Table Of ContentSinn Féin
and the IRA
From Revolution to
Moderation
Matthew Whiting
SINN FÉIN AND THE IRA
SINN FÉIN AND THE IRA
From Revolution to Moderation
Matthew Whiting
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CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables vi
Acknowledgements vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Radicalism and Moderation in the History of Irish Republicanism 13
3 Electoral Participation and Republican Moderation 35
4 Democratisation and Reining in Radical Republicanism 66
5 The US and Brokering Republican Moderation 94
6 British Policy Towards Irish Republicanism 116
7 Conclusion 137
Bibliography 157
Index 170
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 3.1 The number of deaths caused by the IRA compared against
the percentage vote share of Sinn Féin 48
Figure 3.2 Percentage of ‘Protestant and Other Denominations’ and
‘Roman Catholics’ in Northern Ireland, 1971–2011 55
Figure 7.1 Percentage support towards different options for the future
of Northern Ireland, 1998–2015 146
Figure 7.2 Percentage support of Catholics (in grey) and Protestants
(in black) for different options for the future of Northern Ireland,
2008–2014 146
Table 4.1 Protestant versus Catholic unemployment rates and Catholic
unemployment differentials 71
Table 4.2 Percentage of Catholics comprising selected employment
groups 72
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book originated from my doctoral studies at the London School of
Economics and my biggest academic debt there is certainly owed to Bill
Kissane, who proved to be an excellent supervisor throughout the whole
process. Without his guidance and input this book would certainly be much
poorer. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Simon Hix who was hugely support-
ive and encouraged my interest and understanding of comparative politics,
as well as owing thanks to Tony Travers, Denisa Kostovicova and Jonathan
Hopkin. Both Michael Kerr and Giovanni Capoccia made invaluable sugges-
tions on publication, which were much appreciated. I would also like to thank
the two reviewers who offered excellent and constructive advice on improving
the manuscript along the way. Of course, all errors which remain are my own.
In terms of undertaking research for the project, it would simply not have
been possible without the many people who agreed to be interviewed by me
and freely gave their time and insights. Without exception, all interviewees
were very welcoming and open in their assessments and appraisals of the
conflict, often going well beyond my expectations to help me understand their
perspectives on it. For this I cannot express my gratitude enough. Thanks are
also owed to staff at the National Archives in Kew, the National Archives of
Ireland in Dublin, the Linen Hall Library and the Public Records Office in
Belfast, and the British Library Political Collection at the LSE. I would also like
to thank the whole team at Edinburgh University Press who took me through
the publication process so expertly, especially Jen Daly.
Finally, I would like to thank all those friends and family members who sup-
ported me and listened to me throughout the long period it took to write this
book. Johannes Wolff, Stefan Bauchowitz, David Marshall, Mike Seiferling,
Jose Olivas Ossuna and Ulrike Theuerkauf have all listened to my ideas at dif-
ferent times and helped me along the way. I would also like to thank Roisin
and Sinéad, who have been unfailingly encouraging and supportive, even when
I lost motivation myself. Finally, I would like to thank Zeynep and Elif, who
have proved the best inspiration in more ways than I could ever hope for.
vii
1. INTRODUCTION
Two contrasting speeches, both by British prime ministers but made twenty-
five years apart, highlight the stark nature of the transformation of Irish repub-
licanism from violent revolutionaries to reformist politicians. On 12 October
1984, Margaret Thatcher, surrounded by security officers, declared to the
Conservative Party faithful, ‘this government will not weaken. This nation will
meet that challenge. Democracy will prevail.’1 The challenge she was referring
to was that posed by the IRA’s armed campaign and Sinn Féin’s anti-system
politics. She viewed republicans as posing an unambiguous threat to the legiti-
mate democratic political order. The reason for a particularly visible security
presence that day was that she was speaking just hours after the IRA had come
close to assassinating her at the Grand Hotel in Brighton during the annual
Conservative Party Conference. Some days later Thatcher reiterated this same
sentiment even more strongly, declaring that she viewed the bombing as an
attempt to ‘destroy the fundamental freedom that is the birth right of every
British citizen: freedom, justice, democracy’.2 This was not the only time the
IRA came close to assassinating a British prime minister and in 1991, after
John Major’s close escape from an IRA mortar bomb, he too decried republi-
canism. He viewed them with ‘contempt’ and declared that republicans ‘have
demonstrably failed and every time they even contemplate joining the political
process they are rebuffed’.3
By 2010, a British prime minister was making a very different speech.
Instead of accusing republicans of trying to destroy democracy, Gordon Brown
was now praising their co-leadership of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing
executive and their constructive role in the new Northern Irish democracy.
After securing support for the Hillsborough Castle Agreement which enabled
the devolution of policing and justice powers, a key milestone in the consolida-
tion of the peace process, Brown stated that ‘this is the last chapter of a long
and troubled story and the beginning of a new chapter after decades of vio-
lence, years of talks, weeks of stalemate’.4 This speech came sixteen years after
the IRA initially declared what was to become a lasting ceasefire and twelve
years after Sinn Féin accepted the Belfast Agreement peace treaty. For many,
1
