Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self

310 Pages·1979·5.02 MB·English

by  Michael Lewis

Social Cognition
and the
Acquisition of Self
Social Cognition
and the
Acquisition of Self
Micha el Lewis
and
Jeanne Brooks -Gunn
Institute for the Study of Exceptional Children
Educational Testing Service
Princeton, New Jersey
PLENUM PRESS· NEW YORK AND LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Lewis, Michael, 1937 (Jan. 10)-
Social cognition and the acquisition of self.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Self. 2. Social perception. 3. Personality. 4. Infant psychology. I. Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne,
joint author. II. Title. [DNLM: 1. Self concept. BF697 L675]
BF697.L46 155.4'22 79-12070
ISBN-13: 978-1-4684-3568-9 e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4684-3566-5
001: 10.1007/978-1-4684-3566-5
© 1979 Michael Lewis and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn,Educational Testing Service
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1979
Plenum Press, New York
A Division of Plenum Publishing Corporation
227 West 17th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrirval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfIlming,
recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher
To Rhoda
who has given my mind a place to rest
and an opportunity to grow
Michael Lewis
To my parents
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn
Preface
It is always enlightening to inquire about the origins of a research en
deavor or a particular theoretical approach. Beginning with the observa
tion of the mental life of the infant in 1962, Michael Lewis has contrib
uted to the change in the view of the infant as an insensate mass of
confusion to a complex and intellectual being. Anyone fortunate enough
to have participated in the infancy research of the 1960s knows how
exciting it was to have discovered in this small creature such a full and
complex organism. More central to the origins of this work was the
perception of the infant as an interactive, not a reactive, organism, and
as one who influenced its social environment and constructed its cogni
tive life, not one who just passively received information. Other areas of
psychology had already begun to conceptualize the organism as active
and interactive, even while developmental psychologists still clung to
either simple learning paradigms, social reinforcement theories, or reflex
ive theories. Even though Piaget had proposed an elaborate interactive
theory, it was not until the late 1960s that his beliefs were fully im
plemented into developmental theory and practice. A concurrent trend
was the increase of concern with mother-infant interactions (Ainsworth,
1969; Bowlby, 1969; Goldberg & Lewis, 1969; Lewis & Goldberg, 1969)
which provided the impetus for the study of social and emotional as well
as cognitive development.
About this time, Michael Lewis made an interesting observation
of his daughter, Felicia, who was then about eight months old. Al
though the approach of adult strangers produced "stranger fear" as
expected from the infancy literature, the approach of child strangers,
friends of her three-year-old brother Benjamin, elicited no such re
sponse. Fear was absent, yet greeting and approach were not. The cur
rent or subsequent theories concerning fear were not adequate in offer-
vii
viii PREFACE
ing an explanation for the observation, nor did they adequately address
the interface between emotional expression and cognition. It was at this
point that the notion of similarity, of "like me", was formulated. The
empirical literature on self development was practically nonexistent.
Discussing this problem with Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, then a student at the
University of Pennsylvania, we decided to test this observation. In the
study originating out of this observation (Lewis & Brooks, 1974) and in
several subsequent studies (Brooks & Lewis, 1976; Lewis, Young,
Brooks, & Michalson, 1975), we confirmed that young infants are more
wary and frightened of adult strangers than child strangers. In the origi
nal Lewis and Brooks study, we decided to observe the child's response
to other social objects besides strangers and, to this end, a mother-and a
self-approach procedure were observed. In the self-approach, the in
fants were moved toward a mirror in which they could see only their
own image during the approach. From our observations in this study,
our interest in self recognition and the development of self was born.
For her dissertation, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn studied self recognition in a
mirror and a still-picture situation. The results of this labor are Mirror
Study I and Picture Study I. The other studies reported in this volume
have been run since, confirming our belief that self knowledge has its
origins in infancy. Moreover, as our interest in social cognition and
affect development has deepened, the central role of the self as a mediat
ing construct has become increasingly relevant. Fortunately, the work of
others has guided us: Gallup with nonhuman primates, the personality
theory of Kelly, and the social theories of Mead and Cooley. Even more,
their insights have encouraged us, sometimes in the face of skepticism
of our colleagues, to continue our work. Although self knowledge is
widely discussed in the personality, social, clinical, and philosophical
