Safety Culture Perceptions in a Collegiate Aviation Program

13 Pages·2017·2.27 MB·English

Available online at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/jate
Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 3:2 (2014) 44–56
Safety Culture Perceptions in a Collegiate Aviation Program:
A Systematic Assessment
Daniel Kwasi Adjekum
UniversityofNorthDakota
Abstract
AnassessmentoftheperceptionsofrespondentsonthesafetycultureatanaccreditedPart141fouryearcollegiateaviationprogram
was conducted as part of the implementation of a safety management system (SMS). The Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture
Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS), which was modified and revalidated from the existing Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS),
wasused.Participantsweredrawnfromflightstudentsandcertifiedflightinstructorsintheprogram.Thesurveycapturedtheperceptions
ofparticipantsonthestatusofthesafetycultureintheprogram.Thereweresignificantvariancesintheperceptionofrespondentsonthe
safetyculturebyyeargroups,anditwasobservedthatrespondentswhohadspentmoreyearsintheprogramhadabetterperceptionon
theprevailingsafetyculturethanthosewhohadjustenteredtheprogram.Therewerealsosignificant differencesintheperceptionsof
U.S.residentstudentsandinternationalcontractstudentsontheprogram’ssafetyculture.Theinternationalstudentshadalessfavorable
perception of the safety culture in the program. The results show that differences in national culture can have a significant effect on
perceptions of the safety culture inacollegiate aviation program.
Keywords: safetyculture,collegiateaviation,SafetyManagementSystems,perceptions,assessment
AbouttheAuthor
Daniel Kwasi Adjekum is a former aircraft commander,squadron commander in the Ghana Air Force, and airline pilot. He has over 16 years of
experienceasanaviationsafetymanager,accidentinvestigator,andSafetyManagementSystems(SMS)consultantforairlinesandcollegiateaviation
organizations.HeholdsaBachelorofSciencedegreeinPhysicsfromtheKwameNkrumahUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Kumasi,Ghana,and
aMasterofSciencedegreeinAviationfromtheJ.D.OdegardSchoolofAerospace,UniversityofNorthDakota.HehasanAirlineTransportPilot(ATP)
licenseissuedbytheFederalAviationAdministration(FAA),NigerianCivilAviationAuthority,andGhanaCivilAviationAuthority.Heistype-ratedon
theBoeing737300–800turbojets,FokkerF27,BN-2Ttransportaircraft.HealsoflewL-29DolphinandL-39AlbatrossjetsfortheGhanaAirForce.
PresentlyheistheprincipalconsultantforHomeBaseInternational,anaviationsafetymanagementconsultancyinGrandForks,NorthDakota.Hispresent
projectsincludeSMSimplementationwiththeUNDAerospace,andhisresearchinterestisintheareaofSMSimplementationandcontrolincollegiate
aviation.
TheauthorwouldliketoacknowledgeDr.TerryvonThadenforpermissiontousetheCASSforhisresearchandGaryUllrich,BillWatson,Dr.Warren
Jensen,andallofUNDfortheirinvaluableassi[e-mail].
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1086
D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering 45
Introduction safety culture status of front-line personnel like certified
flight instructors (CFIs) and flight students. The norms,
Modern aviation operations are growing ever more perceptions, values, and attitudes toward safety of these
complex in times of increased demand for services with groups of people will have an impact on the safety culture
decreased resources (Wensveen, 2010). Organizational of the aviation organization (Cooper, 2000). An important
factors like safety culture and regulatory oversight play component for the successful implementation of an SMS
significant roles in the foundation of safety in high-risk program in any aviation organization is the level of
systems (von Thaden, 2008). Several high profile acci- the positive status of the organizational safety culture
dents in the late twentieth century brought considerable (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009).
attention to the role of organizational safety culture The purpose of this study was to assess the perceptions
and regulatory oversight in accident causation (von of flight students and flight instructors on the status of the
Thaden, 2006; Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, prevailing safety culture after the implementation of a
& Gibbons, 2004). Accordingly, the Federal Aviation phased process of Safety Management Systems in a
Administration has established a comprehensive and collegiate flight program.
integrated procedure to encompass a national standard of
system safety with the introduction of Safety Management Research Questions
Systems in aviation operations (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2008). 1. What are the differences in perception among
Safety Management Systems provide a top-down, respondents(commercialflightstudentsandcertifiedflight
businesslike approach to safety and emphasize proactive instructors) on the status of the safety culture at an
and data-driven management of safety, distinct from the accredited four year collegiate aviation program?
traditionalreactionaryapproach(FederalAviationAdminis- 2. What are the differences between the perception of
tration, 2008). The Federal Aviation Administration issued internationalcontractstudentsandindigenousU.S.students
AC 120-92A to introduce the concept of Safety Manage- onthestatusofthesafetycultureatanaccreditedfouryear
ment Systems to aviation service providers like collegiate collegiate aviation program?
