Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

327 Pages·2013·1.67 MB·English

by  Raimo Tuomela

social ontology
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Social Ontology
collective intentionality and group agents
Raimo Tuomela
1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Tuomela, Raimo.
Social ontology : collective intentionality and group agents / Raimo Tuomela.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–997826–7 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–19–997827–4 (updf)
1. Social groups. 2. Group identity. I. Title.
HM716.T86 2013
305—dc23
2013000898
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
To my wife Maj
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Contents

Preface   ix
Acknowledgments   xiii
1. Introduction   1
2. Groups and We-Th inking   21
3. Collective Intentions   62
4. Acting for Social Reasons   97
5. Collective Acceptance and the Formation of Group Attitudes   123
6. Cooperation and Authority   147
7. We-Reasoning in Game-Th eoretic Contexts   179
8. Institutional Facts and Institutions   214
9. Group Solidarity: All for One and One for All   242
Notes   265
References   301
Index 307
vii
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Preface

The main title of this book is Social Ontology , with a focus on the two topics of
collective intentionality and g roup agency . Th ese two topics do not cover all that there
is to social ontology, which can be broadly understood to cover all kinds of entities
and properties that rational study of the social world is taken to need. Understood in
this wide sense, social ontology is not only a study of the basic nature of social reality
but at least in part a study of what the best-explaining social scientifi c theories need
to appeal to in their postulated ontologies. Th is book largely focuses on conceptu-
ally group-based notions. Th e theory presented in this book is based on the full we-
perspective (the “we-mode”) and on collective construction of the social world by
means of the collective acceptance by group members.
To say a few words about c ollective intentionality (“aboutness”): a good example
of situations involving collective intentionality is given by cooperation. As we know,
human beings have the capacity to cooperate in a variety of contexts, including those
involving an element of confl ict between the participants. Cooperation in its core
sense requires collectively intentional attitudes such as joint intentions and shared
beliefs, which have the same content and can be taken to be satisfi ed by the same
token state. For instance, watching a fl ying eagle together, conversing, painting a
house together, making an agreement, and forming an organization are examples
of phenomena involving collective intentionality. Collectively intentional mental
states and actions based on them involve reference to a “we”, a social group capable
of collective reasoning and action. When the group members jointly intend, believe,
ix