Social support from bonding and bridging relationships in disaster recovery: Findings from a slow-onset disaster

12 Pages·2020·0.628 MB·English

by  Kien Nguyen-Trung

InternationalJournalofDisasterRiskReduction46(2020)101501
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr
Social support from bonding and bridging relationships in disaster
recovery: Findings from a slow-onset disaster
Kien Nguyen-Trung*, Helen Forbes-Mewett, Dharmalingam Arunachalam
School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Menzies Building, 20 Chancellors Walk, Clayton Campus, VIC, 3800, Australia
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Despite of growing scholarship discussing the role of social capital in disaster recovery, little has been known
Social support about the connection between forms of social capital (bonding and bridging social capital) and disaster recovery
Bonding social capital in the context of slow-onset disaster such as drought. This study employs a qualitative standpoint to explore how
Bridging social capital
disaster-affected households seek support from bonding and bridging social capital during their recovery. The
Disaster recovery
study draws on semi-structured interviews with 28 disaster-affected households and 21 key stakeholders
Slow-onset disaster
including local authorities, mass organisation’s representatives, agricultural input suppliers. The paper finds out
Vietnam
Vietnamese Mekong River Delta that while bonding social capital played a crucial role throughout recovery phases, bridging social capital only
become important when it comes to long-term recovery. The paper also shows that types of support and the use
of support were affected by household poverty, land holdings, and ethnicity of household head.
1. Introduction Recovering from the disaster has been a key task for disaster-affected
households in the VMD. While much of current literature has focused on
As June of 2016, 52 out of 63 provinces of Vietnam suffered severely the roles of social capital in recovery from sudden-onsets natural haz-
from the combination of drought and saline intrusion, with 18 provinces ards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoon, or flood, little has dis-
declaring a state of emergency [1]. The two hazards were believed to be cussed this topic in the context of slow-onset disaster. Questions remain.
~
induced by an El Nõno event - defined as ‘the anomalous appearance of Should social capital be used differently in slow-onset disasters? What
warm sea surface temperatures in the central and eastern equatorial forms of social support do affected people seek from their social re-
Pacific Ocean from time to time’ [2]: 4). The El Nino event developed lationships? And how would social capital be improvised to fit different
from a ‘very weak’ form late in 2014 to one that was ‘very strong’ during phases of slow-onset disasters? In response to this gap, we aim to explore
late 2015 to mid-2016 [3]. The El Nõ~no effect triggered Vietnam’s worst how disaster-affected households use social capital from an informal
drought in 60 years. The drought lasted about 20 months from late 2014 social network (such as bonding and bridging relationships) to recover
to mid-2016, making the wet season start late and end early and from the catastrophe [7,8]. The paper employs a qualitative approach
extending the dry season. The Vietnamese Mekong Delta (hereafter based on semi-structured interviews with disaster-affected households
referred to as VMD), located in the south of Vietnam, suffered most in and key stakeholders from a project conduced in Tan Hung commune,
the country with a drop of 20–50% of rainfall below the 10-year annual Long Phu district, Soc Trang province of Vietnam. The 2014–2016
average during November 2015 to March 2016, with no rain between disaster (hereafter referred to as the disaster or the incident) is the
January and March 2016 [1]: 6). The low rainfall and water river levels combination of drought and saline intrusion that started in late 2014
led to the intensification of annual saline intrusion that travelled 20–30 and peaked from late 2015 until early 2016. In this paper, the
km further inland than expected [4]: 1), up to 55–60 km at the Hau River 2015–2016 incident or disaster will be used to refer to the failure of the
area and the site of this study - Soc Trang province [5]. The increasing 2015 rice crop 3 (i.e., third rice crop of the 2015) under the drought and
saltwater intrusion made the river water too salty to be used for drinking saline intrusion. In the sections that follow, this paper will first discuss
or agricultural production, causing a total economic loss of US$674,000, the concept of social capital and how this concept has been studied in
000 with 660,000 ha (ha) of crop and 2,000,000 people affected [6]. relation to recovery from natural disasters in general and slow-onset
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K. Nguyen-Trung), [email protected] (H. Forbes-Mewett), [email protected]
(D. Arunachalam).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101501
Received 16 May 2019; Received in revised form 22 January 2020; Accepted 23 January 2020
Availableonline30January2020
2212-4209/CrownCopyright©2020PublishedbyElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
disasters in particular. The paper then describes the study area and head and/or breadwinner, these individuals can gain support from their
methodology before presenting the recovery process and the various social networks to facilitate their household recovery.
roles of social capital. The social support literature has shown that social actors seek
different supports from different types of relationships [7,35,36]. One of
2. Social capital and disaster recovery the approaches to this issue is the distinction between two forms of so-
cial capital: bonding capital and bridging social capital [23,37] (see
2.1. Social capital and social support Table 1). The distinction between the two types first comes from their
foundation. While bonding capital is based on homogeneity or the
One of the approaches to understanding the support obtained from similarity in kinship and friendship, bridging capital is based on het-
social networks is through social capital theories [7,8]. Although coined erogeneity or the dissimilarities in socio-economic categories such as
in 1961, the concept of social capital only began to gain wide currency in class, age, occupation, race/ethnicity. From a group perspective, it can
the 1980s and 1990s with works such as [9–13]; Flap [14–20]; and [21, be said that bonding capital arises from within group relationships while
22]. Nonetheless, the concept is a definitional morass since it is viewed bridging capitals emerges from connections between or across groups
in many different ways. Social capital can be seen as the collection of [38,39]. To make the distinction clearer, some scholars added a personal
‘the actual or potential resources’ of social actors as a result of their dimension to these two types. For instance Ref. [39],: 5) added the
possession of ‘more or less institutionalised’ social relationships recog- feeling of being ‘emotionally close’ to bonding connections, while
nised by them and their contacts [9]: 51) [13].: 25) viewed social capital considering bridging ties ‘loosely’ in this respect. As such, bonding
as ‘the resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by connections are inclined to reinforce in-group cohesion and solidarity
actors for actions’ [23].: 3) also defined social capital as a type of asset while excluding outsiders. By contrast, bridging connections tends to
consisting of social norms and networks underpinning community col- involve outsiders, facilitating across-group information flows and sup-
lective actions. In Ref. [21]: 664-5) perspective, social capital can be port [22]: 22). In bonding relationships, one supports his/her kinship
seen as a means to achieve goals because it holds the ‘features of social and close friendships as a kind of family/friend responsibility with no or
life’ comprising of three components, ‘networks, norms, and trust—that little expectation of reciprocation. In bridging relationships, one helps
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared his/her acquaintances or strangers as a social obligation with the trust
objectives’. that this support will be paid back in future [38].: 392) noted that each
Social capital can be used by different social units. Some scholars type of social capital could be ‘important at different times to different
consider social capital at an individual level [9,10,12,13,15–18], others groups’; that is, their benefits can be socially and temporally differen-
study the concept at a collective level [21,24,25]. As a collective asset, tiated. For instance, bonding social capital is helpful for socially
social capital exists in the forms of public trust, civic spirit, sense of excluded groups because it can substitute state support with the provi-
belonging, reciprocity, and social participation (see Refs. [20,21]. In his sion of informal insurance (mutual exchange inside groups). Bridging
famous work [21], explained the downturn of civil society in the United social capital, on the other hand, is helpful for migrant groups who seek
States by showing the decline of social capital in the pattern of political to establish new connections with external contacts (see Ref. [38]: 302)
participation (for instance, voter turnout, serving a political party, [23].: 3–4) also suggested that bonding capital is the main asset of the
attending political speech) and the low trust in the government. In poor, whilst bridging capital is employed effectively by the non-poor,
another study, he and his colleagues accounted for the different devel- implying they would have different effects on community development.
