Settling accounts: violence, justice, and accountability in postsocialist Europe

211 Pages·1997·1.6 MB·English

by  John Borneman

SETTLING ACCOUNTS
E D I T O R S
SherryB.Ortner,NicholasB.Dirks,GeoffEley
PRINCETON STUDIES IN
CULTURE /POWER/ HISTORY
SETTLING ACCOUNTS
VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN POSTSOCIALIST EUROPE
JOHN BORNEMAN
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
Copyright(cid:211) 1997byPrincetonUniversityPress
PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet,
Princeton,NewJersey08540
IntheUnitedKingdom:PrincetonUniversityPress,
Chichester,WestSussex
AllRightsReserved
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Borneman,John,1952–
Settlingaccounts:violence,justice,andaccountabilityin
postsocialistEurope/JohnBorneman.
p. cm.—(Princetonstudiesinculture/power/history)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-691-01682-8(cloth:alk.paper)
ISBN0-691-01681-X(pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Post-communism—Europe,Eastern. 2.Ruleoflaw—Europe,
Eastern. 3.Reparation—Europe,Eastern. 4.Politicalcrimes
andoffenses—Europe,Eastern. 5.Retribution. 6.Social
justice—Europe,Eastern. 7.Europe,Eastern—Socialpolicy.
8.Europe,Eastern—Politicsandgovernment—1989–
I.Title.II.Series.
HN380.7.A8B671997
306.2¢0947—dc21 97-12041 CIP
ThisbookhasbeencomposedinPalatino
PrincetonUniversityPressbooksareprinted
onacid-freepaperandmeettheguidelines
forpermanenceanddurabilityoftheCommittee
onProductionGuidelinesforBookLongevity
oftheCouncilonLibraryResources
http://pup.princeton.edu
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
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1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
(pbk.)
Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xiii
PARTONE:FRAMING,COMPARING,HISTORICIZING 1
Chapter1
FramingtheRuleofLawinEast-CentralEurope 3
AccountabilityandRetributiveJustice 3
ComparisonofRegimeTransformations 8
JusticeandPoliticalTheory 10
TheStudyofLegalReformandAnthropology 16
Violence,Accountability,Dignity 20
Chapter2
Comparing:Decommunization—Recommunization—Reform? 26
DecommunizationandRecommunization 26
SkepticalDescriptionsofReform 28
Coda 39
Chapter3
HistoricizingtheRuleofLaw 40
TheWesternLegalTradition 41
ComparisonofNationalTraditions:England,France,Germany 45
ArchitecturalSymbolismofJusticeinBerlin 47
TheTwoGermanysduringtheColdWar 50
PARTTWO:ETHNOGRAPHYOFCRIMINALITY 57
Chapter4
TheInvocationoftheRechtsstaatinEastGermany:
GovernmentalandUnificationCriminality 59
TheInvocation 59
CreationofCriminalCategoriesandInvestigationofCrime:
ZERV1—UnificationCriminality 63
CreationofCriminalCategoriesandInvestigationofCrime:
ZERV2—GovernmentalCriminality 66
TheInvestigation 71
TransformingMisfortuneintoInjustice:TheRoleof
ArchivesandEvidence 72
vi CONTENTS
ReckoningwiththeCriminalPast:ZERVandthe
Gauck-Authority 75
PreliminaryProceedings(Zwischenverfahren) 78
TheTrial(Hauptverfahren) 78
Chapter5
AccountabilityonTrial 80
Extortion:ProfessorDr.Vogel 81
TheIndictment 84
TheRighttoLeaveandColdWarOrder 86
Zapff’sCottage 90
Postscript 94
PARTTHREE:ETHNOGRAPHYOFVINDICATION 97
Chapter6
DemocraticAccountability:Results,Evaluations,
Ramifications 99
Chapter7
JusticeandDignity:Victims,Vindication,and
Accountability 111
DignityandRestitutiveJustice 111
HistoryofVindicationafter1989 113
TheCommissionofVindicationforRadioandTelevision 118
CaseStudyofVindicationCommissionProceedings 121
EvaluationsoftheVindicationCommission 128
Conclusion 133
PARTFOUR:LEGITIMACY 137
Chapter8
TheRuleofLawandtheState:Violence,Justice,and
Legitimacy 139
Type1:SomeRetributiveJustice 145
Type2:LittleRetributiveJustice 155
Type3:ExtensiveRetributiveJustice 160
Conclusion 165
Notes 167
Bibliography 177
Index 187
NameIndex 195
Preface
I BEGAN the research for Settling Accounts on a trip to Berlin in March
1990. Funded by the German Marshall Fund, I went as an anthropol-
ogist to observe the first free, multiparty elections in East Germany
since1946.IhadjustfinishedastudyofeverydaylifeduringtheCold
War in the divided Berlin, and I was a few months away from com-
pletingabookaboutGermany’sfirststepstowardnationalunification.
