Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network

305 Pages·2006·1.09 MB·English

by  Gordon Corera

SHOPPING FOR BOMBS

SHOPPING FOR BOMBS
Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity,
and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan
Network
G O R D O N C O R E R A
2006
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Corera, Gordon.
Shopping for bombs : nuclear proliferation, global insecurity, and
the rise and fall of the A. Q. Khan network / Gordon Corera.
p. cm.
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530495-4 (cloth)
ISBN-10: 0-19-530495-0 (cloth)
1. Nuclear nonproliferation.
2. Security, International.
3. Khan, A. Q. (Abdul Qadeer), 1936–
I. Title.
JZ5675.C67 2006
623.4'5119092—dc22
2006012510
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
In memory of Bernard Corera
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Taranto—October 2003 ix
Introduction xi
Part 1 RISE
CHAPTER 1 Roots 3
CHAPTER 2 The Bomb 33
Natanz—February 2003 57
CHAPTER 3 Iran—From Import to Export 59
Chagai Hills—May 1998 82
CHAPTER 4 North Korea—Pyongyang and Back 86
Jordan—August 1995 103
CHAPTER 5 The Network Expands—The Libya Deal 106
Part 2 FALL
CHAPTER 6 Picking up the Trail 129
Washington, DC—September 2001 152
CHAPTER 7 Watching 155
London—March 2003 174
CHAPTER 8 Dealing with Gadaffi 176
New York—September 2003 195
CHAPTER 9 Confronting Musharraf—Dealing with Khan 196
vii
viii CONTENTS
Kuala Lumpur—November 2003 217
CHAPTER 10 Unraveling the Network 219
EPILOGUE The Spread 241
Notes 253
Acknowledgments 275
Index 277
TARANTO, ITALY
October 4, 2003
ITWASJUSTAFTERMIDNIGHT when the BBC China made its unscheduled
stop. It would be gone again in two hours. The German Secret Ser-
vice had contacted the ship’s owners in Hamburg, Germany, asking
for help. The owners radioed the vessel as it passed through the
Suez Canal instructing it to change course. “Don’t ask any questions,”
the captain was told. Waiting in the cold night air, the team at the
dock in Taranto knew they would have to work fast to identify five
forty-foot cargo containers by serial number and then remove them
from amongst the more than two hundred on board. The BBC China
had to resume its voyage without anyone knowing what had hap-
pened. Its ultimate destination was the Libyan capital Tripoli.
The containers’ journey had begun in August in a factory in
Malaysia. A close-knit team working between America’s CIA and
Britain’s Intelligence Service received a tip-off in mid-September
that a consignment of important goods had arrived at the bustling
hub of Dubai’s free-trade zone where they would be loaded onto a
tramp steamer.
By the time the team had identified the boat as the BBC China, it
had already left port. After a frantic search, it was found slowly
snaking its way through the Suez Canal. From then on, the ship
was closely watched. But until the containers were finally prised
open at the port in Italy, the tension was palpable amongst those
involved in the operation. What if they were filled with soft toys?
The interception of the BBC China had come after a difficult,
even depressing summer for the small team working jointly be-
tween America’s Central Intelligence Agency and Britain’s Secret
Intelligence Service (formally known as SIS although often known
as MI6). Over the previous years, they had pieced together a pic-
ture of an unprecedented global black market, supplying the most
deadly nuclear technology to some of the world’s most dangerous
states. They had watched and waited for an opportunity to break
the network but it had proved frustratingly difficult and slow. Mean-
while, the network was still churning out more sensitive material
and looking for more customers. Then in the spring of 2003, a golden
opportunity seemed to have arisen when MI6 was contacted by
one of the network’s customers who wanted to talk. But by the
ix