sannia abdullah

243 Pages·2015·1.9 MB·English

NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN
CRISES BEHAVIOR

A thesis submitted to the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

by

SANNIA ABDULLAH

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY
ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN
JULY 2015
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DECLARATION
The PhD thesis “NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES
BEHAVIOR”is based on the original research. No part of the thesis is copied
or plagiarized; all sources are properly documented as per the guidance
provided by the QAU/HEC.

Sannia Abdullah
Islamabad
July 27, 2015

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Dedicated to a mentor and friend, Dr. Nazir Hussain
with special thanks for his support and guidance

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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix
ABBREVIATIONS x
LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES xiv
INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 22
1.1. Nuclear Weapons and International Debate
1.2. International Relations Theory: Learning and Military Crises
1.3. Conceptualizing Nuclear Learning
1.3.1. Operationalizing the term ‘Learning’ in International Relations
1.3.2. Defining the Concept of Nuclear Learning
1.3.3. Who Learns?: Levels of Analyses Approach
1.3.4. Nuclear Learning and State Behavior
1.4. Nuclear Learning and Strategic Culture
1.5. Cognitive Dissonance and the Concept of Nuclear Learning
1.6. “Simple vs. Complex Learning” and Crisis Instability
1.7. Relationship between Nuclear Learning and Stable Nuclear Deterrence

CHAPTER 2: NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING AS A DRIVER OF NUCLEAR
LEARNING 44
2.1. Nuclear Learning between US and Soviet Union
2.1.1. Areas of Strong Mutual Learning
2.1.2. Areas of Weak Learning
2.2. Nuclear Learning between India and Pakistan
2.2.1. Major Drivers of Nuclear Learning in South Asia
2.2.2. Nuclear Decision-Making in South Asia
2.2.3. Nuclear Ambivalence: From Nehru to Gandhi
2.2.4. Buddha Smiles Again in May 1998
2.2.5. India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)
2.3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Decision-Making
2.3.1. The Changing Nuclear Discourse and the Dawn of ‘Nuclear
Nationalism’ in Pakistan
2.3.2. Role of Military in Nuclear Decision-Making
2.3.3. The Genesis of National Command Authority and Birth of SPD:
1999-2001
2.3.4. Evolution and Development of Command and Control Systems

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CHAPTER 3: NUCLEAR LEARNING AND CRISIS INSTABILITY IN
SOUTH ASIA 80
3.1. Possible Attack on Pakistan’s Nuclear Installations (1984-85)
3.2. Militarization of Siachen Glacier (1984)
3.3. Brasstacks (1986-87)
3.4. The 1990 Crisis
3.5. The Kargil War (1999)
3.6. 2001-02 Military Standoff
3.7. The A.Q Khan’s Proliferation Crisis
3.8. Mumbai Crisis 2008

CHAPTER 4: DOCTRINAL ASYMMETRIES AND STRATEGIC ARMS
RACE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA109
4.1. India-Pakistan Doctrinal Asymmetry: Comparing the Postulates
4.1.1. Outcomes of Doctrinal Asymmetry
4.1.2. Nuclear Stockpiles Competition in South Asia
4.1.3. Missile Arms Race
4.1.4. Technological Spin-off: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, BMD and
MIRVs
4.2. Evolving New Security Doctrines under Nuclear Overhang
4.2.1. India’s Proactive Military Operation Strategy: Revival of
Limited War under Nuclear Shadow
4.2.2. Sub-Conventional War Trends in Nuclear South Asia
4.3. Assured Second Strike Capability and South Asian Learning Curve
4.4. Integrating Technological Arms Race into Existing Framework of C2
4.5. Implications for Nuclear Learning

CHAPTER 5: CONFIDENCE BUILDING/NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION
MEASURES: INDIA-PAKISTAN MILITARY CRISES 131
5.1. The Efficacy of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
5.1.1. History of India-Pakistan CBMs/Bilateral Agreements
5.2. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures
5.3. Contrasting Patterns of Nuclear Learning and Fate of Regional Proposals
5.3.1. South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
5.3.2. Strategic Restraint Regime Proposal: Caveats and Concerns
5.3.3. CBMs on Kashmir and Bane for Nuclear Learning
5.4. Common Challenges and Joint Approach: Prospects of CBMs/Arms
Control

CHAPTER 6:FACTORS DETERMINING SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR
UNLEARNING IN THE POST-1998 ERA 147
6.1. Domestic Level
6.1.1. Civil-Military Relations in India and Nuclear Learning
6.1.2.Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan and Nuclear Learning
6.1.3. Domestic Hurdles in Pakistan (Post 1998)
6.2. The Policy of Jihadism and State Learning
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6.3. The OBL Episode and Pakistan’s Response: Complacency vs
Incompetence Dilemma
6.4. Regional Level
6.4.1. Post-Withdrawal Afghanistan: A battlefield of Conflicting
Interests
6.4.2. Pakistan-China Cooperation: Another Determinant of South
Asian Nuclear Learning Curve
6.5. International Level
6.5.1. U.S. Sanctions and Pakistan Strategic Culture: Learning under
Stress
6.5.2. US-India Strategic Cooperation (2005)

