South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition

15 Pages·1.669 MB·English

by  Chong-Sik Lee.

South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition
Author(s): Chong-Sik Lee
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1979: Part I (Jan., 1980), pp. 63-76
Published by: University of California Press
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SOUTH KOREA 1979:
CONFRONTATIONA, SSASSINATION,
AND TRANSITION
Chong-Sik Lee
ON OCTOBER 26, 1979, President Park Chung Hee was
shot to death by his trusted aide Kim Jae-Kyu, the director of the all-
powerful Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). With Park's
death, one of the most turbulent eras in modern Korean history came
to an end, and South Korea entered an uncertain period of transition.
There are conflicting reports concerning the motives for the assasi-
nation. According to the Joint Investigation Team of the Martial Law
Command, which was created after the assassination, Kim Jae-Kyu was
"lost in wild fancies" and contemplated taking over the presidency. But
this explanation sounds totally implausible.' On the other hand, Kim
Jae-Kyu allegedly told his attorneys that he was intent on preventing
bloodshed in Seoul since large demonstrations were expected in the
capital city in the wake of the demonstrations and riots in Pusan and
Masan between October 16 and 20. The paratroopers dispatched by Cha
Chi-Chul, President Park's chief bodyguard (Director of the Presidential
Security Forces), allegedly treated the rioters in Pusan very harshly, pro-
ducing numerous casualties including many deaths. Kim allegedly feared
that more blood would be shed in the streets of Seoul unless he did away
with the president and his chief bodyguard. Cha Chi-Chul was a no-
1 Evidently Kim Jae-Kyu mobilized no military units, nor were other KCIA men
alerted to occupy key positions to support the director. Just before Kim assassinated
the president, one of his cohorts asked him whether the president was to be killed.
On the basis of the official report, one can conclude only that the assassin had been
incensed by the president's chief security officer, Cha Chi-chul, who was killed along
with the president, and angered by the president's reprimands for mishandling the
situation in Pusan and Masan. For the report of the investigation team (in English),
see Korea Herald, November 7 and New York Times, November 7, 1979.
63
e 1980 by The Regents of the University of California
0004-4687/80/010063+ 14$00.50
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64 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 1, January 1980
nonsense paratrooper who had stood by Major General Park Chung Hee
on May 16, 1961, when the military coup was launched against the gov-
ernment of the Democratic Party. Evidently he found the KCIA's sup-
pression of the demonstrators and rioters too lukewarm and ineffective,
and began to take action himself. Clashes between the demonstrators in
Seoul and the forces commanded by Cha Chi-Chul were imminent and
unavoidable, according to this line of argument.
Whatever motive or motives Kim Jae-Kyu may have had, there is
no doubt that a political storm was brewing in South Korea between
1978 and 1979. The Yushin (or Revitalization) system President Park
had instituted in 1972 by revising the constitution that year was openly
challenged by the opposition for the first time in 1979 in spite of severe
penalties against such criticisms. The Emergency Decree Number 9, is-
sued on May 13, 1975, had made it a crime, punishable by imprisonment
of more than one year, to criticize the constitution or report such criti-
cisms. The Yushin constitution had given the president authority and
sole discretion to declare a state of emergency, and permitted him all
dictatorial powers. The constitution also granted him the authority to
nominate one-third of the members of the National Assembly to be
"elected" by the 2,359-member "National Conference for Unification."
The president could also succeed himself indefinitely, to be "elected" by
the same "Conference" without debate. President Park was intent on
silencing all opposition and on leading the nation toward the status of
"rich nation and strong army."2H e used his powers liberally. Numerous
dissidents were arrested and imprisoned, and the press was severely con-
trolled. The KCIA extended its tentacles everywhere, even to Koreans
abroad, precipitating such international incidents as the Tongsun Park
affair and the kidnapping of Kim Dae-Jung from his Tokyo hotel.
