Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations

337 Pages·2010·1.45 MB·English

by  Stephen G. Walker

RETHINKING FOREIGN POLICY
ANALYSIS
Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer present a definitive, social-
psychological approach to integrating theories of foreign policy analysis and
international relations—addressing the agent-centered, micro-political study of
decisions by leaders and the structure-oriented, macro-political study of state
interactions as a complex adaptive system. The links between the internal world of
beliefs and the external world of events provide the strategic setting in which states
collide and leaders decide.
The first part of this ground-breaking book establishes the theoretical frame-
work of neobehavioral IR, setting the stage for the remainder of the work to apply
the framework to pressing issues in world politics. Through these applications stu-
dents can see how a game-theoretic logic can combine with the operational code
research program to innovatively combine levels of analysis. The authors employ
binary role theory to demonstrate that relying only on a state-systemic level or an
individual-decision making level of analysis leads to an incomplete picture of how
leaders steer their ships of state through the hazards of international crises to estab-
lish stable relations of cooperation or conflict.
Stephen G. Walker is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Arizona State
University. He has edited Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis and co-edited
Beliefs and Political Leadership in World Politics.
Akan Malici is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Furman University. He is
the author of When Leaders Learn and When They Don’t and The Search for a Common
European Foreign and Security Policy.
Mark Schafer is Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University. He
has co-edited Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics and co-authored Groupthink
versus High-Quality Decision Making.

RETHINKING FOREIGN
POLICY ANALYSIS
States, Leaders, and the
Microfoundations of Behavioral
International Relations
Edited by Stephen G. Walker,
Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer
First published 2011
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Simultaneously published in the UK
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011.
To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
© 2011 Taylor & Francis
The right of Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer to be
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors
for their individual chapters, has been asserted by them in accordance
with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
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Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Rethinking foreign policy analysis: states, leaders, and the
microfoundations of behavioral international relations/
[edited by] Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. International relations—Decision making. 2. International relations—
Psychological aspects. I. Walker, Stephen G., 1942-II. Malici, Akan,
1974-III. Schafer, Mark, 1962–
JZ1253.R48 2011
327.101'4—dc22
2010028853
ISBN 0-203-83486-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 13: 978–0–415–88697–0 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978–0–415–88698–7 (pbk)
ISBN 13: 978–0-203–83486–2 (ebk)
CONTENTS
List of Figures viii
List of Tables x
Preface xi
List of Contributors xiii
PART I
Foreign Policy Analysis 1
1 Foreign Policy Analysis and Behavioral International Relations 3
Stephen G. Walker
2 Macropolitics and Foreign Policy Decisions: The Billiard Ball
Model of IR 21
Stephen G. Walker
3 Micropolitics and Foreign Policy Decisions: The Behavioral
Model of IR 44
Stephen G. Walker
4 Quantum Politics and Operational Code Analysis: Theories
and Methods 62
Stephen G. Walker
vi Contents
PART II
Foreign Policy Decision Making 81
5 The United States and Rogue Leaders: Understanding the
Conflicts 83
Akan Malici
6 Deceptive Bargaining and Nuclear Ambitions: Prospect
Theory and North Korea’s Decision to Go Nuclear 97
Kai He and Huiyun Feng
7 Small Group Dynamics: The Psychological Characteristics of
Leaders and the Quality of Group Decision Making 112
Mark Schafer, Jonathon Nunley, and Scott Crichlow
8 Alliances and Their Microfoundations: France and Britain in
the 9/11 Era 130
Akan Malici
PART III
Foreign Policy Learning 151
9 Learning to Resist or Resisting to Learn? The Operational
Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung 153
Akan Malici
10 Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code
of George W. Bush from Governor to Second Term President 169
Jonathan Renshon
11 Experiential Learning by U.S. Presidents: Domestic and
International Influences in the Post-Cold War World 189
Samuel B. Robison
12 Cognitive Responses by U.S. Presidents to Foreign Policy
Crises: Belief Changes in Response to Positive and Negative
Experiences 205
B. Gregory Marfleet and Hannah Simpson
Contents vii
PART IV
Foreign Policy Dynamics 221
13 Dueling with Dictators: Explaining the Strategic Interaction
Patterns of U.S. Presidents and Rogue Leaders 223
Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer
14 Binary Role Theory: Reducing Uncertainty and Managing
Complexity in Foreign Policy Analysis 245
Stephen G. Walker
15 The Integration of Foreign Policy Analysis and International
Relations 267
Stephen G. Walker
Appendix: Formal Models of Symbolic and Strategic Interaction 283
Stephen G. Walker
Bibliography 290
Index 318
FIGURES
1.1 Two Systems in World Politics. 12
2.1 Behavioral and Billiard Ball Models of International Relations. 22
2.2 A Static Political Field Diagram of International Relations. 30
2.3 A Dynamic Political Field of Escalation (–) and De-escalation (+). 31
2.4 Connections between the World in Their Minds and the World of
Events. 33
2.5 Extensions of Power Logic from Dyads to Triads. 36
2.6 Mapping Two-Player Games in a Political Field Diagram. 39
2.7 Two-Player Games for the ABC Triad. 40
3.1 A Hierarchical Power Landscape of the Grand Power Game in
the IR Field. 46
3.2 Ego’s Role Enactment Predicted by Exchange Theory and Role
Theory. 50
3.3 Contents of the Revised Holsti Operational Code Typology. 56
3.4 Constructing a Political Belief System Typology. 59
3.5 Drawing Inferences about Preferences. 60
4.1 Basic Research Designs for Understanding Foreign Policy Analysis. 63
4.2 Hierarchical Landscape Features in the Worlds of Beliefs and Events. 64
4.3 A Strategic Interaction Episode during the Vietnam Conflict. 67
4.4 Barack Obama’s VICS Indices and Subjective Games. 74
4.5 Obama’s Operational Code Beliefs and Types of Leadership Styles. 77
5.1 Kim Jong Il’s and Fidel Castro’s Subjective Game. 92
5.2 Ahmadinejad’s and al-Asad’s Subjective Game. 94
6.1 North Korea’s Strategies, Payoffs, and Outcomes. 106
8.1 Inter-State Comparisons of Beliefs for France and Britain. 141
List of Figures ix
8.2 Subjective Games of France and Britain in Operation Enduring
Freedom. 143
8.3 Subjective Games of France and Britain in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. 146
9.1 Real GNP/GDP Growth Rates, 1985–1994. 157
12.1 Probability of Belief Change. 216
13.1 Levels of Decision and Strategic Interaction in the Normal
Form of a 2 × 2 Game. 226
13.2 Internal and External Focal Points for Inferring Strategic
Preferences. 229
13.3 Local Attacker–Defender Objective Game in Persian Gulf and
Kosovo Confl icts. 232
13.4 Global Defender–Attacker Objective Game in Persian Gulf and
Kosovo Confl icts. 233
14.1 Static and Dynamic Matrix Analyses of Role Location Processes. 250
14.2 A Dynamic Political Field Diagram of Role Location. 253
14.3 Rules of Symbolic and Strategic Interaction in Binary Role Theory. 254
14.4 Role Location and Strategic Interaction Processes for a Role Dyad. 255
14.5 General Rules for Power Triads with Agent Strategies for Each
Segment. 263
15.1 Pivot Effects Models for Strategic Triads among Agents ABCD. 273
A.1 Grand Strategies and Inferred Preferences from Power and
Interest Distributions. 286
A.2 Binary Role Theory Locations and Rules for Grand Strategies. 287