Table Of ContentSynthese Library 372
Julie Zahle
Finn Collin Editors
Rethinking the
Individualism-
Holism Debate
Essays in the Philosophy of Social
Science
Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Editor-in-Chief
LUCIANOFLORIDI,UniversityofOxford,OxfordInternetInstitute,
UnitedKingdom
Editors
THEOA.F.KUIPERS,UniversityofGroningenFac.Philosophy,TheNetherlands
TEDDYSEIDENFELD,CarnegieMellonUniversityDept.Philosophy,USA
PATRICKSUPPES,StanfordUniversityCtr.StudyofLanguage&Information,
USA
JANWOLEN´SKI,JagiellonianUniversityofKrakowInstituteofPhilosophy,
Poland
DIRKVANDALEN,UtrechtUniversityDepartmentofPhilosophy,
TheNetherlands
VOLUME 372
For furthervolumes:
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Julie Zahle (cid:129) Finn Collin
Editors
Rethinking the
Individualism-Holism
Debate
Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science
Editors
JulieZahle FinnCollin
DepartmentofMedia,Cognition DepartmentofMedia,Cognition
andCommunication andCommunication
UniversityofCopenhagen UniversityofCopenhagen
Copenhagen,Denmark Copenhagen,Denmark
ISBN978-3-319-05343-1 ISBN978-3-319-05344-8(eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8
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Contents
1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JulieZahleandFinnCollin
PartI OntologicalIndividualism-Holism
2 WhatIsIndividualisminSocialOntology?Ontological
Individualismvs.AnchorIndividualism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
BrianEpstein
3 SocialEntitiesandtheBasisofTheirPowers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
DaveElder-Vass
4 Actor-CenteredSociologyandtheNewPragmatism. . . . . . . . . . . . 55
DanielLittle
5 ThreeIssuesinSocialOntology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
PhilipPettit
6 CollectiveResponsibilityandGroup-Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Andra´sSzigeti
7 RethinkingMicro-MacroRelations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
PetriYlikoski
PartII MethodologicalIndividualism-Holism
8 DeadEndsandLiveIssuesintheIndividualism-HolismDebate. . . 139
HaroldKincaid
9 ExplanatoryStrategiesBeyondtheIndividualism/HolismDebate. . . 153
JeroenVanBouwel
10 Holism,Emergence,andtheCrucialDistinction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
JulieZahle
v
vi Contents
11 WhoAretheAgents?ActorNetworkTheory,Methodological
Individualism,andReduction. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . 197
FinnCollin
12 Structure,Agency,andImprovisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
MarkRisjord
13 AreIndividualsFickle-Minded?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
MathewD.McCubbinsandMarkTurner
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Chapter 1
Introduction
JulieZahleandFinnCollin
Abstract Theintroductionprovidesanoverviewoftheontologicalandthemeth-
odological individualism-holism debates. Moreover, these debates are briefly
discussed in relation to two kindred disputes: The micro-macro and the agency-
structuredebates.Finally,thecontributionstothisbookarebrieflypresented.
The individualism-holism debate is an old – but still vibrant – dispute within the
philosophy of the social sciences and the social sciences themselves. Over the
course of its history, there are three phases in which the discussion has been
particularlylively(Udehn2002:479).Thefirstisaroundtheturnofthenineteenth
century with significant contributions by, among others, Emile Durkheim and
Max Weber. The second phase is around the 1950s, where the ardent defenses
of methodological individualism by Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, and
J.W.N. Watkins spurred on the debate. Finally, the third and last phase stretches
from the 1980s and up till today with pioneering contributions by a number of
theoristsincludingRoyBhaskar,RaymondBoudon,JamesS.Coleman,JonElster,
AlanGarfinkel,DanielLittle,HaroldKincaid,andPhilipPettit.1
The individualism-holism debate has first and foremost revolved around two
issues:
– What is the ontological status of social phenomena and, as part of this, their
relationshiptoindividuals?
1ItshouldbestressedthatUdehnsimplyliststhethreeperiods.Moreover,hisclaimthatthethird
phaseofthedebateisstillongoingisfrom2002.Weareresponsiblefortheobservationthatthe
thirdphaseextendstothepresentjustastheadditionofkeyfigureswithinallthreeperiodsisour
doing.
J.Zahle(*)•F.Collin
DepartmentofMedia,CognitionandCommunication,UniversityofCopenhagen,
Njalsgade80,2300,Copenhagen,Denmark
e-mail:[email protected];[email protected]
J.ZahleandF.Collin(eds.),RethinkingtheIndividualism-HolismDebate, 1
SyntheseLibrary372,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_1,
©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2014
2 J.ZahleandF.Collin
– Towhatextentmay,andshould,socialscientificexplanationsfocusonindividuals
andsocialphenomenarespectively?
The second question, in particular, has received a lot of attention. The methodo-
logical individualism-holism debate refers tothe discussion ofthisissue, whereas
the ontological individualism-holism issue denotes disputes relating to the first
question.Aspartofthesediscussions,anumberofothertopicshavebeenaddressed
too relating to meaning, confirmation, research heuristics, ethics, and the like.