Force alone, of course, could not sustain the dictatorial system. Mas-
sive campaigns were launched periodically to extol the virtues of the
Yushin system. Economic, political, and intellectual leaders were re-
quired to undergo political indoctrination sessions. All the adult male
population, being organized into civil guard units, were subjected to
indoctrination and propaganda programs. South Korea could not meet
the threat posed by North Korea and develop its economy without a
firm leadership and stability, it was argued.
President Park's strongest weapon against his critics, however, was
the high rate of economic development. The rate of economic growth
under President Park's reign was spectacular by any standard. The GNP
had risen 10%/poe r annum since the late 1960s, spurred by rapid export-
2 The similarity between President Park's goals and methods and those of the
Meiji elites in Japan (1868-1912) are not coincidental. Park Chung Hee was trained
in the Manchukuo and Japanese military academies and was an avid reader of
Japanese publications. While such a background and propensity are very common
in Korea, which had been a Japanese colony between 1905 and 1945, it is not too
far fetched to believe that Park particularly admired the Japanese experience of
the Meiji era and patterned his policies after it.
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SOUTH KOREA 65
oriented industrial growth. Exports rose from $500 million in 1968 to
$12 billion in 1978, an increase of 24 fold within ten years. Per capita
GNP rose from $164 in 1968 to $1,242 in 1978. The share of primary
industries in GNP dropped from 45% in 1964 to 23% in 1978, and the
country's landscape changed very rapidly.3
The growth-oriented economy emphasizing export products in-
evitably produced side effects. Although the government had been able
to manage these side effects and effectively surmount various economic
crises before (including the oil crisis of 1974), the situation began to
deteriorate in 1978. The emphasis on exports produced a shortage of
consumer goods that was exacerbated by increasing demands brought
about by rising wages and the advance in living standards. Price controls
imposed on producers of consumer goods discouraged the manufac-
turers. Meanwhile, the inflow of dollars rapidly expanded the money
supply. Thus, inflation became a serious problem. According to a Bank
of Korea report, consumer prices rose only 14.4% in 1978,4 but most
observers agreed that the actual rate was near 30%. The high rate of
inflation continued into 1979. According to a report issued by the Eco-
nomic Planning Board in August 1979, the average household living
cost went up 26.3% during the previous year. Although wages had been
rising very rapidly during the past several years, spurred by shortages of
skilled and semi-skilled workers, the rise in wages began to slow down.
The average wage went up only 12% during the year preceding August
1979.5
To cure these ills, the President replaced the economic team in the
cabinet, including the Vice Premier in charge of Economic Planning, in
December 1978, and adopted stabilization measures entailing the lower-
ing of the growth rate, a stringent tight money policy, a switch of in-
vestment capital planned for heavy industries to light industries pro-
ducing consumer products, a reduction of price controls to encourage
more production of consumer goods, and assistance for the poor.6 But
these measures cause a recession, produced a succession of bankruptcies
among small and medium loan-dependent enterprises, and thereby in-
creased unemployment.
The sudden downturn in the economy could not help but affect
politics. The "J-curve" theory postulated by James C. Davies is highly
relevant here. According to Davies:
3 For one of the glowing accounts of South Korea's economy, see "Survey of
South Korea," Economist, March 3, 1979.
4Dong-a-Ilbo, September 7, 1979. For a comprehensive diagnosis of the South
Korean economy based on interviews with numerous economists, business leaders,
and government officials, see a series of articles published in ibid., April 10-28,, 1979,
under the title of "Sixteen Years of Excess Growth-Korean Economy Under Amber
Signal." An abridgement of this series is published in Japanese translation in Korea
Hyoron (Korean Review) (Tokyo), August (pp. 43-53), September (pp. 14-23). 1979.