opment of Italian regions by their different levels of social capital the Despite these distinctions, there has been discrepancy in the defini-
form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement [26]. In tion and measurement of these two types of social capital [33]: 2). In
the context of organisational studies, collective social capital is defining and measuring bonding social capital, some use relationships
measured through robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, and redun- between families and relatives [30,40], family, relatives and those living
dancy (Jung & Song 2014) while in the context of disaster studies, it is in the same communes [33], and village-based units [34]. In measuring
measured in the forms of collective action, organisational linkages, so- bridging social capital, some use relationships between neighbours and
cial support, access to resources, community narratives (or belief), sense friends [30,40], cross-village organisations [34], and those living in
of communities, embeddedness, trust, and formal ties (such as citizen different communes or engaging in business relationship [33,38]. Based
participation) [27–32]. on these studies and with emphasis placed on the central focus of
As an individual asset, social capital exists in individuals’ networks. household, in this paper we consider bonding social capital to result
For Bourdieu, social capital results from an agent’s ‘size of the network from close relationships between the household’s head and/or bread-
of connections’ to which ‘he can effectively mobilize’ (1986: 21) [14].: winner interviewed in this study and those who they considered to be
36) proposes that social capital consists of four elements including the their consanguineous and affinal (or marriage) relationships, close
number of people prepared or obliged to help the individual – the owner
of the network, the readiness to help of these people, the resources these
Table 1
people hold, and the dense of the network of the individuals. Individual
Comparison between bonding and bridging social capital.
social capital can be understood by studying the forms of support such as
food, finance, information, labor that individuals seek and receive from Aspects Bonding capital Bridging capital
their ties [33,34]. Although social capital can be used by individuals Foundation Homogeneity, especially Heterogeneity in socio-economic
[11],: 315) pointed out that this resource is not private property because kinship, friendship, and characteristics, such as age,
it belongs to social structure where the individual is situated. The locality gender, occupation, location,
religion
structural attribute of social capital enables a flexible use of this resource
Tie position Ties reside within a Ties reside across/between groups
for not only achieving personal goals but also collective goals. In other defined group
words, the use of social capital deriving from a personal network can Perception of Emotionally close Emotionally distant
benefit a collective. In this paper, we consider social capital to be an connections
Tendency Inward looking and strong Outward looking, including
asset of disaster-affected households embedded within the social net-
cohesion, but excluding outsiders but loosening in-group
works of every members’ relationships. However, given the data outsiders cohesion
collected did not include information from every member of each Expectation I help you because you are I help you because I expect you will
interviewed household, we consider household’s social capital as an my family/close friends help me back or support others the
asset resulted mostly from the social relationships of household heads way I help you
and breadwinners who were included in the interviews. As household Source: Summarised from Refs. [22–24,38]; Putulny (2007).
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
friends, neighbours, or fellow farmers who have rice fields in the same social capital forms. They identified the different roles of bonding and
location. By this definition, we include in this analysis family and kin bridging social capital in four phases of flood recovery: evacuation
ties, close friendship, and neighbourhood. Bridging social capital is phase, early recovery phase (including up to a week after event and after
considered as social capital resulting from relationships across cate- a week to a month), after a month to several years, and long-term re-
gories such as occupation or location. Business relationships including covery phase. It was shown that while bonding networks proved to be
brokers, merchants and agricultural input suppliers are considered as essential throughout these phases, bridging relationships broke down in
bridging relationships. the last two phases after playing important roles in the first two (evac-
uation phase and early recovery phase) due to the factors such as
2.2. Social capital in slow-onset disaster recovery poverty, disaster impact, competition and conflict arising afterwards.
Indeed, research on sudden-onset disasters has pointed out a pattern
Social capital is considered by many scholars to be a fundamental where informal supports including bonding social capital (family ties,
determinant of socio-economic development [41,42]; see Refs. [22,23, relatives, friends, neighbours) and bridging social capital (such as
43–45] and disaster risk management including disaster recovery [33, voluntary groups, but sometimes also including friends and neighbours)
46–52]. are deemed essential in the emergency period [27,30,34,35,46,70]. It is
To our knowledge, however, most studies have typically focused on at this time when victims first seek support from their available ties to
the context of sudden-onset natural hazards such as cyclones [30,53], deal with urgent problems threatening their lives. This pattern is quite
hurricanes [47,54,55], earthquake [56,57], or flash flood [58–60]. Little reasonable in the sense that with the instant effects of disasters like
is known about slow-onset disasters such as drought, sea level rise, sa- earthquake or flood, close ties and informal networks are more available
line intrusion, or desertification [61–63], which result ‘long-term, to victims than formal support from government or professional orga-
low-grade, and slow-onset cumulative processes’ [61]: 4). Unlike nisations. In longer-term recovery, especially in the restoration and
sudden-onset hazards, slow-onset natural hazards do not cause imme- reconstruction periods, when it comes to the tasks of revitalising infra-
diately devastating effects such as house destruction, infrastructure structure and public utilities, linking social capital with the role of
damage, death, or the displacement of people. Creeping hazards often government, professional organisations or nongovernmental organisa-
accumulate environmental changes over time before becoming tions can be more important [27,35,68]. However, in case that
full-blown disaster(s) [61]. slow-onset disasters do not cause devastating impacts on infrastructure
To compound the problem, creeping disasters are often invisible and or public unities, should bonding and bridging social capital actively
not detectable in the eyes of authorities and local inhabitants especially provide more informal support for recovery? Do these types of disasters
before they grow into a full crisis; therefore, disaster-prone groups are demand different forms of social supports that are observed in
not prepared with appropriate responses [61,62]. In other words, less sudden-onset disasters? And how are these types support distributed by
awareness of the crisis could impinge on responses or reaction and could different forms of social capital? This study aims to provide answers to
extend to recovery in the post-disaster context. It is believed that more these questions.