aviation organizations (Part 141) under FAA SMS
Guidance, Order 8000.369 and Aviation Safety (AVS) Literature Review
Requirements Document, Order VS 8000.367. The Airline
SafetyandFederalAviationExtensionActof2010 (Public Positive organizational safety culture creates empower-
Law111-216)directedtheFAAtoissueafinalruleonSMS ment which gives responsibility and authority to all and
by July 30, 2012. The FAA is systematically working on provides a horizontal safety hierarchy so as to treat every
establishing requirements for U.S. aviation certificate input equal to others (Bos & Lu, 2007). Wood (2003)
holderstoimplementSMS. commentedthatthefeelingofinvolvementwouldmotivate
The implementation of SMS and the sustenance of a users of the SMS to contribute insights to safety per-
positive safety culture in a collegiate aviation program can formance. Effective safety management in the twenty-first
generate both economic and operational benefits. Moncton century involves paying attention to human factors
Flight College (MFC) in New Brunswick implemented (Perezgonzalez, 2009). System components have as much
SMS and managed to have a $25,000 annual savings in potential to cause, or save, dangerous system states as
insurance premiums along with a significant reduction in technical components (Yule, 2003).
regulatory audit findings (Lercel, Steckel, Mondello, Carr, Lu, Przetak, & Wetmore (2005) state that by paying
& Patankar, 2011). attention to human factors, aviation organizations can
Continued research into proactive organizational safety identify and capture potential hazards before they manifest
culture provides a better understanding of organizational asaccidents.Onemethodofachievingthisisbymeasuring
performance, accountabilities, policies, and procedures the state of safety through so-called ‘‘leading’’ indicators
surrounding safety (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). The suchassafetycultureorsafetyclimate(Yule,2003).These
aim of this new oversight relationship between aviation are seen as distinct from ‘‘lagging’’ indicators of safety,
organizations and regulatory authorities is to shift away such as accidents, as they offer insight into the state of
from a prescriptive era to one of proactive and systematic safety without the need for retrospective analyses of
business-orientedsafetymanagement(Stolzer,Haldford,& negative safety outcomes (von Thaden et al., 2006).
Goglia, 2011).
Defining and Building Up a Safety Culture
Purpose of the Study
Forthepurposesofthisstudy,safetyculturewasdefined
The successful implementationofan SMS initiative ina as‘‘thesetofenduringvaluesandattitudesregardingsafety
collegiate aviation program is strongly influenced by the issues, shared by every member of every level of an
46 D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering
organization’’ (Piers, Montijn, & Balk, 2009, p. 5). Safety whether the data supported what Block described as the
culture also ‘‘refers to the personal dedication and purpose-alignment-control (PAC) model. A pair of experts
accountability of individuals engaged in any activity that recoded the Patankar (2003) survey items in accordance
has a bearing on the safe provision of aviation service’’ with the PAC model. The proposed factors were tested
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2007, appendix A-3). using a structural equation modeling methodology. The
Without a doubt, the core accomplishment of SMS is to main drivers of safety outcomes were organizational
create a positive safety culture to maintain and further affiliation (similar to ‘‘pride in company’’ [Patankar,
improve the entire system’s safety (IATA, 2011). 2003]) and proactive management (partially derived
fromthe‘‘safetyopinion’’factor[Patankar,2003]).Organi-
Summary of Safety Culture Studies in Commercial zational affiliation was directly influenced by communica-
Aviation Operations tion,andproactivemanagementwasinfluencedbytraining
effectiveness and relational supervision.
Wiegmann et al. (2004, p. 129) reported that ‘‘few Substantial research and studies in safety culture
formally documented efforts have been made to assess assessmentshavebeendoneintheairlineandmaintenance
safetyculturewithintheaviationindustry,withthenotable organizations (Patankar, 2003; von Thaden, Kessel &
exception of military aviation.’’ Three studies reported a Ruengvisesh,2008)environmentaswellasintheairtraffic
safety assessment using commercial aviation pilots. The control organization (Gordon & Kirwan, 2004), but not
AustralianTransportationSafetyBureau(2004)andEvans, muchhasbeendoneinassessingthesafetycultureinflight
Glendon,&Creed(2007)reportedonthedevelopmentofa trainingorganizations,especiallyamongflightstudentsand
safety culture questionnaire designed to gain insight into flight instructors. This study intends to build up the strong
pilots’ perceptions of workplace safety (n5 1,308). The foundations built by parallel studies in other aviation
questionnaireconsistedofsixsafetyfactors,eachwithfive organizations to assess the safety culture among this
items. These factors were based upon previous safety particular subset of aviation operations.
culture research and input from aviation safety experts.
Data from half of the sample were used in an exploratory SMS and Safety Culture in Collegiate Aviation in the
factor analysis (EFA) that resulted in a three factor model United States
of management commitment and communication, safety
training and equipment, and maintenance. A confirmatory Even though, presently, SMS and safety culture assess-
factor analysis (CFA) on the remaining half of the sample ment are not regulatory requirements in the United States
showed the three factor model to be an adequate fit to the for aviation training organizations like collegiate and
data. university aviation programs (FAA, 2010c), a number of
Finally, the responses from different types of pilots SMS pilot programs are being run by some proactive
(regular public transport, charter, or aerial work such as university aviation departments due to the immense
emergencymedical services oragriculture) werecompared positive benefits that they stand to derive (Ullrich, 2012).
on each of the four identified safety culture factors. No SMS and a positive safety culture would be substantially
significantdifferencesbetweenthegroupswerefound.The advantageous to collegiate aviation because they perform
Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (2004) concluded standardized activities towards established goals (FAA,
that thiswas duetoa single professional safetyclimate for 2013).
