Table Of ContentSCIENCE IN REFLE CTiON
BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Editor
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
Editorial Advisory Board
ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh
SYL VAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University
JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University
MARX W. WARTOFSKY, Baruch College of the City University of
New York
VOLUME 110
SCIENCE
IN REFLECTION
The Israel Colloquium: Studies in
History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science
Volume 3
Edited by
EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Science in reflection I edited by Edna Ullmann-Margalit.
p. cm. -- (Boston studies in the philosophy of science: v.
110) (The Israel colloquium: studies in history, philosophy, and
sociology of science; v. 3)
Inc I udes index.
ISBN 9027727120. ISBN 9027727139 (pbk.)
1. Science--Phi losophy--Congresses. 2. SCience--Social aspects
-Congresses. I. Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. II. Series. III. Series:
Israel colloquium: v. 3.
Q174.B67 vol. 110
500 s--dc19
[501] 88-3997
ISBN-13: 978-90-277-2713-8 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-2957-9 CIP
DOl: lO.107/978-94-009-2957-9
Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
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Prepared in cooperation with Mrs. Esther Shashar, executive editor,
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THE ISRAEL COLLOQUIUM: STUDIES IN
HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
The Governing Board The Advisory Committee
Yehuda Elkana Joseph Ben-David
Michael Heyd Aryeh Dworetzky
Asa Kasher Jacob Eckstein
Yaron Ezrahi
Coordinator Michael Feldman
Edna Ullmann-Margalit Seymour Fox
Saul Friedlander
Advisory Editorial Board Amos Funkenstein
Robert S. Cohen Max Jammer
Boston University Shneior Lifson
Yuval Ne'eman
Yehuda Elkana Shlomo Pines
Tel-Aviv University and Shmuel Sambursky
The Van Leer-Jerusalem David Samuel
Institute Ben-Ami Scharfstein
Ozer Schild
Gerald Holton Mark Steiner
Harvard University Ezra Talmor
Zvi Yavetz
The Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy, and Sociology of
Science was established in the academy year 1981-82. It offers, annually,
a series of public lectures, alternately in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. It is
sponsored and directed jointly by three bodies: The Center for the History
and Philosophy of Science, Technology, and Medicine of The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem; The Institute for the History and Philosophy of
Science and Ideas of Tel-Aviv University; and The Van Leer Jerusalem
Institute. The advisory board of the Israel Colloquium represents all the
institutions of higher learning in Israel.
Contents
Preface lX
CARL G. HEMPEL, Princeton University
Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of
Scientific Theories
YEMIMA BEN-MENACHEM, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of
Scientific Theories: A Comment 17
GUNTHER STENT, University of California, Berkeley
Cognitive Limits of Science 23
LORENZ KROGER, Universitiit Gottingen
How Philosophy and Science Came to Differ 37
JON ELSTER, The University of Chicago
The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanation 51
MARCELO DASCAL, Tel-Aviv University
Rational-Choice Explanation - The Limits to Grounding:
A Comment 67
L. JONATHAN COHEN, The Queen's College, Oxford
Realism Versus Anti-Realism: What Is the Issue? 81
EDDY M. ZEMACH, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Epistemic and Semantic Reflections on
Scientific Realism: A Comment 97
viii CONTENTS
DAVID M. ARMSTRONG, The University of Sydney
Can a Naturalist Believe in Universals? 103
GILEAD BAR-ELL!, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Can a Naturalist Believe in Universals?
A Comment 117
GAD FREUDENTHAL, CNRS, Paris
The Hermeneutical Status of the History of Science:
The Views of Helene Metzger 123
PIERRE KERSZBERG, The University of Sydney
The Hermeneutical Status of the History of Science:
The Views of Helene Metzger: A Comment 145
THOMAS P. HUGHES, University of Pennsylvania
The Era of Independent Inventors 151
TIMOTHY LENOIR, Stanford University
Social Interests and the Organic Physics of 1847 169
JOSEPH BEN-DAVID, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Social Interests and the Organic Physics of 1847:
A Comment 193
JOHN L. HEILBRON, University of California, Berkeley
The Earliest Missionaries of the Copenhagen Spirit 201
Index of Names 235
Preface
The Israel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science
presents before you its third volume of proceedings. The philosophy section
of the volume has three main foci: the scientific explanation (Hempel and
Ben-Menachem, Elster and Dascal); realism in science (Cohen and Zemach)
and its implications for the problem of universals (Armstrong and Bar-Elli);
and the question of demarcation: the dividing line between science and
philosophy (KrUger), as well as the cognitive limits of science (Stent).
