SFA Case Study: Mosul, Iraq (Full PDF Article) - Small Wars Journal

327 Pages·2008·5.07 MB·English

by  Authorized User

Executive Summary

Preface

Major Thornton of JCISFA in coordination with Dr. John Fishel from the
University of Oklahoma, Dr. Marc Tyrrell of Carleton University, and Mr. Mark Lauber
also of JCISFA sat down to write the Mosul Case study with the goals of considering the
requirements generated in the pursuit of policy and military objectives in complex
conditions, and making some observations and recommendations about how DoD might
better address those requirements. To this end the Case Study is built around a specific
place, Mosul, Iraq over a short period of time, 2006-2007. The Case Study is designed to
give the reader both an understanding of content and context of the environment, and of
the objective and the subjective nature of the participants.
Within the study we found there are areas across DOTMLPF (Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, Personnel and
Facilities) that might be adapted in such a way that reduces risk at the tactical, operational
and strategic levels, as well as risk to the institutions which must consider the broad range
of roles, missions and capabilities required of them. Principal to this is the understanding
that you can not improve our capabilities to conduct these types of missions by simply
addressing one aspect of DOTMLPF. In fact, to attempt to do so usually results in
unintended consequences in other areas, some of which may not be known until they
have manifested themselves as critical deficits.
The Mosul Case Study raises some questions about the nature of how we see
ourselves as an institution, what we value, and how those values translate into enabling
capabilities. One of the questions the study considers is the value of individual
personalities and skills apart from context of collective leadership. The Case Study and
the interviews show that one size does not fit all, cookie cutter solutions and approaches
generally produce problems not solve them, and that personality may matter as much or
more than other skills and attributes.
This study challenges that in order to do this better, we must find ways in our
personnel system to not only recruit, train, educate and retain the best talent, but given the
element of human dimension we must consider that not all leaders of a given rank are
equally suited.
This is not simply a convention change, but a cultural and philosophical one. It
should not be taken lightly, for at its core it is about how we view our ability to provide
relevant and ready military power to achieve political ends.

Summary

• Chapters 1 – 3 - Chapters 1, 2 and 3, provides the reader with an overview of the
environment, U.S. operational history, and then provides an understanding of SFA
as it pertains to the environment, and how it relates to broader issues. The
methodology used to organize the case study chapters employs a stair step
approach which progressively builds understanding in order to give the reader a
set of tools with which to better evaluate the larger ideas.
o Chapter 1 gives a detailed list of the case study’s origins, the concept
behind it, its objectives, and some descriptions of those interviewed so the
reader can better relate where they fit in the broader framework.
o Chapter 2 provides the reader definitions and explanation on just what
SFA is, and how it relates as an enabling capability to objectives and lines
of operation.
o Chapter 3 offers the reader insights into Mosul as an operating
environment. This not only means an overview of geography, history and
culture, but also an appreciation for its significance to U.S. military and
policy objectives though a brief recount of events beginning in 2003.
• Chapter 4 (To be published at a later date) - In Chapter 4, Dr. Marc Tyrrell
examines the experiences contained within the case study from an anthropological
perspective, i.e. the study of man and how people interact. This chapter orients
the reader on the human dimension, providing the reader gains an appreciation for
why we have an “Art” component to war, versus strict adherence to a “Science”
of war.
• Chapter 5: John Fishel looks at SFA in terms of selection of advisors, training,
organization, and application and places those functions in several historic
contexts. In each, he compares the past with the present using counterpoints from
the Mosul Case Study. A number of important consistencies arise, some bad -
like the "hey you" method of selection - some good - like SF and FAO training
practices - which can and, possibly, should be adapted when using GPF in a SFA
role.
• Chapter 6: Major Rob Thornton provides a Battalion level advisor perspective of
how decisions and actions across the levels of war produce a range of
consequences, some of which create new conditions and unanticipated outcomes.
• Chapter 7: What did we learn from the Mosul Case Study? This chapter explores
a broad range of observations and recommendations drawn from the study. More
specifically it serves as the start point for a discussion on the rationale for change,
and the need to understand how the requirements should drive our ability to
generate capabilities.
• Appendix A: These are some of the most relevant source interviews which were
conducted in support of the SFA Case Study. The participants include BCT
leadership and staff, PRT leadership and team members, MiTTs at all levels
across the 2nd IA Division in Mosul and a DOJ contractor working at Badush
Prison just outside Mosul. These interviews provide additional perspective on the
role of personality in facilitating unity of effort.
• Appendix B: Mark Lauber explores the reasons why SFA should be added to our
lexicon, how it fills a gap and how it enables existing terms to better fulfill our
military and political objectives.

