Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism

208 Pages·2018·69.04 MB·English

by  Sebastian Rödl

SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS AND OBJECTIVITY

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity
An Introduction to Absolute Idealism
Se ba S t i a n Rödl
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
2018
Copyright © 2018 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of Amer i ca
First printing
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Rödl, Sebastian, author.
Title: Self- consciousness and objectivity : an introduction
to absolute idealism / Sebastian Rödl.
Description: Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts : Harvard University Press, 2018. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017025230 | ISBN 9780674976511 (alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Self- consciousness (Awareness) | Objectivity. | Self- knowledge,
Theory of. | Idealism.
Classification: LCC BD161 .R596 2018 | DOC 121— dc23
LC reco rd available at https:// lccn.loc. gov/ 2017025230
Cover art: SasinParaksa/Thinkstock
Cover design: Graciela Galup
Contents
1. Objectivity versus the First Person 1
2. Propositions 19
3. D enial of Self- Consciousness 38
4. The Science without Contrary 54
5. Objective Judgment in Nagel and Moore 63
6. The Explanation of Judgment 84
7. The Power of Judgment 100
8. The Self- Determination of the Power 111
9. The Original Act of Judgment 128
10. The Identity of Absolute and Empirical Knowledge 151
Notes 161
Works Cited 185
Acknowl edgments 189
Index 191

SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS AND OBJECTIVITY

Chapter One
Objectivity versus the First Person
1.1. Objectivity, the first person
Thinking that such- and- such is the case is an act of a subject. Yet thought
is objective: w hether someone is right to think what she does depends,
depends alone, on what she thinks; it is in de pen dent of any character of
her who thinks it. If we call what the subject thinks the object of her
thought, we can say: thought is objective, as its validity depends on its
object alone and is in de pen dent of its subject.
Thought is objective: whether it is right to think something depends
on what is thought alone, not on any character of the subject thinking
it. This seems to imply that thought is objective insofar as its subject
does not figure in its object. More precisely: insofar as it does not there
figure as its subject. Someone may think of herself; she who thinks may
figure in what she thinks. But insofar as her thought is objective, she
does not figure in what she thinks as thinking it. Thought, being objec-
tive, is of something other than itself.
There is thought that is of the subject thinking it and is of her as
thinking it: thought whose expression in language requires the use of a
first- person pronoun. When someone thinks in the manner expressed
by a first- person pronoun, then she who thinks is she of whom she