SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

243 Pages·2016·2.3 MB·English

by  Máté Veres

SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY:
TOPICS IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

by Máté Veres

Submitted to Central European University
Department of Philosophy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

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Table of contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 5
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 7
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 9

Chapter 1. Keep calm and carry on: Sextan Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy ....... 17
1. Philosophy and inquiry ............................................................................................ 18
2. The road to Pyrrhonism ........................................................................................... 22
2.1. The 'origins' of scepticism (PH I. 12) ............................................................... 22
2.2. The goal of Pyrrhonism (PH I. 26 and 29)........................................................ 26
2.3. Men of talent ..................................................................................................... 34
3. The origin of Pyrrhonism ......................................................................................... 37
3.1. The Partisan Premise ......................................................................................... 39
3.2. Who's a quitter? ................................................................................................ 44
4. The story of Apelles (PH I. 28) ................................................................................ 50
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 55

Chapter 2. Religious life and intellectual safety in Sextus Empiricus ......................... 57
1. Sextan caveats: PH III. 2 and M IX. 49 ................................................................... 59
2. Observant Pyrrhonism: thoughtless conformism or closet disbelief?...................... 63
The Insincerity Charge ............................................................................................. 67
External safety ......................................................................................................... 69
3. The Autonomy Account ........................................................................................... 73
4. Intellectual safety ..................................................................................................... 78
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 81

Chapter 3. Necessary impieties? The Sextan case against dogmatic theology in PH III.
...................................................................................................................................... 82
The argument at PH III. 2-12. .................................................................................. 83
1. Conceptual arguments: PH III. 2-5. ................................................................. 84
2. Existential arguments: PH III. 6-9. .................................................................. 92
2.1. The transition ............................................................................................ 93
2.2. The argument ............................................................................................ 96
3. Providential arguments: PH III. 9-12. ............................................................ 102
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1. Conceptual aetiologies ....................................................................................... 114
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The objections (M IX. 29-48) ............................................................................ 117
A Pyrrhonean preconception? ............................................................................ 120
2. Conception and existence (M IX. 49) ................................................................ 123
2.1. Inexpert editing? ......................................................................................... 126
2.2. No uniform agenda? .................................................................................... 126
2.3. Dogmatic conformism? ............................................................................... 129
3. Against the Academics (M IX. 1-13) ................................................................. 131
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 139
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Chapter 5. Lapsarian scepticism in Cicero's De Natura Deorum .............................. 140
Agenda ................................................................................................................... 141
1. Cicero's provisional judgement (ND III. 95) ..................................................... 142
1.1. Renouncing scepticism?.............................................................................. 145
2.2. Cicero's scepticism ...................................................................................... 150
2. Providence and inquiry: Cicero's theological hesitancy .................................... 154
2.1. Perdifficilis et perobscura quaestio: The sceptical setup in the dialogue's
preface (ND I. 1-14) ........................................................................................... 154
2.2. Quanto Stoici melius: Consensus and dismissal in dogmatic theology ...... 158
3. Cicero and Cotta: The lesser of two lapses? ...................................................... 164
3.1. Cotta and Sextus ......................................................................................... 166
3.2. Philonian tampering? .................................................................................. 169
3.3. Cicero versus Cotta ..................................................................................... 173
4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 176

Chapter 6. Theology, Innatism, and the Epicurean Self: A Discussion ..................... 177
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 177
2. 'Realism' versus 'idealism': what is it all about? ................................................ 178
3. Minimal requirements ........................................................................................ 180
4. Arguments for and against ................................................................................. 184
5. Dispositional innatism in Epicurus .................................................................... 197
6. Disagreement and the Epicurean self ................................................................. 201
7. Theology and multiple explanation ................................................................... 204
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 207

Concluding remarks ................................................................................................... 208

Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 210
1. Editions and translations .................................................................................... 210
2. Secondary literature ........................................................................................... 211

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I hereby declare that the thesis presented here contains no material accepted for any
other degrees in any other institutions.

I also declare that the thesis presented here contains no material previously written
and / or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgement has
been made in the form of bibliographic reference.