5 Dong-a Ilbo, August 2, 1979.
6 See the Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, September 24, 1979, p. 2.
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66 ASIAN SURVEY,V ol. XX, No. 1, January 1980
Revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of
rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period
of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and grati-
fications quickly widens and becomes intolerable. The frustration that
develops, when it is intense and widespread in the society, seeks outlets
in violent action. When the frustration becomes focused on government,
the violence becomes coherent and directional.7
In the South Korean context, it was only natural that the government
was blamed for the economic "failure."
The first manifestation of the challenging mood of the workers
appeared in August in the form of demonstrations by 200 female em-
ployees of Y.H. Industrial Company, which had just gone bankrupt.
They occupied the headquarters of the opposition New Democratic
Party (NDP), and demanded the right to manage the company them-
selves.8 When the workers refused to obey the government order to dis-
perse, some 1,000 riot policemen raided the building on August 11,
causing pandemonium. One woman worker died or was killed by the
police; 100 people, including NDP National Assemblymen and re-
porters, were injured and 198 other demonstrators were arrested. The
government later charged the Urban Industrial Evangelist Mission with
instigating the demonstration, and arrested two Christian ministers, a
former professor, and a poet. According to the police, these elements at-
tempted to create a social disturbance with the intention of establishing
a "proletarian class control system."9 The Evangelist Mission has long
been a thorn in the side of the government because, along with its
evangelical work among the workers, it frequently exposed illicit labor
practices among entrepreneuers, educated the workers on their rights,
etc., thereby creating disturbances in industrial-labor relations in a
country where labor unions maintained only a nominal existence. The
government evidently feared that the unrest would spread elsewhere if
these demonstrators were not harshly treated. But the Y.H. incident be-
came a rallying cry of the opposition.
Aside from the very visible social unrest caused by political sup-
pression and economic recession, the opposition camp had reason to be-
come more bold in 1979 in its criticism of the government. In spite of
the fact that the NDP was suffering from sharp internal disputes [to be
7 James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a
Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Hugh Davis
Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America (New York:
Bantam Books, 1969), p. 547.
S The Korean and foreign press covered the "Y.H. Company Incident" exten-
sively. See for example, New York Times, August 12, 1979.
9Dong-a l1bo, August 17, 1979. It is interesting to note that there have been
numerous labor disputes in Japan involving bankrupt companies where the laborers
attempted to or actually took over the management of the companies. See Miyake
Yoshiko, "Suna o kandemo shobuba o mamorunya," (We will defend the work place
even if we must chew sand), Asahi jyanaru (Asahi Journal), May 5, 1978, pp. 92-95.
Some 600 labor unions in Japan with 100,000 workers were involved in labor disputes
against bankrupt companies, according to this article.
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SOUTHK OREA 67
discussed presently], it won a handsome plurality in the December 1978
general elections, the first general elections to be held since 1973. In the
1978 elections, the government party (the Democratic-Republican Party
or DRP) won only 30.9% of the popular votes, a decline of 7.8% from
1973. In contrast, the NDP obtained 34.7%, an increase of 2.2% from
1973. The Democratic Unification Party suffered a loss of 3% from the
previous elections, obtaining 7.2% of the popular votes.'0 Independent
candidates won 27.2% (22 seats in the National Assembly); subsequent-
ly, 15 of the 22 signed applications to join the NDP, although 3 of the
15 were "persuaded" to switch to the government party. Since one-third
of the National Assembly members are government appointed, the op-
position could not command a majority in the National Assembly, but
the meaning of the elections was clear for all to see. The majority of
the voters clearly expressed their disaffection from the government, and
they wanted a change. Disaffection from the government was particular-
ly severe in urban areas. The DRP candidates were able to obtain only
26.7% of the popular votes in the six metropolitan centers.11
Not all NDP members, however, were prepared to confront the
government head on. In fact, Lee Chul Sung, the incumbent president