Accordingly, it is also possible to distinguish between individualism-holism
debatesonmeaning,confirmation,researchheuristics,andsoon.
Thepresentcollectionofpapersisinlinewiththetraditionintermsofitsfocus.
The contributions divide into two categories: One group focuses primarily on the
ontological dispute, the other on the methodological dispute. The papers reflect
the newest trends within these debates in the following ways: First, many papers
point to basic concepts and distinctions that are widely applied within the debate.
Ratherthanbeinguncriticallytakenforgranted,itissuggested,theseconceptsand
distinctionsareinneedofbeingcarefullyspelledout,questioned,orevenreplaced
by more adequate conceptions. This approach is, among other things, adopted in
relation to the notion of supervenience, the notion of agency and its domain of
application, the distinction between individuals and social phenomena, and the
distinction between explanations that focus on individuals and social phenomena
respectively. Second, many of the papers strike out in a new direction by paying
close attention to actual developments within social scientific research. They
explicitlystate–andexemplify–afocusonissuesraisedby,oraddressedwithin,
thecontextofsocialscientificresearch,justastheymakesuggestionsofrelevance
tosocialscientificpractice.Intheseways,then,thepapersexemplifyarethinking
of the debate that point to novel directions in which to take future philosophical
discussionsandfutureempiricalworkinthesocialsciences.
Inthefollowing,weprovidearoughsystematicoverviewoftheindividualism-
holism debate. As we go along, we also comment on the history of debate. In
Sect. 1.1, we outline the ontological dispute and, in Sect. 1.2, the methodological
debate.Further,inSect.1.3,wediscusstheindividualism-holismdebateinrelation
to two kindred disputes.2 Against that background, we briefly present the contri-
butionstothisbook.
1.1 The Ontological Individualism-Holism Debate
The ontological individualism-holism debate concerns the ontological status of
social phenomena (or facts) and, as part of this, their relationship to individuals
(or facts about individuals). Ontological holists contend that social phenomena
2Sections1.1,1.2,and1.3drawandexpandonZahle(2007,2013).
1 Introduction 3
existsuigenerisoroverandaboveindividuals,whereasontologicalindividualists
deny this. Before looking into various interpretations of the idea that social
phenomena exist sui generis, it is instructive brieflyto characterize the notionsof
socialphenomenaandindividuals.
Withintheindividualism-holismdebatemoregenerally,itiscommontodistin-
guish between various kinds of social phenomena. Some of the most frequently
mentionedonesare:(a)socialorganizations,asexemplifiedbyanation,afirm,and
auniversity;(b)statisticalpropertiesliketheliteracyorsuiciderate ofagroupof
individuals;(c)normsandrulesasillustratedbytheruletodrivetotherightandthe
prohibitionagainstsexwithclosefamilymembers;(d)culturessuchastheMayan
culture; and (e) social structures as typically identified with one or several of the
sorts of social phenomena already listed. The ontological debate has mainly
concentrated on the issue of whether social organizations exist over and above
individuals.Inthisconnection,socialorganizationsaresimplyreferredtobywayof
termssuchas“university,”“hospital,”andthelike.
Itislessobvioushowindividualsshouldbecharacterizedfromtheperspectiveof
offering an ontological analysis of their relationship to social phenomena. Not
surprisingly,therefore,opinionsdivergeonthisquestion.Mostnotably,itisamatter
ofdisputeexactlywhatkindsofinteractionsandinterrelationsbetweenindividualsit
ispermissibletoinvokeaspartofontologicalanalysesofthissort.Also,andrelated
tothis,itisdiscussedwhetheritisadmissibletomentionindividuals’beliefsabout
socialorganizationslikenationsandfirms.Or,tomentiononelastexample,thereare
differentviewsastowhetheraspecificationofindividualsshouldbetakenbroadlyto
includetheobjectstheymakeuseofand,moregenerally,thephysicalenvironment
inwhichtheyfindthemselves.
Throughoutthehistoryoftheontologicaldebate,avarietyofsuggestionshave
been made as to what it takes for social phenomena to exist sui generis. Here are
some of the many, and sometimes overlapping, ways in which this idea has been
fleshedout:
– Thecausaloverridingcriterion:Socialphenomenasuchassocialorganizations
exist over and above individuals insofar as they have causal powers that are
independentof,andoverride,thecausalpowersofindividuals.
– The translation criterion: Social phenomena such as social organizations exist
over and above individuals insofar as terms, like “nation” and “school,” that
refertothesephenomenacannotbetranslatedintostatementsaboutindividuals.
– Thecompositioncriterion:Socialphenomenasuchassocialorganizationsexist
overandaboveindividualsinsofarastheyarenotmerelycomposedofensembles
ofindividuals.
– The determination criterion: Social phenomena such as social organizations
exist over and above individuals insofar as individuals do not non-causally
determine what kinds of organizations, properties, and the like, are being
instantiated.
– Theagencycriterion:Socialphenomenasuchassocialorganizationsexistover
andaboveindividualsinsofarastheyqualifyasgroupagentsthathaveattitudes
supervenientupontheattitudesofindividuals.
