Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives

352 Pages·2005·2.05 MB·English

by  Gary W. Cox

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SettingtheAgenda
ResponsiblePartyGovernmentintheU.S.Houseof
Representatives
Scholars of the U.S. House of Representatives disagree over the importance of
politicalpartiesinorganizingthelegislativeprocess.Ontheonehand,nonpartisan
theoriesstresshowcongressionalorganizationservesmembers’nonpartisangoals.
Ontheotherhand,partisantheoriesarguethattheHouseisorganizedtoservethe
collectiveinterestsofthemajorityparty.Thisbookadvancesourpartisantheory
andpresentsaseriesofempiricaltestsofthattheory’spredictions(pittedagainst
others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is
naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority
partyhascartelizedagendapowerintheU.S.HousesincetheadoptionofReed’s
rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda
controlatnearlyeverystageofthelegislativeprocessinordertopreventbillsthat
thepartydislikesfromreachingthefloor.Givenourempiricalevidence,wequestion
thevalidityoftheoriesthatdonottakeintoaccountthesubstantialinfluenceof
politicalparties.
GaryW.CoxisaprofessorofpoliticalscienceattheUniversityofCalifornia,San
Diego.Inadditiontonumerousarticlesintheareasoflegislativeandelectoralpol-
itics,heisauthorofTheEfficientSecret(winneroftheSamuelH.Beerdissertation
prizein1983),coauthorofLegislativeLeviathan(winneroftheRichardF.Fenno
Prizein1994),andauthorofMakingVotesCount:StrategicCoordinationinthe
World’s Electoral Systems (1997), which received the American Political Science
Association’sawardsforthebestbookinpoliticalscience(WoodrowWilsonFoun-
dation Award), the best book in comparative politics (Gregory Luebbert Prize),
andthebestbookinpoliticaleconomy.Hislatestbook,ElbridgeGerry’sSalaman-
der,analyzesthepoliticalconsequencesofthereapportionmentrevolutioninthe
UnitedStates.CoxisaformerGuggenheimFellowandwaselectedtotheAmerican
AcademyofArtsandSciencesin1996andtotheNationalAcademyofSciencesin
2005.
MathewD.McCubbinsistheChancellor’sAssociatesChairVIIIintheDepartment
ofPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego.Heisthecoauthorof
fourotherbooks:TheLogicofDelegation(1991),winneroftheAmericanPolitical
Science Association’s 1992 Gladys M. Kammerer Award; Legislative Leviathan
(1993), winner of the American Political Science Association Legislative Studies
Section’s 1994 Richard F. Fenno Prize; The Democratic Dilemma (Cambridge
University Press, 1998); and Stealing the Initiative (2000). He is also editor or
coeditorofeightadditionalbooksandhasauthoredmorethanseventy-fivescien-
tificarticles,withonewinningtheCongressionalQuarterlyPrizeforbestarticleon
legislativepolitics.ProfessorMcCubbinswasaFellowattheCenterforAdvanced
StudyintheBehavioralSciencesin1994–5.HeservedasacoeditoroftheJournal
ofLaw,Economics&Organization. HehasaB.A.fromtheUniversityofCali-
fornia,Irvine,andanM.S.andPh.D.fromtheCaliforniaInstituteofTechnology.
ProfessorMcCubbinsisaFellowoftheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences.
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Setting the Agenda
Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House
of Representatives
GARY W. COX
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS
UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego
iii
CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB28RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521853798
© Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins 2005
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2005
ISBN-13 978-0-511-34462-6 eBook (EBL)
ISBN-10 0-511-34462-7 eBook (EBL)
ISBN-13 978-0-521-85379-8 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-85379-6 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-61996-7 paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-61996-3 paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
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To Karen Cox and Sue McCubbins
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Contents
FiguresandTables page viii
Acknowledgments xi
1 Introduction 1
part i: why party government?
2 ProceduralCartelTheory 17
part ii: negative agenda power
3 ModelingAgendaPower 37
4 ThePrimacyofReed’sRulesinHouseOrganization 50
5 FinalPassageVotes 87
6 TheCostsofAgendaControl 106
7 TheTextbookCongressandtheCommitteeonRules 124
8 TheBillsReportedfromCommittee 149
9 WhichWayDoesPolicyMove? 171
part iii: consequences of positive agenda power and
conditional party government
10 PositiveAgendaPower 201
11 Conclusion 220
Appendix 231
Addendum 253
Bibliography 307
Index 329
AuthorIndex 333
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Figures and Tables
Figures
1.1 Illustrationofleftwardandrightwardpolicymoves page3
1.2 Majority-partyagendacontrolandlegislativesuccess 8
3.1 TheidealizedCartelAgendaModel 43
4.1 Statusquosthatwillandwillnotbeputontheagendaand
amendedtoF 66
4.2 Identifyingthedirectionofpolicychange 67
4.3 EffectofReed’srulesontheproportionofbillsmoving
policytowardthemajorityparty 72
5.1 Majority-partyrollrateinHouseandSenate,Congresses
45–105 94
5.2 Minority-partyrollrateinHouseandSenate,Congresses
45–105 94
7.1 TheRulesCommitteeasanagendasetter 128
7.2 Kerneldensityplotsofrollratesonspecialrules 136
7.3 LocationoftheRulesCommitteemedianandpartyrolls 139
8.1 Estimateddissentratesfor(majority)Democratsand
(minority)Republicans,byW-NOMINATEscore 164
8.2 Estimatedrateofvotingagainstabillfor(majority)
Democratsand(minority)Republicans,byW-NOMINATE
score 165
8.A.1 Illustratingthememberdissentandcommitteeblockzones 167
9.1 ProportionofbillsthatmovepolicyleftwardintheHouse 173
9.2 Agenda-settingandbillpassagestagesofthelegislative
process 174
9.B.1 ProportionofleftwardmovesundertheFloor
AgendaModel 193
9.B.2 Proportionofleftwardmovesundertheextended
pivotmodel 195
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