Table Of ContentF o r e w od r
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls deals with amphibious warfare as waged
by American forces against the Japanese-held atolls of the Central Pacific
during World War II. The word amphibious, as here used, includes the landing
and supply of troopsi n combat as well as the air and naval support of the
operations.
The atoll operations described in this volume were amphibious from begin-
ning to end. They were not simple seaborne hit-and-run raids of the Dieppe
type. The objective was to secure the atolls as steppingstones to the next
advance. The islands were relatively small, permitting continual naval and air
support of the ground operations.
Some outstanding examples of the co-ordination of fire support by artillery,
naval gunfire, and air are found in this book. The advantages of simple plans
and the disadvantages of the more complicated will stand out for the careful
reader.
The story of the capture of these atolls of Micronesia offers some of the best
examples of combined operations that are available in the annals of modern
war. Ground, sea, and air components were always present, and the effective-
ness with which they were combined and co-ordinated accounts in large meas-
ure for the rapid success enjoyed in these instances by American arms. Units of
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps were active participants in the
operations and the role they played is treated in this volume as fully as is con-
sidered appropriate in a series devoted to the history of the U.S. Army in
World War II.
From the point of view of strategy, the significance of this volume lies in the
fact that it tells the story of the beginnings of the drive across the Central Pacific
toward the Japanese homeland. This concept of defeating Japan by pushing
directly westward from Hawaii through the island bases of the mid-Pacific was
traditional in American strategic thinking, but had never been put to test and
was seriously challenged in some quarters. As is shown here, the test was first
made in the campaigns against the Gilberts and Marshalls, the outcome was
successful, and the experience gained was of inestimable value in planning for
the subsequent conduct of the war in the Pacific.
ORLANDO WARD
Washington, D. C. Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
9 January 1953 Chief of Military History
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The Authors
Philip A. Crowl, who has an M. A. from the State University of Iowa and a
Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University, taught History at the Johns Hopkins
University and at Princeton. Commissioned in the Navy in World War II, he
became a lieutenant (senior grade) and commanding officer of an LCI gunboat
that was in action at Leyte Gulf, Lingayen Gulf, and Okinawa. He is author of
Maryland During and After the Revolution (1943) and co-author of The U. S. Marines
and Amphibious War (1951). He was awarded the James V. Forrestal Fellowship
for 1953-54 to prepare a study of command relationships in amphibious war-
fare in World War II.
Before World War II Edmund G. Love, with an M.A. from the University
of Michigan, taught History in a Michigan high school. A captain of Infantry
in World War II, he became historical officer of the 27th Infantry Division and
observed the operations of that division on Makin, Eniwetok, Saipan, and
Okinawa.
From 1946 to 1 August 1949 Mr. Love was a member of the Pacific Section
of the Army's historical staff in Washington. Dr. Crowl has been a member of
that staff since 1949.
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Preface
This volume tells the story of the launching of the Central Pacific drive
against Japan in late 1943 and early 1944. Specifically, it deals with the am-
phibious operations against five Central Pacific atolls—Makin, Tarawa,
Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok. It was in these battles that American
amphibious doctrine received its first critical test in the Pacific war, and the vic-
tories achieved made possible a continuation of the highly important drive
against Japan's perimeter of island defenses in the Carolines, Marianas, Vol-
cano Islands, and Ryukyus.
Numerically speaking, the Army's contribution to the forces responsible for
the capture of these atolls was not as great as that of the Marine Corps. Yet the
Army's role was a major one and is here set forth in minute detail. If the activ-
ities of other participating U.S. services receive less attention in these pages, it
is only because this volume is by definition a part of the history of the U.S.
Army in World War II.
For a variety of reasons this book has been a long time in preparation. A
draft was prepared by Mr. Edmund G. Love, then set aside, to be taken up
later by the undersigned for extensive revision, correction, and elaboration. The
authors' debts for aid and assistance are too numerous to acknowledge in detail.
Dr. Louis Morton and Dr. John Miller, jr., during their respective tenures as
Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, read every
page with care and discrimination and offered invaluable guidance. In addi-
tion, Dr. Miller prepared a separate study of the strategic background of the
operations which was used as the basis for the first and part of the second chap-
ter. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army,
gave liberally of his time and advice. To Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, formerly
Chief of Military History, Col. George G. O'Connor, Chief of War Histories
Division, and the military members of their staff a great debt is owed for their
sympathetic interest, technical assistance, and supervision of the publication of
the volume.
Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff and Mr. Charles von Luettichau not only pre-
pared the maps but offered many important suggestions regarding tactical de-
tails. Mr. Thomas Wilds did a distinguished job of piecing together the com-
plicated and often obscure story of Japanese defensive preparations and battle
operations. Miss Margaret Plumb checked all the footnotes of the original draft
for accuracy. Miss Mary Ann Bacon edited the manuscript and prepared the
index with imagination as well as meticulous care, and Mr. Alien R. Clark was
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