Table Of ContentSound’s
Arguments:
Philosophical
Encounters
with
Music
Theory
By
Bryan
J.
Parkhurst
A
dissertation
submitted
in
partial
fulfillment
of
the
requirements
for
the
degree
of
Doctor
of
Philosophy
(Music
Theory
and
Philosophy)
2014
Doctoral
Committee:
Professor
Kendall
Walton,
Co-‐Chair
Associate
Professor
Ramon
Satyendra,
Co-‐Chair
Professor
Kevin
Korsyn
Professor
Victor
Caston
Table
of
Contents
List
of
Examples
iii
List
of
Abbreviations
iv
Chapter
1:
Aspects
of
Musical
Analysis
1
Chapter
2:
Schenker
and
Kantian
Teleology;
Or,
Schenker’s
Orcanicism
Defended
70
Epilogue
1:
More
Thoughts
on
Dubiel’s
Objections
167
Epilogue
2:
The
Place
of
Genius
in
Schenker’s
Theory
171
Epilogue
3:
Schenker’s
Theory
of
Music
as
Ethics:
A
Criticism
and
a
Suggestion
189
Bibliography
202
ii
List
of
Examples
Example
1
Double
Cross
24
Example
2
Beethoven,
Op.
27
no.
2,
3rd
mvmt.,
beginning
of
recapitulation
26
Example
3
Beethoven,
Op.
27
no.
2,
2nd
mvmt.,
end
of
Allegretto
section
26
Example
4
Beethoven,
Op.
27
no.
2,
2nd
mvmt.,
beginning
of
Allegretto
section
28
Example
5
Beethoven,
Op.
27
no.
2,
2nd
mvmt.,
phrase
expansion
at
the
end
of
the
Allegretto
section
30
Example
6
Schubert,
Morgengru∫,
mm.
12-‐15
46
Example
7
Schubert,
Morgengru∫,
m.
14
49
Example
8
Schenker,
Counterpoint
Vol.
1,
Example
44,
p.
57
81
Example
9
Schenker,
Counterpoint
Vol.
1,
Example
47,
p.
58
81
Example
10
Schenker,
Counterpoint
Vol.
1,
Example
35,
p.
50
85
Example
11
Richard
Cohn,
“Neo
Riemannian
Operations,
Parsimonious
Trichords,
and
Their
‘Tonnetz’
Representations,”
Example
4,
p.
45
(Wagner,
Parsifal
Act
III,
Engelmotive)
151
Example
12
Schenker,
Free
Composition,
Figure
5
157
Example
13
Tone
sequence
c1-‐b-‐a-‐b
160
Example
14
Schenker’s
graph
of
the
C-‐major
Prelude
from
Bach’s
Well-‐Tempered
Clavier
Book
1
161
iii
List
of
Abbreviations
Abbreviations
of
frequently-‐cited
texts,
in
this
chapter
and
throughout
the
paper:
KPT
/
CPT
=
Heinrich
Schenker,
Kontrapunkt
(Vienna:
Universal
Edition,
1910
[Vol.
1]
and
1922
[Vol.
2])
/
Counterpoint,
ed.
John
Rothgeb,
trans.
John
Rothgeb
and
Jürgen
Thym
(New
York:
Schirmer,
1987).
FRS
/
FC
=
Heinrich
Schenker,
Der
Freie
Satz,
ed.
Oswalt
Jonas
(Vienna:
Universal
Edition,
1956).
/
Free
Composition,
ed.
and
trans.
Ernst
Oster
(New
York:
Longman,
1979).
MW
/
MA
=
Heinrich
Schenker,
Das
Meisterwerk
in
der
Musik
3
Yearbooks
(Munich:
Drei
Masken
Verlag,
1925
[Vol.
1],
1926
[Vol.
2],
1930
[Vol.
3])
/
The
Masterwork
in
Music,
ed.
William
Drabkin
trans.
Ian
Bent
et.
al..
(Cambridge
University
Press
1994
[Vol.
1],
1996
[Vol.
2],
1997
[Vol.
3]).
TW
/
WT
=
Heinrich
Schenker,
Der
Tonwille
(Vienna:
Albert
J.
