Self-Deception Unmasked

147 Pages·2001·1.08 MB·English

by  Alfred R. Mele

SELF-DECEPTION
UNMASKED
Alfred R. Mele
princeton university press
princeton and oxford
Copyright2001byPrincetonUniversityPress
PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet,
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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Mele,AlfredR.,1951–
Self-deceptionunmasked/AlfredR.Mele.
p. cm.—(Princetonmonographsinphilosophy)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-691-05744-3(hardcover:alk.paper)—
ISBN0-691-05745-1(pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Self-deception.I.Title.II.Series.
BD439.M452000
128′.3—dc21 00-032626
ThisbookhasbeencomposedinJansonTextandCentaur
Thepaperusedinthispublication
meetstheminimumrequirementsof
ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992(R1997)
(PermanenceofPaper)
www.pup.princeton.edu
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Contents
Preface·ix
CHAPTER1.Introduction:Approaches,Puzzles,Biases,andAgency
3
CHAPTER2.Garden-VarietyStraightSelf-Deception:
SomePsychologicalProcesses
25
CHAPTER3.Self-DeceptionwithoutPuzzles
50
CHAPTER4.AttemptedEmpiricalDemonstrations
ofStrictSelf-Deception
76
CHAPTER5.TwistedSelf-Deception
94
CHAPTER6.Conclusion
119
Notes·125
References·137
Index·145
Preface
WHAT MOTIVATED ME to accept Harry Frankfurt’s kind invita-
tion to submit a manuscript to this series was the opportunity
to present and defend in a systematic way a position on self-
deceptionthathasevolvedpartlyoutofmyearlierattemptsto
shedlightonthephenomenon.AlthoughIdrawonpreviously
published work, the defense offered here of my central theses
aboutthekindofself-deceptionthathasreceivedprideofplace
inthephilosophicalandpsychologicalliteratureismuchmore
robustandhasanimportantnewdimensionthatbenefitsfrom
recentempiricalworkonhypothesistesting.Thegeneralposi-
tiononself-deceptionadvancedherealsoisconsiderablymore
comprehensive than what I have been able to manage in my
scatteredeffortsonthetopicovertheyears.
I have been thinking about self-deception longer than it
pleases me to acknowledge. My first stab at the topic (Mele
1982), a brief commentary on a provocative paper by Robert
Audi (1982), contains some of the seeds of the position ad-
vanced in this book. My central point there was that “there is
noclosegeneralanalogybetweenself-deceptionandintentional
otherdeception”andthat“whenourattachmenttothisanalogy
isbroken,thereissignificantlylessmotivationtopostulateun-
conscious [true] beliefs in ordinary cases of self-deception”
(Mele 1982, p. 164). In Mele 1983, I offered a more rigorous
x PREFACE
defense of this point, a statement of characteristic and jointly
sufficientconditionsforself-deception,andaresolutionofthe
“static” puzzle about self-deception highlighted in Chapter 1.
That article was the basis for Chapter 9 of Irrationality (Mele
1987a).AnotherchapterofIrrationalityalsotackledself-decep-
tion: in Chapter 10, drawing on some literature in social psy-
chology, I offereda resolution of a puzzleabout the dynamics
ofself-deception.Thesetwochaptersareapartialbasisfortwo
recent articles, Mele 1998b and Mele 1997a. The former was
written as an invited contribution to a 1993 interdisciplinary
conferenceonself-deceptionatStanfordUniversityorganized
byJean-PierreDupuyandsubsequentlypublishedinavolume
containingseveralofthepaperspresentedthere.Owingtothe
natureoftheinvitation,Iwasnotbashfulaboutborrowingfrom
Irrationality,butIdidbranchoutintwodirections.Imadeuse
ofnewempiricalliteraturethatsupportedacentralhypothesis
aboutmotivationallybiasedbeliefadvancedinIrrationalityand,
atDupuy’srequest,Iexaminedaliteraryexampleofself-decep-
tion. (My discussion in Chapter 3 of Isaac Bashevis Singer’s
shortstory“GimpeltheFool”derivespartlyfromthatpaper.)
SometimeaftertheStanfordconference,Iwasinvitedtosub-
mitatargetarticletoBehavioralandBrainSciences.Thatarticle
(Mele 1997a) is a wider-ranging and more heavily empirical
descendant of the conference paper. It benefited from two
roundsofrevisionpromptedbyfifteenrefereereports.
