Table Of ContentOXFORD THEOLOGY AND RELIGION
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REPENTANCEINLATEANTIQUITY
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AlexisC.Torrance(2012)
’
Schelling s Theory
of Symbolic
Language
Forming the System of Identity
DANIEL WHISTLER
1
3
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Preface
F.W.J.Schelling’sconstructionofsymboliclanguagein}73ofhisPhilosophie
der Kunst sheds much-needed light on both the history of the emergence of
thesymbolintheGoethezeitandSchelling’sownphilosophicalpracticeofthe
time.1Suchisthethesisdefendedinthisbook.Asmyargumentprogresses,it
willbecomeclearthatboththepeculiartheoryoflanguageSchellinglaysout
in}73andthedistinctivemannerinwhichhesolaysitoutcontributetoanew
idealofsystematization.Myargumentthereforeneedstobesituatedinterms
of two critical debates: first, historical reconstructions of the symbol; second,
philosophicalreconstructionsofSchelling’sproject.
The fate of the symbol in the twentieth century has been far from propi-
tious. In Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, for instance, the legacy of
‘the romantic symbol’2 is characterized as follows by Ulrich, the novel’s
protagonist:
What they meant by ‘symbol’ was the great images of grace, which made
everything that is confused and dwarfed in life...clear and great, images that
suppress the noise of the senses and dip the forehead into the stream of tran-
scendence. Such symbols were the Isenheim Altar, the Egyptian pyramids, and
Novalis...But they did not state, in so many words, what a symbol was: first,
becauseasymbolcannotbeexpressedinsomanywords;second,becauseAryans
donotdealindryformulas,whichiswhytheyachievedonlyapproximationsof
symbols during the last century; and third, because some centuries only rarely
produce the transcendent moment of grace in the transcendent human being.
(Musil1995,338)
Ulrich’s reflections on the nationalist and racist appropriation of the idea of
the symbol act out our post-Romantic unease over the concept. It is a
mysterious means of accessing the transcendent, a way of escaping this
worldintoanother-worldlyrealmofperfection;itisineffableandsoescapes
rational criticism; it is bestowed upon a few world-historical individuals,
thereby feeding into early twentieth-century fascistic and proto-fascistic dis-
course.Theimplicationisnotjustthatthesymbolisaconservativerelicfrom
1 I use the underdetermined term, Goethezeit, to describe this period of German thought,
since the labels ‘Idealism’, ‘Romanticism’, and ‘Classicism’ all suggest an artificial separation
betweenSchellingand(forinstance)GoetheorA.W.Schlegel.
2 AsIwillmakeclearinChapter1,Iplacequotationmarksaround‘romantic’inthiscontext
toindicatethefactthatforthemostparttheRomanticswerenotinvolvedinthedevelopmentof
thesymbol.
vi Preface
areactionaryera;itisalsopernicious—boththeoreticallyandpolitically.Such
isthelegacyofthesymbolinthetwentiethcentury.
Inwhatfollows,Imakethecaseforafreshrecoveryofthesymbol.Weneed
tore-attendtotheemergenceofthesymbolinGoethezeitGermanytouncover
thediversityatitsroot.Notalltheoriesofthesymbolpossessedtheproperties
listed above, not all theories of the symbol could be appropriated by the
political worldview Ulrich intimates. In fact, during the first few years of the
nineteenthcenturythesymbolwasasiteofexperimentation:itwastheorized
and re-theorized in radically conflicting ways for radically different ends.
What we remember as the monolithic ‘romantic’ symboldid not exist; it isa
fiction instituted by our cultural memory at the expense of divergent, even
antitheticalformulationsofthesymbol.
Isetaboutprovisionallydemonstratingtheseclaims byfocusingonSchel-
ling’s theory of symbolic language. Schelling’s theory is suited to this role
because it has been so carelessly treated in the past by both historians of the
symbol and Schelling scholars alike. Schelling is consistently (and falsely)
taken to be a proponent of ‘the romantic symbol’—and a particularly poor
proponentatthat.Indeed,itisrarethattheSchellingiansymbolismentioned
without accompanying accusations of plagiarism or, at least, unoriginality.
Yet,astudyoftheplaceofthesymbol(and,inparticular,symboliclanguage)
in his philosophical system of the time (the Identitätssystem) very quickly
reveals its irreducible difference from traditional accounts of the symbol.
Schellingian symbolic language is distinctive—peculiar, even—and this puts
into question any unitary account of ‘the romantic symbol’ and its develop-
ment.Schelling’stheoryisillustrativeofthemultipleexperimentsundertaken
inthenameofthesymbolinthefirstfewyearsofthenineteenthcentury.