Gutmann,
1921
[Vol.
1],
1922
[Vol.
2],
1922
[Vol.
3],
1923
[Vol.
4],
1923
[Vol.
5],
1923
[Vol.
6],
1924
[Vol.
7],
1924
[Vol.
8-‐9],
1924
[vol.
10]).
/
Der
Tonwille,
ed.
William
Drabkin
trans.
Ian
Bent
et.
al..
(Oxford
University
Press,
2004
[Vol.
1],
2005
[Vol.
2]).
HL
/
H
=
Heinrich
Schenker,
Harmonielehre
(Stuttgart
and
Berlin:
J.
G.
Cotta’sche
Buchhandlung
Nachfolger,
1906).
/
Harmony,
trans.
Elisabeth
Mann
Borgese.
(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1954).
VMS
/
OMB
=
Eduard
Hankslick,
Vom
Musikalisch-‐Schönen,
11th
ed.
(Leipzig:
Breitkopf
und
Härtel,
1910)
/
On
the
Musically
Beautiful,
trans.
Geoffrey
Payzant
(Indianapolis:
Hackett,
1986).
CPR
=
Immanuel
Kant,
Critique
of
Pure
Reason
(Kritik
der
reinen
Vernunft),
trans.
Norman
Kemp
Smith
(New
York:
St.
Martin’s
Press,
1965).
References
to
the
first
Critique,
following
established
custom,
give
the
page
numbers
of
the
first
(A)
and
second
(B)
editions
of
1781
and
1787
respectively.
All
German
citations
of
Kant
come
from
the
“Academy
edition”
of
Kant’s
works,
Kants
gesammelte
Schriften
(Berlin:
Walter
de
Gruyter,
1902-‐1940).
CJ
=
Immanuel
Kant,
Critique
of
the
Power
of
Judgment
(Kritik
der
Urteilskraft),
trans.
Werner
S.
Pluhar
(Indianapolis:
Hackett,
1987).
Citations
from
the
third
Critique
give
the
page
number
of
iv
Pluhar’s
translation,
Kant’s
own
section
number,
and
the
volume
and
page
number
of
the
Academy
edition
(volume
5
is
the
Kritik
der
Urteilskraft),
in
that
order.
Thus:
CJ,
248-‐
9/§64/5:370.
For
ease
of
reading,
I
place
all
German
block
quotes
in
SMALL
CAPS.
I
also
often
use
SMALL
CAPS
when
referring
to
concepts.
Thus:
“the
complementary
concepts
of
FREE
COMPOSITION
and
STRICT
COMPOSITION.”
Regardless
of
the
order
in
which
I
introduce
the
German
and
English
versions
of
a
passage,
citations
of
the
passage
will
list
the
German
edition
first
and
the
English
edition
second
(this
includes
citations
of
works
and
translations
that
are
not
listed
above).
Thus:
KPT.
1,
p.
35
/
CPT.
1,
p.
37.
In
cases
where
I
referred
to
an
English
translation
other
than
the
ones
listed
above,
I
give
the
abbreviated
citation
of
the
German
followed
by
a
full
citation
of
the
alternative
English
source.
v
CHAPTER
1.
Aspects
of
Musical
Analysis
Overview:
This
chapter
thinks
about
how
to
think
about
what
one
is
doing
when
one
is
doing
music
analysis.
I
explain
the
scope
and
aims
of
the
activity
by
detailing
the
relations
among
three
concepts:
Dewey’s
concept
of
INTEGRAL
EXPERIENCE,
his
concept
of
ARTISTIC
PRODUCTIVITY
(as
contrasted
with
PASSIVE
AESTHETIC
APPRECIATION),
and
Wittgenstein’s
notion
of
ASPECTUAL
PERCEPTION
(a.k.a.
SEEING-‐AS).
We
can
adumbrate
what’s
contained
in
those
concepts
and
how
they
are
related:
1) Dewey
uses
the
label
INTEGRAL
EXPERIENCE
to
cover
a
diverse
collection
of
human
practical
activities.
However,
we
can
identify
the
greatest
common
factor
they
share:
every
INTEGRAL
EXPERIENCE
consists
in
the
successful
deployment
of
skills
in
order
to
attain
an
end
one
holds
to
be
worth
attaining.
