Table Of ContentA Venerable Source in a New Era
Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age
Stephen C. Mercado
Our age’s increasingly volumi- 1930s. Building on early work at
nous open-source intelligence Princeton University to monitor
(OSINT) sheds light on issues of foreign short-wave radio, the For-
the day for all-source analysts, eign Broadcast Intelligence
covert collectors, and policymak- Service (FBIS) in 1941 began to
ers, but have we done enough to turn radio into a primary intelli-
exploit its potential? My short gence source during World War
answer is “No,” and here’s why I II.2 The government did not
“
think so. neglect the printed word either.
The Interdepartmental Commit-
Collecting intelligence these days tee for the Acquisition of Foreign
The world today
is at times less a matter of steal- Periodicals (IDC) gathered Axis
abounds in open
ing through dark alleys in a publications through a global col-
information to an foreign land to meet some secret lection network.
extent unimaginable to agent than one of surfing the
intelligence officers of Internet under the fluorescent
The men and women who labored
lights of an office cubicle to find
the Cold War. in the OSINT fields of the day
some open source. The world is
” changing with the advance of produced products that com-
pared well in quantity and
commerce and technology. Mouse
quality to those of other agencies
clicks and online dictionaries
that stamped their documents
today often prove more useful
“SECRET.” Dr. Charles B. Fah,
than stylish cloaks and shiny
writing in mid-1942 as chief of
daggers in gathering intelligence
the Far Eastern Section, Office of
required to help analysts and
Strategic Services (OSS), praised
officials understand the world.
the output of FBIS as “indispens-
Combined with stolen secrets,
able in our work” and “the most
diplomatic reports, and technical
extensive single source avail-
collection, open sources consti-
able” on developments in Japan
tute what one former deputy
and occupied Asia. The OSS itself
director of intelligence termed
fared less well, failing to estab-
the “intricate mosaic” of
lish an agent network in Japan
intelligence.1
and reporting the fabrications of
Today’s commercial and techni- an Italian “con man” in Rome as
cal advances are only the latest
developments in a collection dis-
2Information on the Princeton Listening
cipline whose pioneers began
Center, launched in 1939, is available at
developing the field in the late
http://libweb.princeton.edu:2003/librar-
ies/firestone/rbsc/finding_aide/plc.html.
For a history of FBIS during the Second
1Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: World War, see Stephen C. Mercado,
Stephen Mercado is an analyst
My Three Decades with the Agency (Wash- “FBIS Against the Axis, 1941–1945,” Stud-
in the Directorate of Science and
ington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), ies in Intelligence, Unclassified Edition no.
Technology.
195. 11 (Fall-Winter 2001): 33–43.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 45
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OSINT Then and Now
“
Intelligence officers
expert in open sources
helped analysts and
its most valuable source on devel- gence officers searched German,
opments in Tokyo. officials navigate the Japanese, and Russian docu-
murky waters of the ments in the Army’s Special
Publications also held up well Documents Section and the joint
Cold War.
against classified reports. John Army–Navy Washington Docu-
King Fairbank, the Harvard ” ment Center for clues to Soviet
sinologist who led his field in the technical capabilities. By the late
postwar era, recounted how, after 1950s, the CIA and Air Force had
reading an inaccurate and “unin- discovered a “wealth of informa-
telligent” British report on estrangement between Moscow tion” in the increasing flow of
Japanese shipbuilding, advised and Beijing. FBIS and FDD offi- books and periodicals from the
Col. William Donovan that bet- cers began discerning signs of the Soviet Union.5 By the early
ter intelligence on the issue Sino-Soviet split from their read- 1960s, one insider wrote that “In
would be found in “scrutinizing ings of propaganda material in aggregate, open sources probably
the Japanese press.” The OSS the early 1950s. In contrast, furnish the greater part of all
director evidently found Dr. Fair- some CIA officers from the covert information used in the produc-
bank’s brief compelling, for he side of the house erred, along tion of military intelligence on
sent the young academic, liter- with many observers elsewhere, the Soviet Union.”6 By the
