Table Of ContentW olfenbi.itteler Forschungen Scepticism from the Renaissance
4
to the Enlightenment
Herausgegeben von B77 q
der Herzog August Bibliothek 53
/967
Edited by
Richard H. Popkin
Band 35 and Charles B. Schmitt
In Kommission bei In Kommission bei
Otto Harrassowitz · Wiesbaden 1987 Otto Harrassowitz · Wiesbaden 1987
CONTENTS
Proceedings of a conference held at the Herzog August Bibliothek,
February 22 - 25, 1984
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
M. F. Burnyeat: The Sceptic in his Place and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Amos Funkenstein: Scholasticism, Scepticism and Secular
Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Paul Dibon: Scepticisme et orthodoxie reformee dans la
Hollande du Siecle d'Or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Nicholas Jardine: Scepticism in Renaissance Astronomy:
A Preliminary Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Jean-Paul Pittion: Scepticism and Medicine in the Renaissance .. 103
CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek
Ezequiel de Olaso: Leibniz and Scepticism 133
Scepticism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment:
[proceedings of a conference held at the Herzog-August-Bibliothek,
February 22-25 1984] I ed. by Richard H. Popkin and Charles B. Schmitt. Richard H. Popkin: The 'Incurable Scepticism' of Henry More,
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1987. Blaise Pascal and S0ren Kierkegaard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
(Wolfenbiitteler Forschungen ; Bd. 35)
ISBN 3-447-02745-2 Charles B. Schmitt: The Development of the Historiography
NE: Popkin,Richard H. [Hrsg.] ; Herzog-August-Bibliothek
of Scepticism: From the Renaissance to Brucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
<Wolfenbiitteh; GT
Index of Persons 201
List of Participants 206
<e Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbiittel 1987
Aile Rechte vorbehalten
Photomechanische und photographische Wiedergabe nur mit ausdriicklicher
Genehmigung der Bibliothek
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Druck: Druckerei Th. Schafer GmbH, Hannover
Printed in Germany
5
INTRODUCTION
The Wolfenbiittel Symposium on the History of Scepticism grew out of
discussions by the editors of the present volume over a number of years. We
both felt that during the past generation or so enough interesting research
had been going on regarding the impact of scepticism on European thought
from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment to justify bringing together a
group of scholars from Europe and the Americas to discuss their findings and
their interests. A visit to the Herzog August Bibliothek of Wolfenbiittel by
Richard Popkin in June, 1981 and Charles Schmitt's subsequent discussions
of our proposal with Dr. Walther Killy and Dr. Walter Sparn convinced us
that Wolfenbiittel was the ideal place to hold our first colloquium. We both
agreed that it was essential to have as wide a range of disciplines represented
as possible, so that scholars in philosophy, history, and history of science and
literature could come together to discuss problems of mutual concern. To
make the meeting as fruitful as possible we tried to have the papers available
to participants prior to the meetings, and to use the available time for
discussion and commentary. The unparalleled facilities of the Herzog August
Bibliothek were excellent for this, providing ample time and a congenial
locale for formal and informal interchanges.
The topic is one of growing interest and concern amongst scholars in many
fields of intellectual history. From the time that we began writing on the
subject, there seemed to be a sharp demarcation between the period when
scepticism as a philosophical view flourished in Hellenistic antiquity, and
when it was revived in the early Renaissance. The small number of manu
scripts of Sextus Empiricus that were known to exist in European libraries in
the Middle Ages, the absence of any citation or discussions of them, the
absence of any knowledge of or interest in Cicero'sAcademica and Diogenes
Laertius' Lives and Opinions oft he Philosophers in the Middle Ages, all pointed
to a complete break between the interest in sceptical questions up to the time
of St. Augustine, and the revival of interest in these questions in the
Renaissance and Reformation.
Various scholars had found traces of concern about scepticism among
Byzantine authors. Some had suggested that there were sceptical motifs
discernible in some of the anti-rational medieval Arabic and Hebrew writers.
In the West, however, there was little apparent continuity between the
scepticism of antiquity and the intellectual concerns of the Middle Ages. It
7
has been shown that the very term 'sceptic' did not appear in Latin (or orientation and their opponents. Chief among this group was the English
Western vernacular) texts until the translation of Diogenes Laertius in the Franciscan William of Ockham and his followers. Similar epistemological
first half of the fifteenth century. Consequently the vocabulary to discuss problems also came to the fore about the same time with regard to questions
sceptical issues was largely absent until that time. of scientific knowledge and evidence, for example, at Paris, with Jean Buridan
Two matters of interest, in view of this, were considered at length in the and his contemporaries.