visible impacts could lead to stronger reactions from affected commu- There is no standard in classifying the recovery phases of slow-onset
nities. For instance, in their study of the great East Japan Earthquake in natural hazards. In this study, we propose three phases of recovery
March 2011, Kawamoto and Kim (2015) showed that the levels of including the short-term period, the mid-term period, and the long-term
damage the event caused to localities was likely to affect the ways period based on the purpose and nature of the recovery activities. The
people cooperated in waste management. In communities receiving less short-term phase focuses on meeting urgent needs including foods for
damage, there was a lower motivation for people to engage in social survival which often happened right after the end of the losses of the
cooperation. Also, unlike sudden-onset hazards that could create 2015 rice crop 3 (around March to May 2016). The mid-term phase
considerable displacement of residents resulting in the broken social focuses on solving temporary difficulties associating with previous
networks of affected communities [27–29,64,65], slow-onset hazards commitment (for instance, paying debts) and challenges arising in each
might not lead to the need to reconstruct social networks. For instance, single rice season after the disaster. The long-term phase focuses on
in a study of rebuilding communities after the Japanese Hanshin-Awaji solving core problems by developing a more general strategy for
earthquake of 1995 [57], found that the closer the residents were to the household livelihoods. Occurring at certain time points after the disaster
event location, the more likely they were to invest more in social capital. is not the criterion for classifying a type of support into the mid-term
This finding raises the question of how disaster victims use their social period or the long-term one. Some support actions may take place
capital to recover from creeping disasters that do not provoke obvious later than others but can be still regarded as mid-term measures. For
disturbance in their social networks. instance, in labor support, some households called back their children to
Some scholars have acknowledged that bonding and bridging social assist farming work in a single crop season, which served only as a
capital will have different effects on disaster recovery due to the fact that temporary measure for that crop. Meanwhile, the supports from agri-
these forms vary across societies in terms of amount, characteristics, and cultural input suppliers in deferring debts and selling inputs on credits to
even their combination with other forms [38]. Furthermore, it should be farmers were conducted immediately after the disaster but they were
noted that bonding and bridging social capital must adapt their roles to also used consistently in following seasons, serving the long-term
deal with the challenges posed by the nature of natural disasters they are development of crop production rather than merely one single season.
dealing with. In this respect, sudden-onset disasters require unique types Bonding and bridging social capital are seen to provide support aligning
of support during recovery such as emotional support for severe losses of with different demands/needs arising in these three phases.
lives, rescue, evacuation, shelter offer, food and necessaries aid, housing
reconstruction [27,30,33,34,40,56,60,66–68]. These types of support 3. Study area and methodology
are often incorporated in three recovery phases following a
sudden-onset disaster: the emergency period, the restoration period, and 3.1. Study area
the reconstruction period [69]: 91). The first period focuses on rescue
and recovery through the tasks such as rescuing victim and provide This paper draws on a study conducted in Soc Trang province,
temporary shelters or foods. The second period concentrates on located at the end of the Hau River – one of the two main rivers of the
removing damage infrastructure and reconnecting utilities like gas, Vietnamese Mekong Delta (hereafter referred to as VMD) – before it
water, sewage, and electricity. The third period is to provide a new enters the East Sea (or the South China Sea) (see Fig. 1). The VMD in the
house or repair the old house for survivors. A study by Ref. [30] illus- South of Vietnam is the biggest delta in the country with its agricultural
trated the link between the recovery phases with the roles of different land area (2623.9 thousand ha) being more than three times the area for
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
the weather system, included a Summer-Autumn crop (crop 1) from
April/May to August, Autumn-Winter (crop 2) from September to
December, and Spring-Summer (crop 3) from late December/early
January to mid-March/mid-April. Due to this system, the third crop or
crop 3 falls in the dry season, with its harvesting period regularly
affected by the intensification of saline intrusion from January to April
[76]. In other words, not only because of its geography (located near
rivers and sea) but also its agricultural practices make Tan Hung
commune vulnerable to drought and saline intrusion.
Although the drought started in late 2014, its effects began to
become obvious late in 2015, particularly between January and April
2016 when the drought reached its peak and intensified the associated
saline intrusion, resulting in a significant loss to agricultural production.
According to the 2016 report by the Provincial Steering Committee for
Natural Disaster Prevention and Control of Soc Trang province, the dry
season (from December 2015 to April 2016) saw the Tan Hung
commune in particular and Long Phu district in general, experience the
highest increase in the degree of salt in river water measured at key
Fig. 1. Map of Tan Hung commune, Long Phu district, and Soc Trang province.
stations. The report indicates that as of 2016, the maximum degree of
Source: Adapted from the original shapefiles acquired from gadm.org, accessed
salinisation was 23.1 g per litre recorded at Long Phu station, rising from
in October 2018
14.5 g per litre in 2015, and 8.5 in 2014. An increase of 8.6 g per litre
was highest among eight cities, towns and districts of Soc Trang prov-
the Red River Delta (799 thousand ha). It is a part of the Mekong River
ince. With saline intrusion travelled inland as far as 55–60 km at the Hau
Delta system, starting from the Tibetan Plateau and running through six
River area and Soc Trang province [5], sluices gates were forced to close
countries including China, Myanmar, Lao, Thailand, Cambodia and
to prevent saltwater attack, leaving local households to use remaining
Vietnam. The river has a total length of 4800 km and covers an area of
795,000 km2 (307,000 sq miles), producing an average annual water water from both on-field and nearby channels for their crop production.
discharge of 470 km3 [71]. The VMD is characterized by dense water When water from this available source had been used, crop 3 suffered
from serious water scarcity which led to its losses. Some local farmers
networks including the 7000 km of main canals, 4000 km of on-farm
had no choice but voluntarily pump water from saltwater-affected
canals, and over 20,000 km of dykes (Ministry of Agricultural and
channels and rivers into their fields, but this measure only served to
Rural Development (2003), quoted in Ref. [72]: 19). The delta, con-
kill off the crop more quickly.
sisting of 12 provinces and one city (Can Tho), had a population of 17.66
Data from Long Phu’s Division of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
million by the end of 2015 [73]. Resulting from the 2014–2015 disaster,
ment shows a tremendous loss in agriculture, especially crop 3 pro-
the VMD was the most damaged region of the country with 10 provinces
duction. There was a dramatic decline of 81.9% of the district’s crop 3
under the effect of drought, of which nine were experiencing both
total output, from 109,148 tons in 2015 to just 19,661 tons in 2016. The
drought and saline intrusion [74]. In total, the region suffered most in
planted area of this crop also dropped significantly from 13,273.48 ha in
rice crop production with a loss of 8.6% of the total rice area (244,805
2015 to 6449.56 ha in 2016 and 3297.70 ha in 2017 [77–82]. The loss
ha) being damaged [1]: 6).
was also evident in the Tan Hung commune’s agricultural production,
In Soc Trang province, Tan Hung of Long Phu district - a rural and
which saw the total output and planted area of three rice crops in 2016
agriculture-based commune was chosen for this study. To the north, Tan
fall from 31.49% and 15.66% respectively compared to those of 2015
Hung commune is 14 km away from Long Phu town – the centre of Long
[83,84].
