Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America

840 Pages·2009·9.48 MB·English

by  Harvey Klehr

Spies
Spies
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
KGB
IN AMERICA
John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev
with translations by Philip Redko and Steven Shabad
To my beloved wife, Janette
-JOHN EARL HAYNES
To women of valor Susan Kline Klehr and Robin Klehr Avia
-HARVEY KLEHR
To my son, Ken Vassiliev
-ALEXANDER VASSILIEV

Contents
Preface by JOHN EARL HAYNES and HARVEY KLEHR
Acknowledgments
Conventions for Nomenclature, Citations, Quotations, Cover Names, and
Transliteration
Introduction by ALEXANDER VASSILIEV: "How I Came to Write My
Notebooks, Discover Alger Hiss, and Lose to His Lawyer
CHAPTER 1: Alger Hiss: Case Closed
CHAPTER z: Enormous: The KGB Attack on the Anglo-American Atomic
Project
CHAPTER 3: The Journalist Spies
CHAPTER 4: Infiltration of the U.S. Government
CHAPTER 5: Infiltration of the Office of Strategic Services
CHAPTER 6: The XY Line: Technical, Scientific, and Industrial Espionage
CHAPTER 7: American Couriers and Support Personnel
CHAPTER 8: Celebrities and Obsessions
CHAPTER g: The KGB in America: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Structural
Problems
CONCLUSION
Notes
Index
Preface
Is there anything new to be learned about Soviet espionage in America? After
more than a decade of fresh revelations, it may seem that we must know most of
the details and there is little left to uncover. But new information continues to
emerge. In the fall of 2007, after Russian president Vladimir Putin announced a
posthumous award to a previously unknown spy, George Koval, credited with
enabling the USSR to steal vital atomic secrets, the New York Times published a
front-page article detailing the remarkable story of his transition from an Iowa-
born child of RussianJewish (and Communist-sympathizing) parents who moved
in 1932 to Birobidzhan, Stalin's artificial Jewish homeland in Siberia, and his
transformation into a Soviet spy sent back to the United States who wound up
working at the secret Oak Ridge atomic facilities during World War 11.1
The Koval story illustrates some of the dilemmas faced by anyone attempting
to write a factual account of Soviet espionage. The original story relied on
Russian claims about the value of the material Koval supplied. Despite a number
of clues pointing to his having a less significant role in atomic espionage than
the claims boasted, a credulous press inflated his importance, inadvertently
echoing his employer. Russian military intelligence, the GRU, has, in recent
years, attempted to emulate the public relations offensive that its long-time sister
agency and rival, the KGB, embarked on in the 199os to convince the Russian
public and government officials that it had a major role in the military and
political successes achieved by the Soviet Union.
When the underlying documentation for a spy story is unavailable, the bits
and pieces of information released by governments to placate public curiosity
about espionage can be misleading. Official government statements often have
more to do with internal bureaucratic factionalism or public relations than the
truth. The spies themselves are rarely available to be interviewed and have good
reasons to avoid being too specific or entirely candid. And when they do speak
through memoir literature they are as prone as autobiographers in other walks of
life to romanticize their importance, minimize their mistakes, and pass over
unpleasant events with silence or misdirection. Frustratingly, archival
information regarding intelligence and counterintelligence activities from the