of the NDP since 1974, had argued that the NDP should work within
the system and extolled the virtue of "middle-of-road" politics to "es-
tablish and maintain a proper and optimum balance between liberal
democracy and national security, order and freedom," etc. In a 1979
new year's press conference, Lee called for the establishment of a com-
mission to "examine the constitutional structure" (a veiled call for a
constitutional change), an end to the state of emergency, and the adop-
tion of corrective measures in the economy, but he was not vigorous in
the pursuit of these aims. Lee's challenger within the NDP, Kim Young
Sam, found Lee too mild. Kim was intent on immediate restoration of
democracy. The two rivals met at the national party conference in May,
and Kim Young Sam narrowly defeated the former president by 378 to
367 votes. It should be noted here that 376 votes constituted a majority,
so Kim won only two votes more than the requisite majority.12
Once elected, the new head of the NDP began to make his presence
felt. On June 11, Kim announced to the foreign press his readiness to
meet Kim Il-s6ng, the North Korean president, to discuss matters re-
lating to unification, which subsequently received a favorable response
from the north. On June 23, he delivered a scathing attack against the
government at the National Assembly. He argued that the government
had been in power too long and clearly had been discredited by the elec-
tions; the Emergency Decree Number 9 of May 1975 suffocated people's
freedoms and was clearly unconstitutional; the government had colluded
with hoodlums to assault the NDP headquarters and to harass him;
10 For details, see C. I. Eugene Kim, "Significance of Korea's 10th National
Assembly Election," Asian Survey, XIX:5 (May 1979), pp. 523-532.
11 Ibid., p. 532.
12 Dong-a ilbo, May 31, 1979.
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68 ASIAN SURVEY,V ol. XX, No. 1, January 1980
suppression of human rights had become an international disgrace; the
people should be permitted to elect their own president through direct
elections; people should be allowed to live without fear; fair distribu-
tion of wealth should be permitted without interference from the gov-
ernment, etc.'3 This was indeed an opening salvo against the govern-
ment.
The government's retaliation was harsh and immediate. When the
NDP's organ Minju Ch6ns6n (Democratic Front) printed the speech for
distribution, the government retaliated by seizing copies and arresting
its editor. Then, on August 13, in the wake of the Y.H. incident, three
members of the NDP close to Lee brought a suit in the court alleging
that Kim's election as president was improper because twenty-two dele-
gates who had voted for him were unqualified. Some of them had been
stripped of their civil rights for violating emergency decrees. The court
acted with amazing speed, and on September 7 temporarily suspended
Kim from the presidency of the NDP.14 When Kim Young Sam con-
tinued his defiance by telling a New York Times reporter that "the
time has come for the United States to make a clear choice between a
basically dictatorial regime . . . and the majority who aspire to democ-
racy,"15 the government took another step and ousted Kim from the
National Assembly on October 4.16 Facing the challenge, the remaining
69 members of the NDP in the National Assembly tendered their resig-
nations on October 13 and vacated their offices.
The Y.H. incident and the harsh confrontation between the gov-
ernment and the opposition party could not fail to agitate the college
students. On September 4, a large number of students at Kyongbuk
University and Kyemy6ng University in Taegu held anti-government
rallies on their respective campuses. Those from Kyemy6ng moved off
campus and clashed with the police. On September 11, 20, and 21, stu-
dents of the Seoul National University held campus rallies, and battled
against the riot police sent to squash the demonstrations. On September
26, Ewha Women's University students staged a campus rally, and on
the following day, students of Yonsei University shouted anti-govern-
ment slogans during a "pep rally" for an athletic event.
XWhilet he riot police were able to contain these demonstrations
within university campuses, they were not effective in Pusan, the second
largest city in Korea and the home of Kim Young Sam, the opposition
leader.17 On October 16, 5,000 Pusan University students gathered on
13 Minju Ch6nzs6n (Democratic Front), organ of the NDP, July 23, 1979.
14 Dong-a Hbo, September 8, 1979.
15 New York Timnes, September 16, 1979.
16 Dong-a Ilbo, October 8, 1979. The vote for Kim Young Sam's expulsion was
taken at a secret session of the government party members while the opposition
members occupied the main Assembly hall in an attempt to block the proceedings.