pilots as a group, regardless of the organization for whom Collegiate aviation has areas of particular risk because
they worked. students may have little or no prior flight experience and
Gibbons,vonThaden,&Wiegmann(2006)developeda because malfunctions and unusual situations have to be
questionnaire designed to assess safety culture within the simulatedinordertoexposethesestudentstothevarietyof
context of airline flight operations. Gibbons et al.’s survey elements as part of their routine flying activity (FAA,
consistedof84items,groupedintofivethemes.Thesurvey 2012).Inotherwords,inflighttraining,pilotsmayperform
was designed by examining the content of safety culture maneuvers that should not be accomplished as part of
questionnaires that have been used in other High Risk normalflightwiththeaddedriskthatthisentails.Collegiate
Organizations (HRO). A total of 503 responses were aviation has had its fair share of tragic accidents and
receivedfromasinglecompany.After discarding 29items incidents (NTSB, 2007).
and using CFA, the analysis eventually resulted in a There is an imperative need for controlling risk through
structureoffourbroadfactors(organizationalcommitment, anassessmentoftheprevalentsafetycultureinherentinthe
operations personnel, informal safety system, and formal program (Patankar, 2003). There is no type-specific
safety system), with three subfactors in each. frameworkfortheassessmentofsafetycultureincollegiate
Block, Sabin, & Patankar (2007) reanalyzed the aviation, and some of the few studies done have used
responses obtained from the 281 pilots from the previous modified survey tools more suited for airlines and airports
study by Patankar (2003). The purpose was to examine (University of North Dakota Safety Council, 2011). The
D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering 47
safety culture assessment will provide the needed data and the collegiate program’s safety culture, thus obtaining a
feedback to make changes that will continuously improve benchmark to judge critical movement and change in the
safety and ensure an integrated system-wide safety net for aviation program’s safety culture.
training organizations (McCune, 2012).
Population
Components of a Positive Safety Culture
The population (n 5 1,500) for the study consisted of
A positive safety culture is the engine that drives the aviation students and certified flight instructors at the
organization towards the goal of maximum attainable aviation department of an accredited CFR Part 141 flight
operational safety regardless of any formats of resistance, training and four-year degree-awarding university in the
obstacles, and pressures (International Civil Aviation NorthwesternregionoftheUnitedStates.Thesample(n5
Organization, 2009). A positive safety culture promotes 945) was drawn from undergraduate commercial flight
mutual respect among the employees and managers of the students,internationalcontractflightstudents,andcertified
organization (Simon & Cistaro, 2009). A positive safety flight instructors at the university. Air Traffic Control
culture ensures that operational hazards and errors are (ATC), Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Flight Technol-
anticipated(Stolzeretal.,2011).Therearefivecomponents ogy (FT), and graduate students (GS) were not included in
of a positive safety culture, namely: informed, reporting, this study.
just,learning,andflexiblecultures,asoutlinedinFigure 1.
Survey Administration
Methodology
Participants responded to items in the survey instrument
The study used the Collegiate Aviation Program Safety using a 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly
Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS), which is a agree) and a nonapplicable option (Creswell, 2009). The
modified form of the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey survey was administered through an online survey tool
(CASS), which is a validated tool developed by von called QualtricsH online in the English language to allow
Thaden and Gibbons (2008). The CASS identifies the for simplicity of delivery and anonymity of participants.
respondents’ perception of the current state as well as the Participants were assured of the confidentiality of their
strengths and weaknesses of the safety culture in an responses.
organization. The CASS was specifically modified and The survey allowed participants to have plenty of
revalidated for collegiate aviation programs (Creswell, opportunities to provide more information if they wished
2009). The adaptation and modification were done with to do so, and some open-ended questions were asked to
permission from Dr. Terry von Thaden, copyright owner specifically explore the nature of these activities. There
for CASS. were 61 items in the survey broken into the following
CAPSCAS was then used to assess the safety culture sections: formal safety, informal safety, operational inter-
perceptionofcommercialflightstudentsandcertifiedflight actions, organizational commitment, safety behavior, and
instructors.TheCAPSCASprovidedabaselinemeasureof demographics.
Figure1.Thecomponentsofsafetyculture:Definitionsofinformed,flexible,reporting,justandlearningcultures.(UsedwithpermissionfromGlobal
AviationInformationNetwork,2004.)
48 D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering
Table 1 Table 2
ScalesinventoryfortheCAPSCAS. Cronbach’salphaforCAPSCAS.
CAPSCASMajorFactorScales Sub-factorScales NumberofItemsin
MajorScale Scale(n) Cronbach’sa
FormalSafetyProgram ReportingSystem
Responseandfeedback FormalSafetyProgram 15 0.90
SafetyPersonnel InformalSafetyProgram 14 0.85
InformalSafetyProgram Accountability OperationsInteraction 19 0.87
PilotAuthority OrganizationalCommitment 14 0.86
Professionalism
TotalforCAPSCAS 62 0.96
OperationsInteraction SupervisorsofFlight(SoF)/LeadFlight/
ChiefFlightInstructor
Dispatch/GroundandRampPersonnel Demographic Information
OrganizationalCommitment SafetyValues
SafetyFundamentals
At the end of the response period, (n 5 234) responses
GoingBeyond
wereobtainedfromthesurveyandcomprisedoffully(n5
Compliance
142) completed and useable responses representing a 61%
return rate. About 51.7% of the respondents provided
comments in the text boxes provided for extra comments.