The second critical debate in which this book intervenes concerns inter-
pretations of Schelling’s philosophy, for my concentration on Schelling’s
theory of symbolic language is not merely for the sake of historical accounts
ofthesymbolalone,butisalsointendedasaway-intoSchelling’sphilosoph-
ical system. This book is, therefore, an attempt to reconstruct Schelling’s
philosophy of the time, the Identitätssystem, by means of a focus on the role
the symbol plays therein. This period of Schelling’s philosophical output has
beenseriouslyneglectedoverthelastthirtyyearsandstandsinneedofcritical
attention. To begin to remedy this situation, I provide a detailed reconstruc-
tionofthesystemwhichSchellingdevelopedinhiswritingsbetween1801and
1805. Moreover, I go on to argue that the concept of symbolic language
illuminates Schelling’s metaphilosophical practice. Unlike Hegel, Fichte, and
Maimon, Schelling is often reticent about what he is doing when he writes
philosophy; the concept of symbolic language, however, sheds light on this
underexploredareaofSchelling’sthoughtbydrawingattentiontohisconcep-
tionoftheworkdonebythewordsonthepageofaphilosophytextinforming
asystem.
Preface vii
The contribution that an analysis of }73 of the Philosophie der Kunst can
make to these two critical debates (understanding the history of the symbol
andunderstandingSchelling’sIdentitätssystem)explainswhyIplacesomuch
emphasis in what follows on this short, unassuming paragraph from a set of
posthumously published lecture notes. When read in the context of the
emergence of the symbol and the monistic rigour of the Identitätssystem,
}73 of the Philosophie der Kunst is a hidden gem in Schelling’s output. And
whileoneshouldnotmaketoomuchofit(itis,afterall,sketchyondetailsand
sometimescarelesslyphrased),Ihopethatbytheendofthebookreaderswill
agreethatitdeservesthecentralpositionIhavegivenit.
Over the course of the book, I approach Schelling’s construction of symbolic
language in }73 of his Philosophie der Kunst in three ways. First, I compare
Schellingiansymboliclanguagetoothercontemporarytheoriesofthesymbol
andlanguage(inparticular,thoseofGoethe,Kant,andA.W.Schlegel).While
Schelling’s theory of symbolic language possesses properties similar to these
othertheories(theidentityofbeingandmeaning,organicwholeness,theco-
existence of opposites), I show that it differs in how those properties are
interpreted. Second, I excavate the metaphysical and epistemological prin-
ciplesfromSchelling’sphilosophyoftheperiodwhichunderliethistheoryof
language.ThreetenetsfromtheIdentitätssystemarecrucial:formation,quan-
titativedifferentiation,andconstruction.TheyilluminatewhySchellinginter-
prets symbolic language very differently to his contemporaries. Third,
I consider the metaphilosophical significance of Schellingian symbolic lan-
guage.Thissignificanceistwofold.First,histheorygivesrisetoaconception
of discourse without reference, and so to the notion of a science without
reference.3 On this basis, Schelling criticizes current practices of science for
remaining too concerned with referring to reality, when what is at stake is
ratherthedegreeofintensitytowhichtheyproducereality.Sciencetherefore
stands in need of reformation. Second, the way in which the science of
theology(inparticular)isutilizedbySchellinginordertoconstructsymbolic
language in }73 of the Philosophie der Kunst itself provides a model for
reformed scientific practice. I argue that Schelling conceives of the sciences
asmaterialforintensifyingtheproductionofreality.Inthisway,anabsolute
systemisengenderedwhichhasnoconcernforreferenceorfortheintegrityof
particularscientificpursuits.
Part I of the book therefore focuses on other theories of language and the
symbol formulated in the years leading up to Schelling’s construction of
symbolic language in late 1802. Chapter1 considers Kant, Goethe, and
A. W. Schlegel’s theories of the symbol, so as to delineate an interpretation
3 ‘Science’ is here used to refer to any knowledge-orientated discourse, in line with the
GermanWissenschaft.
viii Preface
ofthisconceptwhichwasdominantthenandsince(whatIcall,the‘romantic’
interpretation)againstwhichSchellingvehementlyreacts.InChapter2,Iturn
to the other element of symbolic language—language—and I outline the
various traditions of linguistic thought which provide the context for Schel-
ling’sconstruction.Forthemostpartmyfocusrestsonotheraccountsof(or
failurestoaccountfor)symboliclanguageintheGoethezeit.4
In Part II, I examine Schelling’s Identitätssystem, and so the metaphysical
and epistemological principles underlying his construction of symbolic lan-
guage. Chapter3 provides a brief introduction to the Identitätssystem.
