Table Of ContentResisting Reality
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Resisting Reality  
S   ocial Construction and Social Critique 
    SALLY HASLANGER  
           
1
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 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
 Haslanger, Sally Anne. 
 Resisting reality: social construction and social critique /Sally Haslanger. 
   p.  cm. 
 ISBN 978-0-19-989262-4 (pbk.: alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-19-989263-1 (hardcover: alk. paper) 
1. Social constructionism. 2. Critical theory. 3. Feminism. 4. Social sciences—Philosophy. I. Title. 
 HM1093.H38  2012 
 300.1—dc23    2011044301   
1  3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2   
 Printed in the United States of America 
 on acid-free paper
CONTENTS  
            Acknowledgments       vii   
            Introduction            
3
       PART ONE            SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION          
       1.       On Being Objective and Being Objectifi ed            
35
       2.       Ontology and Social Construction            
83
       3.       Social Construction: Th  e “Debunking” Project            
113
       4.       Feminism in Metaphysics: Negotiating the Natural            
139
       5.       Family, Ancestry, and Self: What Is the Moral Signifi cance 
of Biological Ties?            
158
       6.       Social Construction: Myth and Reality            
183
      P ART TWO            GENDER AND RACE          
       7.       Gender and Race: (What) Are Th  ey? (What) Do We Want 
Th  em to Be?            
221
       8.       Future Genders? Future Races?            
248
       9.       You Mixed? Racial Identity without Racial Biology            
273
       10.       A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race            
298
       11.       Oppressions: Racial and Other            
311
vi Contents
       PART THREE            LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE          
       12.       What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and 
Normative Epistemology            
341
       13.       What Are We Talking About? Th  e Semantics and Politics of Social 
Kinds            
365
       14.       What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social 
Kinds            
381
       15.       “But Mom, Crop-Tops A  re  Cute!” Social Knowledge, Social Structure, 
and Ideology Critique            
406
       16.       Language, Politics, and “Th  e Folk:” Looking for “Th  e Meaning” of 
‘Race’            
429
       17.       Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground            
446
            Index       4  79
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS     
 Although writing philosophy is usually a solitary business, doing philosophy is a 
collaborative process, whether we acknowledge it or not. Th e collaboration can 
happen in face-to-face conversations, or through reading or listening to others. I 
began writing the essays in this book twenty years ago. Th e ideas and arguments 
that appear here depend on input from many others, including students, col-
leagues, friends, conference participants, interlocutors at colloquia, well-known 
and little known authors, and random acquaintances whom, at this point, I 
cannot even name. So fi rst, and importantly, I want to express my gratitude for 
my communities—both academic and non-academic—that enable rich and chal-
lenging conversation, and the willingness of so many to share their thoughts 
with me. I regret that I cannot give each of you the individual credit that you 
deserve. 
 Most of the chapters in this volume were published separately and have their 
own acknowledgments, so rather than trying to list everyone who has helped me 
with this project, I want to use this opportunity to express special thanks to a few, 
with the understanding that whatever I say here barely scratches the surface. 
 I have known Charlotte Witt since I was in graduate school at Berkeley, and 
for thirty years she has been a wonderful friend, colleague, and collaborator. She 
has pushed me when I needed pushing, supported me when I needed support, 
and been an invaluable interlocutor on personal, professional, and philosophical 
issues. Her input has not only made my feminist work better, but has made it 
possible. 
 Rae Langton, my close friend and colleague at MIT, has also been an impor-
tant part of my life since the late 1980s. Her ideas have inspired me, her writing 
has moved me, and her friendship has sustained me. She shows by example all 
that feminist philosophy can be and d o . I feel privileged to know her and am 
forever grateful for her friendship. 
 Years ago at I supervised Elizabeth Hackett’s dissertation on Catharine 
MacKinnon’s epistemology. Not only was it a joy to work with Beth, but the hard 
vii
viii Acknowledgments
work we did together enabled me to appreciate much more deeply than I had 
before the philosophical richness of MacKinnon’s work. Beth became a good 
friend and colleague, and years later we collaborated on a textbook  Th eorizing 
Feminisms  (Oxford 2005). Beth’s insights into feminist method and the goals of 
feminist theorizing have infl uenced me deeply, and her commitment to philo-
sophical feminism, and making space for it within academia, has helped me keep 
hope alive during hard times. 
 Louise Antony is another close friend who has been a companion from the 
start in doing analytic feminism: my fi rst feminist publication was a response to 
Louise and Charlotte’s invitation to contribute to  A Mind of One’s Own . Her high 
standards, incisive intelligence, and political intensity challenge me in the best 
way and keep me up at night searching for answers. She has been invaluable in 
working on this book, and in so much else. 
 When I was at the University of Michigan, Abigail Stewart was the Director of 
Women’s Studies. Abby was my fi rst feminist mentor. Th e most precious gift—
of many—that Abby gave me was the awareness that feminist theory is its own 
interdisciplinary intellectual project and that even I, a philosopher, was qualifi ed 
to do it. Such work is answerable to rigorous intellectual standards, but diff erent 
standards than those represented in philosophy. Abby unyoked my thinking 
from the burdensome cart of academic philosophy and gave me a voice. She has 
also been an inspiration and role model in working on gender equity issues in 
the academy. I admire her beyond words, and I would not be where I am today 
without her guidance, vision, and support. 