Results and Data Analysis
Of the total respondents, 34% identified themselves as
freshmen, 5% were sophomores, 17% were juniors, 22%
Quantitative data was imported into the SPSSH software
were seniors, and CFI/others accounted for the remaining
andanalyzed.Alladditionalcommentsandresponseswere
21%. This number represents respondents who answered
coded manually by the researcher for themes and analyzed
the demographic question about their status in terms of
using SPSSH. Significant values were set at the 0.05 alpha
yearsspentintheflightprogramasstudentsandCFIatthe
levels (two-tailed). The survey was tested for content
university. Table 3 outlines the categories.
validity and reliability of scale.
The respondents were asked about their status as either
resident U.S. students or international contract students in
Content Validity
theuniversity’sflightprogram.Thiswasdonetodetermine
how many international contract students responded to the
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was conducted
survey. The flight program at the university has a number
on the 61 items with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The
of international contract students from predominantly Asia
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin(KMO)measureverifiedthesampling
and the Middle East and whose national culture and
adequacy for the analysis (KMO 5 0.84 and all KMO
perceptionaboutthesafetyculture oftheflightprogramof
valuesforindividualitems.0.85)whichiswellabovethe
the university may not be the same as resident U.S.
acceptable limit of 0.5 (Field, 2009). A Bartlett’s test of
sphericityx2(1891)56304,p,0.001,wasconductedand students. One of the aims of the study was to find out if
there was any difference in the perception on the status of
indicated that the correlation between items were suffi-
the safety culture of the flight program by the two groups.
cientlylargeforPCA.Thirteencomponentswereextracted
Table 5 illustrates this category.
and had Eigen values greater than Kaiser’s criterion of 1
and, in combination, explained 73.90% of the variance.
Analysis of Research Questions
Reliability
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to find if
there were any significant differences in the mean
All four major scales of the CAPSCAS (Formal Safety,
responses of the participants on the safety culture of the
InformalSafety,OperationsInteraction,andOrganizational
flight program. A one-way independent ANOVA and post
Commitment) showed high reliabilities. Test reliability
hoc (Games-Howell) analysis was used to find out which
referstotheconsistencyorreliabilityofquestionnaireitems
(Stevens, 2002). A reliable scale is one that will yield the
Table 3
samescorefortwodifferentindividualswiththesametrue
Categoryofrespondents.
level of the trait or attitude being measured, or for one
individual tested twice, assuming that no changes have Category Number(n) Percentage(%)
occurred between tests (Cronbach,1951; Cortina, 1993). Freshmen 46 34
Within a scale, items that assess the same underlying Sophomore 7 5
dimensionarerelatedorcorrelatedwithoneanother(Field, Junior 23 17
Senior 30 22
2009; Creswell, 2009). The values for reliability are
CFI/Others 28 21
outlined in Table 2 and show the Cronbach’s alpha values
Total 134 100
for all major scales.
D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering 49
Table 4 Table 6
Genderdistributionofrespondents. Airmancertificationsandratings.
Gender Number(n) Percentage(%) AirmanCertificates/Ratings Number(n) Percentage(%)
Male 125 93 Student 18 13
Female 9 7 Private 52 39
CommercialSingle-Engine 7 5
Total 134 100
CommercialMultiengine 20 15
CFI 4 3
groups differ in their mean responses since no specific CFI(Instrument) 15 11
hypothesiswasgeneratedbeforetheresearch(Field,2009). MultiengineInstructor(MEI) 8 6
AirTransportPilot(ATP) 3 7
Therewasasignificantdifferenceinthemeanresponsesof
Others/MixedCertificate 7 5
perception on the item ‘‘I feel like I am gambling with the
Total 134 100
safetyofmyaircrafteverytimeIgoonatrainingactivity.’’
F(4,128) 5 2.83, p , 0.05 (two-tailed) which falls under
allabovetheneutralpointof3.Thedifferencesinthemean
the subscale of Ramp Operations and major scale of
response were also significant, t(132) 5 22.59, p , 0.05.
Operations Interaction. A post hoc analysis (Games-
TheresidentU.S.studentshadameanresponseof(M5
Howell) revealed that there were significant differences
3.40, SE5 0.18) as compared to the international students
between the mean responses of juniors and freshmen, p ,
who had a mean response of (M5 2.49, SE5 0.27) when
0.05 (two-tail).
asked for their perception on the statement ‘‘Pilots do not
The item ‘‘My university is committed to equipping
botherreportingnearmissesorclose calls, since thisevent
aircraft with up to date technology’’ under the subscale
does not cause any real damage.’’ The difference was
of Safety Fundamentals and scale of Organizational
significant, t(132) 5 2.68, p , 0.05. This shows that the
Commitment showed significant differences in the mean
contract students in their perception agreed with the item.
responses of respondents, F(4,126) 5 3.02, p , 0.05. A
The responses for the item ‘‘Pilots are satisfied with the
post hoc analysis revealed significant differences in the
way the university deals with safety reports’ showed that
mean responses between the juniors and freshmen, p ,
the contract students (M 5 3.92, SE 5 0.23) had a more
0.05. The other item that showed significant differences in
positiveperceptionthantheU.S.students(M53.37,SE5
mean responses was ‘‘Management tries to get around
0.11), even though all of the mean responses were above
safety requirements whenever they get the chance.’’ The
the neutral point of 3.
results were F(4,125) 53.22, p , 0.05. Further post hoc
The differences in their responses were significant,
analysis revealed that there were significant differences in
t(132) 5 2.35, p , 0.05. However, when the mean
the mean responses of juniors and freshmen, p , 0.05.
responses of their perception on the item ‘‘University only
Figure 2 displays a simple bar graph with error bars
keepstrackofmajorsafetyproblemsandoverlooksroutine
highlighting the significant differences in mean of
ones’’ were compared, the resident U.S. students (M 5
responses to their perception of the safety culture.