Rob Thornton
JCISFA
MAJ, USA
Acknowledgments

JCISFA would like to extend its thanks to those interviewed in support of the Mosul Case
Study. In every case, the participants’ primary concern was to make their experience available to
others and to improve the institutions and our ability to prepare those who conduct missions on
behalf of U.S. policy objectives in the best possible manner.

The conclusions and observations contained within the body of the case study are neither
exclusive to JCISFA, nor are they reflective of the points of view of any one participant. They
are not meant to be indicative of service or position. As will be shown in the case study, there are
many different perspectives that evolve along with the understanding of the complex, interactive
environment where these activities take place.

While I've tried to portray the essence of the challenges associated with operating in this
environment to broaden understanding, each reader is encouraged to consider what they read
against their own experiences. Behind the body on the electronic editions of the case study, the
full transcribed text of the interviews will be included in an appendix. While there are some
holes in the transcriptions because some interviews were conducted over the telephone, the vast
majority of relevant insights are preserved for the reader’s reference. In that vein, there was some
discussion about whether to include the interviews with the case study. As we conducted more
interviews, we realized that there was value in both and each one provided relevant context to the
other’s content.

I’d also like to acknowledge the use of other people’s hard work and ideas outside of the
participants. Either directly or indirectly, there is an existing body of SFA related knowledge and
an emerging body that the community is applying existing knowledge in new ways to help us
find better ways of doing things.

Special thanks to Dr. John Fishel, and to Dr. Marc Tyrrell for volunteering their time and
talents to this effort. Both have helped me a great deal and continue to be of service to the
community at large through their personal work and their public activities on Small Wars
Journal. Marc was my “anthro- reach back” while I was deployed to Iraq as an advisor, and John
has forgotten more about advising then many will ever know. The chapters these two
professionals authored provided a great deal of context to the overall study, and will provide the
reader with the relevant tools to consider the cased study as a whole.

We’d also like to thank the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) for publishing the Case Study.
SWJ is a forum that is accessible in a way that builds new knowledge and truly flattens the curve
of adaptation. SWJ provides a community where content can be considered against the context of
policy, all the levels of war, and the institutions that support them.

Robert Thornton
MAJ, FA 59

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Strategic Context

“We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary
battlefield for some time. … Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a
function of shaping behavior — of friends, adversaries and most importantly, the people in
between.”
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates----2007

Developing Foreign Security Forces and building partner capacity (BPC) as a component
of a broader and balanced approach have emerged as a tenet of our 2008 National Defense
Strategy. While we have incorporated aspects of these into our activities in the past, events in the
world have changed the way the United States sees it role and responsibilities with regard to the
global community, and this has increased the value of BPC. While the moral basis that defines
our vital interests for our grand strategy remains rooted in the principles upon which our republic
stands, the scope of our policies and commitments continues to grow.
There are perhaps two principal reasons for this. The first is that the advance of freedom
is in itself a U.S vital interest, and is listed as such in successive National Security Strategies. It
is through assisting others in securing fundamental freedoms that we increase the opportunities
available for all, decrease the potential that power is consolidated in a dictatorship or like body,
and create conditions where governments can meet their responsibilities to both their citizens and
their neighbors. America characterizes this first principle as the one upon which all other
interests, to include its own security, might be best achieved.
The second reason has to do with the changes in the way the United States has come to
view its own security, and the range of threats to it. 9/11 is often cited as a watershed event with
regard to this change given its traumatic impact, visibility, and the decision to go to war
following the attack. However, the threat of terrorism is only one of many reasons we view the
ability for partners to govern responsibly across the breadth of their recognized borders, and to
cooperate in addressing regional issues of paramount importance to our own security.
Building partner capacity is an investment that increases the ability of governments to
create the conditions that make domestic and international terror and insurgency movements less
likely. It increases the ability of governments to create climates that are at the same time better
able to meet their international requirements as recognized states or organizations, and can better
create and sustain the fundamentals of civilization such as belief in the future, leisure, and
surplus wealth. None of the latter three are probable without security.
While there remains a strong requirement to have a “direct” component to our security
such as the ability to project and sustain overwhelming military power across the globe to deter
aggression, or to remove regimes whose conduct and actions have become intolerable by
recognized standards and a threat to U.S. security, our policy also requires the USG to have the
capability and capacity to secure objectives beyond those immediate military objectives. This
may include working to bring a former enemy back to a useful member of a regional framework;
securing a friend or defeated enemy against predatory neighbors; or increasing an existing or
new partner’s ability to govern, or be an international partner. This has been called an “indirect”
approach, and it should be viewed as complimentary to our “direct” approach capabilities. For a
state with such broad and enduring principles such as the United States, both the direct and
indirect approaches are needed to not only achieve its immediate policy goals, but to secure them
for the long term. Civilian and military leaders have a need to understand the environment in
which these capabilities co-exist.
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Table of Contents for SFA Case Study