 Elizabeth Anderson and I were colleagues at the University of Michigan, and 
it was the fi rst time I had a colleague in my own department doing feminist 
work. Liz’s work has had a huge infl uence on me, and her straightforwardness, 
confi dence, and integrity gave me strength in times of doubt. While Abby freed 
me from the artifi cial constraints of academic philosophy, Liz took for granted 
that philosophical feminism i s  philosophy. Th e combination allowed me to form 
a new, less fragmented, intellectual identity and the courage to own it. 
 Since moving to Cambridge, I have had the good fortune to have Lawrence 
Blum as a friend. Larry’s commitment to doing and teaching philosophy in ways 
that matter nourishes me and keeps me grounded in my own values. His unqual-
ifi ed willingness to take up hard issues, his attention to detail, his thoughtful 
self-refl ectiveness and his appreciation of the importance of philosophical 
community have made a huge difference to how and why I still identify as a 
philosopher. 
 For the many ways they have helped me over the years and inspired me, I’d 
like to thank: Linda Martín Alcoff , Anita L. Allen, Nancy Bauer, Robert Gooding-
Williams, Kimberly Leighton, Elisabeth Lloyd, Charles Mills, Jennifer Saul, Jacque-
line Stevens, and Ronald Sundstrom. Th anks especially to Mary Kate McGowan 
who, in addition to her insight and friendship over the years, read through and
Acknowledgments ix
gave me excellent comments on an early version of the manuscript when I was 
still trying to turn it into a monograph. 
 Special thanks to Ásta Sveinsdóttir and Ishani Maitra who were my grad stu-
dents at MIT and helped me found the Workshop on Gender and Philosophy in 
2000. Ishani and Ásta created a warm and welcoming feminist space for me at 
MIT and have been fabulous feminist interlocutors. And they have given me the 
greatest gift by going on to do  such  great work. More recently, Kate Manne and 
Kenneth Walden have given me valuable feedback on the material in this collec-
tion and have been a great pleasure to work with. 
 To all those who have participated in the Workshop on Gender and Philos-
ophy, I am very grateful. WOGAP has sustained me and given me so much to 
think about over the years. Special thanks to the regulars, including Candice 
Delmas, Heidi Lockwood, Alice MacLachlin, Alison McIntyre, Charles More, Ser-
ena Parekh, Ronni Sadovsky, Suzanne Sreedhar, Jacqueline Taylor, Catherine 
Wearing; and to my assistants over the years (who have also contributed to my 
thinking in many ways), including Dylan Bianchi, Rachael Briggs, Jennifer Carr, 
Helena deBres, Tom Dougherty, Romelia Drager, Roxanne Fay, Lyndal Grant, 
Elizabeth Harman, Jerome Hodges, Ginger Hoff man, Adam Hosein, Kate Manne, 
Sarah McGrath, Melissa Schumacher; and to other regular participants already 
mentioned. Th e Philosophy Section in the Department of Linguistic and Philos-
ophy at MIT is a great place to do philosophy and I feel privileged to have been 
part of the community since 1998. Th anks to all the faculty and graduate stu-
dents who have overlapped with me there. 
 For the wonderful conversations and comments over the years that have infl u-
enced my thinking, thanks to: Alia Al-Saji, Luvell Anderson, Anat Biletzky, Susan 
Brison, Sylvain Bromberger, Joshua Cohen, Ann Cudd, Tracy Edwards, Catherine 
Elgin, Janet Farrell-Smith, Heath Fogg-Davis, Jorge Garcia, Joshua Glasgow, 
Heidy González, Elizabeth Harman, Diana Henderson, Emily Hipchen, Jules 
Holroyd, Richard Holton, Adam Hosein, Alison Jaggar, Karen Jones, Evelyn Fox 
Keller, Christine Koggel, Roxanne Kurtz, Mika Lavaque-Manty, Christopher 
Lebron, Kimberly Leighton, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Annabelle Lever, Koffi   Maglo, Ron 
Mallon, Kate Manne, Lionel McPherson, Ifaenyi Menkiti, Maria Morales, Stephen 
Nathanson, Ruth Perry, Anne Phillips, Ryan Preston, Margaret Rhodes, Mark 
Richard, Sarah Richardson, Lisa Rivera, Gideon Rosen, Ronald Sandler, Naomi 
Scheman, Laura Schroeter, Tommie Shelby, Susan Silbey, Sarah Song, Quayshawn 
Spencer, Robert Stalnaker, Natalie Stoljar, Ronald Sandler, Judith Th omson, 
 Manuel Vargas, David Velleman, Kenneth Walden, Ralph Wedgwood, Andrea 
Westlund, Ajume Wingo, David Wong, and Christopher Zurn. Randal Parker and 
Kayley Vernallis were among my earliest conversation partners on feminist issues 
and I am deeply grateful for their enduring friendship and inspiration. 
 Over the years I have received two fellowships that have given me valuable 
time to work. In 1995–1996 I was a fellow at the National Humanities Center;