Phu district, and to the west, around 12–15 km away from Soc Trang city
There were 582 farming households in Tan Hung commune (ac-
– the centre of Soc Trang province. To the northwest, the commune has
counting for 36.44% of its total agricultural households) with 916 ha of
around 70 km to reach Can Tho city – the only provincial city of the
agricultural land were severely affected by the 2015–2016 drought and
VMD, to the northeast, around 230 km to reach Ho Chi Minh city, the
saltwater intrusion. To be more precise, 245 ha in 175 households
biggest city of Vietnam. This provincial city, together with four prov-
experienced a loss of 30–70%, and 671 ha of 470 households lost over
inces (Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, Dong Nai, and Tay
70% of their crop during the drought and saltwater intrusion. Overall,
Ninh), belongs to the Southeast region – one of the most dynamic eco-
each household lost an average of 1.57 ha to the hazards. According to
nomic regions of the country and the most attractive destination for
our interviews, with an investment of VND 1.5–2 million per 0.1 ha,
migration from the VMD including Soc Trang province.
each household would lose VND 15–20 million for each ha lost to the
As of 2016, Tan Hung had five villages, with 12,084 inhabitants
disaster, without considering the cost of their own labour.
living in 3078 households. Of the total households, there were 1597
In selecting affected households, two villages of Tan Hung (Village A
reported to base their livelihood entirely on agriculture (accounting for
and Village B) were chosen (see Table 2). They were located about four
51.88%). Around 63% of the population were in the labour age bracket
km away from each other. They were among the most affected villages in
[75].
the commune with Village A featuring 143 affected households with
Tan Hung commune lies in an area that receives freshwater from
157.01 ha of crop lost and Village B having 130 affected households with
upstream rivers during the rainy season (from June to December) and
115.99 ha. Additionally, the two villages were chosen for having
faces the risk of saline intrusion during the dry season (from December
different socio-demographic characteristics that were expected to have
to May) under the effects of tide regime and the reduction of rainfall
impacts on their recovery. Village A was home predominately to Kinh
[76]: 62). The task of preventing saline intrusion and storing fresh water
people (accounting for 83%), while Village B was home mostly to Khmer
in each area belongs to a specific irrigation system including sluice gates
people (accounting for 95%). Village A was the more populated village
and dykes. Tan Hung commune is situated in and managed by the Quan
but had the smallest percentage of poor households, while Village B was
Lo – Phung Hiep irrigation system which covered a service area of 178,
the least populated and had the largest percentage of poor households.
888 ha [76]: 78).
Local farmers cultivated an annual triple rice crop since early 2000s
and made it popular since 2010. This triple crop system, designed to fit
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
Table 2
Description of research sites.
Villages Total HHs # Poor HHs % in total # ethnic minority HHs % in total # affected HHs Affected area (ha)
Village A* 804 73 9.08 83 10.32 143 157.01
Village B* 480 116 24.17 456 95.00 130 115.99
Tan Hung 3078 487 15.82 1977 64.23 582 916.36
Note: HHs¼Households; ha ¼hectare.
Source: Compiled from Tan Hung commune’s household poverty database 2017
3.2. Data village (Khmer in Village B versus Kinh and Chinese in Village A), and to
also indicate the presence of household poverty (poor and near-poor
This paper draws on data collected between March and December households versus non-poor households). To facilitate this selection,
2018 for a project investigating the risk perception, disaster vulnera- the researchers combined the information from the list of
bility and social capital of disaster-affected people in Tan Hung disaster-affected households receiving relief funds from the government
commune, Long Phu district, Soc Trang province of the Mekong River provided by Tan Hung commune officials, the Tan Hung poor household
Delta. The project was classified as a low risk research and approved by database, and the discussions with commune officials and village staff.
Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (Project number Table 3 below shows the composition of the HHI sample. By ethnicity
11022). of the household heads, there were 16 Khmer headed households with
The dataset used for this paper consists of semi-structured interviews most of them living in Village B while nine were Kinh and two were
[85,86] with 28 disaster-affected households (hereafter referred to as Chinese headed households. Normally, family members have the same
HHIs) and key informant interviews with 21 key stakeholders (hereafter ethnic origin as their household head but there were some exceptions.
referred as KIIs). Besides HHIs and KIIs, this paper also uses relevant For instance, Ms Chanh was a Kinh woman who was married to a Khmer
documents (for example, local reports on socioeconomic situations and man, and Mr Boi Loi was Chinese with a Kinh wife. There were only
land use), archival records (such as datasets relating to natural hazards, seven female headed households and they were all widows. In relation to
rice production, poverty, population dataset) for data analysis. All in- poverty in 2017, there were eight households classified as ‘poor’ or
terviewees cited in this paper appear under pseudonyms. ‘near-poor’. Of which, there was one household classified by the gov-
HHIs were chosen to obtain information about four main topics ernment in 2015–2017 as ‘non-poor’ but was considered as a ‘poor
including the perception of risks of drought and saline intrusion, the household’ by village staff and also themselves because of their critical
conditions of disaster vulnerability, the recovery process since the conditions (Dien Kinh, Village A).
2015–2016 event, and what social supports disaster-affected households According to Long Phu Yearbook Statistics (2016), as of 2016, an
receive from their social relationships during the recovering process. To agricultural household in Tan Hung commune possesses average 1.82 ha
generate information on such support, interviewees were asked if of agricultural land area. Using 1.82 ha as the dividing indicator, there
anyone provided support to them that helped recovery from the losses are 17 households having less than 1.82 ha, most of them (11) living in
associated with the 2015–2016 disaster. Each household’s representa- Village B and over half of them (nine) were poor or near-poor house-
tive was also asked to specify what support, if any, they received from holds. Poor and near-poor households have limited land area (under 1
their family and relatives, friends, neighbours, brokers, merchants, ha). There was only one non-poor household who did not receive land
agricultural input suppliers, mass organisations and local government. (Chin Ro, village staff) because he had not yet inherited land from his
The type of support was identified based on the information provided by father, but he could borrow from his father up to 3 ha to cultivate crop.
interviewees. Households with 1.82 ha and more were mostly from Village A and Kinh
The strategy used for selecting disaster-affected households was group (eight out of 11). Seven households had more than 4 ha of land
stratified purposeful sampling [87]. The stratified strategy helped select area, with five of them are Kinh.
affected households by using the administrative structure of the Interviews with key stakeholders provided information of the
commune to choose two settlement units (two villages). Out of the five context, the support from government and mass organisations, and
Tan Hung commune villages, Village A and Village B were selected as served to triangulate information sources. There were three main groups
they were among the most severely affected, and more importantly, had of stakeholders included in KIIs. First, local staff including government
contrasting characteristics: Village A, including 804 households, was officials at three administrative levels (from the provincial level to
home to mostly Kinh population – the ethnic majority group in the
country (other ethnic groups in this village including Khmer and Chinese
Table 3
groups accounted for only 10.32% in 2017); while Village B, containing
Household profile.
480 households, was home to mostly Khmer population – the ethnic
minority group – making up 95% of total village population in the same Categories Village A Village B Total
year. Village B had higher percentages of poor and near-poor households By ethnicity of HH head
than that of Village A (32.08% versus 12.69%).1 Within each village, Khmer group 3 13 16
households selected for the study needed to meet the following criteria: Kinh group 9 1 10
Chinese group 2 0 2
to have suffered from the drought and saline intrusion in the 2015–2016
Sub-total 14 14 28
third rice crop season, to reflect the presence of ethnic origins in each By gender of HH head
Male headed household 12 9 21
Female headed household 2 5 7
Sub-total 14 14 28
1 In Vietnam, the official poverty line is calculated by the Ministry of Labour, By poverty status in 2017
Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) based on the National Census on Poverty Poor/Near-poor 3 6 9
undertaken every five years. From 2016 to 2020, a household is ranked as Nonpoor 11 8 19
‘poor’ if its average monthly income per capita is below VND 700,000/month/ Sub-total 14 14 28
capita (USD$30.4), as ‘near poor’ – in danger of falling into poverty - if their By land holdings
figure falls between VND 700,000 and 1,000,000/month/capita (USD Under 1.82 ha 6 11 17
$30.4–43.4). There was no classification of non-poor households into smaller 1.82 ha and above 8 3 11
Sub-total 14 14 28
groups such as middle or rich.
