Table Of ContentRETHINKING
THE
PRINCIPLES
OF WAR
ANTHONY D. Me IVOR
EDITOR
RETHINKING
THE PRINCIPLES
OF WAR
This book has been brought to publication
with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.
RETHINKING
THE PRINCIPLES
OF WAR
Anthony D. Me Ivor
EDITOR
Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland
This book has been brought to publication by the generous assistance of
Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 2005 by the U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or
by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publisher.
First printing in paperback, 2007
ISBN-10:1-59114-482-5
ISBN-13: 978-1-59114-482-3
The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:
Rethinking the principles of war / Anthony Me Ivor, editor,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-59114-481-7 (alk. paper)
1. Military art and science. 2. War (Philosophy) 3. Military art and
science—History—21st century. 4. United States—Military policy.
5. Military doctrine—United States. 6. World politics—21st century.
I. Me Ivor, Anthony.
U102.R48 2006
355.0201—dc22
2005024654
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
CONTENTS
Foreword ix
Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Preface xiv
Vice Adm. John G. M organ, U.S. Navy, and
D r. A nthony D. Me Ivor
Introduction 1
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army
Part 1
AN AMERICAN WAY OF WAR?
1 The American Way of War 13
D r. Colin S. G ray, University of Reading
2 The Second Learning Revolution 41
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army (Ret.), Colgen, Inc.
3 Principles of War or Principles of Battle? 58
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, SSI, Army War College
4 On War: Enduring Principles or Profound Changes? 79
Dr. Harlan K. Ullman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
5 Speed the Kill: Updating the American Way of War 95
Lt. C ol. Ralph Peters, U.S. Army (Ret.), Independent scholar
6 The U.S. Air Force and the American Way of War 109
Dr. Grant T. Hammond, Air War College
7 Pitfalls and Prospects: The Misuses and Uses of Military History
and Classical Military Theory in the “Transformation” Era 127
Dr. Jon T. Sumida, University of Maryland
Part 2
OPERATIONAL ARTS: CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
8 Future Warfare and the Principles of War 143
A dm. Sir Ian Forbes, Royal Navy (Ret.)
vi CONTENTS
9 Transformation and Operational Art 155
Brig. Gen. David A. Fastabend, U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command
10 Operational Art and Doctrine 167
Dr. M ilan Vego, Naval War College
11 Rethinking Operational Art 188
D r. Robert R. Tomes, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
12 From Operational Art to Grand Strategy 208
Lt. Col. Robert R. Leonhard, U.S. Army (Ret.), JHU-APL
13 Preponderance in Power: Sustaining Military Capabilities
in the Twenty-first Century 223
D r. James J. Carafano, Heritage Foundation
14 Teaching, Learning, and Leading: The New Mandate 244
M aj. Gen. Paulette M. Risher, U.S. Army,
Joint Special Operations University
Part 3
OPERATIONAL ARTS: IRREGULAR WARFARE
15 Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare 263
Col. Thomas X. Hammes, U.S.M.C. (Ret.),
National Defense University
16 Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges 279
Dr. Steven M etz, Army War College
17 Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace 299
Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman, U.S.M.C. (Ret.), CETO,
Marine Corps Warfare Laboratory
Part 4
POST-CONFLICT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
18 Seeing the Enemy (or Not) 323
Dr. Anna Simons, NPS, Monterey
19 A “Post-Hostilities” Moment? 345
Dr. M ichael V lahos, Johns Hopkins University
CONTENTS vii
20 Rethinking and Rebuilding the Relationship between War
and Policy: Post-Conflict Reconstruction 360
Bathsheba Crocker, JD, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, with Col. John Ewers, U.S.M.C., and M r. Craig Cohen
21 Principles for the Use of the Military in Human Security
Operations 388
Dr. Mary H. Kaldor, London School of Economics
22 The Role of Nonlethal Weapons in Future Military Operations 401
D r. John B. Alexander, Apollinaire Group
Part 5
INTELLIGENCE—WINNING THE SILENT WARS
23 Rethinking War and Intelligence 419
D r. W illiam M. Nolte, Central Intelligence Agency
24 Beyond Intelligence Reform: The Case for a Revolution
in Intelligence Affairs 440
Ms. Deborah G. Barger, Central Intelligence Agency
25 The Weakest Link: Intelligence for Preemptive
and Preventive Military Action 456
Dr. Richard L. Russell, National Defense University
26 Making the Case: Defense Counterintelligence
as a Strategic Asset 477
Dr. Anthony D. M cIvor, GrayHawk Systems, Inc.,
and M r. Roy L. Reed Jr., Kingfisher Systems, LLC
27 Does Intelligence Have a Future Tense? 497
Dr. W esley K. Wark, University of Toronto
28 Intelligence Transformation Past and Future: The Evolution
of War and U.S. Intelligence 516
M r. M ichael Warner, Central Intelligence Agency
29 Refocusing Intelligence: The Art of Analysis 533
M r. Keith J. Masback, Frontiers Office, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, with M r. Sean Tytler
Appendix: U.S. Principles of Joint Operations 551
List of Contributors 557
FOREWORD
War is about more than combat, and combat is about more than shooting.
That is, war entails the interrelated actions and support of diverse peo
ple, public and private organizations, and institutions. If these relationships—
and their implications for interagency integration and multinational
coalitions—were so obvious, then we would have less debate about what con
stitutes a principle of war and what they mean collectively. Furthermore, if
this truism were more widely recognized, then our nation would have a less
ad-hoc approach to responding to friction—the known unknowns of war
fare. The hierarchical relationship of war to combat and to shooting is analo
gous to the relationship between strategy, operations, and tactics. This
analogy indicates that some unifying theme or theory binds the activities.
Some theorists have argued that the unchanging nature of war, an
intense form of human competition involving violence, profound risk, and
mutual danger, leads to the principles of war. But the only principle that type
of thinking leads to—quite rightly—is that war should be avoided except as
a last resort, which is an essential element of just war theory. Put another way,
the unchanging nature of war leads to an enduring just war theory, while the
ever-changing character of war leads to changes in the underlying principles
governing how it is actually conducted. That is why this anthology is
important.
Still other strategists have argued that we have an unchanged unifying
theory of war’s conduct complete with guiding principles in Carl von
Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century treatise On War. That Clausewitz is more
often quoted than read is partly the result of the early-nineteenth-century
writing style that renders much of the work inaccessible to the modern
reader. But more so because one can find within Clausewitz’s work justifica
tion for any point on war, strategy, or the nature of combat that one chooses
to make. This is not an attack on the enduring value of his work, but merely