ate in Chinese and Japanese, to in dismissing as disinformation decade’s end, another wrote of
China to help organize a publica- the open evidence well into the the “tidal wave of publicly
tions procurement program.3 next decade.4 printed paper” that both sup-
ported and threatened “to
Throughout the Cold War, in swamp” the Intelligence Commu-
Navigating Cold War Waters fact, OSINT constituted a major nity. He also offered an example
part of all intelligence on the of OSINT’s value: “Intense scru-
After the guns of the Second Soviet Union, China, and other tiny of the North Vietnamese
World War fell silent, intelli- adversaries. OSINT on the Soviet press and radio has been an
gence officers expert in open Union, for example, grew from essential intelligence element in
sources continued to help ana- modest beginnings to become the support of [the] US effort” in the
lysts and officials navigate the leading source. In the closing Indochina conflict.7
murky waters of the Cold War. years of World War II, intelli-
For example, analysts in FBIS, It is worth noting in passing that
whose acronym by then stood for all powers exploited OSINT dur-
the Foreign Broadcast Informa- 4The downgrading of the “I” in FBIS from ing World War II and the Cold
tion Service, and the Foreign “Intelligence” to “Information” reflects the War. Indeed, our adversaries
mistaken notion that only stolen secrets
Document Division (FDD) led the used technical information from
count as intelligence. CIA counterintelli-
CIA in detecting the developing open sources in the United States
gence officers, under the leadership of
James Jesus Angleton, were among those
in Washington who continued to dismiss
3For Dr. Fah’s comment, see Mercado, 41. the growing evidence of the Sino-Soviet 5J. J. Bagnall, “The Exploitation of Rus-
On the Italian “confidence trickster” who split well into the 1960s. On how OSINT sian Scientific Literature for Intelligence
fooled James Jesus Angleton and other officers led the way in understanding the Purposes,” Studies in Intelligence (Sum-
OSS officers, see David Alvarez, Spies in breakup of “monolithic communism,” see mer 1958): 45–49. Declassified article.
the Vatican: Espionage and Intrigue from Harold P. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet 6Davis W. Moore, “Open Sources on Soviet
Napoleon to the Holocaust (Lawrence: Uni- Split,” Studies in Intelligence, Winter Military Affairs,” Studies in Intelligence
versity Press of Kansas, 2002), 248–53. 1998–99, Unclassified Edition: 57–71. On (Summer 1963-declassified article): 101.
Regarding Dr. Fairbank’s role in OSS, see Angleton, see also Harold P. Ford, “Why 7Herman L. Croom, “The Exploitation of
John King Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty- CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Foreign Open Sources,” Studies in Intelli-
Year Memoir (New York: Harper Colo- Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence, Unclas- gence (Summer 1969-declassified article):
phon, 1983), 174–75. sified Edition No. 1 (1997): 88. 129–30.
46 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3
OSINT Then and Now
“
Adversaries used
technical information
from open sources in
and other advanced industrial case officers recount their clan-
the United States and
nations to monitor foreign devel- destine careers.11
other nations to
opments and to save time and
money on their own projects. The monitor developments
US aerospace publication Avia- and to save time and OSINT, OSINT Everywhere…
tion Week, dubbed “Aviation money on their own
Leak” for its scoops, was a peren- projects. The revolution in information
nial favorite. The journal was technology, commerce, and poli-
”
among the US technical periodi- tics since the Cold War’s end is
cals that East German only making open sources more
intelligence, among others, trans- accessible, ubiquitous, and valu-
lated to monitor current able. Simply put, one can gather
developments in aerospace.8 years later, intelligence officers more open intelligence with
at Langley and government lead-
greater ease and at less cost than
By the Cold War’s end, commer- ers across the Potomac watched, ever before. The explosion in
cial and technical changes had glued to their television sets, as OSINT is transforming the intel-
made evident the value of CNN broadcast the fall of the ligence world with the emergence
OSINT. Radio, the cutting edge Berlin Wall.10 of open versions of the covert
artsof human intelligence
in the 1930s, remained a key
source in the Second World War The world today abounds in open (HUMINT), overhead imagery
(IMINT), and signals intelli-
and the years thereafter. When information to an extent unimag-
gence (SIGINT).