Inthisbook,Ihaveborrowedliberallyfrompublishedwork
of mine. Parts of Chapter 1 derive from three sources: “Real
Self-Deception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 91–
102(Mele1997a);myreplytotheBBScommentaries,“Under-
standing and Explaining Real Self-Deception,” Behavioral and
BrainSciences20(1997):127–34(Mele1997b);and“Motivated
Belief and Agency,” Philosophical Psychology 11 (1998): 353–69
(Mele1998a).PartsofChapter2derivefromMele1997a,Mele
1998a, and another article: “Twisted Self-Deception,” Philo-
sophical Psychology 12 (1999): 117–37 (Mele 1999a).1 Parts of
PREFACE xi
Chapter3derivefromthesamethreearticlesasChapter1and
an additional source: “Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception,” in
J. Dupuy, ed., Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (Stan-
ford:CSLI,1998),pp.37–58(Mele1998b).PartsofChapter4
derivefromthesamethreesourcesasChapter1.Chapter5is
basedonMele1999a.
Naturally, I have learned from authors of published re-
sponsesto mypreviouswork onself-deception.For usefulin-
formaldiscussionandwrittenremarks,IamgratefultoRobert
Audi, Kent Bach, Jim Friedrich, Rainer Reisenzein, and Bill
Talbott. I also have benefited from the advice of two anony-
mousreferees.
Icompletedthefinalrevisionofthisbookduringmytenure
of a 1999–2000 NEH Fellowship for College Teachers. (The
fellowshipsupportedworkonanotherbook—tentativelyenti-
tled Motivation and Agency—that is well underway at the time
of this writing.) Much of the revision was accomplished while
I was a Visiting Fellow in the Philosophy Program in the Re-
search School of Social Sciences at the Australian National
University (June through August, 1999). I am grateful to the
NEHandtheANUfortheirsupport,andtoDavidsonCollege
fora1999–2000sabbaticalleave.
1
Introduction: Approaches, Puzzles,
Biases, and Agency
“ASURVEYofuniversityprofessorsfoundthat94%thoughtthey
werebetterattheirjobsthantheiraveragecolleague”(Gilovich
1991, p. 77). Are university professors exceptionally adept at
self-deception? Perhaps not. “A survey of one million high
school seniors found that ... all students thought they were
above average” in their “ability to get along with others ...
and25%thoughttheywereinthetop1%”(ibid.).Onemight
suspect that the respondents to these surveys were not being
entirelysincereintheiranswers.Thenagain,howmanyuniver-
sityprofessorsdoyouknowwhodonotthinkthattheyarebet-
teratwhattheydothantheiraveragecolleague?
Data such as these suggest that we sometimes deceive our-
selves.Thatsuggestionraisessomeinterestingquestions.How
dowedeceiveourselves?Whydowedeceiveourselves?What
isittodeceiveoneself?Isself-deceptionevenpossible?These
questionsguidemydiscussioninthisbook.
Sometheoristsunderstandself-deceptionaslargelyisomor-
phic with stereotypical interpersonal deception. This under-
standing, which has generated some much discussed puzzles
or “paradoxes,” guides influential work on self-deception not
4 CHAPTER ONE
onlyinphilosophybutalsoinpsychology,psychiatry,andbiol-
ogy.1 In the course of resolving the major puzzles, I argue
thattheattempttounderstandself-deceptiononthemodelof
stereotypical interpersonal deception is fundamentally mis-
guided.Thepositiononself-deceptiondefendedhereisdefla-
tionary.IfIamright,self-deceptionisneitherirresolvablypara-
doxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the
assistanceofmentalexotica.Althoughatheoristwhoseinterest
in self-deception is restricted to the outer limits of logical or
conceptual possibility might view this as draining the topic of
conceptual intrigue, the main source of broader, enduring in-
terestinself-deceptionisaconcerntounderstandandexplain
thebehaviorofrealhumanbeings.