1. Description of the U.S. SFA participants in Mosul
2. SFA in Context
i. Definition
ii. SFA Phases & SFA Tasks
iii. SFA Imperatives
iv. SFA Goals
1) SFA as an operational construct to achieve strategic ends
2) The Scope of SFA, Depth and Breadth, Capability and Capacity
3) SFA as a framework for policy tools
3. Mosul
1) Mosul in Geographical and Historical context
2) The Mosul OE
v. Enemy
vi. Friendly
vii. HN
viii. Populace
ix. U.S. Operational Timeline
4. The Cultural Contexts of Advising (TBP Dr. Marc Tyrrell, Carleton University)
5. American “Advisors:” Yesterday and Today (Dr. John Fishel, Oklahoma University)
6. Advising the IA in Mosul: A Personal Account
i. Forming the team, train up, and deployment
ii. Mosul with the 172nd
iii. Mosul with 3/2
iv. Mosul with 4/1
v. Conclusion
vi. Chapter Conclusions
7. Observations and Recommendations
1) Doctrine:
2) Organizations: Force Structure: Pregnant Pyramid and Sliding Scale MTO&E &
Organizing
3) Training
4) Materiel
5) Leader and Education Development
6) Personnel (Skills, Experience and Attributes)
7) Facilities
8) Conclusion

8. Appendices
a. Interviews
b. Why should Security Force Assistance be added to the current lexicon
(Mark Lauber from JCISFA)

9. Brief bios of the authors

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Chapter 1 Background

“Our strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the
basis for long-term security. We must also seek to strengthen the resiliency of the international
system to deal with conflict when it occurs. We must be prepared to deal with sudden
disruptions, to help prevent them from escalating or endangering international security, and to
find ways to bring them swiftly to a conclusion.”
From the June 2008 National Defense Strategy

1. This case study on the Security Force Assistance (SFA) effort in Mosul came about from
the need to portray the complexity involved with conducting SFA activities in full
spectrum operations, in this case during a major counterinsurgency effort against a
resourceful and adaptive enemy.
A. The goal of this case study is to take a contemporary SFA example and make it
relevant to future SFA activities.

The intent of this case study is to help leaders, units, agencies, and personnel involved with
SFA to:

I. facilitate an effective transition to HN security forces by helping to flatten the
“Adaptability Curve” between planning and execution
II. recognize and overcome organizational complexity and friction in the SFA environment
such as:
A. stovepipe communications that don’t facilitate shared situational awareness and
understanding
B. how the various levels of command and various agencies involved with SFA
interact and how each might see the operational environment differently in terms
of METT-TC
C. by identifying the roles, culture, and values of disparate JIIM organizations within
the AOR
D. how to overcome initial operational preconceptions – e.g. “fighting the last
rotation”
E. how to recognize and leverage opportunities for synergy

The concept was to create a contemporary SFA case study on a specific geographical
location over a six month period (Mosul, Iraq 2006-2007) to accomplish the goals and intent
listed above by identifying and interviewing key SFA participants to include:

1. 4/1 BCT (Brigade Combat Team) who provided a level of resourcing,
synchronization and integration for the different lines of operation and lines of
effort, two of its squadrons (a battalion level organization) and its support BN.
a. 2-7 Cavalry from 4/1 BCT who ran day-to-day U.S. operations within the
area of Mosul and the surrounding area, and was also a key player in
working by, with, and through Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), from
conducting combined security operations to working in support of the
greater SFA mission.
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b. 1-9 Cavalry who received an in-theater fragmentary order (FRAGO)
which placed them in the role of ISF support – both providing additional
forces to the various transition teams operating in the area, as well as a
direct assistance role in supporting Iraqi security operations.
c. The 4/1 BSB was tasked to provide both area and direct support not only
to organic members of the 4/1 BCT, but also to the many disparate
organizations operating in Mosul, some of which were of the Coalition
FOB MAREZ and had irregular support requirements, but increasingly the
requirement to support the ISF as their capabilities and operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) increased.

