Table Of Content
Copyright © 1991 by Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi Revised introduction and
epilogue copyright © 2002 by Efraim Karsh
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by
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systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer,
who may quote brief passages in a review. Any members of educational
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publishers who would like to obtain permission to include the work in an
anthology, should send their inquiries to Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 841 Broadway,
New York, NY 10003.
First published in Great Britain in 1991 by Brassey's
This edition published in the Great Britain in 1991 by Futura Publications, a
division of Macdonald & Company, Ltd., London
Published simultaneously in Canada
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Karsh, Efraim.
Saddam Hussein : a political biography / Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 9780802199546
1. Hussein, Saddam, 1937– 2. Presidents—Iraq—Biography. 3. Iraq—
Politics and government. I. Rautsi, Inari. II. Title.
DS79.66.H87 K37 2003
956.7044'092—dc21
[B] 2002035344
Grove Press
841 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
03 04 05 06 07 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Man and His World
1 The Making of a Baʿthist
2 Second Among Equals
3 The Ruthless Pragmatist
4 The Strong Man of Baghdad
5 President at Last
6 Deciding on War
7 Confronting the Ayatollah
8 The Rule of Fear
9 The Road to Kuwait
10 Against the World
11 The “Mother of All Battles”
12 Survival in Defeat
Epilogue
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
Acknowledgments Our thanks are
due to many individuals in
Europe, the Middle East and the
United States who generously
shared their time and knowledge
with us. In addition to those who
wish to remain anonymous, we
are particularly indebted to Fred
Halliday, Charles Tripp, Peter
Sluglett, Richard Murphy,
Lawrence Freed-man, Ofra
Bengio, Philip Sabin and Joseph
Mekelberg.
A good editor is of immeasurable help. We were fortunate to have one in the
person of Joyce Seltzer.
Needless to say, the responsibility for what follows is ours and ours alone.
Introduction: The Man and His
World
“From inside America how four planes flew. Such a mishap never happened
in the past! And nothing similar will happen. Six thousand infidels died.
Bin Laden did not do it; the luck of the [Iraqi] President did it.”1
The sheik finished reciting the poem and withdrew to his seat. The other tribal
chieftains clapped enthusiastically. Their meeting with their absolute leader was
being televised for screening on prime time, and they were on their best
behavior. The camera then moved to President Saddam Hussein. He gave a small
regal nod in the direction of his admiring subjects. His face showed little
emotion, yet his lips twisted in a barely perceptible smile of self-satisfaction. He
had just been credited, in front of his entire nation, with being the moving spirit
behind what was regarded in the West as the worst-ever terrorist atrocity, but
was applauded by many Arabs and Muslims as a heroic act of retribution against
“American imperialism” and he seemed to be enjoying the “compliment.”
Did Saddam have anything to do with the September 11 atrocity? The various
attempts to link him to the attack have failed to produce conclusive proof,
though Iraq apparently trained al-Qa'eda fighters during the 1990s and sheltered
scores of terrorists fleeing the American offensive in Afghanistan. Nor did Bin
Laden need Saddam's inspiration: his hatred for the United States was far more
ideological, if no less intense, than that of the Iraqi tyrant. For Bin Laden, the
U.S. represented the archenemy by virtue of its position as the latter-day leader
of the “infidel camp,” in its millenarian struggle with the “House of Islam” for
world domination. For Saddam it was a strictly personal matter. The humiliation
attending Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait by a U.S.-led international coalition was
deeply etched on his mind (according to Saddam's longtime mistress, he wept
when his troops were being driven out of Kuwait).2 So was his frustration with
the reversal of Iraq's nonconventional weapons program. The United States had
jeopardized his attempts to recover from the debilitating effects of the Iran-Iraq
War (1980-88) and had put his personal rule in mortal danger, and Saddam was
neither forgetful nor forgiving. The desire for revenge was burning. And
although he might not be in a position to take revenge on his own, he was not
going to shed many tears if somebody else did.
