Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923

398 Pages·1987·21.41 MB·English

by  Lloyd C. Gardner

SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY
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Safe for
Democracy
The Anglo-American Response
to Revolution, 1913-1923
LLOYD C. GARDNER
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York Oxford
1987
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dares Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and assoeiated companies in
Beruit Berlin Ibadan Nicosia
Copyright © 1984 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
First published in 1984 by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1987
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Gardner, Lloyd C., 1934—
Safe for democracy.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain.
2. Great Britain—Foreign relations—United States.
3. United States—Foreign relations—1913—1921.
4. United States—Foreign relations—1921 —1923.
5. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1910-1936.
6. Wilson, Woodrow, 1856—1924. 7. Lloyd George, David,
1863-1945. 8. World War, 1914-1918—Diplomatic history.
I. Title.
E183.8G7G2233 1984 327'.09*041 83-26790
ISBN 0-19-503429-5
ISBN 0-19-504155-0 (pbk.)
Printed in the United States of America
Printing (last digit): 98765432 i
To my children,
Rebecca, Erin, and Timothy.
They know how much this book has meant;
I hope they know how much more they mean.
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Introduction
When Woodrow Wilson arrived at the Capitol on the evening of April 2,
1917, it was not to ask Congress to intervene in a European war. His quest
was for a new world. Only that outcome of the Great War could ensure
the conversion of the "irrational" revolutionary impulses that surged up
in the late imperial era from Mexico to China into steady forces support-
ing world equilibrium. "When you have the foundations of established
order," Wilson told Mexican newspaper editors in 1918, "and the world
has come to its senses again, we shall, I hope, have the very best connec-
tions that will assure us all a permanent cordiality and friendship."*
Long before he had accepted American participation in the war as
both inevitable and necessary, Wilson had called the Mexican Revolution
a "wedge" in American politics. By that he meant that the industrial era
had produced a genuine world politics. Wars could never be localized
"private quarrels" any more; revolutions could no longer be considered
mere "native uprisings." What was happening in Mexico would shape the
future of the world in the same way the French Revolution had earlier
altered European society and politics. Wilson believed this beforfc he
made his decision to ask for war; but if there had been any question,
events in Russia settled the issue. "It is no doubt true as Mr. House told
me in so many words," British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour reported
to London on April 27, 1917, "that but for Russian Revolution and fa-
mous German telegram to Mexico, President would have found it very
difficult to take decisive step. . . ."**
*"An Address to a Party of Mexican Editors," June 7, 1918, in Ray Stannard Baker and
William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols. (New York, 1925-27),
5:223—28.
**Balfour to Lloyd George, April 27, 1917, FO 371 3119/86512, Public Record Office,
London.
viii INTRODUCTION
British prime minister David Lloyd George did not get involved in
Mexican or Chinese questions as Wilson did. But from the time of the
overthrow of the tsar in Russia in March 1917, he was as absorbed as the
president was in devising a strategy to meet the revolutionary challenge.
In British politics, revolution was more than a "wedge"; it was a likely
cause of military defeat in the war and a real threat to postwar security.
Some of the materials for this book were researched in 1965—66, when I
held a Social Science Research Council Fellowship. A John Simon Gug-
genheim Fellowship in 1973—74 and a Fulbright Professorship at the
University of Birmingham in 1975—76 gave me the opportunity to com-
plete the bulk of the work in the Public Record Office and in various
private collections. I should like to thank all those connected with these
organizations for making the book possible. I would also like to thank the
archivists in the many libraries and research centers who have helped me
with access to documents. Extracts from Crown-copyright material in the
Public Record Office, London, appear by permission of the Controller of
H.M. Stationery Office.
Inevitably, such lists leave out other persons who have contributed
greatly to my research and writing. But I must give special thanks to
Arthur S. Link for allowing me to consult the vast collection of Wilson
materials he has assembled at Princeton University for the publication of
the Wilson Papers. I am also indebted to him for many conversations on
Wilson's role in attempting to construct a liberal alternative to revolution.
Over the years, as well, I have learned so much from Arno Mayer, also of
Princeton, both from his books and conversation, that it is a pleasure to
acknowledge my debt here. In the course of doing the research for this,
and a subsequent volume on the Roosevelt-Churchill era, I met Professor
Christopher Thorne of the University of Sussex. He is a model scholar
and a great companion on what he once called "the journey of enquiry."
At Rutgers, Professor Michael Adas read the manuscript when it was
nearly twice the size it finally turned out to be. No greater burden can be
put on a friendship between historians than to read a rough draft. War-
ren F. Kimball lets me try out all my ideas on him, and helps me to sort
out the occasional insight from the truly insignificant. Samuel Baily never
lets me forget that American diplomatic historians are all too narrow in
their outlooks. He is as well a great good friend for all seasons.
I can never finish a book without expressing my gratitude to the oldest
of these friends, Walter LaFeber of Cornell University, Thomas McCor-
mick of Wisconsin, and William Appleman Williams of Oregon State Uni-
versity. Like Michael Adas, Walter LaFeber did double duty by reading
the "whole thing." Thanks again. At Oxford, Sheldon Meyer may have
Introduction ix
thought he would never see the end of this project. I hope other authors
are fortunate enough to work with an editor of Sheldon's skill and pa-
tience. I should also like to thank his colleagues Leona Capeless and copy
editor Tessa DeCarlo, who have provided expert help and advice in add-
ing much more than the final touches to this project. Thanks, finally, to
my literary agent and friend Gerald MacCauley, who successfully keeps
abreast of developments both in the historical world and Little League
coaching.
East Brunswick, New Jersey L. G.
July 4, 1983