Returning to Primordially Creative Thinking

362 Pages·2018·3.375 MB·English

by  Shuren Wang

Shuren Wang
Returning to
Primordially
Creative
Thinking
Chinese Wisdom on the Horizon of
“Xiang thinking”
Returning to Primordially Creative Thinking
Shuren Wang
Returning to Primordially
Creative Thinking
“
Chinese Wisdom on the Horizon of Xiang
”
thinking
123
ShurenWang
Institute of Philosophy
ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences
Beijing
China
Translated byDr. LinZhang
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Preface
“Returning to primordially creative thinking” qua the subject of this book is
directedtowardthefactthat“primordiallycreativethinking”hasbeenobscuredand
is, hence, lacking. Primordial creating demands the seeking of knowledge for
reason but even more for eidetic understanding. The cultivation and improvement
ofthenatureofeideticunderstandingprimarilyrestnotinrationallogic-conceptual
thinkingbutratherin“Xiangthinking”.Myinvestigationsasto“Xiangthinking”in
recentdecadesaimtocallpeopletoattachimportancetothecultivationofnatureas
such and to the promotion of primordial creating. In this preface, I would like to
address my train of thought on presenting the category of “Xiang thinking” and
relevant issues.
In the 1980s, I presented the category of “Xiang thinking” and performed
investigations around it. Nevertheless, the topic did not draw the attention of
academia until the 1990s. That is to say, not until after I published Re-find the
TraditionalWisdom(PartA,B,TheWritersPublishingHouse,1997)withmylate
wife Yu Bolin was the issue of “Xiang thinking” given increasing importance in
academia. This book has been republished several times and appears in the list of
best sellers, despite being an academic work, which also shows its popularity
among the readers. It performs particular elucidations with respect to “Xiang
thinking”,butitalsodisplaysincompletefashiontheperspectiveofthethinkingas
such. Since writing it, I also published, successively, a series of articles pertaining
to “Xiang thinking” in periodicals and journals. Gradually, discussions about
“Xiang thinking” have begun to emerge in the academic works of other scholars,
andparticulararticlesonithaveemerged.Allofthesepublicationsindicatethatthe
category of “Xiang thinking” and relevant issues have obtained the universal
acknowledgment and interest of Chinese academia.
In what follows, I will review specifically the process of thought whence I
presented the category of “Xiang thinking” and relevant issues. Albeit I broke
through the limit of studying Western philosophy and focused more on Chinese
philosophyandcultureearlyon,whenIfollowedthestyleofa“free-and-unfettered
school” in the late “Cultural Revolution”, I still focused on Western philosophy
until the mid-1980s. That which determined my turn to comparative studies
v
vi Preface
between Western and Chinese philosophies is, in fact, accidental. In 1986–1988,
when I performed academic visiting in Germany, I brought two articles there for
communication. One of them was about Hegel’s philosophy, and the other was
about Chinese philosophy. Responses to the former article were rather modest,
whereas the latter aroused heated discussions. This result greatly stimulated me,
evokingreflectionsandvariousassociations.IttoldmefirstthataChinesescholar,
however focused on Western philosophy, must make efforts to cultivate his
knowledgeofChinesephilosophyandcultureand,betterstill,thatheissupposedto
breakthroughthebarrierbetweenWesternandChinesephilosophiesandseekfora
fusion of them because the study of Western philosophies is ultimately aimed at
developing our own philosophy and culture. I also thought therefrom that many
famous scholars were profoundly cultivated concerning the philosophical thought
andcultureoftheirownnationsandhadperformedexcellentstudies.Itwasonthis
basis that they headed toward the world and promoted the development of their
national philosophies, thought, and culture. In China, the masters appear in the
periodoftheMayFourthMovementlikebrilliantstars.Forinstance,insofarasHu
Shi is concerned, had he not found in America that it was “shameful” (Hu 1947:
703) to not know “much about the history and politics of one’s country” or “the
literature of one’s nation” and hence industriously studied Chinese traditional
classics, historical records, philosophical writings, and miscellaneous works at the
same time when engaged in Western learnings, he would not later have been a
master of Chinese culture. That Hu Shi is capable offusing Qianjia Sinology with
experimentalism and of making pioneering creations in many areas, such as phi-
losophy, history, and literature, is never completely due to his Western studies;
rather,thegenuinerootisChinesetraditionalphilosophy,thought,andculture.His
awakening occurred during the course of comparison, and he thus wrote in his
diariesofstudyinginAmerica,“OfthestudentsImet,betheyforexampleGerman,
French, Russian, or Balkan, they know soundly the history and politics of their
countriesandknowthoroughlytheirliteratures.Onlythestudentsoftwocountries
know little about their civilization history and politics. They are Chinese and
American students… How many of our students can tell something about the
poems of Li Bai and Du Fu, the history of Zuo Qiuming and Sima Qian, or the
proses of Han Yu, Liu Zongyuan, Ouyang Xiu and Su Dongpo? It is actually a
shameful thing (ibid.).” We put aside the value judgment of “shameful” made by
Hu Shi here; nevertheless, the problem he noted at the beginning of the past
century,namely“knowlittleabouttheircivilizationhistoryandpolitics,”stillexists
in today’s education sphere and academia of China and still deserves particular
attention and reflections. This need exists because in today’s China, not merely
common educated people but many members of the advanced intelligentsia have
forgotten their origin and ancestors and are “collectively losing memory” of the
civilization history of their homeland.