There is no neat separation in this volume between essays on the history of
science and those on the sociology of science, and perhaps properly so. Thus,
Lenoir's contribution is a clear example of the way the two disciplines
combine and interrelate. Joseph Ben-David's comment on this lecture was
among the last things he wrote, knowing full well that his days were numbered.
Reading his contribution imparts a strong sense of loss, the loss of a great
sociologist and a wise man.
Not only history, however, but also historiography is a subject for reflection
in this volume (Freudenthal and Kerszberg). And, finally, a couple of articles
convey the sense of fascination with science as a story (Heilbron, Hughes).
We have by now come to expect from the investigations reported in the
Israel Colloquium series not surface unity of theme and method, but rather
an underlying common commitment and zest for the scientific enterprise at
its best. The third volume hopes to join the first two in footing this bill.
Edna Ullmann-Margalit
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
IX
Limits of a Deductive Construal
of the Function
of Scientific Theories
CARL G. HEMPEL
The Deductivist Construal
The goal and the proudest achievement of basic scientific inquiry is the
construction of comprehensive theories which enable us to understand large
sectors of the world, to predict, to retrodict, to explain what occurs in them.
Any theory, however far-reaching and successful, eventually proves wanting
in some respects and comes to be replaced by a superior alternative. The
search of basic science is unending.
This paper will not be concerned, however, with the ways in which scientific
theories are arrived at and eventually changed. Rather, I propose to consider
with you what is meant by saying that a given theory applies to a certain range
of phenomena, or that it explains, predicts, or retrodicts them.
Specifically, I intend to discuss a widely held view, the so-called
hypothetico-deductive model, according to which, briefly, to explain or
describe a phenomenon by means of a theory is to deduce a sentence
describing the phenomenon from the theory taken in conjuction with
sentences providing certain initial information. I intend to argue that this
conception has serious limitations which raise some fundamental problems
concerning the character of scientific knowledge.
E. Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Science in Reflection, 1-15.
© 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
2 SCIENCE IN REFLECTION
The best-known elaboration of this general conception is provided by the
so-called standard empiricist construal of theories and their application. It
views a theory T as analyzable into two components: a set C containing the
basic principles of the theory and a set I of interpretative statements.
The sentences, or formulas, of C serve to characterize the specific entities
and processes posited by the theory (e.g., elementary particles and their
interactions) and to state the basic laws to which they are assumed to
conform. The sentences of C will be formulated with the help of a theoretical
vocabulary, Vc, that is characteristic of C and that refers to the kinds and
characteristics of the theoretical entities and processes posited by the theory.
The sentences of the interpretative set I serve to link the theoretical
scenario represented by C to the empirical phenomena to which the theory is
to be applied. These phenomena are taken to be formulated in a vocabulary
VA which is antecedently understood, i.e., which is available and understood
independently of, or logically prior to, the theory. Thus, the sentences of I are
said to provide partial interpretations, though not necessarily full definitions,
of the theoretical terms in Vc by means of the well-understood terms of VA.
So-called operational definitions and reduction sentences in Carnap's sense
might be viewed as special kinds of interpretative sentences.
Schematically:
1-
C (theoretical principles, exp~essed
c.....,---:---;----;------,l III Vd
Theory T
- I (interpretative sentences, expressed
}
in Vc and VA)
'-_______ ---'1-
Statements expressed in VA
The application of T to phenomena described in terms of VA is then effected
by means of a deductive argument of this type:
I II I CI 0 F 1
SA- SC-SC-SA
1
It leads from initial information S which is expressed in VA, via suitable
interpretative sentences I I, to a statement S ~ couched in terms of Vc ; from
there by means of basic theoretic laws C I to another statement S ~ containing
theoretical terms, and finally, with the help offurther interpretative sentences