Chapter4looksindetailatitsmetaphysicalfoundationsbyrehearsingSchel-
ling’sanswertothefundamentalmetaphysicalquestion,‘inwhatdoesreality
consist?’Chapter5concentratesonamuch-neglectedbutcentraltenetofthe
Identitätssystem—quantitative differentiation. I use quantitative differenti-
ation to elucidate the doctrine of the potencies (the Potenzlehre). In
Chapter6, I turn to Schellingian epistemology and in particular his notion
ofconstruction.
Part III explores the key sections from the Philosophie der Kunst in which
Schellingconstructsfirstthesymbolingeneralandsecondsymboliclanguage
inparticular.Chapter7isadetailedcommentaryon}39ofthePhilosophieder
Kunst where Schelling constructs his notion of the symbol; I show how he
subvertsandmutatesprevioustheoriesofthesymbol.InChapter8,Iturnto
someofthemoregeneralquestionsconcerningthestatusandroleoflanguage
in Schelling’s Identitätssystem. This chapter is preliminary to my more sus-
tained engagement with Schellingian symbolic language in Chapter9.
Chapter9 itself is another detailed commentary, this time on }73 of the
Philosophie der Kunst. I bring all the preceding arguments to bear in an
attempt to fully describe the meaning, role, and significance of the construc-
tionofsymboliclanguage.
Part IV argues for the metaphilosophical import of this construction. In
Chapter10, I draw some general conclusions from Schelling’s philosophy of
language and transpose them into the domain of systematic practice.
Employing the example of the science of theology in particular, I argue that
(a) Schelling’s views on language compel him to critique theology both past
and present and consequently (b) Schelling sets about reforming theology
(andsoscienceingeneral).Finally,Chapter11takesupthemetaphilosophical
4 Itisworthpointingoutatthispointalacunainmyargument.IdonotdiscussColeridge’s
theoryofthesymbol,forexample,orHumboldt’stheoryoflanguage,norinPartIIdoIconsider
Hegel’scriticismsofSchelling’sIdentitätssysteminanydetail.Infact,philosophical,theological,
andlinguisticdevelopmentsafter1805arenotdiscussedhereatall.Thereadermayfindthisa
somewhat frustrating lack, since the question ‘how does this relate to X?’ seems extremely
pressingatmanypoints.However,understandingSchelling’sownthought(andthesourceson
whichhedrew)istheprimeobjectiveofmyargument,ratherthancomplexcomparisonswith
laterthought.
Preface ix
significance of Schellingian symbolic language from another perspective,
concentrating on a specific strategy Schelling practises to make scientific
language symbolic: systematic eclecticism. All scientific forms are materials
tobeplunderedintheformationofthesystemofidentity.
WearelivingthroughaSchellingrenaissance.MarkusGabriel,IainHamilton
Grant, Joseph Lawrence, Bruce Matthews, Sean McGrath, Dalia Nassar, and
JasonWirth,among others,arerevivinghislegacyand,insodoing,building
ontheground-breakingwritingsofadecadeago(byBowie,Courtine,Fisch-
bach,Frank,Hogrebe,Vater,andŽižek).Thisbookisthoroughlyindebtedto
such innovative Schelling scholarship, even if I take issue with the continual
andpathologicalneglectoftheIdentitätssystem.Indeed,onehastolookback
to Hermann Zeltner or Klaus Düsing’s work from the 1970s to find the last
focusedreconstructionofthisstageofSchelling’sphilosophy.
The arguments which follow were forged in conversation with numerous
teachers, friends, and colleagues: Pamela Sue Anderson, Jenny Bunker, Nick
Bunin,MichaelBurns,JamesCarter,KirillChepurin,RoccoGangle,Douglas
Hedley, Tobias Hübner, Judith Kahl, A. W. Moore, Karin Nisenbaum, Joel
Rasmussen, Anthony Paul Smith, Sebastian Stein, and Johannes Zachhuber.
Crucial to its genesis was the funding of the Arts and Humanities Research
Council and the support (in very different ways) of my family, colleagues at
the University of Liverpool, support staff at the University of Oxford, Diar-
maid MacCulloch, Tom Perridge, and Elizabeth Robottom. Nick Adams’
comments on a draft manuscript were extraordinarily helpful. Most of all,
thepatience,attention,andadviceofGeorgePattisonmadeitallpossible.Iam
extremely grateful for his wisdom. This book is dedicated to Jenny, sine qua
non.