After I began Sino-Western comparative studies, the deeper I delved into
Chinesetraditionalthoughtandculture,themoreprofoundlyitsinsideinformation
was shown to me—the characteristic of being rich in and, more importantly, of
inspiringprimordial creativeness.Itisexciting thatintoday’sChina, peopleatlast
Preface vii
are beginning to focus more on their own traditional culture and to reflect on the
lessons learned from their breaking from it. During my reflections in recent years,
an important question lingering in my mind has been, in what type of thinking
mode have Chinese traditional classics, be they of the origin of Confucianism,
Daoism, or Zen, been created or generated? Since Chinese education was
Westernized, interpretations concerning Chinese traditional classics have been
relying on this thinking mode. Nonetheless, can such interpretations return to or
genuinelygraspthetruenatureoftheseclassics?Itisthesequestionsthatpromoted
me to study Western and Chinese thinking modes, particularly the eidetic conno-
tations and fundamental characteristics of the Chinese traditional thinking mode.
The category of “Xiang thinking” and relevant issues were presented during these
studies.“Xiangthinking”is,sotospeak,mygeneralizationoftheconnotationsand
fundamental characteristics as such.
Duringthecourseofmystudyof“Xiangthinking”,Heidegger’scriticismsandhis
original ideas with respect to Western traditional thinking mode have also offered me
more than a few inspirations at the same time I intensively studied and eidetically
understoodChinesetraditionalclassics.Theexplicationsinthisrespectcanbeseenin
the Introduction, Preface, and every Chapter. That which merits the most attention,
presumably,aremyelucidationsorexpressionsinmycomparativestudieswithrespect
to the “xiang” of “Xiang thinking” and other topmost ideas of Chinese traditional
thought and culture in terms of their being “non-substantial-ness”. It is the
“non-substantial-ness” of “xiang” or other topmost ideas qua a dynamic whole that
determines their characteristics of being “non-objective”, “non-ready-made”, and
“primordiallycreative”.Thiscanbeseeninthe“Wujiandhencetaiji无极而太极”of
Yidao 易道, the “Dao” of “Being comes from Nothing” of Daoism, the “Ren仁
(benevolence)”of“internallysaint”ofConfucianism,the“self-nature”ofthe“knowing
themindbeforeseeingthenature”ofZen,andsoonandsoforth.Differentfromthis,
inWesterntraditionalthinkingmode,betheythe“concepts”of“logic-centrism”orthe
“languages” of “language-centrism”, they show external “substantial-ness”, that of
ultimate regulations, insofar as they are the ontological or original top ideas. The
“substantial-ness” as such determines their characteristics of being “objective”,
“ready-made”,andnon-generatively“constitutive”.ThiscanbeseeninPlato’s“idea”,
Aristotle’s “four causes”, and Hegel’s “category”, “concept”, “idea”, or the like.
The greatest inspiration I obtained when reading Heidegger derives from the fact
thatheemployed,inhiscriticismsconcerningsubstantialismmetaphysics,themethod
of turning words into a dynamic state so as to break the ossified regulations of the
concepts or categories in the sense of metaphysics, namely, turning the substantial
concepts or categories into “non-substantial”. His parlance that over the past two
millennia,peoplehaveforgottenthe“Being”(einai,Sein)intheoriginalsensemeans,
in fact, that the original “Being” is “non-substantial”, but people “turned it into sub-
stantial” later when they confused “Being” with “beings”. That he explored and
returnedtothetruenatureof“Being”frommantheparticular“being”(Dasein)isdue
to the fact that man is a dynamic whole “being toward death” at the moment he was
born. That which is shown by the sein of Dasein is dynamic “presence” or “to be”
(zu-sein) rather than static regulations. Mr. Zhang Xianglong translated Dasein into
viii Preface
“yuanzai 缘在 (being by fate)”, which inherits Mr. Xiong Wei’s understanding when
hetranslateditinto“qinzai亲在(beingbyperson)”inearlytimes.ThesetwoChinese
versions are trying, so to speak, to display the dynamic nature of Dasein or the
“tension” of “zu-sein”. Albeit the translations of the two scholars may evoke misun-
derstandings in the context of Chinese and hence cannot be said ideal (presumably,
therehasneverbeenanidealtranslation),comparedwiththeliteraltranslationof“cizai
此在(beinghere)”,theyaremorepreferabletome.Thissortofcriticismofpromoting
the “turning-to-non-substantial” of Heidegger is notably manifested in his later eluci-
dations pertaining to poetries and language.