For
the
one
who
undergoes
it,
an
integral
experience
possesses
what
I
shall
call
TELEOLOGICAL
VALUE.
2) Within
the
aesthetic
domain,
TELEOLOGICAL
VALUE
looms
large,
Dewey
notices,
in
the
artist’s
skillful
production
of
beautiful
objects.
But,
Dewey
suggests,
it
can
also
manifest
itself
in
one’s
receptive
appreciation
of
art
objects
made
by
others.
3) TELEOLOGICAL
VALUE
can
arise
for
music’s
listeners,
I
suggest
on
Dewey’s
behalf,
when
they
ASPECTUALLY
PERCEIVE
music,
i.e.
exercise
their
capacity
for
HEARING-‐AS.
Further,
we
can
think
of
certain
music-‐analytical
activities
as
aimed
at
bringing
about
such
perceptions
and
developing
such
capacities.
Music
analysis,
so
understood,
endows
acts
of
musical
listening
with
TELEOLOGICAL
VALUE.
1
In
the
first
section
of
this
chapter,
I
give
a
prospectus
of
Dewey’s
discussion
of
integral
experience.
Much
of
his
discussion
centers
on
the
way
in
which
such
experiences
have
both
an
active
and
a
passive
side.
Kant,
whose
works
Dewey
studied
intensely,1
also
famously
probes
the
connection
between
activity
and
passivity
within
experience
(Erfahrung).
I
use
Kant
as
foil
in
order
to
throw
into
relief
several
key
features
of
Dewey’s
account.
In
the
second
section,
I
find
musical
analogues
to
Wittgenstein’s
examples
of
visual
aspectual
perception,
using
Beethoven’s
“Moonlight”
sonata
as
a
case
study.
I
then
offer
a
conceptual
analysis
of
the
overarching
phenomenon
of
perceiving-‐as.
In
the
third
section,
I
situate
one
of
David
Lewin’s
essays
within
the
framework
of
the
hearing-‐as
model.
In
the
fourth
section,
I
bring
the
first,
second,
and
third
sections
together
by
unfolding
the
idea
that
we
should
prize
music
analysis
for
its
potential
to
turn
our
experiences
of
music
into
integral
experiences
thereof.
**************
Introduction:
What’s
the
point
of
music
analysis?
A
good
deal
of
ink
has
been
spilled
attempting
to
demonstrate
that
music
analysis
can,
does,
or
should
explain
things,
after
the
manner
of
the
canonical
natural
and
social
sciences.2
Since
its
1
Dewey’s
1884
Johns
Hopkins
dissertation
was
entitled
“The
Psychology
of
Kant.”
It
was
never
published
and
is
now
lost.
“Kant
and
Philosophic
Method,”
an
article
Dewey
published
that
same
year
in
The
Journal
of
Speculative
Philosophy,
is
likely
drawn
from
his
dissertation.
2
A
few
of
the
loci
classici
of
music-‐theoretical
scientism
are:
Matthew
Brown
and
Douglas
Dempster,
“The
Scientific
Image
of
Music
Theory,”
Journal
of
Music
Theory
vol.
33
(1989):
65-‐106;
Matthew
Brown,
“Adrift
on
Neurath's
Boat,”
Music
Theory
Online
2.2
(1996);
Benjamin
Boretz,
“Meta-‐Variations:
Studies
in
the
Foundations
of
Musical
Thought,”
Open
Space
(1991);
Milton
Babbitt,
The
Collected
2
inception,
this
platform
has
always
had
more
notoriety
than
credibility.
There
is
little
cause,
therefore,
to
challenge
it
in
quite
the
revolutionary
spirit
with
which
one
challenges
the
received
wisdom
and
its
entrenched
orthodoxies.
In
many
corners
of
the
discipline
of
music
theory,
the
“wisdom”
of
scientism
was
not
received,
and
its
“orthodoxies”
never
looked
very
orthos.