2. The 2nd Division Military Transition Teams (MiTT) which included 13 x 11 men
teams (1 x DIV MiTT, 3 x BDE MiTTs, and 9 x BN MiTTs) of which the DIV
team, two BDE teams and six BN level teams lived and operated either in Mosul,
or in close proximity to Mosul. Some of these teams lived off of FOB MAREZ,
location dependent on the location of the unit to which they were advising. These
MiTTs were largely dependent on the BCT and other sustainment services located
on FOB MAREZ and operated under the relationship of OPCON (Operational
Control) with caveats refined by the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) located in
Tajii, Iraq and the MNSTC-I located in Baghdad. The MiTTs were also dependent
on the BCT for resourcing of ISF projects such as force protection improvements,
etc. Given the nature of the command relationship, both the various MiTTs and
the BCT had to work to achieve unity of effort. The subsequent rotation placed
the MiTTs in an attached command relationship and as such achieved unity of
command, but not necessarily unity of effort.
a. For the purpose of this case study, the 2nd DIV MiTT Chief, the 2nd and 4th
BDE MiTT Chiefs and a BN MiTT Chief from 4th BDE and an advisor
from 1st BN, 2nd BDE MiTT were interviewed.

3. Four members of the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) were
interviewed – the Department of State (DoS) PRT Chief, his military deputy, and
two other key DoS members. The PRT was tasked with building institutional
capacity, and is a significant SFA player given its role in the greater context of
Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Rule of Law (RoL) capacity building. In many
ways like the MiTTs, the PRT was also dependant upon the BCT for some of its
resources; they were also a tenant of FOB MAREZ, required assistance in force
protection issues as they moved through Mosul and Ninewa to conduct their
missions. The PRT could also potentially benefit the greater intelligence picture
based on their observations and interactions, and enhance their own mission by
being briefed on the information collected.

4. A member of the DoJ contingent responsible for advising the Iraqi Prison Systems
at Badush Prison, approx. 20 minutes West-North-West of Mosul by Tal-Afar
Road. Many times ISF from Mosul (primarily the 1/2/2 IA) and patrols from the
BCT had to respond to events at the prison. The DoJ advisory contingent had to
pass through coalition and Iraqi battlespace almost daily as they made their trips
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from FOB MAREZ/DIAMONDBACK to Badush Prison. Several riots at Badush
required heavy ISF and BCT assistance to regain control of the prison. The
relationship between both the IA advisors at 1/2/2 and the DoJ advisors was ad-
hoc and incidental, i.e. they sought each other out and made it happen. This is
roughly the same relationship between the Badush Prison Warden and the 1/2/2
IA CDR. Communications between the advisory efforts was by UNCLASS
Internet and cell phone, and the communications between Iraqi warden the 1/2/2
CDR was strictly by cell phone as the radio linkages were inadequate given the
distances and non-line of sight. Including the DoJ contingent not only reflects the
breadth of SFA operations, but also illustrates the ways the various SFA players
identify and create point to point ad-hoc networks that while better then nothing,
don’t facilitate a “common” operational picture between all members of the SFA
community.

5. MND-N - The 25th ID ADCM BG Bednarek, was asked to participate to broaden
the scope and depth of the case study. MND-North made key decisions about SFA
Development in Mosul, and interacted with the ISF senior leadership and senior
coalition leadership. As such they allocated and synchronized resources, approved
requests, influenced ISF direction, issued orders, etc. Including MND-North into
the case study extends the operational bridge between the tactical SFA actions
inside Mosul and the Strategic level decisions made in the Iraqi Ministry of
Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD), the U.S. led MNSTC-I, MNC-I and
MNF-I.

The reader should understand that even with the method used to show as many potential
causal relationships as possible, there are going to be limitations. It is specifically because of the
nature of these interactions and the follow-on actions they generate towards a steady progress on
SFA, in this environment it can still be very difficult. SFA can often feel like it is taking “two
steps forward one step back,” but can just as quickly go to “one step forward and two steps back”
because events outside of the immediate control or purview of key players take place, or because
the gravity of an assessment takes on new meaning too quickly to affect or change. An example
within the study is the clear knowledge of all the SFA players that the IP in Mosul were being
heavily targeted by the AIF (Anti-Iraq Forces) because they were more vulnerable. The AIF
understood that by setting back the development of the police while they were at an immature
stage, they were achieving multiple objectives such as challenging the legitimacy of the local
government, increasing the burden on other components of the ISF, and building up their own
status in the process. However, there were different perspectives on the causes of the weaker
development of the IP, what steps could be taken to advance their development, and which
courses of action should be adopted. There were also issues with related resources and
authorities, so while a given command or leader might have had the right answer, authorities
might not have been in place to allow them to implement it. The design of the Case Study itself
is to provide the reader with a “stair step” approach where each chapter builds on the last to
increase the reader’s understanding and to equip them with the relevant tools for considering
how to approach tough challenges such as “achieving unity of effort” in these complex,
interactive environments.

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