colloquium; one, was there a serious and radical difference between ancient If we have to reconsider when and how modern scepticism began, we must
Greek scepticism and Renaissance and post-Renaissance scepticism, that also consider why it almost immediately took on more than an epistemolo
might account for why the first disappeared, and why the second arose when gical character. At least from Montaigne onward, including the presentations
it did. Myles Burnyeat has taken the lead in trying to spell out a clear of Charron, Descartes, Pascal, Joseph Mede, Henry More and John Locke,
difference between the content and import of ancient Pyrrhonism, and the posing of sceptical doubts is immediately joined with a psychological, and
modern scepticism. Others, including Amos Funkenstein and Nicholas existentially frightening possibility, that the world is unreal, that life is but a
Jardine, have tried to show that there are anticipations of the concerns of dream, that everything and everybo8y, including myself, may be unreal.
modern scepticism prior to the actual revival of the source texts of Cicero and Myles Burnyeat has comfortably explained why the ancient Pyrrhonists did
Sextus. The extreme voluntarist theology of Ockham and his followers raised not arrive at such worries, and instead simply achieved ataraxia, peace of
radical doubts about the possibility of knowledge. And these doubts appear minS and imperturbability.
as part of the sceptical scene from which Descartes was trying to escape. The But why is modern man haunted by the consequences of modern doubt?
theology of Gregory of Rimini, and the exploration of what is involved in the This can hardly be blamed on Descartes' psyche, his overweaning quest for
belief in the complete omnipotency of God, pose basic sceptical problems - certainty, if he was just one of many of his time living through the same
can there be any necessary truths that God cannot falsify? Can God lie? Can sceptical crisis. Obviously reading Sextus Empiricus in 250 A.D. would have
God change the past? etc. Descartes was contending not only with the had a different content and possibly a different effect than reading it in 1600
scepticism spread by Montaigne, Charron and Sanches, but also with the A.D. But, why is there such a remarkably striking difference? One guess is
extreme voluntarism that he found in some of the Augustinian thinkers ofhis that the tremendous upheavals that had shaken the intellectual and religious
time. Thus Descartes was both trying to slay the sceptical dragon and trying worlds in the Renaissance and Reformation, and after the new geographical
to tame the anti-rational tendencies of the voluntaristic theology he accepted. discoveries had left people without anchors to secure them from the effects of
This voluntaristic theology that predates the sceptical revival became part of extreme doubt. Ancient sceptics could, apparently, easily and comfortably
sceptical discussions by Descartes' time. Its role as a form of scepticism accept the customs, mores and beliefs of their societies. But could a 16th or
leading beyond Descartes is clear in Pierre Bayle's article on Gregory of 17th century intellectual, especially when he or she had been indoctrinated
Rimini, where the discussion of whether God can lie or deceive is not just with the eternal and cosmic importance of the views, mores and customs that
about Gregory's claims, or even Descartes', but is part of the then on-going one accepted? The doubting did not lead to peace of mind, but to nightmares
debate amongst the Calvinist theologians in Holland fighting off the reli that there is no reality, that we are always deceived, that God is a deceiver,
gious rationalism of Louis Meyer and Spinoza. that we are not possessed of any truth or certitude.
If certain tendencies in late medieval theology foreshadowed the problem According to Sextus, scepticism should have led to mental health, or sanity;
that would erupt with the revival of scepticism, other problems of another the opposite of dogmatism which is always on the brink of mental collapse
sort also tended in this direction. The disagreements amongst astronomers and anguish. We only have Sextus's word for what supposedly happened to
seems to have done it, for example, as Jardine shows. A study of geographers, those who took the sceptical therapy in Alexan8rian times. No testimony by
of lawyers, of medical doctors, and of other specialists might yield similar any "cured" patient has come down to us. On the other hand we have many
intriguing results. testimonies from Montaigne onward. People go through une crise pyrrho
What all of this suggests in that there was a fertile preparation for sceptical nienne, and are on the brink of madness. The strongest advocates of sceptical
thinking before the tools provided by the recovery of ancient texts became arguments -Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Bayle and Hume - offer the same
available. Thus, in trying to delineate when and why modern scepticism refrain, that to be completely sceptical is to be mad. We are saved from this
began, we may have to modify the simple picture that it started when the consequence not by our own efforts, but by the Grace of God, the Honesty
issues arose in the Reformation and in the humanist revolution. Certain and Integrity of God, or the foibles of Nature and human nature.
pre-sceptical sceptical issues were already being debated amongst four W~y the effect of the new scepticism is so much more devastating than its
teenth-century theologians and philosophers of critical or quasi-sceptical class1cal ancestor needs more exploration in terms of both individual case
8 9
studies of the intellectual values at stake for moderns versus ancients. Such deal with a number of these issues, but it must remain for future meetings to
studies may help illuminate where we are and how we got here, and may help take up some of the others. For example, it is essential to give attention to the
explain why the interest and concern with sceptical ideas and problems is so precise relation of the arguments of ancient scepticism to the rising tide of
current in the contemporary literature, after, supposedly three or four atheism and libertinism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as
manifested in such notorious texts as the Trois imposteurs and Theophrastus
centuries of rational scientific enlightenment.