All 159 assemblymen present at the session voted for the ouster.
17 In the city of Pusan as a whole, the NDP won 387,81.7 votes, electing five
National Assembly men, and the DRP polled 295,761 votes, electing four. See
Dong-a Ilbo, December 11, 1979.
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SOUTH KOREA 69
campus for a rally and then moved into the center of the city. While
the demonstrations of that day ended with the arrest of nearly 300
students, the police were not able to control the demonstrators on the
following day when 1,000 students from Dong-a University joined force.
Nonstudents also joined after dark, and peaceful demonstrations turned
into riots. Twenty-one precinct police offices and 18 police vehicles were
damaged, and 56 policemen were injured. Numerous students and other
rioters were injured in the fracas.18T he government declared martial
law in the city and placed it under military control. But the events in
Pusan were contagious. On October 20, in the nearby city of Masan,
about 800 students of Kyungsang University launched a demonstration
that quickly turned into a riot. Students reportedly threw rocks and
fire bombs at police posts, shops, houses, and the local office of the gov-
ernment party.19 Ironically, Kyungsang University is owned and oper-
ated by the family of former chief of President Park's security force,
Park Chong-Gyu, whose house, according to various reports, was burnt
to the ground. The government placed the city under "garrison decree"
under which the army took over all responsibility for public order from
the police.
The situation obviously required remedies beyond continuing sup-
pression. Since it was impossible to bring about a quick turn in the econ-
omy, a more fundamental political solution was needed. The arrival
of U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown on October 18 did not help
the president's cause. While the secretary's primary purpose was to at-
tend the annual joint security talks, he also brought a letter from Pres-
ident Carter requesting the Korean president to ease the repression of
human rights in South Korea.20 The U.S. had just recalled its ambas-
sador "for consultation" after Kim Young Sam was expelled from the
National Assembly. Obviously, the president faced a crisis of magnitude.
Evidently some of those close to the president, including Kim Jong-
Pil, counselled him to meet some of the student demands and reduce
repression. Kim is married to President Park's niece, and had collabor-
ated with the president when he led the military junta against the gov-
ernment headed by President Yun Po-Sun in May 1961. Kim was the
founder and first director of the KCIA (1961-1963) and had served as
premier (1971-1975) until he was forced into a quiet retirement. But
the presidential security chief Cha Chi-Chul opposed such a course,
fearing that it would only mean Park's political demise, and placed
Kim Jong-Pil under a virtual house arrest. Kim Jae-Kyu, the head of
the KCIA, also came under Cha's criticisms, and Cha began to inter-
vene directly in suppressing student demonstrations. These develop-
18 Ibid., October 18, 1979.
19 New York Times, October 21, 1979.
20 While the, exact content of the letter was not made public, the Korean news-
papers reported the general gist of the letter. See, for example, Dong-a Ilbo, Oc-
tober 19, 1979.
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70 ASIAN SURVEY,V ol. XX, No. 1, January 1980
ments led to the assassination of President Park and Cha Chi-Chul by
the KCIA chief on October 26.21
It could be argued that President Park had driven himself onto
the horns of dilemma by instituting the Yushin system and wielding un-
limited powers. His political measures alienated a large number of the
populace. The economic downturn brought political grievances to a
sharper focus and increased support for the opposition, including those
who took their grievances to the streets. If he applied more pressure on
the opposition, more martyrs would have been created, making the situ-
ation even more explosive. But if he loosened control, the demand for
reforms might have spread, rendering it impossible to contain the de-
mand. The Yushin system had provided for neither a pressure-release
valve nor an escape hatch. It could have been maintained only through
manipulation of all the political and economic mechanisms, but this
proved to be impossible.