1.PREVIEW
Self-deception apparently occurs intwo quite different forms,
“straight” and “twisted.” Straight cases of self-deception have
receivedprideofplaceinphilosophicalandempiricalwork.In
these cases, people are self-deceived in believing something
thattheywanttobetrue—forexample,thattheyarenotseri-
ouslyill,thattheirchildrenarenotexperimentingwithdrugs,
orthatalovedoneisinnocentofacriminalcharge.Intwisted
cases,peopleareself-deceivedinbelievingsomethingthatthey
wanttobefalse(anddonotalsowanttobetrue).Forexample,
aninsecure,jealoushusbandmaybelievethathiswifeishaving
an affair despite his possessing only relatively flimsy evidence
for that proposition and despite his not wanting it to be the
case that she is so engaged.2 If some self-deception is twisted
in this sense, at least one relatively common claim about self-
deceptionisfalse—theclaimthatS’sbeingself-deceivedthatp
requires S’s desiring that p.3 Furthermore, twisted self-decep-
tion apparently threatens even the more modest claim that all
INTRODUCTION 5
self-deceptionismotivatedorhasamotivatedcomponent.4Al-
thoughthemostobviousantonymof“straight”is“bent,”Ipre-
fer“twisted”hereforstylisticreasons.Iamnotusingtheterm
pejorativelyandIdonotregardtwistedself-deceptionasessen-
tiallypathological.)
In Chapters 2 and 3, I offer an account of the nature and
etiology of garden-variety straight self-deception and resolve
somefamiliarpuzzlesaboutself-deception.InChapter4,Ire-
viewandrejectattemptedempiricaldemonstrationsofa“strict”
kind of self-deception in which the self-deceiver believes a
proposition,p,whilealsobelievingitsnegation,∼p.InChapter
5,Idevelopapairofapproachestoexplainingtwistedself-de-
ception—a motivation-centered approach and a hybrid ap-
proach featuring both motivation and emotion—in order to
displayourresourcesforexploringandexplainingtwistedself-
deception and to show that promising approaches are consis-
tentwithmypositiononstraightself-deception.
2.THREE APPROACHES TO CHARACTERIZING
SELF-DECEPTION AND A PAIR OF PUZZLES
In defining self-deception, three common approaches may be
distinguished:lexical,inwhichatheoriststartswithadefinition
of “deceive” or “deception,” using the dictionary or common
usage as a guide, and then employs it as a model for defining
self-deception; example-based, in which one scrutinizes repre-
sentative examples of self-deception and attempts to identify
theiressentialcommonfeatures;andtheory-guided,inwhichthe
searchforadefinitionisguidedbycommonsensetheoryabout
theetiologyandnatureofself-deception.Hybridsoftheseap-
proachesarealsocommon.
The lexical approach may seem safest. Practitioners of the
example-basedapproachruntheriskofconsideringtoonarrow
6 CHAPTER ONE
a range of cases. The theory-guided approach, in its typical
manifestations,reliesoncommonsenseexplanatoryhypotheses
thatmaybemisguided:evenifordinaryfolksaregoodatidenti-
fying hypothetical cases of self-deception, they may be quite
unreliableatdiagnosingwhathappensinthem.Initsmostpris-
tineversions,thelexicalapproachreliesprimarilyonadiction-
arydefinition of“deceive.” Andwhatcould bea bettersource
ofdefinitionsthanthedictionary?
Matters are not so simple, however. There are weaker and
strongersensesof“deceive”bothinthedictionaryandincom-
mon parlance.Lexicalists needa sense of“deceive” thatis ap-
propriateto self-deception.On whatbasis aretheyto identify
that sense? Must they eventually turn to representative exam-
plesofself-deceptionortocommonsensetheoriesaboutwhat
happensininstancesofself-deception?
The lexical approach is favored by theorists who deny that
self-deception is possible (e.g., Gergen 1985; Haight 1980;
Kipp1980).Apairoflexicalassumptionsiscommon:
1. By definition, person A deceives person B (where B
may or may not be the same person as A) into believing
thatponlyifAknows,oratleastbelievestruly,that∼pand
causesBtobelievethatp.
2. By definition, deceiving is an intentional activity:
nonintentionaldeceivingisconceptuallyimpossible.
Eachassumptionisassociatedwithafamiliarpuzzleaboutself-
deception.
Ifassumption1istrue,thendeceivingoneselfintobelieving
thatprequiresthatoneknows,oratleastbelievestruly,that∼p
andcausesoneselftobelievethatp.Attheveryleast,onestarts
outbelievingthat∼pandthensomehowgetsoneselftobelieve
thatp.Sometheoriststakethistoentailthat,atsometime,self-
deceivers both believe that p and believe that ∼p (e.g., Kipp
1980, p. 309). And, it is claimed, this is not a possible state of
mind:theverynatureofbeliefprecludesone’ssimultaneously