The contemporary discussions, intriguing as they are as symptoms of a redivivus. Moreover, the ethical and political dimensions of early scepticism
malaise in the present intellectual world, also indicate a surprising ignorance have hardly been touched in the present volume, nor have the implications of
of the history and nature of scepticism. Arguments are presented and refuted scepticism for valid historical knowledge. While much attention has already
that have been discarded centuries ago. Kinds of scepticism and anti been given to the relation of scepticism to the rise of modern science, there
scepticism are mixed up and confused. Little effort seems to be made to study has thus far been little attempt to relate the recovery of ancient scepticism to
the classical formulations, and the development of these from Sextus at least the major figures of the so-called Scientific Revolution with the same rigour
to Hume and Kant. All sorts of trivial versions of scepticism and trivial and precision as is evident in the papers of the present collection.
refutations of these versions fill the journals. It is to be hoped that renewed Consequently, we foresee a series of future colloquia similar to the one held
emphasis on the actual history of scepticism, with perhaps a modern edition at Wolfenbi.ittel in 1984. Plans are already at an advanced stage for one to be
of Sextus in English, comparable to the ones available in other European held at Naples and another to be held in Israel.
languages, may help, and may make the present discussions more fruitful.
Part of the necessary preliminary to this has been launched by several Richard H. Popkin
scholars, who have traced how sceptical ideas, terms and questions got into Charles B. Schmitt
modern (post-scholastic) academic discussions, and how scepticism emerged
as a form of philisophical discourse to be reckoned with. Patient scholarship
is giving us its rewards in terms of now knowing the kinds of sceptical issues
that first appeared in university disputations, how they were changed by the The co-director of the Wolfenbi.ittel Symposien on Scepticism from the
discussions concerning Cartesianism, how these were applied to specific Renaissance to the Englightenment in 1984, and the co-editor of this volume,
legal, medical, historical an~ theological issues. We can know what ancient Dr. Charles B. Schmitt, died suddenly in Padua, on April15, 1986. Dr. Schmitt
scepticism meant to various modern thinkers, and how it was used in their had been delivering a set of lectures on Renaissance philosophy when he had
discussions. Examples of this were brought out in the presentations of Paul an aneurysm, and died several hours later. Funeral services and burial were in
Padua.
Dibon, Ezequiel de Olaso, and Jean-Paul Pittion.
On the basis of much recent scholarship, we can now see how scepticism Charles Schmitt was born in Louisville, Kentucky, on August 4, 1933. He
entered, as a subject in its own right, in the texts on the history of philosophy first trained as a chemical engineer, and then began studying philosophy at
from the 17th century onward, and how scepticism became central in 18th Columbia University where he was awarded a doctorate in 1963 for his study,
century thought, in different ways in France, England and Germany. We are under the direction of Prof. Paul Oskar Kristeller, on Gianfrancesco Pico
beginning to have a canvas on which a general form is taking shape. della Mirandola and his critique of Aristotle, later published in the Interna
The results of the Wolfenbi.ittel meeting which are presented here are a tional Archives of the History of Ideas series. Dr. Schmitt taught at Fordham
beginning towards a fuller understanding of the role of scepticism in the University in New York, the University of California at Los Angeles, the
development of modern thought. They are firmly grounded in the most University of Leeds, and form 1973 was lecturer in History of Sciences and
recent research on the subject and raise a number of the key issues which must Philosophy at the Warburg Institute of the University of London. His
be faced if we are to progress in our historical understanding of this topic. By scholarly work from 1963 onward soon established him as one of the major
its very nature scepticism was not - and is not - an issue which can easily be interpreters of Renaissance and early modern thought. He published import
confined to one or several intellectual disciplines. As even the first ancient ant studies on sceptical thought in the Renaissance, on the history of science
writers of sceptical orientation pointed out, the arguments contained in the in the period, and on the character of the Aristotelian tradition form 1300 a. d.
philosophy are wide-reaching and all-embracing. In addition to the different ~nto the 17th century. He greatly aided in establishing the nature of the
Intellectual world from the late Middle Ages up to the 17th century. His
intellectual groups to whom Sextus Empiricus addressed himself in Adversus
studies and his views became authoritative in the many discussions among
mathematicos there were many others which seventeenth-century thinkers
historians of philosophy, science, theology and literature. His books on
found to be subject to the same type of criticism. The papers presented here
11
10
Renaissance scepticism ans Renaissance Aristotelianism, and many, many M.F. BURNYEAT
articles and reviews, have become recognized as being of immense value, and
indispensible for scholars and students in the field.
