Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U. S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015

361 Pages·2017·3.38 MB·English

by  Melvyn P. Leffler

SAFEGUARDING
DEMOCRATIC
CAPITALISM

Safeguarding
Democratic
Capitalism
U.S. Foreign
Policy and
National
Security,
1920– 2015
Melvyn P. Leffler
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD
Copyright © 2017 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press,
41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press,
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press.princeton.edu
Jacket photographs: (top) courtesy of Shutterstock; (bottom) FEMA / Alamy Stock Photo
All Rights Reserved
ISBN 978- 0- 691- 17258- 3
British Library Cataloging- in- Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Adobe Text and Gotham
Printed on acid- free paper. ∞
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For
Sarah and Jake
Elliot and Naomi
and for
Audrey, Carol, and Nava
רודל רודמ
From Generation to Generation

CONTENTS
Preface ix
Introduction: Embracing Complexity 1
1 The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921– 1923:
A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation 28
2 Herbert Hoover, the “New Era,” and American Foreign
Policy, 1921– 1929 47
3 Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism:
American Policy toward Western Europe, 1921– 1933 76
4 The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings
of the Cold War, 1945– 1948 117
5 Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey,
and NATO, 1945– 1952 164
6 Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of
the Early Cold War 187
7 Victory: The “State,” the “West,” and the Cold War 221
8 Dreams of Freedom, Temptations of Power 243
9 9/11 and American Foreign Policy 281
10 Austerity and U.S. Strategy: Lessons of the Past 303
11 National Security 317
Index 337
vii

PREFACE
Woodrow Wilson declared war in 1917 hoping that the United States would
make the world safe for democracy and capitalism. He wanted to defeat the
Central Powers and thwart the rise of Bolshevism. But after the U.S. Senate
repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, and after the
Democrats were defeated in the elections of 1920, Republican policymakers
embarked upon a sequence of policies that affronted Wilson’s supporters and
subsequently garnered much criticism from historians. After World War II,
claiming to have learned the lessons of the past, U.S. officials assumed the role
of hegemon in the world capitalist economy and projected American power
around the globe. For more than forty years they waged a tenacious Cold War
against the Soviet Union and world communism. Stunned by the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s, Republican and Democratic policymakers sought to consolidate and
institutionalize the global ascendancy of democratic capitalism. But fearing
isolationist impulses and eschewing the role of global policeman, they pursued
inconsistent policies that aroused criticism and perplexed contemporaries.
The tragic attacks on 9/11 ended Washington’s ambivalence. President George
W. Bush launched a global war on terror with the goal of creating a balance of
power in favor of freedom— free people and free markets.
In this volume, I have assembled essays that seek to address questions of
enduring importance about the course of American foreign relations and the
making of U.S. national security policy from the end of World War I to the
global war on terror. If Republican officials in the 1920s embraced Wilson’s
goal of liberal capitalism, as they did, why did they reject the role of hegemon
in the international political economy and why did they refrain from playing
a more constructive role in European financial affairs? Why, in particular, did
the United States not cancel or reduce the war debts of European allies when
so many contemporaries recognized their importance to the resolution of
other European political and economic controversies? Likewise, why did the
United States fail to guarantee the security of France, and why did it not incur
strategic commitments and assume responsibilities commensurate with its
power?
ix