3.92, SE 5 0.16) disagreed with the item, whereas the
For the second research question, an independent t-test
international students (M 5 2.44, SE 5 0.27) who agreed
was used to determine if there existed any significant
with the item. The differences in their responses was
differences in the mean perception of the resident U.S.
significant, t(132) 5 24.78, p , 0.05.
students(n595)andinternationalflightstudents(n539)
Generally, there was a good perception on the item
onthesafetyculture oftheuniversity’sflightprogramThe
‘‘Personnel responsible for safety hold high status in the
variances in the samples were assumed roughly equal, and
university.’’ The mean responses for the U.S. students
scores were independent. The mean perception on the
(M 5 4.13, SE 5 0.07) was higher than the international
status of the safety reporting system of the collegiate
students (M 5 3.72, SE 5 0.21). The difference in
aviation program of resident U.S. students (M 5 4.27, SE
response was significant, t(130) 5 22.03, p , 0.05. Both
5 0.23) was better than the international contract students
groups were in strong agreement with the item ‘‘Personnel
(M53.77,SE50.23),whenasked,‘‘Thesafetyreporting
responsible for safety have power to make changes.’’ The
systemisconvenientandeasytouse.’’Theresponseswere
mean of responses for the U.S. students (M 5 4.34, SE 5
0.07)washigherthantheinternationalstudents(M53.71,
Table 5
SE 5 0.21). The difference in responses was significant,
Internationalstudentstatus.
t(130) 5 23.45, p , 0.05.
InternationalStudent
The two groups also agreed with the item ‘‘Personnel
Status Number(n) Percentage(%)
responsibleforsafetyhaveaclearunderstandingoftherisk
Yes 39 29
involved in flight.’’ The mean responses of the U.S,
No 95 71
students (M 5 4.31, SE 5 0.09) was higher than the
Total 134 100
international students (M 5 3.87, SE 5 0.21), and the
50 D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering
Figure2.Simplebargraphof‘‘meanperceptionofsafetyculture.’’
differences in the mean responses were significant, t(130) strong perception that ‘‘Pilots have little or no authority to
522.11,p,0.05.Theitem‘‘Safetypersonnelhavelittle make decisions that affect the safety of normal flight
ornoauthoritycomparedtooperationalpersonnel’’showed operations.’’ The U.S. students (M 5 3.45, SE 5 0.13),
that, while the U.S. students (M 5 4.29, SE 5 0.14) however, disagreed with the item. The differences in their
disagreed with the item, the international students (M 5 responses were significant t(130) 5 23.86, p , 0.05.
2.03, SE 5 0.27) agreed with it. There was a significant TheU.S.students(M52.88,SE50.12)disagreedwith
difference in the mean of their responses, t(128) 5 26.63, the item ‘‘Pilots who are new and less senior are willing
p , .05. to speak up regarding flight safety issues,’’ while the
The item ‘‘University management shows favoritism to internationalstudents(M53.55,SE50.21)agreed.There
certain pilots’’ showed that the perception of the U.S. was a significant difference in their responses t(130) 5
students (M 5 3.15, SE 5 0.18) were partially neutral, 2.80,p,0.05.TheU.S.students(M52.47,SE50.09),
while the international students (M 5 2.03, SE 5 0.27) however, disagreed that ‘‘Pilots never cut corners or
agreed with the item. The differences in responses were compromise safety, regardless of the operational pressures
significant, t(128) 5 23.28, p , 0.05. The international todoso’’whiletheinternationalstudents(M53.55,SE5
students (M 5 2.35, SE 5 0.28) had a strong perception 0.21) agreed. There were significant differences in their
that ‘‘When accidents and incidents happen, management responses, t(130) 5 4.79, p , 0.05.
always blame the pilot’’ as compared to the U.S. students Theinternationalstudents(M52.59,SE50.33)agreed
(M 5 3.39, SE 5 0.17) who partially disagreed with the with the item ‘‘Chief/Lead CFIs and Supervisors of Flight
item. The differences in their responses were significant, are unavailable when pilots need help,’’ while the U.S.
t(128) 5 23.12, p , 0.05. students(M54.19,SE50.16)disagreed.Thedifferences
Thetwogroupshadaneutralperceptionthat‘‘Pilotsare betweentheirresponseweresignificant,t(127)524.19,p
actively involved in identifying and resolving safety ,0.05.The international students (M52.88,SE50.32)
concerns.’’ The responses of the U.S. students (M 5 hadaperceptionthat‘‘Aslongastherearenoaccidentsor
3.23, SE5 0.11) had a lower mean as compared to the incidents,Chief/LeadCFIsandSupervisorsofFlightdon’t
international students (M 5 3.82, SE 5 0.19). The care how flight operations are performed,’’ while the U.S.