The Sceptic in his Place and Time
Besides conducting so much significant research, Dr. Schmitt was a teacher
who brought out the best in hist students, and led tHem to becoming genuine
scholars. He also lectured and did research in North America, Europe and
Israel. He became a leading figure in the Republic of Letters, bringing
scholars from different countries and different disciplines together. His office
at the Warburg was a friendly and exciting place for scholarly travellers to Nowadays, if a philosopher finds he cannot answer the philosophical ques
learn about what was going on hither and yon, and to impart to Schmitt their tion 'What is time?' or 'Is time real?', he applies for a research grant to work on
own doings. Over the years Charles had begun to play an increasingly large the problem during next year's sabbatical. He does not suppose that the
role in ·bringing people together, getting them to work together and to arrival of next year is actually in doubt. Alternatively, he may agree that any
appreciate each other's contributions. He actively developed interdisciplina puzzlement about the nature of time, or any argument for doubting the
ry projects, conferences, journals, etc. At the time of his death, he was reality of time, is in fact a puzzlement about, or an argument for doubting, the
completing the editorial work for the forthcoming Cambridge History of truth of the proposition that next year's sabbatical will come, but contend
Renaissance Philosophy, and with Charles Lohr, preparing a Wolfenbiittel that this is of course a strictly theoretical or philosophical worry, not a worry
gathering on Aristotle in the Renaissance. that needs to be reckoned with in the ordinary business of life. Either way he
I had the privilege, the enjoyment and the excitement of working with insulates his ordinary first order judgements from the effects of his philoso
Charles from the time he was a graduate student at Columbia. Our common phizing.
interest in Renaissance scepticism led us to take an active interest in each The practice of insulation, as I shall continue to call it, can be conceived in
other's work and to interest other scholars in what we were doing. We various ways. There are plenty of philosophers for whom Wittgenstein's
corresponded actively, met often in the United States and Europe, and well-known remark (1953: # 124), that philosophy 'leaves everything as it is',
discussed our common interestes. The stimulation gained from our shared describes not the end-point but the starting-point of their philosophizing.
intellectual life was most important to me, and I hope, also to him. Charles There are many who accept one or another version of the idea that philo
was not only an excellent, careful, patient scholar, but also a wonderful sophy is the analysis or, more broadly, that it is the meta-study of existing
friend. It is hard to believe our contact is over, and, of course, it is not. It will forms of discourse - an idea going naturally with the thought that, while a
go on through volumes like this one, the Cambridge History of Philosophy certain amount of revision may be in order, in general philosophy must
volumes, the various projects that were in progress, and that will be carried on respect and be responsive to these forms of discourse in the same way as any
by his friends and fellow scholars. His wit and his wisdom has touched us all. theory must, in general, respect and be responsive to the data it is a theory of.
Those who knew him, if only briefly, at Wolfenbiittel have some idea of the Others again have invoked Carnap's (1950) distinction between internal and
man, as a scholar and a personality. external questions: ordinary inquiries about when and where things happen
I regret deeply that he did not live to see this volume through its publi are inquiries which go on by recognized procedures within the accepted
cation. He and I completed all of the editorial work together. As a joint effort, spatiotemporal framework of science and everyday life, whereas philosophi
it was and is our hope that this will be only the first of an ongoing series of cal questions and the doubts that inspire them are external questions, about
symposia and conferences on the history of scepticism. Charles' spirit will be the framework itself, as to whether it provides the best way of speaking about
with us in this, and in the many other ventures that will be carried out on lines places and times1 But I am not here concerned with the credentials of these
•
of research that he started. His loss is irreparable, but his contribution should and other accounts of the practice of insulation. For I believe that, at least in
inspire us to carry on, each in our own way, the scholarly interests we shared some central areas of philosophical discussion, the sense of a difference
with him. It is with deep sorrow that I add this statement to our volume. between philosophical and ordinary questions lies deep in most of us: much
deeper than any particular articulation of it that you might meet yesterday or
Richard H. Popkin today in Harvard, Oxford or California.