..........................
Máté Veres
Budapest, 12 June 2016

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Abstract

In Chapter 1, I consider the objection that Pyrrhonism cannot be a kind of philosophy
in any garden-variety sense of the term, since suspension makes one unmotivated or
unable to engage in truth-oriented inquiry. In response, I show that Sextus provides a
narrative accounting for the original motivations of inquirers, as well as for the
eventual split among dogmatists and Pyrrhoneans. On this account, suspension does
not do away with the possibility of inquiry, rather keeps one removed from dogmatic
commitments that would terminate inquiry.
In Chapter 2, I examine the claim that Pyrrhoneans suspend about dogmatic
theology, but engage in cultic practices of their societies without breach of their
suspensive policy. I argue that the conformism advocated by Sextus is not dogmatic,
and that possible hypocrisy is not his concern. Against the suggestion that ancient
religion did not require beliefs subject to sceptical examination, I argue that this
reading fails to provide a philosophically charitable account. In contrast, the general
Pyrrhonean stance easily applies.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the arguments against theology in PH III. I analyse the
arguments about the conception, existence, and providential activity of gods. I raise
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the inconceivability claim, leading Sextus to a dialectical appropriation of ordinary
standards of impiety.

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In Chapter 4, I argue that the discussion of conceptual aetiology in M IX is
compatible with the parallel discussion in PH III. While the arrangement of the
material in M IX gives rise to worries about Sextus' editorial competence as well as
about the fixity of his agenda, none of these worries proves substantial. I also argue
that the contrast between 'more dogmatic' and 'more aporetic' parts of Sextan
argumentation points to the different origin of materials incorporated into his position.
In Chapter 5, I argue that the stance of Cotta in Cicero's De Natura Deorum
resembles that of Sextus. While both Cicero and Cotta represent a Clitomachean
variant of scepticism, the character Cicero retains his commitment to an assumption
of divine providence, which explains his provisional judgement in favour of Stoic
theology. In contrast, the dialogue at large expresses Cicero's wavering generated by
conflicting commitments, and is thus more a piece of sceptical stagecraft than a
meticulous presentation of philosophical options of the day.
In Chapter 6, I argue that there is no principled way to decide the 'realist'-
'idealist' debate concerning Epicurean theology. 'Realists' cannot offer an
unproblematic account of the physical existence of gods, while 'idealists' endanger the
criterial role of preconceptions. An innate disposition to conceive of god does not
carry the day for 'idealists', though it highlights the ethical orientation of Epicurean
n theology. I suggest that Epicurus could have been genuinely uninterested in
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Acknowledgements

I am indebted beyond measure to my doctoral supervisor, Gábor Betegh, for his
academic and personal guidance. I have tried his patience many times throughout the
years, yet he never failed to support my work and my academic endeavours. Besides
reading through various drafts of my thesis, he has involved me in further projects
that significantly contributed to my academic development. Last but not least,
whenever I found myself doubting the merit of my research or the relevancy of my
chosen topic, he invariably urged me to keep working. I can only hope that he is not
disconcerted by the result of his sometimes supererogatory encouragement and
longsuffering.
It has been my good fortune to pursue my graduate studies at the Department
of Philosophy of Central European University. I am thankful to the university in
general and to the departmental community in particular for the opportunities offered
not only through the educational program but also in the form of various travel grants
and scholarships. While at CEU, I have accumulated further debts of gratitude
towards people involved with the Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies and with
the Human Project.
During these years, I have been a guest participant at a seminar organised at
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bursary holder at the Fondation Hardt (May 2015), and a Fulbright visiting graduate
researcher at the Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University (August–December
2015). These opportunities helped me immensely in progressing with my work, and I
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am grateful to all the individuals who made it either possible or worthwhile to move
around.
A special thanks is due to those who have acted as my supervisors during this
long and winding journey. A substantial part of my dissertation was first drafted in
Cambridge; David Sedley provided helpful comments and well-deserved criticism
both during our meetings and in written form. My chapters were then significantly
revised and expanded at Cornell, with immense help from Tad Brennan, who went out
of his way to help me shape and clearly formulate my views.
Charles Brittain, though on sabbatical leave, was so kind as to read and
comment on chapters 1 to 4. I have also received especially helpful comments on
chapter 2 from Gail Fine, and on chapter 6 from Brad Inwood, Voula Tsouna, and
James Warren. I also thank Péter Lautner, under whose guidance I have first
familiarised myself with ancient scepticism, and István M. Bodnár, whose depth of
learning and matchless, occasionally sardonic wit often proved invaluable.
I have presented draft versions of various chapters, as well as overviews of my
research project, on a number of occasions, including a workshop on Academic
scepticism at the University of Nicosia; the Fellows' Seminar of IWM in Vienna; an
interdisciplinary workshop at CEU's Institute of Advanced Studies; a guest lecture at
n Ivane Javakhashvili State University in Tbilisi; a conference held at Universide
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am thankful to all these audiences for their attention, questions and comments.
I have received extraordinary assistance at pivotal stages from Ákos Brunner,
Yuliya Kanygina, and Bálint Kékedi. Last but not least, I am eternally thankful for the
help and support of my friends and, above all, my unusually supportive family.
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Introduction