Inmysearchforthekeyissuesintheradicaltransformationsofculture,
society, and politics, I was struck by publicdemands,often bordering
onhysteria,forjustice.Thesedemandsrangedfromrequestsforreha-
bilitation of one’s name or reputation to calls for the prosecution of
membersoftheoldelite.Initiallytheyhadlittletodowithfightsover
the return or redistribution of property, which has since occupied the
attention of so many intellectuals. Much public attention was focused
on what legal theorists call “moral injuries”—deeds, like attempted
murder,thatdidnotresultinactualharmbutwerenonethelesswrong.
People seemed united that the “actually existing socialist” regimes
were illegitimate and that their elites had behaved unethically, if not
criminally.Inthistransformativemoment,theburningissuesinpublic
discourse, not only in East Germany but throughout much of East-
Central Europe, became: how and for what should people be held ac-
countable,andhowcouldpastwrongsbesetright?Itappearedthatthe
immediatelegitimacyofthenewpostsocialiststatesoftheformerEast
bloc rested largely on formulating adequate responses to what all
agreed were intractable problems of rectifying perceived injustice un-
der the old regimes. Most of this book is devoted to evaluating the
performanceofthesenewstatesinreckoningwiththeircriminalpasts
in the first five years after the revolutionary change of regimes. This
reckoninghasinvolvedanattempttoinvoke theprinciplesoftherule
oflaw.
Now,asIclosethisstudy,therelevanceoftheinitialtopicthatinter-
ested me is no longer limitedto the losers of the Cold War, to the for-
mer socialist regimes of East and Central Europe. From Western Eu-
ropetoLatinAmericatoAsia,eventheregimesofthecapitalistvictors
andtheirallieshavebeenunsettledbydemandsforaccountabilityand
justice. An extraordinary anti-Mafia campaign continues to shake the
foundationsofpostwarItalianpoliticalculture;ChileanandArgentin-
ian officers responsible for terrorizing and killing political opponents
have been tried and imprisoned; two past presidents of South Korea
viii PREFACE
were recently convicted on charges of ordering a massacre. Although
itisunlikelythatmanyofthesecampaignswillresultinconvictionsor
imprisonment (or that general amnesties will be declared, as has al-
readyhappenedinChileandArgentina),theperformativeeffectofthe
state’s effort should not be ignored. What began quite narrowly as a
studyofthetransformationofEastblocsocialistregimesnowappears
relevantoutsidetheEuropeancontext.Indeed,itisperhapsthebegin-
ningof aparticularkindofHistory. Wearewitnessingaworldmove-
mentforretributivejustice:theconvictionofwrongdoersandtheresto-
rationofthedignityofvictims.
Unlikedistributivejustice,whichisconcernedwithgivingeachhis/
her proper share, or corrective justice, which is intent on rectifying
harms, retributive justice deals primarily with moral injuries, wrongs
that frequently do not result inmaterial injuryor harm.In current us-
age, retribution has come to be associated solely with punishment for
offenses,yetetymologicallythemeaningofthewordincludesreward-
ingforgooddeeds.Onlyinthecourseofthetwentiethcenturyhasthe
meaningofretributionbeenreducedtoamanifestationofrevengemo-
tives.Upuntilthelate-nineteenthcentury,ithasalwaysbeenpartofa
settling of accounts that necessarily both punishes evil and rewards
good.
Therelevanceofretributivejusticeinthecontemporarycontextgoes
far beyond the fate of individual criminals and victims; its increasing
importanceispartofaglobalritualpurificationofthecenterofpolitical
regimesthat seek democraticlegitimacy.Notallstates,ofcourse,seek
democratic legitimacy, and those which fail, despite positive inten-
tions,toachievedemocraticpoliticalformwilllikelyturntodictatorial
means of assuring their domination. For them, retributive justice will
likely not bejusticeat all.Butforthose thatdoseekdemocratic legiti-
macy, only with this purification can the “rule of law” be successfully
invoked.Onlywithanappealtoprinciplesembodiedinpublic“ruleby
law”insteadofinpersonal“rulebymen”canthesenewstatesinEast-
Central Europe establish democratic legitimacy. The invocation of the
ruleoflawisnotaone-shotinjectionofjusticeintoformerstatesocial-
ist settings, a return of errant governments to political normality; re-
gimepurificationisnecessarilyaperiodicprocess.
To invoke the rule of law has always meant different things to dif-
ferent people. Some analysts see it as a set of procedures to protect
individualsfromarbitraryrule,whileothersviewitastheprogressive
march of reason and rationality. The former tend to focus on human
rightsandpoliticalliberties,thelatteroncontractandpropertyrights.
Historicallythetwoperspectiveshavebeendifficulttodisentanglethe-
oretically and empirically, partly because private property rights and
PREFACE ix
political liberties coexist everywhere in a sometimes complementary,
sometimes antagonistic relationship. The distinctive claims and inter-
connectednessofthe twoperspectiveswasillustratedagainin1989in
TiananmenSquarebyChinesedemonstrators,whotooktheruleoflaw
tomeanpoliticallibertiesandfreedoms—whereasDengXiaopingand
othermembersofthepoliticalelitesawitastheimportationofforeign,
Western individualism. Subsequently many of these demonstrators
havereportedlybecomecapitalists,joiningthepoliticaleliteinitspro-
growth economic goals. Yet in order to reach these economic goals,
Westernbanksandlendinginstitutionshaveforcedtheelitetoenact,if
only formally, contract law—henceinvoking atleastsomebasictenets
oftheruleoflaw.Thenewlegislationwillundoubtedlyhaveaneffect
onpoliticallibertiesandonprinciplesofaccountability.Preciselywhat
thateffectwillberemainstobeseen.