Soviet tanks rolled into Budap- inable to intelligence officers of
est in 1956, for example, the Cold War. When the Soviet
intelligence officers in Washing- Union sent the first man into The Intelligence Community has
ton kept current through radio space in 1961, secretive officials seen open sources grow increas-
reports. One veteran of the CIA’s revealed little and lied even ingly easier and cheaper to
Directorate of Operations (DO), about the location of the launch acquire in recent years. The
referring to Moscow’s suppres- site. In contrast, television Internet’s development and com-
sion of the Hungarian uprising, reports, Internet sites, and news- mercial innovation has given us
wrote: “It is a well-known phe- paper articles heralded China’s Web sites, ‘amazon.com,’ and
nomenon in the field of first manned flight into orbit last countless other vendors. During
intelligence that there often year. Even intelligence services the Second World War, Dr. Fair-
comes a time when public politi- have emerged from the shadows bank traveled far and at great
cal activity proceeds at such a to some extent. Two journalists expense to gather Japanese pub-
rapid and fulminating pace that caused a stir in 1964 by writing a lications in China and send them
secret intelligence, the work of landmark book on the US Intelli- to Washington. Today, anyone,
agents, is overtaken by events gence Community. Today, former anywhere, can order Japanese
publicly recorded.”9 Some 30 media with a click of the mouse
from amazon.co.jp or other online
9Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the
8Joseph Becker, “Comparative Survey of Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times
Soviet and US Access to Published Infor- Books, 1978), 120. 11See David Wise and Thomas B. Ross,
mation,” Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1957- 10Antonio J. Mendez, with Malcolm The Invisible Government (New York:
declassified article): 43; John O. Koehler, McConnell, The Master of Disguise: My Se- Random House, 1964). Notable insider ac-
Stasi: The Untold Story of the East Ger- cret Life in the CIA (New York: William counts of recent years include Duane
man Secret Police (Boulder, CO: Westview Morrow & Co., 1999), 337. On the monitor- “Dewey” Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons
Press, 1999), 110. Becker’s article includes ing of television in the Cold War, see Mau- (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997) and
a reference to Soviet reading of Aviation reen Cote, “Veni, Vidi, Vid-Int,” Studies in Robert Baer, See No Evil (New York:
Week. Intelligence, Fall 1990. Unclassified. Crown publishers, 2002).
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 47
OSINT Then and Now
“
Open sources
increasingly enhance
secret collection
merchants and receive the orders for the most intractable prob-
programs.
by express air shipment. In the lems. Digital Globe and Space
“old days,” not so long ago, aca- ” Imaging will never replace NGA,
demics and analysts made the for example, but government
pilgrimage to Maryland to acquisition of their commercial
imagery for basic requirements
browse the shelves of Victor
can relieve NGA of mundane
Kamkin’s unmatched store for
IMINT, for example, is becoming tasks and permit it focus on
Soviet publications. In the
such a commercial commodity as higher priorities.
present, one can go on line from
to be in danger, in the view of one
the comfort of home to
intelligence expert, of ceasing to
www.kamkin.com to buy from the In addition to their influence on
be an “INT.” Japan offers a fine
half million Russian titles in collection disciplines, open
demonstration of media exploita-
sources have long played a major
stock or to place a custom order.
tion of commercial IMINT. A
role in covert action. Imperial
major magazine known for its
Japan, for example, employed the
Moreover, the IT revolution focus on North Korea, for exam-
German, Alexander von Siebold,
extends beyond the printed word. ple, prominently and frequently
to influence foreign opinion in
More and more local radio and displays commercial imagery of Tokyo’s favor. The agent
television broadcasts, for exam- such sites as the nuclear facili- launched the journal Ostasien
ple, are found on the World Wide ties at Yongbyon and the alleged (East Asia) in 1899 with Japa-
residences of leader Kim Chong-
Web. Monitors no longer need to nese backing, contributed
il. Journalists combine the
sit close to the broadcast source. favorable articles to the Euro-
IMINT with published defector
Nor do they always need an pean media, and otherwise
information, leaks, and other
expensive infrastructure of worked to shape views on Japan.