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
district and commune levels), village staff (heads of villages), and rep- In addition to aid, the district and commune government experi-
resentatives of mass organisations (hereafter referred to as MOs) pro- mented with a model of corn cultivation in the dry season of 2017 for
vided insights into agricultural production, disaster progression, effects one or two households in Village A and Village C – another village of Tan
and impacts, local policies on disaster management, and the recovery Hung commune, without including any households from this study. The
process of the commune and studied villages. Different from other types purpose was to offer local farmers a chance to convert livelihood from
of organisations, MOs can be considered as ‘political’ as they were rice production to corn cultivation, helping them to omitt the risky rice
formed to help Vietnam’s Communist Party (VCP) and the state imple- crop 3. However, the model turned out to be a failure for two reasons.
ment their policies as well as ‘social’ functions such as helping people in First, selling corn to companies faced difficulties because of low price.
social welfare at a grassroots level [88]: 19, 30). The most common mass This lack of out-market access made other households ignore this model
organisations included the Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, Youth and rely on rice production for their recovery. Second, households did
Union, War Veteran’s Association General Federation of Trade Unions not want to change to corn production because of its requirement of
[89]: 8). Second, agricultural input suppliers were asked to provide in- more labour and techniques, and more importantly, their familiarity
formation on their relationships with farmers, how they have supported with rice production. Other options of changing livelihoods such as
farmers before, during, and after the loss of the 2015–2016 third rice converting rice crop into shrimp production system found in other
crop. Third, experts were asked to provide information on national studies [91] was absent from our interviews due to the fact that the
policies on the disaster risk management and climate change adaptation agro-ecological conditions of Tan Hung commune with a half year of
as well as the rice production in the VMD. In total, there were two ex- freshwater and another half of saline intrusion fitted better the rice
perts, seven officials (three at the communal level), three village heads, production.
five representatives (often chairman/chairwoman) from mass Besides the role of local government, mass organisations such as
organisations. Women’s Union and the Farmers’ Union were expected to provide
After being conducted and recorded, interviews were transcribed support to disaster-affected households. However, our interviews with
before being imported into and organised in NVivo. The data then were households showed that these organisations offered no assistance. Key
analysed based mostly on the thematic analysis approach proposed by informant interviews with leaders of Commune Women’s Union, village
Ref. [90]. The thematic analysis approach was used to code and find Father’s Front and village Farmers’ Union indicated that these organi-
themes and sub-themes of types of support sought and received by sations had no funds for such support. Interviewed households in our
disaster-affected households during their recovery as well as the social sample also reported that they did not join other types of organisations
relationships they engaged with to get such support. We also coded these (voluntary organisations, community-based organisations) that might
types of support into three recovery phases: the short-term period, the have played a role in assisting them in their recovery.
mid-term period, and the long-term period based on the purpose and The tendency for maintaining the mono rice production presented in
nature of the support activities. After the coding, we built matrixes to our sample was evident with most households (26 out of 28 households)
link households (of different characteristics such as ethnicity of house- continuing to rely on this livelihood for their recovery. The two
hold heads, poverty status, land holding, location) with types of social households that stopped crop cultivation had very limited land area
support, types of social relationships, and recovery phases. (0.15 ha), were poor and headed by older females (over 55) with
frequent health problems. They both rented out the land and lived
4. Results dependently on their children’s supplies. The dependence on rice pro-
duction facilitated the use of bonding and bridging social capital sur-
4.1. Disaster recovery and the government aid rounding this livelihood.
The 2015–2016 disaster caused serious loss to households who 4.2. Bonding and bridging social capital in recovery phases
cultivated the 2015–2016 crop 3. Affected households in our study did
not receive any support from domestic and international non-profit or- 4.2.1. Bonding social capital
ganisations, but they did receive the government aid for the affected Bonding and bridging social capital provided different types of
area. The commune government, based on their calculation, divided supports for the recovery process. It is seen that bonding networks
affected households into two levels of crop loss, one was those who were played a key role in three phases while bridging networks became more
affected by loss of 30–70% of their total planted area and the other was important in later phases (Table 4).
those who experienced over 70% loss. The former would receive an aid Bonding social capital, embedded mostly in family ties, neighbour-
of the rate of $1 million VND per every 1 ha affected, and the latter hoods, and close friendship, provided social supports throughout three
would receive a double of that amount. For instance, if a household had recovery phases.
0.1 ha with over 70% affected, they would receive an aid of $200 In the short-term phase, disaster-affected households focused on
thousand VND. According to fieldwork data, 18 out of 28 households (10 meeting survival needs with the support coming from bonding re-
from Village B, 8 from Village A) had from 71 to 100% of their cultivated lationships. It was no surprise that all eight households from this cate-
area lost from the disaster, six lost from 30 to 70%, and four under 30%. gory were poor and near-poor households who struggled immediately
Fifteen households lost 1 ha or above, seven lost 2 ha or above and after the 2015–2016 crop 3, with seven of them being Khmer. This type
notably three lost 7.8 ha and above. The crop loss, nevertheless, seemed of support included requesting food or borrowing a small amount of
more serious than the two levels of loss determined by the government. money to buy food. This is understandable as the loss of crop 3 meant
For instance, for those who lost from 30 to 70 area of their crops, the they did not receive an income after three to four months of hard work
remaining area produced lower productivity and low quality of paddy while having no savings to supply family members. These households
due to saline intrusion, which resulted in lower prices or no sale. also had small landholdings (under 0.5 ha). Therefore, their crop pro-
Furthermore, the government aid for each 1 ha lost did not compensate duction often served for self-consumption purposes. Ms Buoi’s case was
households’ losses of total investment in crop production. Each house- a prime example. After the loss of 0.15 ha during the 2015–2016 season,
hold could invest from around $1.5–2 million VND (around $65 to $86 as she did not have any income or stored rice, she had to borrow a small
USD) for every 0.1 ha (cong), or $15–20 million VND (around $652 to amount of money from her relatives for food. They did not have a big
$869 USD) for every 1 ha. These amounts included costs for agricultural land holding to use as collateral, nor did they have wealthy relatives to
inputs such as fertiliser, pesticide, and seeds, and labour renting for ask for large amounts of money. For some extremely poor households,
specific tasks such as seeding and pumping, however they did not like Mr Xoai’s household (male, 60þ, Khmer, poor household, Village
include the costs for their own labour. B), moneylending from family or relatives was a rare option as they were
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
Table 4 except her second daughter who had migrated to An Giang province
Roles of bonding and bridging social capital in three phases of disaster recovery. with her family years ago. The case of Ms Chanh, 50, Kinh woman
Forms Relationships Recovery phases married to a Khmer man, was special because she used her children’s
remittance to pay debt and invest in the following rice season.