differences in the mean responses for both groups were students(M54.91,SE50.16)disagreed. Thedifferences
significant, t(130) 5 2.67, p , 0.05. The international in their responses were significant, t(127) 5 23.92, p ,
students (M 5 2.26, SE 5 0.28) had a strong perception 0.05.
that ‘‘Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by Theinternationalstudents(M52.79,SE50.34)agreed
the Supervisor of Flight or other flight management withtheitem‘‘DispatchinappropriatelyusesMEL,whenit
personnel,’’ while the U.S. students (M 5 3.69, SE 5 is better to fix equipment.’’ The U.S. students (M 5 4.48,
0.18) disagreed with the item. The differences in their SE 5 0.12) strongly disagreed. The differences in
responsesweresignificant,t(130)524.25,p,0.05.The responses were significant, t(126) 5 25.80, p , 0.05.
international students (M 5 2.53, SE 5 0.29) also had a The U.S. students (M 5 4.27, SE 5 0.14) disagreed with
D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering 51
the item ‘‘Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety international students (M 5 3.87, SE 5 0.18) and U.S.
thancancelaflight.’’Theinternationalstudents(M52.06, students(M54.55,SE50.05)bothagreedwiththeitem
SE 5 0.29) strongly agreed. The differences in their ‘‘My university is committed to equip aircraft with up-to-
responses were significant, t(127) 5 27.35, p , 0.05. date technology.’’ The differences in responses were
Both U.S, students (M 5 4.28, SE 5 0.05) and significant, t(129) 5 24.62, p , 0.05. The item ‘‘My
international students (M 5 3.91, SE 5 0.18) agreed with university ensures that maintenance on aircraft is ade-
theitem‘‘Instructors/trainers haveaclearunderstandingof quately performed and aircraft safe to operate’’ was agreed
the risk associated with operations.’’ The differences in on by the U.S. students (M 5 4.58, SE 5 0.06) and
theirresponsesweresignificant,t(126)522.49,p,0.05. international students (M 5 3.92, SE 5 0.19). The
Both U.S. students (M 5 4.31, SE 5 0.13) and differences in their responses were significant, t(129) 5
international students (M 5 3.91, SE 5 0.18) all agreed 24.07, p , 0.05.
on the item ‘‘Safety is consistently emphasized during The U.S. students (M 5 4.11, SE 5 0.09) and
training at my university.’’ There was a significant international students (M 5 3.55, SE 5 0.20) agreed with
difference in their responses, t(126) 5 22.33, p , 0.05. the item ‘‘Management goes above and beyond regulatory
The international students (M 5 2.21, SE 5 0.31) had a minimums, when it comes to issues of flight safety.’’ The
perception that ‘‘Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and differencesintheirmeanresponsesweresignificant,t(128)
ways to get around safety requirements’’ while the U.S. 522.79,p,0.05.Theinternationalstudents(M52.21,
students(M54.24,SE50.13)disagreed.Thedifferences SE 5 0.28) agreed that ‘‘Management schedules CFIs as
in their responses were significant, t(126) 5 26.89, p , much as legally possible, with little concern for their sleep
0.05. schedule or fatigue.’’ The U.S. students (M 5 3.67, SE 5
U.S. students (M 5 4.17, SE 5 0.07) and the 0.17),however,disagreed.Thedifferencesintheresponses
international students (M 5 3.76, SE 5 0.18) agreed on were significant, t(128) 5 24.48, p , 0.05.
the item ‘‘Ramp personnel are careful about position of TheU.S.students(M54.61,SE50.11)disagreedthat
equipment (fuel trucks, power carts, etc.).’’ There was ‘‘Management tries to get around safety requirements
significance in the differences in their responses, t(131) 5 whenever they get the chance.’’ The international students
22.41,p,0.05.Theinternationalstudents(M52.63,SE (M 5 2.32, SE 5 0.28) agreed with the item and the
50.31)hadaperceptionthat‘‘Ramppersonnelarecareless differences in the responses of the two groups were
aboutremovingdebris(e.g.cups,rags,tools,clothing,etc.) significant, t(128) 5 29.10, p , 0.05. Finally, both U.S.
neartheaircraft, whichmayposeFODhazards.’’TheU.S. students(M54.09,SE50.10)andinternationalstudents
students (M 5 4.28, SE 5 0.14) did not agree with this (M 5 3.68, SE 5 0.20) agreed that ‘‘Management views
item. The differences in their responses were significant, violationsveryseriouslyevenwhentheydon’tresultinany
t(130) 5 25.49, p , 0.05. International students (M 5 serious damage or injury.’’ The differences in their
2.47, SE 5 0.31) agreed with the item ‘‘I feel like I am responses were significant, t(128) 5 22.00, p , 0.05.
gamblingwiththesafetyofmyaircrafteverytimeIgoona
trainingactivity’’whiletheU.S.students(M54.65,SE5 Discussion
0.10) disagreed. The differences in their response were
significant, t(131) 5 28.54, p , 0.05. Perception of Safety Culture Among Respondents
U.S.students(M53.76,SE50.16)disagreedwiththe
item‘‘Managementismoreconcernedwithmakingmoney The first part of the discussion sought to deal with the
than being safe’’ while the international students (M 5 research question, ‘‘What are the differences in perception
2.58,SE50.31)agreed.Thedifferencesintheirresponses among respondents [commercial flight students and
was significant, t(128) 5 23.57, p , 0.05. International certified flight instructors] on the status of the safety
students (M 5 2.84, SE 5 0.31) agreed with the item culture at an accredited four year collegiate aviation
‘‘Managementdoesnotshowmuchconcernforsafetyuntil program?’’ The research question was to find out the level
thereisanaccidentorincident,’’whiletheU.S.students(M of variability in the perception of flight students and flight
5 4.14, SE 5 0.15) disagreed. Both U.S. students (M 5 instructors on the safety culture in the university’s flight
4.34,SE50.06)andinternationalstudents(M53.97,SE program.