This study emphasizes another, frequently neglected aspect of the
rule of law: its principles of accountability, which, I maintain, are in-
trinsictothelegitimationofdemocraticstatesandtheoreticallypriorto
conceptions of human and property rights. In this, it deviates from
mostcontemporaryperspectivesontheruleoflaw.Iam,however,not
alone in my focus on accountability. In literary criticism, for example,
Derrida-inspireddeconstruction hasbeenconcernedwithlocating the
authority of representation. Hence it has focusedlargely on questions
about “from where” one speaks or writes in order to hold authorities
accountable for their representations. In the history of science, ques-
tionsaboutmedicalethics,theroleofprofitsindrugresearchanduse,
and the regulation of biogenetic experiments have become central.
Whatunitesthehumanitiesandsocialsciencestodayisafundamental
concernwithrenewingandreinvigorating principlesofaccountability
in a fluid and decentered international order. I hope that sucha focus
willalsobecomeacentralconcernoflegalandpoliticalstudies.
My own views on law have changed considerably in the course of
my research for this book. When I began, I thought it was presump-
tuousto assumethatthediscreditedsocialiststatesneededtheruleof
law in order to reestablish their legitimacy. To be sure, most of these
statesseemedtohavelosttheirmonopolyonthelegitimateuseofvio-
lence,butIremainedunconvincedthatinvokingtheruleoflawwould
bring about a more peaceful public order. Moreover, the sudden at-
tempt to install a newsystemof formal procedures and rulesentailed
arejectionoftheentiresystemofsocialistlegality,notonlyofitsrules
butalsofrequentlyofthepeoplerepresentingandenforcingthemtout
court, without consideration of individual responsibility. In any case,
mostsocialtheoristsatthattimewerenottalkingabouttheruleoflaw
andretributivejusticebutaboutconstitutions,propertyrights,andthe
x PREFACE
extension of Western markets into East-Central Europe. Their interest
in the installation of specific institutional arrangements, I thought,
wouldmeetthesamefateasotherattemptstoinsertaglobalideology,
such as the fate of “development” in the Third World: it would fail,
even measured by its own terms, but not without leaving permanent
tracesofaninternationalproperty regime.Fiveyearslater,Ihavecon-
cluded that one must distinguish between the installation of institu-
tionalarrangementsandinvocationoftheprinciplesoftheruleoflaw;
thisinvocationisnotonlydesirablebutalsoaprerequisiteforinternal
andexternallegitimacy.
Inowthinkthatthisinvocationisnotonlypartofaglobalideology
that is spreading to the Eastbloc,butthat the ruleof lawalsoconsists
ofritual performancessuchastrialsforwrongdoersandpublicvindi-
cations.Theseperformancesareinfacttransnationalpracticesandpro-
cesses,andtheyareintrinsictomaintainingthelegitimacyofallstates
that claim democratic form. While the principles of the rule of law
sharewithotherjuraltypesafunctionofritualpurification—establish-
ingmoralprinciplesthroughtheidentificationofwrongdoingandthe
rightingofwrong—theruleoflawhasprovenitselftobeasuperiorset
ofsuchprinciples.Contrarytomanypunditswhoclaimthateconomic
growth or acts of reconciliation alone will legitimate the transformed
East bloc states or quell the violence that has accompaniedthe transi-
tions, I conclude that failure to rectify past injustices will undermine
thelegitimacyofnewstates.Inowthinkthatdemocraticstatesrequire
the reiteration ofprinciplesofaccountabilitytoreestablishthemselves
asmoralauthoritiesthatcanclaimtorepresententirecommunities.
Mostanthropologicalstudiesoflegalregimescloselyfollowtheemic
conceptionsofthoseregimes(orofscholarsoreliteswithinthem)and
assume the autonomy of either folk or national legal categories and
cultures. The little ethnographic research on law during the transfor-
mation of socialist legal regimes has also focused on specific conflicts
within national legal cultures—assumed to be separate, holistic, and
bounded—without adequately addressing the increasing internation-
ality of all conflictandculture.I amarguing against extending sucha
cultural relativism, however well intentioned, to the analysis of legal
systems,andseekinsteadanencounterbetweentheempiricaldetailof
howthe principlesof the ruleof lawwork inspecificplacesandwhat
theirclaimsaretouniversalvalidity.
SettlingAccountsthereforepresentsitselfasablurredgenre:parteth-
nographyofritualpurificationundertheruleoflawintheformerEast
Germany, part history of a global legal transformation, part essay in
comparative political-legal anthropology, part moral philosophy. In