Short-term Mid-term phase Long-term
In addition to direct money borrowing or remittance, seven hazard-
(urgent (temporary (permanent
problems) problems) problems) stricken households (three Kinh, three Khmer, and one Chinese)
received financial support through free land exchange among their kin
Bonding Family ties, Borrowing Financial support Seasonal and
relatives, close money or (borrowing long-term relationships. They were mostly non-poor (six out of seven), lived in
friends foods money for paying migration Village A (five), and had land 1 ha and above (five). They tended to have
debts or starting better-off relatives who could share land with them. The only poor
new seasons,
household in this category was Mr Chay Ben who did not possess any
getting
land but rented 0.13 ha from his mother. For the 2015–2016 crop 3, he
remittance to pay
debts, cancelling borrowed another 0.9 ha from other villagers, making a total of 1 ha.
land borrowing With the loss of all this area, he owed a debt of $4.5 million VND to those
fees) villagers but he did not need to pay for his mother’s 0.1 ha. This practice
Temporary
of borrowing land without fees if there was a crisis shows the benefits of
migration
Labour support bonding connections during critical situations.
Bridging Input suppliers Delaying debt The second type of support in the mid-term recovery was labour
from the support among family and kin ties with 12 households. Most of them
previous were non-poor households (seven) and Khmer (eight). Of which, four
season(s)
households (all non-poor household, three Khmer and one Chinese)
Buying inputs
on credit were found providing support to their family and relative ties. These
households either had machines such as a ploughing machine (Man,
Source: HHIs
Khmer, non-poor, Village B) or a cutting machine (Luu, Khmer, non-
poor, Village B) or had free time outside of their main jobs such as
also poor. Xoai’s nephew, who lived nearby, had experienced his own
Chin Ro (Chinese, village staff) and Muoi Bich (Khmer, village staff). The
hardship and was unable to help Mr Xoai. The nephew-in-law said: ‘My
remaining households (eight) received labour support from their family
family is also too poor to give him anything during the incident’ (female,
members such as grown children, brothers/sisters or husband. One of
35þ, Khmer ethnicity, poor household, Village B).
the prime examples was the case of Co Vua (male, 55, Kinh, Village A),
In the mid-term phase, the support focused on getting back to the
head of one of the most severely affected households with a loss of 7.86
normal cycle of crop production. Therefore, providing financial insur-
ha. Co Vua had to call his son, who was living with his wife in Soc Trang
ance was the key with varying options: borrowing money for paying
city and had uncertain employment, back to Tan Hung commune to
debts and starting new seasons, getting remittance to pay debts, omitting
work on crop production. The cases of Cam, Xoai and Dua Hau (all poor)
land borrowing fees, and facilitating temporary migration for replace- indicated a great need for labour support due to their households’ health
ment income. The money borrowing featured two non-poor households
problems. Cam had a physical disability that did not allow him to work
(also Kinh ethnicity and from Village A) who borrowed big amount of
on the farm, thus all labour tasks were left to his wife. Xoai faced
money (over $20 million VND onward) for paying debt in agriculture. As
frequent health problems and suffered a serious illness during
a result of the 2015–2016 drought and saltwater intrusion, Bong Da’s 2016–2017. Ms Dua Hau, blind and weak at 58, was head of her
household lost 100% of the 2015–2016 third crop (10.01 ha out of
household which included her daughter and granddaughter after her
10.01 ha). Of which, 3.2 ha lost from 30 to 70% of crop, and the
husband died in 2016. With lack of physical capacity, these poor
remaining area lost over 70%. With an investment of approximately
households needed their kin to help them. Asked how his nephew helped
VND 1.7 million (around US$75) every 0.1 ha, Bong Da estimated a loss
him, Xoai replied: ‘I actually left all [land] to him. [He managed all the
of VND 170 million (around US$7391). This investment was mostly
things such as] how much paddy needs to cut, how to sell, how much
from his family savings of VND 30–40 million and a one-year bank loan paddy to keep…’.
of VND 100 million. When the 2015–2016 crop 3 failed, his family did
In the mid-term recovery, there was one household who sent their
not have any earnings to pay back the bank loan. These circumstances
children to temporarily migrate to big cities in search of replacement
led him to borrow from his parents-in-law (who are his neighbours) two income. The case of Oi Dao (male, 60þ, Khmer, non-poor household,
ounces of gold and his uncle $40 million VND to pay for the bank loan
Village B, possessing 7.4 ha) showed that the use of temporary migration
and invest in new seasons.
should be considered more general than just a financial option for
Asking children to send back remittance was also a financial option.
households with large land holdings because it did not just focus on
The type of support (including seven households) featured almost
financial aspects but also helped reduce the immediate pressure and
equally between household head’s ethnicity (three Kinh or Chinese and
stress of losing income. The loss of 11.2 out of 11.7 ha cultivated during
four Khmer) and household poverty (four non-poor households and
the incident resulted in an estimated loss of $220 million VND for Oi
three poor and near-poor households). All households in our sample had
Dao, led his household to send his daughter and son-in-law to Binh
either their children or brothers/sisters or relatives migrating to other
Duong province to work for six months so they could send home their
districts within Soc Trang province or other provinces of Vietnam. This
earnings. However, this migration only presented as a mid-term solution
was an important source of security for local households. Different from as these children came home in the following crop’s harvest time to help
borrowing for the sake of immediately urgent needs right after the
the family because the family could not give up on their land.
disaster, most households in this category often received small remit-
In the long-term recovery, bonding relationships were found offering
tance monthly or quarterly throughout a period of time. For instance, Ms
support via starting migration as a new livelihood strategy. Finding
Chay Nhanh (Village A) received around $500,000 VND to $1 million a
alternative earnings from off-farm works was an option for disaster-
month from her children to buy food. Some needed remittance for ex-
affected households in the VMD [91]. Surprisingly, all eight cases
penses during critical events. For instance, Ms Dien Kinh (Village A)
found were from households with Khmer head, with five from poor and
suffered appendicitis in 2017 and needed $2 million VND for surgery.
near poor households and three non-poor households. Of which, except
This event was seen as an additional stress combined with the original
for Chay Ben whose household head was approaching 40 years of age,
disaster that put her in crisis. No one was able to lend her this money
other households had heads in their 50s or 60s. Thus, while Chay Ben
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
was the only household where they (husband and wife) migrated harvest. In addition, suppliers also allowed affected households to buy
seasonally themselves, other households in this category chose to send new inputs on credit for their next crops. For instance, a farmer recalled
their children on permanent migration (for example, Tao, Man, Sau the reaction from Ms Pho Ga, the Kinh supplier after the incident: ‘…
Rieng, Buoi, Mit, and Muoi Bich). Possessing a small area of land after the 2016 hazard, I lost 100% of my third crop. She sympathised
appeared to make it easier for households to send their children to with me and said to me that I could pay the debt if my next year’s crops
migrate because their landholding could not provide required income were profitable’ (male, 60þ, Khmer, non-poor household, Village B).
for recovery (for instance the cases of Buoi household, 0.15 ha; Mit, 0.15 Reflecting on the support from supplier, Dua Hau said: ‘She did not allow
ha; Muoi Bich 0.6 ha). With this small land holding, the parents who you to be starved’. Dua Hau was allowed to defer her debt and buy on
stayed in the village also avoided crop production by lending out their credit until the 2016 crop 2’s harvest (around December 2016). Using
land after the disaster. Although permanent migration was a long-term this crop’s income to pay part of her debt she went on to borrow again
measure, it did not solve all their problems. Indeed, only young peo- for the next crop. Such circle of buying on credit – harvesting and paying
ple migrated, leaving behind those who were old and weak. While the part of debt – deferring part of debts – buying on credit – harvesting and
young people were able to experience a good recovery with a new paying next debts was common practice in the relationship between
livelihood without the risk of saline intrusion, the elders were left farmers and suppliers.