Plainly, the criticisms of Heidegger as regards promoting the “turning-to-
non-substantial” deconstruct Western traditional metaphysics and its thinking mode
of logic-centrism on the one hand and are manifested in his approaching Eastern
thought, particularly the thought of Chinese Daoism on the other hand. That which
deserves notice as to the relationship between poetry and language is Heidegger’s
insight that the former is of more originality than is the latter. This is an important
finding of his. Starting from this, Heidegger placed particular stress on the philo-
sophicalstudiesofpoetriesandonpoemsofsuchgreatpoetssuchasHölderlin,Stefan
Gorgias, Rainer Maria Rilke, and others. His revealing of the natures of man and
languagealsostartedfromtheanalysespertainingtothepoeticlinessinceHeideggeris,
infact,ofthepropensitytoattributetherevealingofnaturesassuchto“poeticsense”.
For instance, in the article entitled “…man dwell poetically” having reference to
Höderlin’s poem, Heidegger ruminated once and again “dwelling poetically” in the
context of the whole poem. He stated that poetic language is capable of “first and
ultimatelyguidingustowardtheessenceofthething.”Nevertheless,healsonotedthat
the difference between poetic and common speaking: “The more poetic a poet is, the
freer his speaking is, that is, the opener he is to the unrevealed things, and hence the
more expectant he is (Heidegger1999: 466).” However, “Writing poetries is not
overflying and rising over, hence abandoning and drifting over the earth. Rather,
writingpoetriesisfirstofallbringingpeopletotheearthandmakingthemapartofit
soastorealizetheirdwellingpoeticallytherein(ibid.:468).”Moreover,dwellingonthe
earthisdwellingunderheavenoverthisearth,whichmeansthatmandwellsbetween
heavenandearthandisintegratedwiththem.Astothis,Heideggersaid,“Mandoesnot
perform this integration occasionally but has become what he is in essential fashion
duringtheintegrationassuch(ibid.:471).”Here,Heideggerviewsthe“integration”of
heaven,earthandmanasthe“essence”withwhichmaniswhatheis,whichshowshis
new thought of surpassing the Western metaphysical tradition and meeting with
Chinese Daoism.
ThatIhavemorethanoncecitedZhuangzi’sversesof“Heavenandearthcoexist
with me, and things in the life-world are of the same kind with me”
(Zhuangzi(cid:129)Qiwulun 庄子(cid:129)齐物论) can be considered ruminating repeatedly on
thesetwolines.ThisisbecauseZhuangzihasactuallyrevealedinfinitemeaningsby
virtue of “setting context via xiang” and “highlighting spirit via context.”