Admittedly, there are those who, influenced perhaps by Quine, would be
reluctant to accept any of these views or to have anything to do with
insulation. For· them, as for Quine, philosophical reflection and ordinary
12 13
II
thought are to be seen as a single fabric, no part of which is immune from the
effects of revisions and puzzlements elsewhere. But it is one thing to say this, The first philosophers to title themselves sceptics, in both the ancient sense
another to make sure that you fully believe it. One test is how you react to the (skeptikos means 'inquirer') and in the modern sense of 'doubter' (for which
following argument: It is true that yesterday my body was for some time their word was ephektikos, 'one who suspends judgement'), were the members
nearer to the mantelpiece than to the bookcase; therefore, it is false that space of the Pyrrhonist movement founded by Aenesidemus in the first century
and time are unreal. In my experience\ nearly everybody protests that this B.C.5• Their use of these words was designed to distinguish their type of
argument of Moore's (1925) is the wrong sort of argument to settle a philosophy both from that of the Academics and from that of the dogmatic
philosophical dispute about the reality of space or time. They feel strongly schools. Pyrrhonist enquiry, we are told, has a unique feature: it does not
that philosophical scepticism cannot be straightforwardly refuted by com terminate either in the discovery of the truth, as the dogmatic philosophers
mon sense. But the corollary of this must be that common sense cannot be claim theirs does, or in the denial of its discoverability, which is the conclu
refuted by philosophical scepticism. And indeed, when we look at the paper sion argued for by the Academics6 This was more than a theoretical distinc
•
which has contributed more than any other single factor to keeping alive an tion. In the ancient context to appropriate skeptikos and ephektikos to flag a
interest in scepticism during these days of exact philosophy, Thompson type or school of philosophy was a dramatic and fundamentally new decla
Clarke's famous paper The Legacy of Skepticism (1972)3, we find that his ration that from now on scepticism, inquiry and doubt, was to be a philo
starting-point, the foundation of the whole thing, is the thesis that the sophy to live by7
•
· judgements and knowledge-claims we make in ordinary life are immune (that
Not only were the Pyrrhonists the first self-proclaimed sceptics, it was
is his word) from philosophical doubt. Insulation, it turns out, is a two-way above all their ideas which represented scepticism to the modern world when
business. It protects ordinary life from philosophy and it protects philosophy the writings of Sextus Empiricus (circa 200 A.D.) were rediscovered and
from ordinary life and G.E. Moore, and you cannot buy the one protection published in the sixteenth century8 The sixteenth century was in fact the
•
without the other. Alternatively, if you do want your philosophizing to time when Pyrrhonism achieved its greatest impact. As Richard Popkin
connect with first order concerns, you had better keep it sober. (1979) has taught us, the rediscovery of Sextus played a major role in shaping
I hope that I have said enough for you to recognize the phenomenon I am modern philosophy's preoccupation, from Descartes onwards, with the task
pointing to: if not in yourselves, then in others and in the philosophy of our of finding a satisfactory rebuttal of sceptical arguments. For a long time this
time. My thesis is going to be that it is precisely that, a phenomenon of our meant a rebuttal of the arguments in Sextus Empiricus. Thus the notion of
time. Ancient philosophers would find it puzzling; so would the philosophers scepticism which we find in Sextus Empiricus can claim to be the original one,
of the Renaissance. This sense of the separateness, sometimes even the
both for antiquity and for modern times. And it so happens that as far back as
strangeness, of philosophical issues is not a timeless thing, instrinsic to the Gassendi and, I think, Montaigne we find an interpretation of Pyrrhonian
4
very nature of philosophy. It is a product of the history of philosophy • I shall scepticism according to which the sceptic does practise insulation of a kind -
tell of a time when insulation was not yet invented, when philosophical of what kind, we shall shortly see9•
scepticism did straightforwardly clash with common sense, and people tooN This interpretation will provide a useful point of departure, first because
it seriously precisely because they saw it as a genuine alternative to their Montaigne and Gassendi were two of the thinkers most closely involved in
ordinary views. If my thesis is correct, there will be historical questions to ask
the modern revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism; second because their brand of
about when, and by whom, and why insulation was invented: questions the insulation is still to be met with in modern accounts of ancient scepticism 10;
answers to which might help to explain the atmosphere of 'belatedness' (if I
and third because in the modern literature on ancient scepticism the Mon
may borrow a term from literary criticism) that so often surrounds twentieth
taigne-Gassendi type of insulation competes with another, different notion
century philosophical discussions of scepticism. All that thrashing about to of insulation which is itself something I would like to situate in a historical
discover a way to take the sceptic seriously, and to insist that he is still very
perspective designed to highlight changes in the role that scepticism has
much alive, betrays a feeling that the important dealings with scepticism took played at different periods.
place long ago. Which I think is true. But I shall come to the historical So now to business.
questions in due course. First, I must establish that once upon a time
scepticism was a serious challenge and no-one thought to insulate it from
affecting, or being affected by, the judgements of ordinary life.