Still,
scientism
in
music
theory
has
enjoyed
enough
of
an
ascendancy,
and
remains
a
big
enough
part
of
the
field’s
ideological
patrimony,
for
its
specter
to
continue
to
haunt
those
of
us
music
theorists
who
feel
drawn
toward
a
sharply
opposed
perspective.3
That
alone
provides
me
with
a
reason
to
begin
this
essay
by
wondering:
is
it
a
good
idea,
even
prima
facie,
to
try
to
gather
together
the
various
facets
of
the
music
analyst’s
vocation
beneath
an
experimental-‐scientific
rubric?
The
idea
isn’t
utterly
misconceived.
On
the
one
hand,
it
behooves
us
to
figure
out
what
important
commonalities
and
continuities
there
are
between
what
scientists
do
and
what
music
analysts
do.
Figuring
that
out
could
be
a
matter
of
seeing
how
far
we
can
get
by
trying
to
assimilate
the
latter
to
the
former,
taking
as
our
starting
point
those
cases
where
we
have
no
qualms
saying
that
one
and
the
same
theoretical
exercise
is
both
scientific
(i.e.,
would
be
recognized
as
science
by
those
we
recognize
as
scientists)
and
music-‐analytical
(i.e.,
would
be
recognized
as
Essays
of
Milton
Babbitt,
eds.
Stephen
Peles
et.
al.
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
2003);
and
Milton
Babbitt,
Words
About
Music,
eds.
Stephen
Dembski
and
Joseph
N.
Straus
(Madison:
University
of
Wisconsin
Press,
1987).
These
texts
do
not
set
forth
a
monolithic
view,
but
demarcating
them
from
one
another
lies
outside
the
scope
of
this
essay.
3
Part
of
what
warrants
continued
hand
wringing
over
scientism
is
the
short
supply
of
alternative
views.
Protestations
against
scientism
abound
in
the
music-‐
theoretical
literature;
contender
theories
do
not.
3
music
analysis
by
those
we
recognize
as
music
analysts).4
But,
on
the
other
hand,
we
should
have
little
patience
for
those
who
monomaniacally
fix
their
gaze
on
the
“scientific
image”
of
music
analysis
and
are
accordingly
blind
to
how
messy
and
complicated
its
true
image
is.
They
appear
to
be
moved
by
a
desire
to
provide
music
analysis
with
a
kind
of
legitimation
that
it
arguably
doesn’t
need
and,
in
a
wide
swath
of
cases,
demonstrably
doesn’t
deserve.
It
is
easy
to
see
the
attraction
of
the
scientific
image.
It
holds
out
the
tantalizing
prospect
of
delivering
a
unified
account
of
what
is
going
on
in
the
field
of
music
analysis.
It
also
promises
to
deliver
a
share
of
the
prestige
of
experimental
science,
simply
the
most
important
and
successful
intellectual
endeavor
the
world
has
ever
known.
However,
it
is
also
easy
to
see
that
the
wings
melt
off
of
one’s
account
of
music
analysis
pretty
quickly
as
it
soars
toward
this
lofty
image.
For
the
most
part,
it
is
obvious
that
the
criteria
of
adequacy
for
most
of
what
goes
under
the
heading
“music
analysis”
(e.g.,
the
kind
of
stuff
that
gets
published
in
Music
Analysis)
has
little
to
do
with
the
following:
1)
determining
which
types
of
musical
events
are
most
statistically
relevant
to
the
occurrence
of
other
types
of
musical
events,
as
a
means
to
2)
apportioning
credence
to
counterfactual
claims
about
how
a
piece
of
music
would
have
gone
later
on
had
different
things
been
true
of
it
earlier
on;
3)
articulating
rules
for
algorithmically
elaborating
syntactically
well-‐formed
musical
4
The
example
I
suspect
would
win
the
widest
consensus
if
Lerdahl
and
Jackendoff’s
A
Generative
Theory
of
Tonal
Music
(MIT
Press,
1995),
which
is
proudly
claimed
by
(many
members
of)
the
music
theory
and
linguistics
communities
alike.
The
authors
equate
a
musical
theory
with
a
“formal
description
of
the
musical
intuitions
of
a
listener
who
is
experienced
in
a
musical
idiom”
(p.
1).