50.18)agreedwiththeitem‘‘Myuniversityflightmanual Agoodmeasureofconsistencyinthesafetycultureofan
is carefully kept up to date.’’ The differences in their organizationistofocusonthevarianceinsurveyresponses
responses were significant, t(129) 5 22.18, p , 0.05. (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). When a population
U.S. students (M5 4.16, SE 5 0.08) and international demonstrates considerable variance, the coherent structure
students(M53.79,SE50.18)bothagreedwiththeitem for an underlying culture of safety is, for all intents and
‘‘My university is willing to invest money, resources, and purposes, nonexistent and shows that there are gaps in the
effort to improve safety.’’ The differences between the purpose, alignment, and control of the safety management
responsesweresignificant,t(129)522.18,p,0.05.The (Patankar, 2003).
52 D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering
The results showed that respondents had a good The other item that showed significant differences in
perception and favorable outlook of the safety culture mean responses was ‘‘Management tries to get around
prevailing in the university’s flight program. There were, safety requirements whenever they get the chance.’’ There
however, some areas that needed improvement, and the were significant differences in responses between the
discussion will focus more on the areas for improvement juniors and the freshmen. From the results, the freshmen
for the safety program and how the Safety Management seem to have a rather poor perception about the commit-
Systems can consolidate a more proactive and positive ment of management to safety, while the juniors had a
safety culture. rather good perception. The diametrical responses and
Therewasasignificantdifferenceinthemeanresponses measure of the perception of the commitment of manage-
of perception on the item ‘‘I feel like I am gambling with ment to safety potentially indicates a gap in the safety
the safety of my aircraft every time I go on a training management of the flight program.
activity,’’ under the major scale of Operations Interaction.
The significant differences were between the responses of Perception of International Students and U.S. Students on
juniors and freshmen. The results showed that, while the the Safety Culture in the Collegiate Aviation Program
juniors had a more favorable perception on most items
under operations interaction, the freshmen had poor This section of the discussion focuses on the second
perception on these items. Since the university has a research question: ‘‘What are the differences between the
standard operational procedure and curricula for all flight perception of international contract students and resident
operations, it was expected that there would be very U.S. students on the status of the safety culture at an
minimal variability of responses among the year groups. accredited four year collegiate aviation program?’’
However, variability in perception can be a function of The perceptions of these two groups (international
training environment, operational interaction, experience students and resident U.S. students) were analyzed on the
level, prior training, fleet assignment, and operational basis of the impact of national culture on their perception
safety records (von Thaden et al., 2008). onthesafetyculture(Hofstede&Holfstede,2004).Fanjoy
A significant variation in responses can also be a result & Gao (2011), in their study on the learning style of
of the risk perception among the year groups (Block et al., Chinese collegiateaviationstudents, observesthat Chinese
2007). A more risk-loving attitude and behavior can result culture is significantly different from that of the U.S. in
in significant safety breaches in the wall of the most terms of power-distance, individualism, and long-term
formidable safety management system (Reason & Hobbs, orientation. Joy & Kolb (2009) states that national culture
2003;Patankar,2003).Concurrenceisacriticalfeatureofa has an impact on individual learning and cognitive style
healthy safety culture (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008; preferences. Hofstede & Hofstede (2004) suggests that
IATA,2011),asitreflectsthedegreetowhichbothjuniors when students from a different cultural background are
and freshmen share a common perception of the safety educated in a different cultural context, the impact of the
culture. It is, therefore, important for more attention to be cultural differences should be considered to identify any
focused on freshmen by reinforcing safety education, potential negative influence.
especially on operations interaction. The item ‘‘Pilots do not bother reporting near misses or
The item ‘‘My University is committed to equipping close calls, since this event does not cause any real
aircraft with up-to-date technology’’ under the subscale damage’’ on the reporting system of the flight program
of Safety Fundamentals and scale of Organizational showed that resident U.S. students disagreed with the item
Commitment showed a significant difference in the mean whilethecontractstudents,intheirperception,agreedwith
responses of juniors and freshmen. There were some theitem.Thesignificantdifferences intheresponsescould
relevant comments from respondents: be a result of the level of risk perception among the two
groups, as compared to a similar study on general aviation
‘‘Aspertechnology intheaircraft, justlook atourfleet. pilotsbyHunter(2006).Thedifferencesinnationalculture
Most of the fixed-wing are astounding. Most of the andlanguagecouldalsoaffecttheperceptionandbehavior
helicopters are laughable. I feel that there is not equal of these two groups as outlined in the research of Kanki,
representationamong fixed-wing and rotorcraft in terms Helmreich & Anca (2010) on crew management resources
of technology. This obviously plays a role in safety.’’ among multicultural crews.