15
14
But we can also ask about the other half of the contrast in PH I 13. What
III does Sextus mean by saying that the sceptic does not assent to any of the
The key text for all insulating interpretations is Outlines of Pyrrhonism non-evident matters investigated by the sciences? It is this side of the issue I
(abbreviated 'PH) I 13, which Sraws a contrast between certain things the propose to discuss here. Perhaps it will contribute some light on the first area
sceptic assents to, and certain others he does not assent to. The contrast of dispute14•
defines the scope of Sextus' scepticism, and our decision as to where the line is What, then, are the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry? The notion of
drawn will determine our interpretation of the scepticism: the non-evident is the notion of that which we can only know about, if we can
When we say that the sceptic does not dogmatize, we are not using 'dogma' in know it at all, by inference from what is evident. If knowledge of the
the more general sense in which some say it is dogma to accept anything (for the non-evident is possible, as Sextus' dogmatist opponent believes, it is mediate
sceptic does assent to the experiences he cannot help having in virtue of this knowledge as contrasted with the immediate, non-inferential knowledge of
impression or that: for example, he would not say, when warmed or cooled, 'I what is evident (PH II 97-9). The dogmatist's favourite example of something
seem not to be warmed or cooled'). Rather, when we say he does not dogmatize, evident is the proposition 'It is day'. If you are a normal healthy human being
we mean 'dogma' in the sense in which some say that dogma is assent to any of walking about in the daytime, it is perfectly evident to you that it is day. But
the non-evident matters investigated by the sciences. For the Pyrrhonian
we need an example which relates smoothly to the sciences on the one hand
assents to nothing that is non-evident. (PH I 13)11
and to the sceptic's experience of being warmed on the other. I do not think
To begin with, we can ask what Sextus means by saying that the sceptic that Sextus' dogmatist would hesitate to claim, when he is sitting on his stove,
does assent to experiences (pathe), like that of being warmed, which are that it is quite evident that it is warm. Now, if one takes 'The stove is warm' as
bound up with the use of the senses and, more generally, with the having of an example of something evident, and couples it with the reference to the
impressions (phantasiai), whether of sense or of thought. (I italicize these sciences, it becomes rather natural to suppose - and this is what Montaigne
words as a quick warning not to take the quoted paragraph as confining the and Gassendi did suppose-that dogma in the sense Sextus wishes to eschew is
sceptic's assent to sense-impressions. Although the example here is a sense- ' any scientific pronouncement about, for example, the underlying physical
impression, in Sextus 'impression', 'experience', 'appearance' are not restrict structure which makes warm things warm, any theory about the real nature
ed to the sensory12, and readers more familiar with British Empiricist ideas of heat, perhaps even the assertion or the belief that there is such a thing as the
and impressions than with Hellenistic epistemology should beware of real nature of heat about which a theory could in principle be given.
importing the former into the latter.) But this assent, which is elsewhere and Ci>n this type of interpretation-in honour of Montaigne I should like to call
often called assent to appearances, is itself unclear, or at least has been the it the country gentleman's interpretation - Pyrrhonian scepticism is scepti
subject of dispute13. The dispute, in a nutshell, is this: if one gives the sceptic a cism about the realm of theory, which at this period will include both what
generous notion of appearance, the area of his assent expands anS the we would consider philosophical or metaphysical theory and much that we
scepticism contracts, while conversely scepticism spreads and assent draws can recognize as science. The non-theoretical judgements of ordinary life are
back if (as I do) one takes a more restricted view of appearance. Let me explain insulated from the scepticism and the scepticism is insulated from them, not
in a little more detaiL because Sextus, like Thompson Clarke, assigns a special status to philoso
Sextus directs us to understand every statement he makes, however phical doubt, but because he assigns it a special subject matter, different from
expressed, as a record of his experience (pathos) telling us how things appear the subject matters with the ordinary man is concerned in the ordinary
to him (PH I 4, 15, 135, 197, 198-9, 200, M XI 18-19). If he means 'appear' in its business of life. This is insulation by subject matter or content, a disengage
non-epistemic sense, PH I 13 implies that the sceptic's assent is restricted to ment of life from theory. 'Socrates thought that a man knows enough
experiential reports like 'It feels warm to me here', 'This argument strikes me geometry if he is able to measure out the land he gives or receives' (Montaigne
as persuasive'. He may say 'It is warm', 'It is a sound argument', but what he 1580: I 535-6).
means is 'I have the experience of its appearing so'. If, on the other hand, Here, for example, is Gassendi defending ordinary life against Descartes'
'appear' carries its epistemic sense, to talk about how things appear is simply method of doubt:
to talk in a non-dogmatic way about how things are in the world. We will no
But if the tower seen from close up appeared to have no corners and to be quite
doubt want further elucidation of what it is to talk 'in a non-dogmatic way',
rounded, then I cannot see why any desire to restrain our belief in appearances
but PH I 13 now leads us to expect that the sceptic will be content to accept
or any doubt whether it is round and smooth rather than square would occur to
(eudokein) a host of propositions like 'It is warm here', 'This is a persuasive anyone except those you call 'not of sound mind'. (Gassendi 1644 in Brush 1972:
argument', just so long as these are understood to make no more strenuous 168)
claims than suffice for the purposes of ordinary life.