sources to analyze issues. As an
antennas and other equipment to He also monitored the media,
example of open IMINT closer to
listen to radio or watch submitting his “Baron von Sie-
home, the Federation of Ameri-
television. bold’s Report on the Press” to
can Scientists (FAS) used Space
inform the Japanese of foreign
Imaging photographs of a DPRK
developments and opinion.14 In
Beyond the usual public media, missile site to argue in 2000 that
the Cold War, covert organs of
OSINT is expanding into the P’yongyang’s missile threat was
the major powers disseminated
areas of HUMINT, IMINT, and far less than Washington had news and views through front
SIGINT. In the words of one claimed. Whatever the merits of organizations to win hearts and
advocate with experience in both the FAS argument, the case minds. Open sources still consti-
underscores the opening of the
the government and private sec- tute the core of political covert
covert INTs.13
tor, “OSINT now pervades all of
the collection disciplines.” He
notes that one can gather intelli- Even so, OSINT is no replace- 13On IMINT ceasing to be an “INT,” see
ment for covert collection. Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National
gence today by overtly tasking
Intelligence for an Age of Information (New
Rather, open sources increas-
collectors to elicit information, York: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
ingly enhance secret collection
ordering commercial satellite 87. A Japanese magazine notable for its
programs. The CIA, NGA, NSA, prominent use of commercial IMINT on
imagery, and using software to
and other actors on the classified DPRK pol-mil issues is SAPIO, which ad-
conduct traffic analysis.12
side all benefit from the growing vertises itself as an “international intelli-
gence magazine.” See SAPIO, 8 January
volume of open data serving
2003, for example, for use of Digital Globe
them as collateral information.
12Mark M. Lowenthal, “OSINT: The State imagery of alleged residences of Kim
of the Art, the Artless State,” Studies in In- Too, OSINT allows covert collec- Chong-il. Regarding the FAS dispute, see
telligence 45, no. 3 (2001): 62. tors to marshal limited resources New York Times, 11 January 2000.
48 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3
OSINT Then and Now
“
Open sources may
often be more useful in
penetrating closed
action today, except that overt has a boisterous press, compris-
borders than open
organizations are often conduct- ing over a dozen newspapers
societies.
ing the campaigns.15 centered in Seoul, with views
” spanning the full spectrum of
political opinion. Each day brings
…Surrounding Targets Hard a flood of government state-
and Soft… ments, corporate press releases,
editorials, scoops, and scandals.
warning. He has even estimated
In relative terms, monitoring
Not only are open sources that open sources may account
P’yongyang’s media is like sip-
increasingly accessible, ubiqui- for “as much as 80 percent” of the
ping through a straw; following
tous, and valuable, but they can intelligence database in general.
Seoul’s open sources is like drink-
shine in particular against the Nevertheless, Hulnick has sug-
ing from a fire hose.
hardest of hard targets. OSINT is gested that OSINT would
at times the “INT” of first resort, probably be far less useful
last resort, and every resort in against such tough cases as P’yongyang media, while con-
between. North Korea.16 trolled, constitute a valuable
resource to anyone seeking to
To some, this assertion may rep- understand the DPRK. More
However, open sources may often
resent an overselling of OSINT. than mere propaganda, as Dr.
be more useful in penetrating
Arthur Hulnick, a former CIA Wayne Kiyosaki, an expert liter-
closed borders than open societ-
officer who went on to teach at ate in Korean and well-versed in
ies. Because OSINT is
Boston University has written the media, argued in his study of
intelligence derived from open
about OSINT’s importance: “Nei- DPRK foreign relations, P’yongy-
sources, fewer sources mean
ther glamorous nor adventurous, ang’s communications are a tool
greater coverage is possible with
open sources are nonetheless the of mass indoctrination. As such,
a limited number of monitors.
basic building block for secret they provide “a barometer of pri-
Take the two Koreas, for exam-
intelligence.” He has also noted orities.”17 Dr. Adrian Buzo, a
ple. The Democratic People’s
how OSINT, whether conveyed former Australian diplomat with
Republic of Korea (DPRK), with
via FBIS or CNN, provides early the rare experience of residing in
perhaps the world’s most author-
P’yongyang, has seconded the
itarian government, is a
value of DPRK media as a “con-
relatively easy OSINT target.
14Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Records Of- tinuing record of the regime’s
North Korea has only two major
fice and Nihon Gaikoshi Jiten Editorial priorities, of its ideological con-
Committee, eds., Nihon Gaikoshi Jiten daily newspapers: Nodong Sin-
cerns, and of key personnel
[Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic Histo- mun and Minju Choson, the
changes.” Warning readers
ry] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992), newspapers of the ruling party
361. A British historian of Japanese diplo- against the common trap in the
and the government, respec-
matic history has also written of “indica- West of dismissing the media
tively. There is no opposition
tions” that Von Siebold went beyond "out of hand,” he has advised
OSINT for the Japanese Foreign Ministry newspaper in the capital and no
that “Sustained exposure to the
and Army. Ian Nish, “Japanese Intelli- lively provincial media to offer
DPRK media is an essential
gence and the Approach of the Russo-Jap- competing opinions or expose
anese War,” in Christopher Andrew and
wrongdoing. The Republic of
David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension:
Korea (ROK), on the other hand,
Governments and Intelligence Communi- 17Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea’s For-
ties in the Twentieth Century (Urbana: eign Relations: The Politics of Accommoda-
University of Illinois Press, 1984), 19. tion, 1945–75 (New York, Praeger, 1976),
15Frederick L. Wettering, “(C)overt Action: 16Arthur S. Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Ma- x–xi. Dr. Kiyosaki, a graduate in Korean of
The Disappearing ‘C,’” International Jour- chine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Defense Language Institute who later
nal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence the Twenty-First Century (Westport, CT: honed his media insights at FBIS, knew of
(Winter 2003–2004), 566–67. Praeger, 1999), 8, 40–41. what he wrote.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 49
OSINT Then and Now
“
Too many people still
reject OSINT as
intelligence.
requirement for the would-be indispensable than is generally
”
analyst, both in itself and as an imagined.”21
essential check on the reportage
of the DPRK’s adversaries.”18
…But Few To Sail the Sea
Finally, continuing with the
Other nations fare no better. One Today, open source has
DPRK as an example, US ana- expanded well beyond “frost-
would expect the Japanese,
lysts and policymakers often ing” and comprises a large part
former colonial overlords of
have little beyond OSINT upon of the cake itself. It has become
Korea for more than 30 years, to
which to base their judgments. indispensable to the produc-
accomplish more covert collec-
The State Department has no tion of authoritative analysis.
tion against their neighbors than
embassy in P’yongyang. Few for-
their writings suggest. Tsuka-
—John Gannon, former
eigners reside in the capital; even
moto Katsuichi, a retired army Chairman, National Intelli-
fewer live in the provinces.
general with experience as gence Council22
Opportunities to make contact
defense attaché in Seoul, has con-
with the rare North Koreans who
fessed: “No country is as opaque With open sources so accessible,
reside or travel abroad have been
as the DPRK (North Korea). ubiquitous, and valuable, one
poor. Only the trusted few may
Almost no information leaks out would expect to see OSINT occu-
make an international telephone
of there. Therefore, we have no pying a commensurately large
call, send a fax, exchange e- choice but to make our judg- space within the Intelligence
mails, or surf the Internet. Such ments based on the little Community. This is not the case.
restrictions reduce covert collec- announced in the official newspa- Too many people still reject
tion opportunities. The open per (Nodong Sinmun) and radio OSINT as intelligence. Worse, too
record for HUMINT is telling. broadcasts (Korea Central News few are able to gather and exploit
Ambassador Donald Gregg, an Agency), as well as a limited open sources. Worst of all, the
“Asia hand” whose DO career number of visitor accounts.”20 A Intelligence Community assigns
included a stint in Seoul, has former officer of the Public Secu- only a handful of those capable
described the DPRK as “one of rity Intelligence Agency (PSIA), people to the task.
the longest-running intelligence Japan’s equivalent to the FBI,
failures in the history of US has also written that analysis of Too many people still mistake
espionage.”19 “published materials” is “cen- secrets for intelligence. The
tral” to analyzing the DPRK, enduring popularity of the fic-
given the absence of nearly all tional James Bond bears much of
18Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty: else. Such OSINT, he has writ- the blame, perhaps, for the mis-
Politics and Leadership in North Korea
ten, is “more important and perception outside of the
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 284–
Intelligence Community that a
85. On the value of DPRK media in chart-
ing personnel changes in P’yongyang, it is
worth noting that the standard reference 19Donald P. Gregg, “A Long Road to
works, such as the annual North Korea Di- P’yongyang,” The Korea Society Quarterly, 21Noda Hironari (pseud.), CIA supai ken-
rectory of Japan’s impressive Radiopress Spring 2002: 7. shu: Aru Koan Chosakan no taikenki [CIA
and the online biographic compilations of 20Tsukamoto Katsuichi, “Kitachosen josei Spy Training: One PSIA Officer’s Account]
the ROK’s National Intelligence Service to Higashi Ajia no anzen hosho” Securitar- (Tokyo: Gendai Shokan, 2000): 169–170. It
(www.nis.go.kr) are based on media moni- ian, July 1995: 22. General Tsukamoto, is interesting to note that PSIA changed
toring. For one journalist’s recognition of who began his career as a commissioned its English name, but not its acronym, in
the value of following P’yongyang’s media, officer of the Imperial Japanese Army and 2003, replacing “Investigation” with “In-
see Gordon Fairclough, “To See North Ko- finished it as commander of the Ground telligence.”
