Russian Nuclear Weapons

525 Pages·2011·3.51 MB·English

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Strategic Studies Institute Book
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Stephen J. Blank
Editor
November 2011
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the De-
partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publica-
tions enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose
classified information, jeopardize operations security, or mis-
represent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empow-
ers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives
in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is
cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy-
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ISBN 1-58487-504-6
ii
CONTENTS
Foreword ........................................................................v
Introduction .................................................................vii
Stephen J. Blank
Part I
1. Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons:
The Broken Relationship .........................................1
Dale R. Herspring
2. R ussia’s Conventional Armed Forces:
Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020 …………...33
Roger N. McDermott
Part II
3. N uclear Weapons in Russian Strategy and
Doctrine ………………………................................99
Andrei Shoumikhin
4. R ussia’s Security Relations with the
United States: Futures Planned and
Unplanned..............................................................161
Pavel K. Baev
5. N uclear Weapons in Russian National
Security Strategy ………………….......................187
Nikolai Sokov
iii
Part III
6. C aught between Scylla and Charybdis: The
Relationship between Conventional and
Nuclear Capabilities in Russian Military
Thought ……...........................................................261
Daniel Goure
7. Russia and Nuclear Weapons..............................293
Stephen J. Blank
8. R ussian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Current
Policies and Future Trends..................................365
Richard Weitz
9. N ew START and Nonproliferation: Suitors or
Separate Tables?....................................................417
Stephen J. Cimbala
10. Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat
that Dare Not Speak its Name............................459
Jacob W. Kipp
About the Contributors ............................................505
iv
FOREWORD
While the Cold War is long past, the importance
of arms control in Russo-American relations and the
related issue of nuclear weapons for Russia remain
vital concerns. Indeed, without an appreciation of the
multiple dimensions of the latter, progress in the for-
mer domain is inconceivable. With this in mind, the
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is very pleased to pres-
ent the following essays, which were presented at a
conference at the National Defense University on June
28, 2010. These essays explore many, if not all, of the
issues connected with Russia’s relatively greater reli-
ance on nuclear weapons for its security. As such, they
constitute an important contribution to the analysis of
the Obama administration’s reset policy, Russo-Amer-
ican relations, Russian foreign and defense policy, and
international security in both Europe and Asia. Addi-
tionally, questions concerning the approach taken by
other nuclear power nations in reference to the arms
control agenda provide a crucial backdrop for the
progress toward curbing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, a long-standing central goal of U.S. security
policy.
We offer these essays to our readers in the belief
that the information and analyses contained herein
will strengthen our understanding of Russia’s ex-
tensive nuclear agenda and provide a deeper under-
standing of the many issues in international security
connected with Russia and its nuclear posture.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
v

INTRODUCTION
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the
United States and Russia that was signed in Prague,
Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification
vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro
and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is
clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not
only materially affect the Obama administration’s re-
set policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nu-
clear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout
the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based
on what each was thought to have or be building. Al-
though the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically
announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage
relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, criti-
cal aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia’s
orientation to the United States and in the language of
the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly
affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.1
Therefore, whatever the fate of the treaty and the
reset policy, it is clear that both Moscow and Washing-
ton stand before crossroads in regard to the future of
their strategic nuclear programs and force structures.
Moreover, each side’s course of action will tangibly
affect the future course of action of the other side re-
garding the panoply of issues and policies connected
with the development of nuclear weapons and the
missions for them. With this in mind, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) organized a conference
bringing together several distinguished experts on
Russian nuclear weapons. The conference took place
at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. Mc-
Nair, Washington, DC, on June 28, 2010, and the pa-
vii
pers that follow are the revised versions of the papers
presented at this conference.
Each author was asked to answer several different
questions pertaining to the present and future pos-
ture of Russia’s nuclear weapons (including tactical
nuclear weapons). Moreover, it quickly became clear
that Russia’s nuclear future in many ways, large and
small, depends greatly on the degree of success that
Moscow will have in its current large-scale efforts at
comprehensive military reform. These reforms en-
compass virtually the entire military structure and are
the most thoroughgoing reforms since Mikhail Frun-
ze’s reforms in 1924-25. Consequently, no analysis of
nuclear present and future posture is possible with-
out a systematic analysis of those reforms and their
impact. Therefore, the following chapters provide an
examination of Russia’s military and political motives
behind nuclear weapons policy as they pertain not
only to the U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), but also to China, whose rising power has
clearly caught the Kremlin’s attention.
Dale Herspring and Roger McDermott present
a systematic exposition and analysis of the reforms
of the conventional forces and the impact this might
have on nuclear issues. Andrei Shoumikhin, Pavel
Baev, and Nikolai Sokov closely examine the ways in
which Russia has previously thought about nuclear
weapons, how it does so at present, and as well as
how it might think about them in the future. Daniel
Goure and Stephen Blank analyze some of the larger
strategic issues driving Russian security and defense
policy and their connection to nuclear weapons. Ste-
phen Cimbala relates both the U.S. and Russian struc-
tures to issues tied to nonproliferation and to what
viii
future reductions to a 1,000 warhead level might look
like, while Jacob Kipp analyzes the deep-seated stra-
tegic challenges that Russia faces in its Asian-Pacific
Far East. Richard Weitz provides an in-depth analysis
of the vexing issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)
that are already a source of friction between the two
sides and one that will figure prominently in any fu-
ture arms control negotiation.
In many cases, it will become clear that in the at-
tempt to answer the questions asked of them, the
authors of this book have produced a considerable
amount of overlap, i.e., more than one author ad-
dressing the same point. However, what is equally as
clear is that there is no agreement among them. There
was a deliberate attempt to avoid a “pre-cooked”
consensus. Rather, each author’s individual view is
asserted in their chapters, underscoring the inherent
opacity of Russian programs and the different analyti-
cal approaches of each writer. This outcome is hardly
surprising in view of the strategic importance, com-
plexity, many-sidedness, and ambiguity of Russia’s
approach to nuclear weapons. While the differences
among the writers may produce difficulties for read-
ers not necessarily versed in the intricacies of Russian
strategic thinking and policy, they reflect the true real-
ity of the material and the issues, which are inherently
difficult and contentious in the United States (as the
debate over the NEW Start treaty clearly illustrates).
The difficulty and complexity is inherent in the subject
matter, and we deliberately sought to avoid imposing
predetermined outcomes or conclusions in organizing
the conference and these papers. We hope that these
papers serve to illuminate some of the most important,
yet also intractable, defense policy issues facing the
United States (and other states as well, not just Russia)
ix