ComparedwithHöderlin’sversesasinterpretedbyHeidegger,Zhuangzi’saremore
concise and are of more profound and far-reaching state and contemplation. The
state and contemplation of Höderlin’s verses contain implications through the
Preface ix
rumination and reconstructions performed by Heidegger. In Zhuangzi’s verses,
conversely, they are self-contained and simultaneously self-shown. The version
“Heaven and earth … with me” definitely contains “the three talents”, whereas
“coexist” shows and contains something. The implication of the xiang of “co
(exist)” is the integration of the three, and that of “(co)exist” indicates that the
“integration” as such is dynamic. The “Shengsheng 生生 (generate and create) is
calledYi”of“Yidao”andisoftheflavorof“exist”here.“Things…withme”isthe
further externalizationof“heaven andearth …with me.”Thesun,themoon, stars
and wind, rain, frost, and snow in the sky on the one hand and birds, brutes,
flowers,plants,insects,andfishontheearthontheotherhandallhaveinextricable
relationshipstoman,whichisthexiangof“areofthesamekind.”Thatistosay,in
Zhuangzi’s poem, the poet’s free mind and state having surpassed the mundane
world are rather far reaching and grand, but the contemplations conceived therein
are also rather profound. Poetic meaning and contemplations are integrated in
Zhuangzi’s verses. The depth as such is, it seems, far beyond the poems of
Hölderlin and other Western poets. Heidegger also ruminated once and again on
Gorgias’sverses:“I…Nothingis(sein).”Inparticular,whenrevealingtheessence
of language by means of Gorgias’s poem, he presented a viewpoint meriting great
attention,namely,thatitiswrongthatthinkingbelongsmerelytoreason.Henoted,
“Thereisabiashavingbeenformedinthepastmillenniums,namely,thatthinking
is the business of reason (ratio) or calculation (Rechnen) in the broad sense—this
bias has always puzzled people. That is why people have doubt about the discus-
sions with respect to the close relationship between thinking and poetry
(Heidegger1996: 1070).” According to Heidegger, howbeit people use language,
theyfailtoobtainthetrueexperiencesoflanguagethatareattainedbythepoetfrom
nowhere else but the poems. What is the “abandon” in Gorgias’s poem? It is to
abandon formalism and mechanism, which interpret language merely as a sign,
aiming at surpassing secular views and going deep into meditations to grasp the
essence of language. That is to say, “words” is that which determines the appear-
ance or “presence” of “things” and that which is of the original sense. This is the
true meaning of “Nothing is where words crash.” After the interpretations of the
meaning of eidetic understanding with respect to poetries, Heidegger reached a
conclusion:thinkingandpoetryareina“closerelationship”that,ratherthanbeing
anexternalrelationshipinthecustomarysense,referstothestateof“Youareinme
andIaminyou”whenthinkingorpoetically“speaking”.Astothis,Heideggerhas
also shown his inclination toward the thinking of Chinese Daoism. Nonetheless,
from the aforementioned poem of Zhuangzi, viz., “Heaven and earth coexist with
me, and things in the life-world are of the same kind with me,” it can be seen that
thinking and poetry (or performing thinking and writing poems) are integral with
eachother,beingintherelationshipofoneandthesameratherthanthe“Youarein
meandIaminyou”ofthe“closerelationship”.Whyisthereadifference?Thatis,
traditional Chinese thinking is “Xiang-thinking” or “thorough sense is manifested
via xiang (xiangyijinyi 象以尽意),” whereas Western thinking is “language-
thinking” or “thorough sense is manifested via language.” Albeit Heidegger has
tried to turn substantial metaphysical words into “non-substantial”, he remains
x Preface
restricted to language and contends, “Language is the home of Being.” It can thus
be seen that Heidegger remains to enter the train of thought and state of Chinese
“Xiang thinking”.
Now it seems that we can give the answer to the questions raised afore. If
Heidegger, who tries to approach the thought of Chinese Daoism, remains outside
Chinese “Xiang thinking”, those who are wedded to rational logic-conceptual
thinking when interpreting Chinese traditional classics will surely fail to grasp the
true nature of them. This is because Chinese traditional classics were primarily
created by previous sages via “Xiang thinking”. Presumably, it is virtually
impossible to demand that modern Chinese scholars completely return to “Xiang
thinking” and create with corresponding expressions (e.g., poetries and fables).
Notwithstanding that, it is plainly necessary to demand that Chinese scholars cul-
tivate “Xiang thinking” more during their education and academic studies to
understand the classics of the ancient sages and perform conversations or com-
municatewiththem.Inthemeanwhile,thecultivationof“Xiangthinking”issurely
greatlybeneficialtotheimprovementoftheawarenessoftheoriginalityofmodern
Chinese scholars. In addition to many external causes, in modern times and pre-
viously, the lagging behind and lack of primordial creativity in China lies in that
insofarasculturalinternalityisconcerned,thelossofthesuperiorityofbeinggood
at“Xiangthinking”duringtheprocessofbeingseparatedfromtraditionalcultureis
the fundamental cause. In terms of the direction or aim of my writing this book, it
is,sotospeak,tocallfor“Xiangthinking”anditsprimordiallycreativereturn.This
is also why I adopt Returning to Primordially Creative Thinking as the title.
HowbeitIdidnotwritethisbookbasedonimpulsebutonyearsofaccumulations,
since the issues are weighty and concern rather vast areas, there must be defi-
ciencies, even faults. Consequently, criticisms from academic colleagues and
readers are welcome.
Beijing, China Shuren Wang
References
Shi, Hu.(1947).DiariesofStudiesOverseas,Vol.3.Beijing:TheCommercialPress,p.703.
Heidegger, M. (1996). Collections of Heidegger’s Works, Part B. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint
PublishingHouse,p.1070.
Heidegger, M. (1999). Collections of Heidegger’s Works, Part A. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint
PublishingHouse,pp.466.468.471.