behind and continuously faced the risk of natural disasters if they There was a slight difference between non-poor households and poor
maintained crop production. and near-poor households in receiving suppliers’ support. Non-poor
households, who appeared to have more family savings, were more
4.2.2. Bridging social capital active in their crop production and less dependent on the support of
As 26 out of 28 households continued to depend their livelihood suppliers; whereas, poor and near-poor households who lacked cash,
through agricultural production, they needed a boost to return to their were more dependent on suppliers’ support. Asked if he bought on credit
usual circle of agricultural production. This meant that they needed to from suppliers, Mr Quan Vot (50, male, non-poor, Kinh household,
rely on bridging relationships in this sector. There were important Village A) said: I only bought on credit at the end of crop because at that
bridging connections in relation to crop production including agricul- time I had invested most of my money… But I only owed them 1–2
tural input suppliers, brokers and merchants. Agricultural input sup- months then I paid’. After 2015–2016, the household of Luu owed
pliers (đại lý) were those who provided different types of crop around 42 million to a supplier in the same village. Asked if they kept
production’s inputs including seeds, pesticides, fertilisers and agricul- their debt on hold, Hong, the wife, said: ‘They were easy on our debt
tural tools. Some suppliers were providing one of these and others payment but after the incident, we paid, but not all of our debt. For
provided them all. Suppliers were retailers of big companies who sold instance, we owed $30 million, so we paid $20 million and borrowed
these inputs. Each supplier could be tier 1 (directly importing products some more’. In addition, non-poor farmers often did not have to pay
from companies) or tier 2 (importing products via retailer’s tier 1), or extra credit for deferring debt: ‘As I often buy a large number of inputs so
tier 3 (importing products from tier 2). In our sample, suppliers were that the supplier does not count the interest and allow me to pay the debt
mostly located in Village A or other villages of Tan Hung commune, when I can’, said Boi Loi who cultivated 13 ha of the 2015–2016 crop 3
Long Phu town of Long Phu district (14 km away from Tan Hung (male, 35þ, Chinese, non-poor household, Village A).
commune), or in Soc Trang city (14–15 km away). Brokers (c�o) in the By contrast, for some poor and near-poor households, suppliers could
local context refers to a job connecting farmers to specific service pro- ask them to pay debt as soon as possible. The Khmer household of Chay
viders or buyers or sometimes service providers themselves. For Ben - a poor family living in Village A was an instance. With the loss of 1
instance, paddy brokers were those who assemble paddy from farmers ha (all of which was borrowed land), his family was in serious debt to the
after their harvest and sell them to merchants (thương la�i). Brokers could tune of VND 9 million. Although he was allowed to postpone the debt, he
also be those who provided or connected those who provided ploughing could not buy more inputs on credit. This led him to omit crop pro-
machines (Man, Khmer, Village B) or cutting machines (such as Luu, duction and seek income from sugarcane cutting: ‘After that, I went to do
Village B) or pumpers to farmers in need. Brokers often were those who casual work to pay him. I was hired as an agricultural labourer and
lived in villages or a commune and had a knowledge of who were the worked to earn money to repay the debt’. (Chay Ben, male, 35þ, Khmer,
farmers. Merchants were those who bought paddy from farmers or from poor household, Village A). There were a few households who were
brokers and sold them to companies. Merchants were often from other refused to borrow more inputs for new seasons. This was the case of Dien
provinces. They moved across provinces in the VMD to buy products. Kinh who failed to convince her supplier to get new inputs: ‘That year I
Because of their constant travelling, farmers often did not have a owed him around 800 thousand VND. I begged him to skip the debt but
consistent relationship with merchants. he refused. I had to get money from other sources to pay for him in order
When asked who provided assistance during their recovery, farmers to borrow another debt. However, he did not lend me any more’ (Dien
did not provide any evidence of any support received from brokers or Kinh, female, 60þ, Khmer, poor household, Village B). In some cases, as
merchants. However, the relationship with suppliers was different. reflected by Mr Bong Ro (70, Kinh, non-poor household, Village A),
Suppliers were reported to be helping affected households, regardless of household’s capacity in crop production was the key to suppliers’ sup-
ethnicities, poverty status, land holding, or location, helping them port: ‘If they know you don’t have capacity to pay debt, they will not
mitigate the impact of the 2014–2016 disaster and overcome their crisis. allow you buy on credit. You have to borrow cash from other sources to
The support received from these bridging relationships included two buy.’
distinct but interrelated types: deferring debts from previous seasons The relationship between farmers and suppliers appears as an eco-
and allowing the purchase of inputs on credit. These two forms of nomic relationship but they were indeed much more than that. First, the
assistance could be used consistently and continuously season after flexibility shown in credit sale and deferring debt in this relationship had
season by farmers, becoming a part of permanent crop development in been built and practiced as a cultural way of enacting agricultural
longer-term recovery which allowed farmers to stay within the circle of business. This mechanism did not just appear after the 2015–2016
crop production. incident but had existed long before. Even suppliers cannot change the
The use of deferring debts and buying on credit were common among habit of buying on credit that farmers have become accustomed to.
all households in our sample (except for the two Khmer households who Asked whether this mechanism caused them risks of bankruptcy, Nuoc
stopped their crop production after the disaster). They reported that Tuong, a supplier in Long Phu town of Long Phu district replied: ‘Yes, but
after the 2015–2016 crop 3 they were more or less in debt to their we have to bear it because some suppliers had tried to not use this
suppliers. However, their suppliers allowed them to defer part or all of mechanism died first’. Indeed, in our sample, Nhay Cao (a former input
their debts and allowed them to repay these debts until the next crop’s supplier, Village A), was forced to close her business around 10 years
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K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
ago because she could not bear credit sale. Suppliers who did not allow that was paid. In addition to this notebook kept by farmers, suppliers
credit sale often lost their customers. For instance, another case was Ms also had a large notebook logging the same information about the
Chay Nhanh who ended her connection with the Banh Xeo supplier – a money and inputs owed by all debtors. Farmers were expected to bring
supplier operating in Village A – even though her family was related to their notebook whenever they came to get more inputs, purchase new
Banh Xeo’s owner. Chay Nhanh recalled that this owner refused to let items, or pay their debt. However, this was often not the case. As indi-
her buy inputs on credit. This upset Chay Nhanh and she sought other cated by one supplier, ‘sometimes they [farmers] just pop by and buy
input retailers to work with (female, 60þ, Kinh, near-poor household, some inputs on credit without bringing their notebook’ (Com Rang
Village A). Therefore, suppliers needed to alter their ways of conducting supplier, Kinh, Village A). In another situation, a farmer was observed
business and build a flexible bond with farmers. Asked whether they paying her total debt of VND 12 million to a supplier in Soc Trang city
would allow farmers to delay their loans after the 2014–2016 disaster, a without her notebook or any signature. Only the supplier noted in her
female owner of Nuoc Mam supplier in Long Phu district said: ‘Yes, we notebook at that time (Bo Tai supplier, Soc Trang city). Sometimes, the
must. No other ways! (Laughing aloud). No one comes to solve this for us business transaction was reduced to an oral agreement: ‘Yeah, [some-
[suppliers]. We and farmers have to sort this out alone’ (female, 60þ, times] nothing at all, just by word of mouth’. (Female, 60þ, Kinh
supplier, Long Phu). ‘Nowadays there are few households buying inputs ethnicity, Manager of Nuoc Mam supplier, Long Phu town). This situa-
by cash, almost all farmers buy on credit’, said Bong Ban (male, 40, tion denotes the trust prevailing between farmers and suppliers.
