “recipro-
cus” derive, in fact, from “reci-pro-cum”, where the three
components are “procus” (“that which stands before”), “recus”
(“that which comes from behind”) e “cum” (“with”). Other ety-
mologies connect it to the words “recuperate” and “procari”
(“ask for, request”), but the meaning remains the same.
On the basis of these etymologies it is clear that reciprocity
and the typical economic exchange comprise a two-way ex-
change involving giving and giving back, even though the eco-
nomic transaction is differentiated by the fact that a third par-
ty can render the giving back obligatory whereas in simple
reciprocity the return gift is not obligatory. Relationships,
which are based both on contracts and on reciprocity, con-
tribute to achieving individual and collective results effective-
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Reciprocity as source of coordination and spontaneous cooperation

ly. All the same, cooperation based on reciprocity is more
complex than contractual cooperation, because it is formed on
the basis of the mutual consideration of personal interests
and tends to be overlaid with the typical relational logic of
friendship (“philia”) even when such behaviour could appear
contrary to the personal interests of the individual for a brief
period of time. Again Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics,
created the paradigm of the theory of friendship (intended as a
form of reciprocity) in Western culture:
a) “Equivalence”: the first characteristic of “reciprocity-
philía” is equivalence, not necessarily intended in the
mathematical sense but in the sense of justice or equi-
ty, since associated friendship with justice.
b) “Equality”: Aristotle denied that friendship could exist
between a free man and a slave. This was because
there was effectively an inequality between the partici-
pants and the rules of the game tend artificially to re-
establish the equality which is lacking.
c) “Liberty”: For Aristotle only the free man could have
friends. One initiates a friendship freely and one ter-
minates it freely.
d) “Non-transferability”: friendship is not transferable in
the sense that if X is a friend of Y and Y is a friend of Z
then X will not necessarily be a friend of Z. According
to Aristotle, it is not possible to be friends with lots of
people.
e) “Conditionality”: the logic of “reciprocity-philía” is that
in friendship one makes the first move and one grants
the other party a trust based on prior actions, and one
is inclined to forgive, but for the reciprocal relationship
to continue over the course of time the other party
must reciprocate the treatment. In practical terms, in
a relationship based on “philia” (that is, on friendship
in the sense restricted to meaning the internal dynam-
ics of a team of colleagues) one does not calculate the
costs and benefits of a single act and one even toler-
ates actions which are wrong, and is inclined to for-
give: however the friendship is terminated when we see
the willingness to be a friend cease on the part of the
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