In the aftermath of the assassination, Kim Jae-Kyu somehow lost
control over the situation, and Chung Seung-Hwa, the chief of the staff
of the army, placed Kim and a handful of his assistants under arrest.
General Chung declared martial law on October 27, and assumed the
role of the martial law commander. Choi Hyu-Hah, a bureaucrat of
long standing and the prime minister under Park, was appointed acting
president.
The Politics of Transition
The assassination of the president and the arrest of the KCIA
director created a political vacuum that was not to be filled very easily.
While acting president Choi Hyu-Ha was elected president on December
6 and inaugurated on December 21, he had never been a political figure
and he has no independent political base. The Yushin constitution that
legitimized his election as president by the "National Conference for
Unification" has been widely discredited. The National Assembly, with
one-third of its members appointed, wields neither actual power nor
does it have popular support. With its director and other high echelon
officers implicated in the presidential assassination, the KCIA no longer
functions as an instrument of power. Only the divided but fairly co-
herent and popular opposition camp demanding immediate restoration
of democracy confronts the army, which is not sanguine about precipi-
tous changes in the constitution.
While there was little disagreement with the view that the old con-
stitution should be replaced by a more democratic one, it was more dif-
ficult to agree on when this should be done. There were also other dif-
ferences. The government and military leaders took the position that
21 Although an elaborate funeral was given in honor of the deceased president,
the martial law command prohibited the publication of news concerning the funeral
of Cha Chi-chul, the chief of the Presidential Security Office.
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SOUTH KOREA 71
the transitional period should be governed by the Yushin constitution
and that one to two years would be necessary to adopt and implement a
new constitution; the opposition, on the other hand, demanded the im-
mediate replacement of the Yushin constitution.
- The intensity of confrontation was clearly manifested in late No-
vember before president Choi was elected president under the Yushin
constitution. On the 24th, a large number of dissident Christian leaders
held an indoor rally in a downtown building in Seoul and issued a
declaration calling for an immediate change in the political system. This
was followed by other such meetings in Kwangju (on November 28) and
elsewhere. The martial law authorities retaliated by arresting 96 persons
in Seoul on November 24, another 100 in the same city on the 27th, and
18 more in Kwangju on November 28, allegedly subjecting many of the
arrested to grueling tortures.22 On the day President Choi was elected
president, the New Democratic Party called for an early end to martial
law, for freedom of the press, and for the immediate release of students,
professors, journalists, and lawyers held as political offenders. The party
also demanded a free election of a new leader by popular vote by next
August.23
Concurrently, however, more moderate and pragmatic forces were
at work. On November 6, former president Yun Po-Sun, who had been
at the forefront of the dissident movement, was released from house
arrest. A conciliatory courtesy call by Kim Jong-Pil, the new president
of the government party (elected on November 12), on the opposition
leader Kim Young Sam on November 17 considerably alleviated tension.
The revocation of Emergency Decree Number 9, and the release of
some of the political prisoners, including Kim Dae-Jung on December
9, and the subsequent grant of amnesty to other prisoners on the occasion
of President Choi's inauguration on December 21, further improved the
situation. The appointment of Kim Ok-Kil, the former president of
Ewha Woman's University, to the new cabinet on December 14, was
interpreted by many as a sign that the new government may be moving
toward reconciliation. During her incumbency as university president,
she had often sided with demonstrating students, and resisted govern-
ment pressures to dismiss professors who had been critical of the Park
government. The National Assembly, in turn, on November 26, created
a 28-member special committee to draft a new constitution, which is
likely to be sumitted to a national referendum by the president. The
constitutional committee includes 14 opposition members.
Thus, two currents of confrontation and reconciliation were con-
currently at work in South Korea as of the end of 1979. While the dra-
conian emergency decree has been lifted, South Korea is still under
martial law. In the meantime, the country's economy continued to
22 New York Times, December 7, 1979.
23 Ibid.
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