Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War

203 Pages·2011·1.04 MB·English

by  Terrence L. Chapman

securing approval
Edited by
William G. Howell and Jon Pevehouse
Also in the series:
After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents,
and the Politics of Waging War
by Douglas L. Kriner
=
S e c u r i n g
A p p r o va l
Domestic Politics
and Multilateral
Authorization for War
Terrence L. Chapman
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London
Terrence L. Chapman is assistant professor in the Department
of Government at the University of Texas, Austin. He is the author
or coauthor of several articles that have appeared in the Journal of
Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly,
and the Journal of Conflict Resolution.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 2011 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 2011.
Printed in the United States of America
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-10121-7 (cloth)
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-10122-4 (paper)
ISBN-10: 0-226-10121-5 (cloth)
ISBN-10: 0-226-10122-3 (paper)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Chapman, Terrence L.
Securing approval : domestic politics and multilateral
authorization for war / Terrence L. Chapman.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-10121-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-10122-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-226-10121-5 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-226-10122-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. War, Declaration
of—Decision making. 2. International agencies. 3. United Nations.
Security Council. 4. International agencies—Influence. 5. Military
policy—Public opinion. 6. Security, International. 7. International
relations. I. Title.
JZ4850.C43 2011
341.6'2—dc22
2010020387
a This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992
(Permanence of Paper).
List of Illustrations vii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1
Contents
The Value of Multilateral Authorization
19
2
Institutions, Member State Bias,
and Information Transmission
37
3
Appealing to Multilateral
Security Organizations
73
4
UN Authorization and U.S. Public Opinion
101
5
International Organizations and
Coalition Building
131
Conclusion 153
References 163
Index 179

Illustrations
Figures
2.1. Game sequence 49
2.2. Hawkish public 51
2.3. Dovish pivotal member (preferred leader policies) 53
2.4. Dovish pivotal member (pivotal member opposition) 54
2.5. Hawkish pivotal member (pivotal member support) 57
2.6. Moderate pivotal member 58
2.7. Game sequence with implementation 60
3.1. Marginal effect of regime by preference similarity 87
4.1. Marginal effect of UN authorization by affinity 118
5.1. Sequence with a foreign audience and government 135
5.2. Policy and preferences with a “dovish institution” 137
Tables
0.1. Global and regional organization membership and voting rules 11
2.1. Selected media coverage of the UN Security Council 46
3.1. Analysis of UN Security Council consultations, 1946–2003 86
3.2. Predicted probability of Security Council consultation 88
3.3. Multinomial logit results 91
vii
Illustrations
3.4. Predicted probabilities of forum shopping 92
3.5. Bivariate probit forum shopping 93
3A.1. Security Council appeals and decisions 98
4.1. Determinants of rallies, 1946–2001 116
4.2. Robustness tests 120
4.3. 2×2 Experimental design 123
4.4. Average support of Iraq troops pooled across scenarios 124
4.5. Average support of Iraq troops increase conditional on presidential
candidate 125
4.6. Support for Iraq troops increase, by likely presidential vote 126
4A.1. UN consultations by the United States and Security Council
resolutions over the period studied 129
4A.2. Data from individual experimental questions 130
5A.1. Interaction terms and interpretation 147
5A.2. Probit regression of decision to join crises 148
viii
Acknowledgments
I accumulated too many intellectual and personal debts during the writing
of this book to hope to ever repay fully. Many colleagues and friends (in-
cluding some who began as strangers but became friends throughout this
process) offered advice and criticism that have helped make this book im-
measurably better. I am extremely grateful for their help and do not think
this book could have been completed without all the incredible feedback. I
offer my sincerest apologies if I leave anyone out of the following acknowl-
edgments. Of course, all errors are my own.
First, I would like to thank my mentors during my graduate training at
Emory University: Cliff Carrubba, David Davis, Eric Reinhardt, and Dani
Reiter. Each provided me with considerable attention and challenged me to
think harder about asking good questions and constructing careful answers
to those questions. I am very lucky and grateful to have had their mentor-
ship early on in my scholarly career and I continue to benefit from their
insights and advice. I owe a special debt to Dani Reiter for all of his time
and help.
Second, I was fortunate to overlap in graduate school with a group of
very talented international relations scholars and wonderful friends, many
of whom provided useful suggestions both formally and in informal conver-
sation. Those who read portions of this project or offered advice along the
way include Zaryab Iqbal, Emily Hencken Ritter, Scott Wolford, and Amy
ix