CHAPTER 7: NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA: PROSPECTS AND
CHALLENGES 173
7.1. Nuclear Learning in the Next Decade
7.1.1. Role of Track II/ Back Channel Diplomacy
7.1.2. Overcoming Risk-Aversive Civil-Military Establishment
7.1.3. The Need for Institutional Reforms
7.1.4. Delinking South Asian Nuclear Dimensions for Regional
Politics
7.2. Challenges to Nuclear Learning in South Asia
7.2.1. Geo-Politics and Alliances: Role of Perceptions in State
Learning
7.2.2. Technological Determination and Policy Implications: Gap in
State Learning

CONCLUSION 190

BIBLIOGRAPHY 198

ANNEXURES 216
I Flowchart of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)

II Bilateral Agreements/CBMS between India and Pakistan
and Military Crises

III Memorandum of Understanding [Lahore MoU]

IV India-Pakistan Missile Inventory

V Nuclear Related Bilateral Agreements/Conventions
Treaties Signed between India and Pakistan

VI Proposed Regional Initiatives between India and Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

South Asia’s strategic stability is embroiled with deep rooted trust deficit,
technological arms race, sub-conventional war trends and evolving doctrines. In
the absence of sustainable dialogue process, the strategic anxieties of both India
and Pakistan have consolidated into aggressive force postures leaving little room
for shared learning. Instead of forging grounds to seek resolution to the bilateral
disputes (complex learning), both states have adapted new means to pursue their
existing state policies (simple learning). The drivers of nuclear learning in South
Asia are primarily assessed at three levels of analyses i.e. individual,
organizational level which directly affects the third tier i.e. the state level. Over
the years, the state institutions in two countries have evolved following parochial
interests eventually giving birth to rigid organizational cultures. Moreover, the
idiosyncratic role of key decision makers remained vital in determining the
military crises in both pre and post-1998 eras. Each military crisis is different in
its backdrop, occurrence and termination from its preceding event. The reason
being, each military crisis taught different lessons to either state, subject to
different interpretations drawn by the decision makers on both sides. Hence,
unlearning at the individual level is responsible for shaping a peculiar strategic
culture of South Asia promoting crisis instability.

It is important to explore the factors determining crisis behavior in the region
while the two states have operationalized their deterrent capabilities and pursuing
assured second strike pathways. Ideally, the acquisition of nuclear weapons should
have inculcated enough confidence in both states to transform their ‘enduring
rivalry’into a new relationship having greater credence on nuclear deterrence. In
reality, both states have used nuclear shield to pursue their existing state practices
thus, complicating deterrence stability in the region (stability-instability
paradox).The study analyses the lag in nuclear learning as a determinant of crisis
instability. One of the key levels of analysis is the individual level reiterating the
role of strong personalities operating at different tiers of decision making
remained involved in crises eruption. Interestingly, the ‘culture of secrecy’that
shrouded in the development of nuclear programs of both the countries is
eventually found a key factor for confining the nuclear decision making circle.
This explains the inconsistent policies and risk prone behavior as a direct outcome
of nuclear unlearning by the state due to incompetent judgment of the individuals
facing security paranoia and organizational pathologies in the concerned
bureaucracies. The recurrence of military crises is explained through the prism of
nuclear learning, constructivism and cognitive dissonance in shaping a strategic
culture conducive for crisis instability.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Completion of this doctoral dissertation was only possible with the astounding
support, sincere guidance, consistent encouragement and scholarly contribution of
my supervisor Dr. Nazir Hussain. A person with an amicable and optimistic
disposition, he spared his valuable time to clarify my doubts despite his busy
schedules. I consider myself fortunate to do my doctoral thesis under his guidance
and learnt from his research expertise; he supported me in every possible way to
see the completion of my research work.

I owe my gratitude to Feroz Hassan Khan for his valuable guidance, feedback and
support in conducting my research. My work was greatly facilitated by
intellectually stimulating environment provided by Middlebury Institute of
International Studies (MIIS) and Center of Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) with
which I was associated as a visiting fellow. I extend word of thanks to Professor
Jeffrey W. Knopf for my academic exchange with him. It was productive and
thought provoking.

My research was made less obstacle ridden because of the presence of my family
and my parents for their good wishes. They have been a great support ever since I
started my dissertation. Last but not least, I am grateful to the administrative and
library staff, who have been kind enough to extend their assistance at various
phases of my research.

Sannia Abdullah
July 27, 2015

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ABBREVIATIONS
ABMT Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (Directorate) Pakistan
AWC Air Weapons Complex
BARC Bhabha Atomic Research Center
BJP Bhartiya Janata Party
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
CANDU Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor
CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CD Conference on Disarmament
CDD Combat Development Directorate
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CHASNUPP Chasma Nuclear Power Plant
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIRUS Canadian Indian Reactor United States
CJCSC Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee
COAS Chief of the Army Staff
CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator
CSD Cold Start Doctrine
CSIR Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
C2 Command and Control
C4I2SR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DCC Deployment Control Committee
DGMOs Director General Military Organizations
DGISI Director General Inter-Services Intelligence
DGSPD Director General Strategic Plans Division
DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization
ECC Employment Control Committee
E&R Dir Evaluation and Research Directorate
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