Philosophical theology in the Hellenistic age was arguably more philosophical than it
was theology. The term itself does not point to a clearly defined domain of inquiry,
but rather to a coalescence of topics inherited from previous philosophical thought.
Typical questions include the correctness of ordinary beliefs, the place of the divine in
a complete physical description of the universe, or the origin of religious cult and
practice, coupled with a concern for the best possible way of life available for
humans.1 Furthermore, most philosophers proposing theological ideas conceived of a
peaceful co-habitation between popular religious cults on the one hand, and their own
theories on the other hand, no matter how revisionist in spirit the latter happened to
be.2
Reflection on the fact of religious variety nevertheless shaped the
philosophical debate. An appeal to the fact of consensus or of disagreement, be it
among philosophers or laymen, could figure as a motivation for inquiry, or as part of
the justification of a given theological view. To put it somewhat crudely, the
relationship between popular opinion and theoretical investigation could be conceived
of in two – potentially incompatible – ways. On the one hand, popular disagreement
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1 While the literature on particular topics is ever-growing, more comprehensive treatments of
Epicurean and Stoic theology do not abound; but see Babut 1974: 137-201; Dragona-Monachou 1976;
Mansfeld 1999; Algra 2003, 2007, 2009; Frede 2005; Meijer 2007; and Sedley 2007: 139-166, 205-
238.
2 Cf. Betegh 2006: 626: 'Thus, philosophers conceived their innovations and criticisms not as a rupture
with traditional religiosity or a devastating attack from the outside, but as internal reforms grounded on
a genuine understanding of the nature of the divine'; and Annas 2012: 80: 'Apart from Plato's theories,
philosophers' theories about the divine are not taken to undermine, or to demand the removal or
modification of, popular religious beliefs and practices. Everyday religious life is taken to be self-
standing.' For a general discussion, see Parker 2011: 1-39.
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theology gave rise to many differing accounts of the divine, tables could easily be
turned: thinkers of a sceptical bent of mind could point out that philosophical dispute
only added to the already prevalent cases of disagreement. Philosophical
disagreement about theology could indicate that philosophers should retrace their
steps to popular accounts of divinity.3
This is nothing but an instance of what one might call the Sceptical Diagnosis:
the general recognition that philosophical inquiry has thus far failed to deliver the
results it has promised.4 Having received the Sceptical Diagnosis, one can respond in
a variety of ways, from relaxing one's standards about the truth to a complete
rejection and abandonment of the philosophical endeavour. One particular proposal
advocates universal suspension of judgement coupled with ongoing inquiry and
practical conformism. On this proposal, in response to those who would like to
convince us to discard or revise our pre-theoretical beliefs, yet fail to deliver on the
promise of rational persuasion, the safe thing is to suspend judgement and continue
the search.

3 In the words of Long 1990/2006: 280: 'Stoic and Epicurean theologies, for all their differences, blend
tradition and rational innovation, and they do so in ways that are designed to provide content to
religious sensibility without recourse to the crudities and superstitions that had discredited the gods in
the eyes of the many. As to the philosophical sceptic, what he attacks in the doctrines of his rivals is
not, or not primarily, the traditional features of the gods that the doctrinaire schools retain, but the
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ecti analysis, and argument.' Cf. Algra 2009: 228: 'Whereas ancient sceptics – both the Academic sceptics
oll and the Neopyrrhoneans – argued that no such starting points were available, that rational
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philosophical theology was an impossibility, and that we should accept the tradition, simply because it
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4 A predicament famously captured by a passage in Cicero's De Legibus (I. 53). According to this
anecdote, a certain politician named Gellius, when proconsul of Greece, exemplified Roman
pragmatism in the following way: 'he summoned all the philosophers who were then in Athens to one
place and vigorously urged them to bring their controversies to an end. And if they did not want to
waste the rest of their lives in disputes, some accommodation could be made, and he promised them his
assistance in reaching some agreement.' (Tr. Zetzel.) (... Gellium familiarem tuum, quom pro consule
ex praetura in Graeciam venisset <esset> que Athenis, philosophos, qui tum erant, in locum unum
convocasse ipsisque magno opere auctorem fuisse, ut aliquando controversarium aliquem facerent
modum. Quodsi essent eo animo ut nollent aetatem in litibus conterere, posse rem convenire, et simul
operam suam illis esse pollicitum, si posset inter eos aliquid convenire.)
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