Table Of ContentNew Directions in the Philosophy of Science
SCIENCE IN METAPHYSICS
EXPLORING THE METAPHYSICS
OF PROPERTIES AND LAWS
Vassilis Livanios
New Directions in the Philosophy of Science
Series Editor
Steven French
Dept Philosophy
Univ Leeds
Leeds , United Kingdom
Th e philosophy of science is going through exciting times. New and
productive relationships are being sought with the history of science.
Illuminating and innovative comparisons are being developed between the
philosophy of science and the philosophy of art. Th e role of mathematics
in science is being opened up to renewed scrutiny in the light of original
case studies. Th e philosophies of particular sciences are both drawing on
and feeding into new work in metaphysics and the relationships between
science, metaphysics and the philosophy of science in general are being
re-examined and reconfi gured. Th e intention behind this new series from
Palgrave-Macmillan is to off er a new, dedicated, publishing forum for the
kind of exciting new work in the philosophy of science that embraces novel
directions and fresh perspectives. To this end, our aim is to publish books
that address issues in the philosophy of science in the light of these new
developments, including those that attempt to initiate a dialogue between
various perspectives, off er constructive and insightful critiques, or bring
new areas of science under philosophical scrutiny. Th e members of the
editorial board of this series are: Otavio Bueno, Philosophy, University
of Miami (USA) Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame (USA)
Hasok Chang, History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge (UK)
Steven French, Philosophy, University of Leeds (UK) series editor Roman
Frigg, Philosophy, LSE (UK) James Ladyman, Philosophy, University of
Bristol (UK) Michela Massimi, Science and Technology Studies, UCL
(UK) Sandra Mitchell, History and Philosophy of Science, University
of Pittsburgh (USA) Stathis Psillos, Philosophy and History of Science,
University of Athens (Greece) Forthcoming titles include: Sorin Bangu,
Mathematics in Science: A Philosophical Perspective Gabriele Contessa,
Scientifi c Models and Representation Michael Shaff er, Counterfactuals
and Scientifi c Realism Initial proposals (of no more than 1000 words)
can be sent to Steven French at [email protected].
More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14743
Vassilis Livanios
Science in
Metaphysics
Exploring the Metaphysics of Properties and
Laws
Vassilis Livanios
University of Cyprus
Nicosia , Cyprus
New Directions in the Philosophy of Science
ISBN 978-3-319-41290-0 ISBN 978-3-319-41291-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41291-7
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016958225
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Series Editor’s Preface
R ecent years have seen a fl ourishing of what has been called ‘the meta-
physics of science’. In part this is the result of certain challenges to meta-
physics as currently practised, which have focused on its apparent lack of
engagement with modern science. A quick scan of the relevant literature
will reveal numerous works on monism, dispositions, metaphysical ‘sim-
ples’, gunk and other such exotica but which either deploy caricature-like
examples from physics, say, or make no contact with current scientifi c
developments whatsoever. When so challenged, metaphysicians will typi-
cally respond that they are more concerned with charting the vast seas
of the possible than with accommodating the mundane features of the
actual world, but that raises the obvious question: if their metaphysics of
the actual fails to make contact with modern science, why should we pay
attention to their claims about the possible?!
Fortunately, Livanios’ aim is to meet this challenge by presenting a
‘science-informed metaphysics’ that takes seriously not just the results
of current physical science but also what we know of how that science
works. His carefully constructed and detailed analysis begins with one
of the most prominent metaphysical claims—namely, that all physi-
cal properties can be understood in terms of dispositions that manifest
in certain ways when subjected to certain stimuli—and shows how it
is undermined by General Relativity, for example, which suggests that
spatio-temporal relations are in fact categorical. Th is then feeds into his
v
vi Series Editor’s Preface
defence of ‘Categorical Monism’ which insists that all fundamental natu-
ral properties are categorical and non-dispositional, a defence that also
draws on certain much discussed features of Quantum Field Th eory.
In subsequent chapters, Livanios tackles some well-known objections
to this view and, further, argues that as a metaphysical account of funda-
mental properties, it is only contingently true. In other words, although
in this world the properties of physics are categorical, there are possible
worlds in which they are dispositional. Th is is a provocative claim which
then shapes his consideration of the metaphysics of scientifi c laws. Here
he rules out currently popular dispositional accounts, on the grounds
that they cannot accommodate conservation laws and associated sym-
metries and defends a form of ‘nomic realism’, which maintains that cer-
tain law-like relations, at least, actually exist, where, again, this should be
understood as a contingent matter.
Th us, Livanios’ book not only deals with a number of much discussed
issues that sit at the heart of the metaphysics of science, issues to do with
the nature of properties and of laws, but also exemplifi es beautifully and
engagingly how a ‘science-informed metaphysics’ should proceed. It sub-
jects a range of alternative perspectives to the detailed and nuanced con-
sideration that has been lacking in many such accounts and also advances
a radical new approach to the metaphysics of scientifi c laws, namely
‘selective nomic realism’. For both these sets of reasons, then, S cience in
Metaphysics is a very worthy addition to the New Directions in Philosophy
of Science series, and I am sure it will not only provoke considerable dis-
cussion but also open up new avenues of research at the intersection of
metaphysics and the philosophy of science.
Series Editor Steven French,
Professor of Philosophy of Science,
University of Leeds.
Contents
1 Against Dispositional Monism 1
2 Against Identity Th eory and Neutral Monism 31
3 In Defence of Categorical Monism 55
4 Categorical Monism and Quidditism 69
5 Further Objections to Categorical Monism 105
6 Th e Contingent Character of Categoricality and
Dispositionality 129
7 Do Nomic Relations Exist? 153
8 Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws 199
vii
viii Contents
9 Concluding Remarks 225
References 229
Index 243
Introd uction
Surveying the introductions of a number of recent essays on metaphysics
(see, for instance, Loux (1998), Sider (2001), Lowe (2002), Heil (2003))
one may fi nd that the authors embark on their work with attempts to
defend metaphysics as a discipline worth pursuing. Th is is an understand-
able attitude given the recent resurgence of an anti-metaphysical stance
expressed in various views concerning whether metaphysics has anything
to say about the structure of reality at all (for a recent collection on that
meta-metaphysical issue, see Chalmers et al. (2009)). Unlike those meta-
physicians, I do not feel obliged to do that; in my view, metaphysics needs
no more defence than philosophy itself in general. So, I begin unhesitat-
ingly (and unblushingly!) by claiming that the present work is intended
to be an essay falling under the broad category of science-informed meta-
physics. In particular, it aims to be an essay in metaphysics of p hysical
science. Th is means (inter alia) that throughout this work I have taken
seriously both the fi ndings of mature, fundamental physical theories a nd
the scientifi c practice. Th e relationship between science and metaphysics
is a subtle one; therefore, it is somewhat controversial how this ‘taking
seriously’ clause should be cashed out. To start off , however, it suffi ces to
point out that my commitment to a science-informed manner of doing
metaphysics compels me to give extra weight to arguments stemming
from (or simply inspired by) the fi ndings and practice of contemporary
(physical) science, and to ensure that my metaphysical suggestions are
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