Table Of ContentSoldier in the Sinai
Foreign Military StudieS
History is replete with examples of notable military campaigns and
exceptional military leaders and theorists. Military professionals and
students of the art and science of war cannot afford to ignore these
sources of knowledge or limit their studies to the history of the U.S.
armed forces. This series features original works, translations, and
reprints of classics outside the American canon that promote a deeper
understanding of international military theory and practice.
The Institute for Advanced Military Thinking (IAMT) was formed by
retired senior officers of the Israel Defense Forces to serve as a bridge
between the theories and policies of the academic world and the doc-
trine, training, and other preparations required for field operations.
The IAMT applies this approach across the full spectrum of future land
warfare by:
• initiating and supporting joint discussions regarding the
historical lessons offered by land warfare in the Middle East;
• encouraging innovative thinking and open debate about current
critical defense issues;
• supporting decision makers as they prepare for future
challenges.
SerieS editorS: Roger Cirillo and Gideon Avidor
An AUSA Book
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Copyright © 2014 by Emanuel Sakal
Reprinted by special arrangement with Emanuel Sakal
Published by the University Press of Kentucky
Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth,
serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky,
Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown
College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead
State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University,
Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and
Western Kentucky University.
All rights reserved.
Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky
663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008
www.kentuckypress.com
All photographs are courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Avi Gur (Ret.), IDF
Spokesperson’s Unit, Government Press Office.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Sakal, Emanuel.
[Ha-sadir yivlom? English]
Soldier in the Sinai : a general’s account of the Yom Kippur war / Major
General Emanuel Sakal, IDF (Ret.) ; translated by Moshe Tlamim.
p. cm. — (Foreign military studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8131-5080-2 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8131-5081-9 (pdf)
— ISBN 978-0-8131-5082-6 (epub)
1. Israel-Arab War, 1973. 2. Israel. Tseva haganah le-Yisra’el— Campaigns.
I. Tlamim, Moshe, translator. II. Title.
DS128.1.S2613 2014
956.04’8—dc23 2014017667
This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American
National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
Member of the Association of
American University Presses
In memory of my son,
Sergeant Yoav Sakal
(Golani Reconnaissance Unit),
who fell in battle in Lebanon
on September 5, 1986
Contents
Foreword ix
List of Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1. Development of the Defense Concept in Western Sinai 9
2. Initial Blunders 79
3. Ground Forces in the Defensive Battle 111
4. Air Support for the Ground Forces 325
5. The Preemptive Strike that Wasn’t 411
Afterword 457
Acknowledgments 459
Appendixes
1. The 252nd Division’s Order of Battle 463
2. The Strongholds: Location and Manning 467
3. The Egyptian Ground Forces’ Order of Battle 469
4. Report on the 526-T Photo Sortie 471
5. Order for the Alert in 14th Brigade/252nd Division 473
6. The Strongholds: Manpower, Casualties, and Fate 475
7. The 252nd Division’s Tank Order of Battle 479
Notes 481
Selected Bibliography 505
Index 511
Maps and figures follow page 126
Photographs follow page 324
Foreword
When the Yom Kippur War broke out, Israel found itself fighting a
strategic defensive campaign on two fronts: on the Golan Heights
against the Syrian invasion, and on the Suez Canal against the
Egyptian onslaught. In the north, Israel succeeded in blocking the
Syrian advance. In Sinai, the first stage of the defensive battle ended
without Israel achieving an operational decision. The author, Major
General Emanuel Sakal (Ret.), has analyzed the defensive battle in
the south and posits eight reasons for its failure:
1. The disproportionate number of Egyptian troops and Israeli
regulars.
2. The delay in mobilizing Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reservists
due to dilatory decision making before the war’s outbreak.
3. Failure to implement the IDF’s deployment plan, code-named
Dovecote (in Hebrew, Shovach Yonim).
4. Failure to carry out a preventive counterstrike against Egyp-
tian bridging and crossing equipment situated on the western
bank of the Suez Canal.
5. Failure of the first IDF counterattack.
6. Ineffective air support for IDF ground forces owing to the
nonimplementation of Operation Scratch (Sreeta).
7. The IDF’s ineffective use of armor in the first twenty-four
hours of fighting.
8. Failure to evacuate the Israeli strongholds during the first
night of the war (October 6–7).
Sakal is a war hero. He began his regular army service in the
Golani Infantry Brigade. As a reservist, he commanded a platoon
of recoilless guns during the Six-Day War. Thereafter, he joined the
standing army. In my role as commander of Israel’s Armored Corps,
I interviewed Sakal when he applied for a commission in the corps.
He spoke ardently about the lessons of the Six-Day War and argued
that future wars would be decided by mobile armored forces. Even
then, at the very start of his career, I recognized that he had the mak-
ings of a fine senior officer.
ix