literature, its place in developmental psychology is sadly precarious.
Since we have begun our work, a few empirical papers have appeared
and a few developmental psychologists have begun to discuss the self.
Our hope is that this volume and the theoretical approach that we pre
sent will encourage others to approach the problem of self knowledge
and development. For us, the problem of the self remains a vital consid
eration in any theory of social cognition and motivation. It is necessary
to reintroduce the organism into psychology, somewhere between the
stimulus and the behaviors we observe.
MICHAEL LEWIS
JEANNE BROOKS-GUNN
Princeton, New Jersey
Acknowledgments
We would like to express our gratitude to the many people who pro
vided assistance and support. Christine Brim, Susan Lee-Painter, Eileen
Scott, Linda Michalson, Gina Rhea, and Sherrill Lord all gave gener
ously of their time during data collection and data coding. Erik Holme
designed our original mirror apparatus and provided invaluable techni
cal help during all the studies. Al Rogers and Allan Yates lent their
statistical expertise to the data analysis. Jeannette Haviland assisted us
in the study presented in Chapter 8 in her design of a system for coding
emotional expressions. Marsha Weinraub deserves special mention as
she contributed to early conceptualizations of the problem and early
behavioral coding systems.
Picture Study I and Mirror Study I were conducted as part of Jeanne
Brooks-Gunn's dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania, and spe
cial mention should be made of the faculty members who served on the
thesis committee. Dr. Joanna Williams, Dr. Gail Zivin, and Dr. Erling
Boe's encouragement and advice were extremely helpful.
Special thanks are due to the many mothers from the Princeton area
who participated in our studies with their infants, who were usually
cooperative and always interesting subjects, and to Gloria Weiss and
Claire Montagna who typed the many drafts of this book.
Support for this research was generously provided by a grant from
the National Institute for Mental Health (MH-24849-0l). The writing of
the volume was funded by a grant from the Foundation for Child De
velopment. Our personal appreciation goes to Orville Brim, who sup
ported our work.
ix
Contents
LIST OF FIGURES ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV
LIST OF TABLES ............................................ " xvii
Chapter 1
THE ORIGINS OF SELF ........................................ 1
Social Cognition .......................................... 7
Duality of Self ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Theoretical Accounts of the Origins of Self .................. 11
Self Knowledge and Self Awareness ................ . . . . . . . . 26
Plan of This Volume. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 2
MIRROR REPRESENTATIONS OF SELF ............ ,. ... . . . . . . . . .. . 29
Mirror Study I ............................................ 29
Mirror Study II ........................................... 46
Chapter 3
VIDEOTAPE REPRESENTATIONS OF SELF AND OTHERS.... . . . ... . . . 69
Videotape Study I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Videotape Study II ........................................ 87
Chapter 4
PICTORIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SELF AND OTHERS..... . . . ...... 115
Picture Study I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 116
Picture Study II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 123
xi
xii CONTENTS
Chapter 5
VERBAL LABELING OF SELF AND OTHERS. ...... ...... . . . . . . . . . .. 141
Labeling Study I .......................................... 142
Labeling Study II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 150
Chapter 6
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE EXPRESSION OF SELF RECOGNIfION 165
Chapter 7
SELF RECOGNITION AND EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 184
A Definition of Emotion ................................... 185
The Ontogenesis of Emotional Experience and Self Knowledge 189
Chapter 8
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF RECOGNITION..... . . ... . ..... ...... 198
Representational Forms of the Self. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 199
Criteria for Self Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 212
The Ontogeny of Self Recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 214
Individual Differences in the Development of Self Recognition 219
Chapter 9
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF. ... . . . . . . ..... 222
Self Development ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 222
Self, Interaction, and Other: The Onset of Social Cognition ... 228
Three Principles of Social Cognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 230
Social Dimensions and the Categorical Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 233
Chapter 10
THE USES OF A THEORY OF SELF ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 241
The Ontogeny of Thought: A Sociobiological Approach.. . . ... 241
The Role of Self in Cognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 246
The Self-Other Distinction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 249
Self and Interaction ....................................... 257
CONTENTS xiii
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 273
AUTHOR INDEX ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 289
SUBJECT INDEX .............................................. 293