Self-respect in the just society: a Rawlsian reconstruction and defence

219 Pages·2016·1.71 MB·English

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF SOCIAL, HUMAN AND
MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
Department of Politics and International Relations

SELF-RESPECT IN THE JUST SOCIETY:
A RAWLSIAN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEFENCE
by
Richard Penny

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
August 2015
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES
Politics and International Relations
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
SELF-RESPECT IN THE JUST SOCIETY: A RAWLSIAN RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEFENCE
By Richard Penny
This thesis is concerned with the status of the good of ‘self-respect’ within
John Rawls’s account of the just society. Self-respect has a central place within
Rawls’s theory of justice—and yet, as many recognise, Rawls’s discussion of
this good is both fragmented and opaque. As such, very basic questions
remain unanswered. What is the nature of this good? Precisely how does it
relate to justice? And what moral implications follow from this for organising
the basic structure of a just society?
In the first part of this thesis I address these (and other) important questions.
I begin by reconstructing a Rawlsian account of self-respect, so as to arbitrate
between the multiple uses Rawls ascribes to the term. What emerges, I argue,
is an account of self-respect which is not only more coherent than Rawls’s
exposition may suggest, but one which has an interesting and sophisticated
relationship to the account of justice which Rawls develops. I use this account
to argue that considerations of self-respect act as a constraint upon the
principles of justice Rawls sets out, and I set out what I take to be a covert
distributive standard for this good. These findings not only shed light on the
status of self-respect within Rawls’s work, but also on a number of theoretical
debates over the kind of project in which Rawls was engaged.
With this exegesis completed, the second part of the thesis asks what the
implications are for three contemporary debates over the Rawlsian ‘legacy’. I
first address G.A. Cohen’s ‘incentive-based’ critique of Rawls, and argue that
the good of self-respect serves to deepen the thrust of this challenge. I then
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address recent accounts of ‘Market Democracy’ and argue that its proponents
are wrong to argue self-respect can act as the bridge between Rawlsian and
libertarian thought. Finally, I address the recent work done to expand upon
the Rawlsian ideal of a ‘property-owning democracy’. I argue that—subject to
some minor revisions—this interpretation comes closest to realising the
vision that Rawls had for the status of self-respect in the just society.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP
I, .....................................................................................................................................
declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been
generated by me as the result of my own original research.
.................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................
I confirm that:
1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research
degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree
or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this
has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always
clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given.
With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I
have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have
contributed myself;
7. Parts of this work have been published as: Penny, R. 2013. 'Incentives,
Inequality and Self-Respect,' Res Publica, 19(4).
Signed:..................................................................................................................................................
Date:

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my sincere thanks to my principal supervisor, Professor
Chris Armstrong, who has been a paragon of support - both academic and
personal - throughout what has often been a sub-optimal process. Without
his patience and encouragement this thesis would not have been possible,
and I am greatly in his debt. I also owe much to Professor Andy Mason who
supervised my work in my first year, and who was invaluable in the shaping
of this topic from the rather bulbous mass of ideas with which he was
presented.
I would also like to thank Professor David Owen for his generous reading of
drafts and chapters, as well as his insightful and helpful advice regarding
both the thesis and my research more widely. I also owe David thanks for his
support in my original application to the PhD and for the Centre for
Citizenship Globalization and Governance at Southampton for offering me
the studentship funding without which – once more – this thesis would not
have been written.
I also wish to thank my friends Anjelica Finnegan, George Disney, Michael
Elliott, Steve Donbavand and Vicki Bolton for providing – through humour,
political activism and good company – a genuine sanctuary in more difficult
times.
Finally, I wish to thank my family – my two children whose incredulity at the
time a PhD takes offered me constant impetus – and my mother Gill, and my
sister Alison – who have been a constant source of support throughout.
I dedicate the following to the memory of my father who passed away early
in the process but from whom – more than anyone – my intuitions on these
questions were derived.

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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ 7
Contents ........................................................................................................................................... 9
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 12
1. Chapter 1 – The Rawlsian Account of Self-Respect ........................................ 16
1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 16
1.2. Rawls’s description of self-respect ................................................................ 17
1.3. Self-respect or self-esteem?............................................................................... 22
1.4. The Kantian tradition of self-respect............................................................ 26
1.5. The Kantian element of Rawlsian self-respect ......................................... 32
1.6. Distinguishing self-respect from self-esteem ........................................... 35
1.7. The structure of self-respect ............................................................................ 37
1.8. Reconstructing Rawlsian self-respect .......................................................... 42
1.9. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 45
2. Chapter 2 – The Place of Self-Respect in Rawls’s Theory of Justice ........ 50
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 50
2.2. The position of self-respect in Rawls’s account of Justice .................. 51
2.3. The primary goods ................................................................................................ 53
2.4. ‘Perhaps the most important primary good’? .......................................... 55
2.5. Self-respect and citizenship .............................................................................. 57
2.6. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 61
3. Chapter 3 – The Social Character of Self-Respect ............................................ 66
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 66
3.2. Social and natural primary goods .................................................................. 66
3.3. The development of self-respect: The ‘Aristotelian Principle’.......... 71
3.4. The development of self-respect: Social recognition ............................ 78
3.5. The social bases of self-respect ....................................................................... 81
3.6. Three Categories of social bases of self-respect ...................................... 82
3.7. Conclusions: Beyond the distributive paradigm ..................................... 84
4. Chapter 4 – Justice as Fairness and Self-Respect ............................................. 90
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 90
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