It
will
become
clear
over
the
course
of
this
essay
that
I
reject
this
reductive
characterization
root
and
branch,
for
the
simple
reason
that
I
believe
musical
theories
can
be
intended
to
(and
can
in
fact)
change
and
improve
our
musical
intuitions.
4
phrases;
4)
generating
inductive
generalizations
that
allow
us
to
make
principled
conjectures
about
pieces
we
haven’t
inspected
based
on
what
we’ve
learned
from
pieces
we
have
inspected;
or
5)
modeling,
describing,
or
predicting
the
physical
and
psychological
responses
listeners
exhibit
when
presented
with
musical
stimuli.5
If
lots
of
music
analysis,
lots
of
the
time,
adduces
no
such
explanations,
what
are
we
to
say
music
analysts
are
up
to?6
In
this
essay,
I
try
to
tell
a
counter-‐
5
I
do
not
intend
the
list
to
be
exhaustive.
Many
more
activities
might
deserve
the
title
“explanatory
science
of
music.”
Robert
Gjerdingen’s
“An
Experimental
Music
Theory?”
in
N.
Cook
and
M.
Everest,
eds.
Rethinking
Music
(Oxford:
Oxford
Univ.
Press,
1999),
161-‐170
contains
interesting
reflections
on
this
topic,
but
rests
on
assumptions
I
do
not
endorse.
Gjerdingen
accuses
music
theory
of
suffering
from
the
same
defect
he
thinks
mars
Aristotle’s
science:
both
fail
to
allow
fundamental
concepts
to
be
subject
to
revision
or
elimination
in
the
face
of
contravening
evidence.
(This
does
not
seem
to
me
to
be
a
knowledgeable
or
fair
treatment
of
Aristotle,
but
I
leave
that
issue
to
one
side.)
“As
a
result,”
Gjerdingen
says,
“music
theoretical
discourse
has
become
largely
music-‐exegetical
in
content.
The
self-‐
stabilizing,
corroborating
effect
of
interdependent
premises
precludes
fundamental
revisions,
major
discoveries,
or
even
accidental
breakthroughs”
(p.
162).
This
reasoning
is
questionable
in
two
respects.
First,
Gjerdingen’s
desire
to
disown
“music
exegesis”
sits
uncomfortably
with
his
later
acknowledgment
that
music
theory
has
“important
historical
and
art-‐critical
components”
(p.
169).
Second,
music
theory
only
looks
like
bad
science
to
Gjerdingen
because
he
insists
on
looking
at
it
as
science
in
the
first
place,
a
move
which
he
has
not
shown
to
be
mandatory.
That
said,
the
empty
scientific
pretensions
of
some
music-‐theoretical
and
music-‐
analytical
literature
do
invite
these
kinds
of
criticisms.
6
I
would
go
so
far
as
to
say
that
the
lion’s
share
of
published
music
analysis
contains
nothing
that
a
philosopher
of
science
would
recognize
as
an
explanation,
or
even
as
an
intended
explanation.
All
the
same,
we
probably
shouldn’t
think
that
every
kind
of
explanation
is
scientific.
There
are
as
many
kinds
of
explanation,
arguably,
as
there
are
kinds
of
knowledge,
and
there
is
arguably
more
than
one
kind
of
knowledge.
One
major
distinction
to
be
drawn
in
epistemology
is
between
knowledge-‐that—knowledge
of
matters
of
fact—and
knowledge-‐how—the
capacity
to
accomplish
a
task
or
perform
an
action.
Later
in
this
essay,
I
try
to
understand
the
activity
of
music
analysis
as
something
which
is
importantly
connected
with
knowledge-‐how.
Explanation
could
be
reintroduced
into
my
account
if
I
went
on
to
argue
that
music
theory
is
explanatory
in
the
same
sense
that,
say,
teaching
someone
to
play
the
violin
is
explanatory,
which
is
not
the
same
sense
in
which
a
scientific
theory
is
explanatory.
Considerations
of
space
force
me
to
forgo
making
such
an
argument.
5
Description:Example 14 Schenker's graph of the C-‐major Prelude from Bach's Well-‐Tempered Clavier Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979) Foundations of Musical Thought,” Open Space (1991); Milton Babbitt, The Collected .. the keystone of my account: the thought that developing and demonstrating.