rea, Keep Your Eyes Peeled On the Official Self-Defense Force’s Western Army, has 22John Gannon, “The Strategic Use of
Press,” Wall Street Journal, 19 February written several books on Korean security Open-Source Information,” Studies in In-
2004: 1. issues. telligence 45, no. 3 (2001): 67.
50 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3
OSINT Then and Now
tuxedo, pistol, and charm are the Select Committee on Intelligence conducted more than 20 hours
main tools of intelligence gather- (HPSCI) once explained to a dep- of interviews with him, during
ing. Even some insiders err in uty director of operations, “We which the former operative
believing intelligence to be iden- don’t give you brownie points for named agents and discussed
tical with covert sources and collecting intelligence by the tradecraft. The resulting book
methods. The following opinion of hardest means possible.”25 and Levchenko’s press confer-
a retired DO officer is typical: ences were, according to a US
“Despite frequent references to A few examples should suffice to intelligence officer, more reveal-
‘open source intelligence,’ within support Kent’s definition of ing than his CIA debriefing.27
the CIA this term is somewhat of intelligence:
an oxymoron. By definition, intel- (cid:127)On 7 June 1942, the day after
ligence is clandestinely acquired the US “miracle” at Midway
(cid:127)An intelligence officer would
information—stolen, to put it due to the top-secret breaking
likely have received high marks
bluntly. Information from a mag- of Japanese communications,
for stealing a map of the Kha-
azine, a television broadcast, or the Chicago Tribune trum-
barovsk area of the Soviet Far
someone’s newsletter may be peted on its front page that the
East in 1988. Drawn at a scale
valuable, but it is not US Navy had known of Japa-
of 1:10,000 and running to 80
intelligence.”23 pages, the map of the General nese plans “several days before
the battle began.” A Japanese
Staff’s Military Topographic
officer reading that newspaper
More than 40 years after Sher- Headquarters would have
probably would have grasped
man Kent, the CIA’s father of taken a classified stamp and
that the naval codes were
intelligence analysis, persua- stayed within a secure vault,
sively argued that intelligence is available only to those with a insecure.28
knowledge, some still confuse the need to know. The map, pub-
method with the product. Sadly, lished in 1998 and advertised Information openly acquired,
such confusion is widespread. As as the first of this scale declas- whether open from the start (say,
one DPRK watcher noted: “Much sified in Russia, is for sale
of the best political intelligence today.26
27Levchenko’s interviews, which appeared
comes from careful culling of
in abbreviated form in a series running in
public sources, like reading (cid:127)Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB the Japanese weekly magazine Shukan
reports in the North Korean officer working under cover as a Bunshun over five weeks in mid-1983,
media, but within the intelli- reporter in Japan, defected to were issued later that year as a book. Shu-
kan Bunshun, ed. Refuchenko wa shogen
gence community this source is the United States in 1979. In
suru [Levchenko Testifies] (Tokyo: Bungei
not considered as reliable as 1983, a Japanese journalist
Shunju, 1983). Haruna Mikio, a former
more esoteric technical means, Washington bureau chief of Japan’s Kyodo
like satellite photography and News Agency with extensive contacts in
communications intercepts, or 25Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for the US Intelligence Community, wrote
American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: that an unidentified CIA officer was “sur-
spies.”24 However, as a staff direc-
Princeton University Press, 1949). There is prised” at how much more detailed he
tor of the House Permanent
no more succinct definition of intelligence found Levchenko’s public revelations. See
than the title of Part I: “Intelligence Is Haruna Mikio, Himitsu no fairu: CIA no
Knowledge.” For the HPSCI staff director’s tainichi kosaku [Secret Files: The CIA’s
23Thomas Patrick Carroll, “The Case remark, see Mark M. Lowenthal, “Open Operations Against Japan] (Tokyo: Shin-
Against Intelligence Openness,” Interna- Source Intelligence: New Myths, New Real- chosha Bunko, 2003), volume 2, 483.