Kinh, non-poor, Village A). Buying on credit therefore was a cultural
way of doing crop production in locality. 5. Conclusion
This culture of business practice created calmness for farmers facing
the disaster. Asked how the mechanism helped farmers, Muoi Bich Slow-onset disasters generate support types different from sudden-
whose household lost around 12 million invested in 0.6 ha during the onset disasters. The latter disasters include earthquakes, tsunamis, or
2015–2016 crop 3, said although the loss was severe, it did not affect typhoons, which often engender devastating impacts by deconstructing
much because most of the loss was the investment on fertiliser and housing and infrastructure and causing death. The type of supports
pesticide, which he could owe to suppliers: ‘Suppliers understood the associated with these types of disasters are also unique with rescuing,
situation of drought and saline intrusion’s impact so that they allowed evacuation, and the offering shelter [34], food and necessary aids [27,
farmers to defer their debt’. After three years, he could pay all the debt, 30,40,60,66,67], strong emotional support [33,66,68], or repopulation
with $2 million from each crop. When responding to the question of how [56]. Household recovery from slow-onset disasters like drought in the
important was the credit sale to farmers’ crop production, Mr Bau Duc, a VMD seemed to concentrate on agriculture– the main area that was most
70-year-old Kinh farmer living in Village A asserted that the credit sale affected by the disaster. In this context, households seemed to seek and
mechanism between farmers and retailers was fundamental to their crop receive support such as cash borrowing, debt defer, input sale on credit,
production: ‘If we buy everything in cash, where do we get money or labour support which helped them get back on the course of agri-
from?’ cultural production. There were few households who were poor and
The second indicator of the farmers-suppliers’ relationship is that living on the edge of subsistence required food aid like in the
farmers, regardless of ethnicity and poverty status, did not take sup- sudden-onset disaster context [34].
pliers’ support for granted. Not every farmer received the support from Our paper confirms that bonding and bridging capital contributed
suppliers to bounce back after the 2015–2016 incident. Indeed, to be substantial aid to the disaster recovery process but they should play
able to ask for suppliers’ help, farmers had to build trust with suppliers different roles in each phase. Bonding networks are essential to not just
over time through their business. For Bong Chuyen, the relationship was to the emergency period but also mid-term and long-term recovery
built over a long period of time and knowing each other’s identity and phases. Our paper showed additional aspect of the difference between
capacity was key: poor/near-poor and non-poor households. The first group used money
Mr T [supplier] will allow me to buy on credit as much as I want. But borrowed as a source for their emergent needs (short-term) while the
there are some farmers Mr T does not know, he did not sell. Having done second group seemed used more in mid-term recovery as they invested
farming with each other [between me and Mr T] is the key. Further, if in the following-up crop production. Non-poor households also used
you are from this village but he doesn’t know you or your capacity, he their remittance for paying debt purposes while those poor households
will not sell to you. seemed using remittance for daily expenses.
Asked whether every farmer was allowed to buy on credit, Oi Dao It is noted that borrowing large amounts of money for heavy in-
stressed that close acquaintance and credibility in business were the vestment like crop production was not the strength of bonding re-
most important criteria: ‘just only those who are closely acquainted are lationships. Indeed, there were not many households including those
those who are allowed to buy new inputs on credit. No acquaintance and that were better-off, which could borrow large amounts of money from
credibility, no credit sale. Just we buy them every single crop every their relatives to invest in crop production. This somehow suggested the
single year’. For Tao, the key to the relationship was to show from the limitation of bonding social capital in dealing with large-scale, severe
beginning that you are trustworthy. Asked if his supplier allows disaster found in current literature [60,66]. This was similar to the
everyone to buy on credit, Tao said: ‘No, she judges you first before conclusion that close networks were found to be unhelpful in reducing
accepting you buy on credit, not letting anyone owe. If you are decent to drought-related health effects, which could be explained by ‘the fact that
her, she will be treating you well. If you are not trustworthy, then she the amount of damage done by drought is too large to be coped with
won’t be’. through social networks’ [92]: 441). In a study of Quang Nam province
Only trust and understanding each other would allow suppliers to of Vietnam affected by flood [93],: 112) argued that neighbourhood
accept variations to credit sales and debt repayment postponement. It social capital was weak in disaster protection because neighbour re-
was observed that during the process of selling on credit, between lations are mostly limited to ‘ad hoc donations rather than local level
farmers and suppliers there was often no formal deferred payment cooperation and reciprocity’.
agreement, or no official credit-sale invoice or money lending receipt Sending family members to big cities was also a common recovery
needed. In terms of buying on credit, each household was given a measure in Ref. [91]. This conclusion is similar to findings suggesting
notebook to record their debt. This notebook could be either a printed that flood-affected households turned their family members into sea-
notebook designed by a company and carrying information of that sonal migrants as one of the adaptive strategies in responding to floods
company and suppliers, or an improvised ordinary notebook. Every [94]. Those seasonal migrants can extend their networks, find more
input item owed or paid was recorded in this notebook. Blue color income and send remittances back to their family members whose sur-
indicated the ongoing debts while the red color indicated the part of debt vival and recovery from flood relied significantly on this money [94].
9
K. Nguyen-Trung et al. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f D i s a s t e r R is k R e d u c t i o n 46(2020)101501
Our study shows that using migration in disaster recovery was indeed University), Dr. Fiona Miller (Macquarie University), Professor Be�ata
based mostly in relation to children, especially in households with the Da�vid (Semmelweis University), Dr. Nguyen Xuan Nghia (Vietnam Na-
heads over 50 or 60 years of age. Poor/near-poor households and those tional University Ho Chi Minh city), Mr. Le Minh Tien (Ho Chi Minh
who have land holdings tended to choose permanent migration and quit Open University), Dr. Tran Huu Quang, Southern Institute of Social
crop production while non-poor households having large land holdings Sciences (Ho Chi Minh city) and Institute of Sociology (Hanoi) for their
appeared to send their children on migration but keep their crop special advice and feedback regarding social capital ideas and the
production. fieldwork in Vietnam. Warm thanks also go to Dr. Loc Ho (Nanyang
Bridging social capital arising mostly from the relationship with Technological University) and Ms Lan Nguyen (Vietnam National Uni-
suppliers was only used for long-term purposes (crop development) in versity Ho Chi Minh city) for their support in map drawing. And last but
disaster-stricken households. The support from suppliers were seen as a not least, welcome Nguyen Ha Lam to the world!
main source for affected households to get back to their crop production
and maintain and develop them in the following up seasons after the Appendix A. Supplementary data
disaster. Our research further confirms the argument that social capital
can flower from the commercial context in order to help affected Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://
households recover from adversity [29]. Commercial connections doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101501.
among farmers and input suppliers have turned into socio-cultural re-
lationships, facilitating a smooth system of credit sale, debt deferring, References
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10