Whenthemeanresponsesoftheirperceptionontheitem
The quote underscores the perception that updating ‘‘Universityonlykeepstrackofmajorsafetyproblemsand
aircraftwithnewtechnologyisskewedtowardsfixed-wing overlooks routine ones’’ were compared, the resident U.S.
operation and that management should make a conscious students disagreed with the item while the international
effort to create equity in allocation of resources. It can students agreed with the item. The differences in their
create a perception that management is not committed to responses were significant. The results show similarities
enhancing safety in some fleet of the program. with the study of Dillman, Voges & Robertson (2011),
D.K.Adjekum / JournalofAviationTechnologyandEngineering 53
whichshowedthatflightstudentssometimessimplydonot when in a group, compared to the international students
report safety occurrences because, in their opinion, the who mostly have a culture that is more of a High Power
event is not significant enough to warrant completing the Distance which makes them less willing to challenge
paperwork, since it takes time, energy and effort. There is authority. The U.S. students, however, disagreed that,
also the issue of effective feedback from management for ‘‘Pilots never cut corners or compromise safety, regardless
theeffortofreportingsafetyoccurrences.Ifstudentsdonot of the operational pressures to do so,’’ while the
receive tangible and timely feedback from safety manage- international students agreed. National cultural values like
ment personnel on seemingly insignificant reported safety Uncertainty Avoidance (rules and order [Hofstede, 1980;
hazards and occurrences, it promotes apathy and stifles an Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005]) could largely influence this
effective safety reporting system. perception. Respondents provided comments to reinforce
The U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Safety their perceptions and are quoted below:
personnel have little or no authority compared to opera-
tional personnel,’’ but the international students strongly ‘‘I think in general most pilots treat safety with respect
agreed with it. There was a significant difference in the and are professional about safety, but there are some
mean of their responses. This can be an indication of who are much more willing to cut corners or ignore
the perceived marginal input of safety personnel in the safety policies and procedures than others.’’
administration and operation of contract flight programs.
‘‘Studentsarenegativelyimpacted bynotmeeting flight
The international students’ perception is probably influ-
templates which promotes them to cut corners and fly
enced by their increased interaction with the operational when they should not.’’
personnel over the safety personnel.
The item ‘‘University management shows favoritism to The international students agreed with the item
certain pilots’’ showed that the perceptions of the U.S. ‘‘Dispatch inappropriately uses MEL when it is better to
students were almost neutral while the international fix equipment.’’ The U.S. students strongly disagreed. The
studentsagreedwiththeitem.Thedifferencesinresponses U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Dispatch would
were significant, and this was correlated to the response to rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight.’’ The
the item ‘‘When accidents and incidents happen, manage- international students strongly agreed. This was another
ment always blame the pilot,’’ where the international worrying trend in flight operations interaction of the
students strongly agreed but the U.S. students partially university. It could be a result of the operational tempo
disagreed. This result is similar to the research findings of of contract training, which sometimes requires that
von Thaden et al. (2008), which suggested that a primary international student to fly under some pressure to meet
challenge regarding accountability concerns perceptions of company deadlines.
favoritism.Itappearsthatpilotsarenotblamedunfairlyfor U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Management is
theirerrors, butfavoredpilotsmayreceivemorebeneficial more concerned with making money than being safe,’’
outcomes than non-favored pilots (Dekker, 2007). while the international students agreed. The international
The international students had a strong perception that studentsagreedwiththeitem‘‘Managementdoesnotshow
‘‘Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the much concern for safety until there is an accident or
Supervisors of Flight (SoF) or other flight management incident,’’ while the U.S. students disagreed. The interna-
personnel,’’ while the U.S. students disagreed with the tionalstudentsagreedthat‘‘ManagementschedulesCFIsas
item. The international students also had a strong percep- much as legally possible with little concern for their sleep
tion that ‘‘Pilots have little or no authority to make schedule or fatigue,’’ while the U.S. students disagreed.
decisionsthataffectthesafetyofnormalflightoperations.’’ The U.S. students disagreed that ‘‘Management tries to get
The U.S. students, however, disagreed. The two items, aroundsafetyrequirementswhenevertheygetthechance.’’
rather, send a worrying signal about the perception of the The international students agreed with the item. The
international students on their input when it comes to perceptions of the international students were consistent
makingdecisionsthatcanaffectthesafetyofflight.Studies in their mean responses and reflected their poor outlook of
by Gordon & Kirwan (2004) and Dillman et al. (2011) the prevailing safety culture in the flight program. This
highlight the importance of personnel input in order to could also imply a gap in alignment of safety promotion
achieve an effective SMS. coverage in their contract training. Safety culture assess-
The U.S. students disagreed with the item ‘‘Pilots who ment is a dynamic process and requires establishing a
are new and less senior are willing to speak up regarding baseline forcomparison.The safetyculture willhavetobe
flight safety issues,’’ while the international students subjected toperiodicandcontinuous assessmenttobeable
agreed. This was quite unusual since Hofstede (1980), to build a confident database for comprehensive analysis.
and Hofstede & Hofstede (2004) suggest that national Due to changes in procedures, operations, and even the
cultures with Low Power Distance, like those of U. S. human components, the safety culture of an organiza-
students, have a tendency to be more assertive and bold tion will always evolve; safety staff and management will