17
16
And here he is expounding ancient Pyrrhonism: _ and because he is impressed by certain destructive arguments of the kind
promulgated later by Augustine and McTaggart against the reality of time
Nor is there enough solidity in the customary objection to those who say that
nothing is certain or can be comprehended, namely that they do not really (PH III 140-150). Not that the sceptic accepts the negative conclusion of the
doubt that it is daylight when the sun is shining, that fire is hot, snow white, destructive arguments: that would be dogma too, a negative dogmatism.
honey sweet, and other things of that sort; and that therefore they must at least Rather, just as he cannot find a criterion for deciding which among the
accept the criterion by which those things are determined, namely the senses. competing positive views is correct, so equally he cannot decide whether or
For these men, as we observed above, say that the appearances of things, or what not the destructive arguments should be preferred to more positive urgings
things appear to be on the outside, is one thing and the truth, or the inner nature
from the other side. The two dogmas, the affirmation and the denial of the
of things, namely what the things are in themselves, is another matter, and that
reality of time, balance out and the sceptic suspends judgement on the issue
when they say that nothing can be known certainly and that there is no
and on all theoretical issues connected with time (PH III 140). The same goes
criterion, they are not speaking of what things appear to be and of what is
for space, as will appear below. The sceptic disengages from the heavy
revealed by the senses as if by some special criterion, but of what things are in
pronouncements of the philosophers and the scientists and gets on with the
themselves, which is so hidden that no criterion can disclose it. (Gassendi 1658
in Brush 1972: 294, my emphasis) business of daily life in Cambridge or Montaigne:
These two quotations can serve as Gassendi's version of the contrast in PH I The heavens and the stars have been swinging round for three thousand years, as
13: on the one side, a casual acceptance of the standards we ordinarily use in all the world had believed, until Cleanthes of Samos, or according to Theo
phrastus, Nicetas of Syracuse, presumed to proclaim that it was the earth that
judging that the tower is round, on the other side a strong scepticism about
moved, revolving about its axis, through the oblique circle of the zodiac. And, in
the 'inner nature' of things.
our days, Copernicus has so well grounded this theory, that he very lawfully
Notice how Gassendi aligns Sextus' contrast with a contrast between the
uses it for all astronomical conclusions. What can we make of that, except that
outside of things (what is accessible to everyday observation through th,e
we need not bother our heads about which of the two theories is right?
senses) and their inner nature. You will not find Sextus adding the epithet (Montaigne 1580: II 15)
'inner' on the innumerable occasions when he concludes, 'We can say how
things appear, but not what their nature is'. The inner/outer contrast be
speaks a new world, in which the interpretation of ancient Pyrrhonism has
been overlaid with the preoccupations of seventeenth-century science. IV
Now one advantage of the country gentleman's interpretation is that there
is no great difficulty in understanding how he can walk about his estate So far, then, so good. But how well does the country gentleman's interpre
making arrangements for next year's crops while proclaiming himself a tation measure up to the texts (besides PH I 13) in which it claims to find
sceptic about space and time. There is no difficulty here because what the evidence of insulation? At first glance it does rather well.
sceptic suspends judgment about, on this view, is not the spaces and times of Sextus starts his treatment of topos (place) in the Outlines ofPyrrhonism with
ordinary life but the space and time of the natural philosophers. The sceptic is an introductory statement about the scope of his discussion:
not a man who doubts he is in Cambridge or that he has been talking for at
Space, or place, then, is used in two senses, the strict and the loose -loosely of
least five minutes. He is a man who is doubtful about the sorts of thing that
place taken broadly (as 'my city'), and strictly of exactly containing place
the natural philosophers say in constructing their theories:
whereby we are exactly enclosed. Our enquiry, then, is concerned with space of
For some define time as the interval of the motion of the whole (by 'whole' I the strict kind. This some have affirmed, others denied; and others have
mean the universe), others as that motion itself; Aristotle (or according to some, suspended judgement about it. (PH III 119, tr. Bury 1933-49)
Plato) defines it as the number of prior and posterior in motion, Strato (or The parallel passage in Sextus' larger work adversus Mathematicos (abbrevi
according to some, Aristotle) as the measure of motion and rest, and Epicurus (as
ated 'M), comes not at the beginning but shortly thereafter:
reported by Demetrius Lacon) as the concomitant of concomitants, since it
accompanies days and nights and seasons, and the presence and absence of Now it is agreed that, speaking loosely, we say that a man is in Alexandria or in
feelings, and motions and rests. (PH III 136-7) the gymnasium or in the school; but our investigation is not concerned with
place in the broad sense but with that in the circumscribed sense, as to whether
The sceptic is doubtful about time both because the dogmatic philosophers
this exists or is merely imagined; and if it exists, of what sort it is in its nature,
disagree with each other and there seems to be no way of resolving the
whether corporeal or incorporeal, and whether contained in place or not. (M X
dispute (PH III 138-40)-hence the recitation of the different accounts of time 15, tr. Bury 1933-49)
18 19
These announcements focus the inquiry on a conception of place which is of what he means to be arguing for when he opens his own discussion of place
familiar from Aristotle: place as the immediate container of a body. Your in Physics IV 1 (cf. 208b 8 ff.)16 If this is the positive dogma, the negative
•
place, on this idea of it, is the innermost boundary of the body (of air or other dogma set against it will be the denial of these theoretical notions, and the
material) surrounding you, the boundary which encloses you and nothing sceptic's suspending judgement will be suspending judgement as to theory.