tional Journal of Intelligence and Counter- ities,” Defense Daily Online, reprinted in Whatever the accuracy of Haruna’s pur-
Intelligence (Winter 2001–2002): 561. The Intelligencer (Winter 1999): 7. ported source, Levchenko’s Japanese book
24Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nu- 26This and many other declassified Rus- is more revealing than the one he pub-
clear Diplomacy With North Korea (Princ- sian maps have been advertised on line at lished in the United States: On the Wrong
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, East View Information Services of Minne- Side: My Life in the KGB (Washington:
1998), 234. apolis, MN (www.eastview.com). Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988).
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 51
OSINT Then and Now
“
Even the Internet fails
the monolingual
American.
a telephone book), declassified, or English is declining from the
”
leaked, is intelligence when world’s dominant language to
assessed and disseminated merely “first among equals.”32
appropriately.29 History abounds Even the Internet fails the mono-
with examples of OSINT collec- lingual American. Chinese is
tion by intelligence officers: slated to surpass English as the
Internet’s leading language in
(cid:127)Military attachés have long the near future.33 Domain names,
Zvezda (Red Star), including
attached magazine photo- once issued only in English or
the wartime Imperial Japanese
graphs of aircraft, ships, and other languages with Roman let-
Army’s Harbin Special Ser-
tanks to their classified reports. ters, increasingly appear in
vices Agency and the postwar
Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Korean,
US Intelligence Community.31
(cid:127)Japan’s Kempeitai in wartime and other non-alphabet lan-
Shanghai gathered the writ- guages. Put simply, English is
Beyond the persistent dismissal
ings of Agnes Smedley and best for monitoring nations
of open sources as intelligence,
Edgar Snow in the course of where English is used. But what
the US Intelligence Community
collecting intelligence on the intelligence challenges confront
suffers from America’s general
Chinese Communist Party.30 the United States in Australia,
indifference to foreign languages
Britain, Canada, Ireland, or New
and ideas. Any intelligence
(cid:127)Various services culled intelli- Zealand? On the contrary, lan-
agency reflects the society from
gence from the pages of the guages with which Americans
which it comes. Americans, liv-
Soviet military daily Krasnaya are least familiar are precisely
ing in a vast country and
those of countries of greatest con-
speaking a language that has
cern: Arabic (Iraq), Chinese
28“Navy Had Word of Jap Plan To Strike at become the world’s lingua franca, (China), Farsi (Iran), Korean
Sea,” Chicago Tribune, 7 June 1942. On show little interest in learning
(DPRK), and Pashto (Afghani-
the “miraculous” character of the victory, other languages or, indeed,
stan), to name only some
see Gordon Prange et al., Miracle at Mid-
knowing what those outside their
way (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982). examples.
borders think. The result is an
29Intelligence officers have long worried
about the damage done through the leaks Intelligence Community recruit-
Although facing such challenges,
of classified intelligence and even the ing officers from among a
gathering of published information by ad- relatively small pool of Ameri- the United States lacks the edu-
versaries. Leaks are an old problem. See, cation base upon which to
cans who, through immigration
for example, Allen Dulles, The Craft of In- develop tomorrow’s intelligence
or education, possess the exper-
telligence (New York: Harper&Row, 1963),
officers. Relatively few Ameri-
241–43. On leaks today, see James B. tise in foreign languages and
cans pursue a foreign language
Bruce, The Consequences of Permissive area studies required for collect-
Neglect,” Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 ing open sources. from secondary school through
(2003, Unclassified). Becker, “Compara- the university level. Worse, most
tive Survey,” 35, noted in 1957 Soviet ex- university language students still
ploitation of US open sources and the Knowing foreign languages is the
study the Romance tongues or
repeated failures of the US Government key to exploiting OSINT. An
German in courses designed
from the 1940s to find a solution to the account with LexisNexis and a
problem.
subscription to the Wall Street
30Tsukamoto Makoto, Aru joho shoko no
Journal are hardly sufficient.
shuki [Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer] 32David Graddol, “The Future of Lan-
(Tokyo: Chuo Bunko, 1998), 195. Agnes guage,” Science 303 (27 February 2004):
Smedley (China’s Red Army Marches, 1329–31.
