Table Of ContentRETHINKING VIRTUE ETHICS
LIBRARY OF ETHICS AND APPLIED PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME28
EditorinChief
MarcusDüwell,UtrechtUniversity,Utrecht,NL
EditorialBoard
DeryckBeyleveld,DurhamUniversity,Durham,U.K.
DavidCopp,UniversityofFlorida,USA
NancyFraser,NewSchoolforSocialResearch,NewYork,USA
MartinvanHees,GroningenUniversity,Netherlands
ThomasHill,UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill,USA
SamuelKerstein,UniversityofMaryland,CollegePark
WillKymlicka,QueensUniversity,Ontario,Canada
PhilippeVanParijs,Louvaine-la-Neuve(Belgium)enHarvard,USA
QuiRenzong,ChineseAcademyofSocialSciences
PeterSchaber,Ethikzentrum,UniversityofZürich,Switzerland
ThomasSchmidt,HumboldtUniversity,Berlin,Germany
Forfurthervolumes:
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RETHINKING VIRTUE
ETHICS
by
MICHAELWINTER
UniversityofSt.Thomas,USA
123
MichaelWinter
UniversityofSt.Thomas
DepartmentofPhilosophy
SummitAve.2115
55105-1096St.PaulMinnesota
USA
[email protected]
ISSN1387-6678
ISBN978-94-007-2192-0 e-ISBN978-94-007-2193-7
DOI10.1007/978-94-007-2193-7
SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergLondonNewYork
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2011935053
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Acknowledgments
There are many I want to thank for making this book possible. I owe a debt of
gratitude to Norman Dahl, my mentor and friend, whose detailed, insightful com-
mentswereimmeasurablyhelpfulinwritingmydoctoraldissertation.Partsofthis
bookgrewoutofourconversationsattheUniversityofMinnesotaintheearlyand
mid-1990s.Anothermentorandfriend,ThomasSullivan,hasalwaysbeenaphilo-
sophicalandpersonalrolemodelforme.Tom’sconstantfocusonclearlylayingout
arguments has had a tremendous impact on how I approach philosophy. I want to
thankhimforthat.
IwanttothankPattiViramontes,PaulBlaschko,DanielClarke,andSeanBarker,
whoprovidedexcellenteditinghelp.
I want to thank audiences and commentators at the Society of Christain
Philosophers, the American Catholic Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian
Society, the Minnesota Philosophical Society, the Minnesota Society for Ancient
Philosophy, the Global Conference on Ethics in Everyday Life, the First
International Conference on Philosophy, and the Conference on Values. Great
commentsandobjectionstopapersdeliveredatthesevenueshavestrengthenedthis
book.
I thank my colleagues at the University of St. Thomas who have provided a
stimulatingintellectualenvironmentovertheyears.
Lastly,IwanttothankmywifeKaraforallofhersupportandencouragement.
v
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 MoralRealismandVirtueEthics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 ChallengesFacingMoralFoundationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 ObjectionsfromAristotle’sOwnWork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 ObjectionsfromSocialScience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 WhatIsaVirtue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 TheArgumentDorisAdvances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.3 ACritiqueofDoris’Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 ObjectionsfromEthicalTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1 VirtuesofIgnorance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2 Driver’sArgument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3 WhatIsModesty? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.4 AResponsetoDriver’sArgument . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.5 VirtueandGoodIntentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5.6 AnAlternativeAnalysisoftheHuckFinnCase . . . . . 27
2.6 ObjectionsfromPhilosophyofBiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.1 DifferentSensesof“Teleology” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6.2 TeleologyinAristotle’sEthics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 ASketchofanAristotelianScienceofEthics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 LookingatTopicsIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 CanAristotle’sEthicsFallWithinHisConceptionofScience? . . 47
3.4 TheTwoScienceProposal(TSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4.1 HoldingfortheMostPart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 OneConceptionofSciencewithTwoTypes
ofDemonstration(TDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.1 For-the-Most-PartPropositions:Necessary
orContingent?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5.2 TheTDPAccountofWhatHoldsfortheMostPart . . . 65
3.5.3 SummaryofTDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
vii
viii Contents
3.6 FurtherConsiderationsAboutWhatHoldsfortheMost
Part:AnAlternativeAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 VirtueTheoryandScientificDemonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7.1 CanFor-the-Most-PartRelationsbeDemonstrated? . . . 78
3.8 TheGoalsofEthicalInquiry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.9 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4 HowAreEthicalPrinciplesKnown? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 WhataretheProspectsforArmchairEthics? . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.1 Fumerton’sCaseforArmchairEthics. . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 MichaelSmith’sDispositionalTheoryofValue . . . . . 93
4.2.3 WorriesAboutArmchairEthics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 InductionandMoralSelf-Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3.1 InductioninEthics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.2 LookingtoAristotleforaSolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 InductiveReasoningConsideredSpecifically . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4.1 TheProblemofInduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.2 InductioninNaturalizedEpistemology . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4.3 AristotleonInduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.4 InductioninAristotle’sEthics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.5 Aristotle’sTheoryofInductionApplied
toEthicalPrinciples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5 Aristotle’sFoundationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5 SomeChallengestotheDeductiveModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2 ParticularismandAristotle’sEthics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.2.1 McDowell’sObjection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.2.2 For-theMost-PartRelationsReconsidered . . . . . . . . 133
5.2.3 SomeObjectionsandResponses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.2.4 FurtherConsiderations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.3 TheScopeoftheDeductiveParadigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1 AnotherLookattheDeductiveParadigm. . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.2 MoralRealismandtheDeductiveParadigm . . . . . . . 146
5.3.3 VirtueEthicsandAltruism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.3.4 AristotleonCourage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3.5 AGeneralArgumentforAltruism . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.4 ACaseforInalienableRightsandtheLimitsoftheModel . . . . 153
5.4.1 Suicide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4.2 ThePrecept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4.3 AHybridApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.4.4 TheJustificationforthePrecept . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Contents ix
5.4.5 AnObjection:ForcedSuicide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.5 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Appendix:CanUnconditionalMoralPrinciplesBeJustified? . . . . . . 169
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Description:Rethinking Virtue Ethics offers a model of Aristotelian virtue ethics based on a deductive paradigm. This book argues that, contrary to what many contemporary thinkers are inclined to believe, Aristotelian virtue ethics is consistent with at least some action-guiding moral principles being true unco