else15. We may well think such a conception of place a heavily theoretical one, Which leaves him free to indulge in as much use as he likes of the ordinary
or at least not an ordinary man's conception of place. Correspondingly, it broad sense of 'place'.
looks to be a point in favour of the country gentleman's interpretation that
Sextus should confine his discussion to the exact or circumscribed sense of v
'place'. We could hardly ask for a more explicit statement that his scepticism
has no quarrel with ordinary remarks to the effect that someone is in But our country gentleman is taking it too easy. To begin with, the arguments
Alexandria. just quoted, although Aristotelian in character, do not argue for the existence
The country gentleman will be encouraged further by the opening moves of place in the narrow as opposed to the broad sense. They argue for the
in the debate about place. Sextus' usual practice is to set out the arguments in existence of place. Several of the considerations are indeed drawn from
favour of something, match them with the arguments against, and declare a natural philosophy, but they make no use of the narrowness of narrow place.
draw: the equal balance of opposing arguments leaves us no choice but to Second, we should look more closely at what Sextus says about the broad
suspend judgement. What the sceptic suspends judgement about is what the sense which he is not contesting. And here I must touch briefly on some
dogmatic arguments are for and against. And when we attend to the argu points of philology.
ments for affirming that place is real, we find this: The key word in PH III 119 is katachrestikos. To say 'My city is the place
If, then, there exist upwards and downwards, and rightwards and leftwards, and where I am' is to use 'place' in the broad sense and thereby to speak
forwards and backwards, some place exists; for these six directions are parts,o f katachrestikos. Bury (1933-49) translates 'loosely' but this does not tell you
place, and it is impossible that, if the parts of a thing exist, the thing of which
that the adverb derives from a verb meaning 'to misuse'. To use an expression
they are parts should not exist. But upwards and downwards, and rightwards
katachrestikos is to use it improperly (grammarians still say 'catachrestically')
and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, do exist in the nature oft hings (en tei
and is contrasted here with using it kurios, in its proper meaning. So the
phusei ton pragmaton); therefore place exists. (M X 7, tr. Bury 1933-49; my
contrast between broad and narrow place is a contrast between an improper
emphasis)
and a proper use of the term. Both uses are current (legetai dichos), but in the
It sounds Aristotelian, and it is. To say that there are real directions in the proper acceptation of the term 'place' means that by which we are exactly
nature of things is to say that physical theory must recognize that direction enclosed. Narrow place is not a technical construct of natural philosophy but
ality is an objective feature of nature, not just relative to ourselves, and this is what 'place' actually means. In his introductory statement about the scope of
exactly what Aristotle maintained: ' ... the kinds or differences of place are his discussion Sextus is saying that it will be concerned only with place
up-down, before-behind, right-left; and these distinctions hold not only in properly so called, not with anything and everything that gets called 'place' in
relation to us and by arbitrary agreement, but also in the whole itself' (Physics the sloppy usage exemplified by such remarks as 'My city is the place where I
205b 31-4; cf. 208b 12-22). am'.
We get the same message from M X 9, which adduces the (Aristotelian) In the parallel passage M X 15 Bury again translates 'loosely' but the word
doctrine of natural places: now is aphelos. Aphelos occurs a number of times in Sextus Empiricus and
Further, if where what is light naturally moves there what is heavy naturally elsewhere, and so far as I can see the best gloss on it would be 'without
does not move, there exists a place proper (idios tapas) to the light and to the distinctions', with special reference to technical distinctions by which theory
heavy; but in fact the first < is true> ; therefore the second < is true> . For or science purports to represent real distinctions in the nature of things17 If
•
certainly fire, which is naturally light, tends to ascend, and water, which is
you say that someone is in Alexandria, you are simply not distinguishing
naturally heavy, presses downwards, and neither does fire move downwards
between his place and his city, which we would often describe as the place
nor water shoot upwards. There exists, therefore, a proper place both for the ?e
w?ere is. You are not picking out his place, but the surroundings he shares
naturally light and for the naturally heavy. (M X 9, tr. Bury 1933-49 with
wah h1s fellow citizens. What Sextus is saying, then, is that the dispute will
modifications)
not be about anything and everything that people call place, but about the
That each element tends by virtue of its intrinsic nature to its own proper attempt to identify for each thing its own unique place in the world, distinct
place in the universe is a central tenet of Aristotle's cosmology and a large part from the places of all other things.
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