1934) and Edgar Snow (Red Star Over Chi- 31Nakano Koyukai, ed., Rikugun Nakano 33The prediction on Chinese Internet was
na, 1938) were prolific American writers Gakko [Army Nakano School] (Tokyo: Na- made at a conference of the World Intellec-
with extraordinary access to Chinese com- kano Koyukai, 1978), 176, and Moore, tual Property Organization, according to
munists. “Open Sources,” 104. the Financial Times, 7 December 2001.
52 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3
OSINT Then and Now
“
An indifference to
foreign languages and
even foreign sources in
chiefly to produce professors of An example closer to home is
literature. The Intelligence Com- translation diminishes that of Dr. Emmanuel Todd’s
munity must then compete with the OSINT value of the After the Empire: The Break-
the private sector for the hand- down of the American Order.
US mass media.
ful of competent linguists Published originally in 2003 in
graduating from university. The ” French, the book appeared the
bleak alternative is to start same year in various languages,
adults on crash courses at the including German, Italian, Japa-
Defense Language Institute nese, Korean, and Spanish. The
(DLI) or elsewhere on some of the The reluctance of US publishers belated appearance a year later
world’s most difficult languages. to introduce foreign books in of the American edition of a book
translation further lessens the regarding what a prominent aca-
flow of open sources available to demic—who had forecast in 1976
On a related issue, an indiffer-
Americans. For example, ROK the eventual fall of the Soviet
ence to foreign languages and
movie star Ch’oe Un-hui and her Union—sees as Washington’s
even foreign sources in transla-
former husband, the director Sin futile struggle to maintain a glo-
tion diminishes the OSINT value
Sang-ok, gained extraordinary bal hegemony stands as an
of the US mass media. American
access to Kim Chong-il after he indictment of the US publishing
journalists on the whole have
kidnapped them in 1978 in a bid industry.37
been ignorant of the countries on
to upgrade P’yongyang’s film
which they have reported. Most
industry; they worked for him
who have covered the nuclear Compounding the problem of
until their escape in 1986. Their
dispute between P’yongyang and insufficient foreign information
account of the Dear Leader, com-
Washington, for example, cannot reaching the United States, the
plete with photographs, appeared
read a Korean restaurant menu, decline of area studies since the
in 1988 in Seoul and Tokyo. They
let alone the pages of Nodong Cold War’s end has reduced the
were for years the only outsiders
Sinmun. Worse, as one observer pool of able applicants prepared
who had known Kim and written
noted of an earlier period of cri- to exploit foreign information in
sis: “Reporters did not routinely of their experience, but no Ameri- the vernacular. Russian studies,
read translations of the North can publisher saw fit to issue the for example, have suffered griev-
Korean news by the Foreign book in translation. The same is ously in funding and enrollment.
Broadcast Information Service. true of numerous books in recent Many graduates have found that
Nor did they avail themselves of years from other insiders, includ- US businesses prefer to send
information circulating among ing the architect of DPRK monolingual accountants to Mos-
ideology and Kim’s private sushi cow to teaching a Russian expert
outside experts by e-mail and
chef.36 accounting. Area experts seeking
fax.”34 The resulting level of
university tenure find positions
reporting has been so poor that
going to political scientists
one prominent academic who can
36The architect of North Korea’s Chuch’e
churning out papers on “rational
read Korean wrote recently of philosophy, Hwang Chang-yop, has writ-
choice” regarding countries they
having to turn to P’yongyang’s ten a number of books, including Na nun
“tightly controlled press” for yoksa ui chilli rul poatta: Hwang Chang-
yop hoegorok [I Saw the Truth of History:
information on Washington-
Memoirs of Hwang Chang-yop] (Seoul: Ha- 37Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: The
P’yongyang relations.35
nul, 1999). A Japanese sushi chef in Kim’s Breakdown of the American Order (New
service, publishing under the pseudonym York: Columbia University Press, 2004),
Kenji Fujimoto, wrote Kin Seinichi no ry- Après l’empire: Essai sur la décomposition
34Sigal, Disarming Strangers, 221 orinin (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2003). These du système américain (Paris: Gallimard,
35Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another are two of many insider accounts likely 2003) and La Chute finale: Essai sur la dé-
Country (New York: New Press, 2004), 47– never to see the light of day in the United composition de la sphère sovietique (Paris:
48. States. Robert Laffont, 1976).
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3 53
