Table Of ContentResisting Reality
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Resisting Reality
S ocial Construction and Social Critique
SALLY HASLANGER
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haslanger, Sally Anne.
Resisting reality: social construction and social critique /Sally Haslanger.
p. cm.
ISBN 978-0-19-989262-4 (pbk.: alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-19-989263-1 (hardcover: alk. paper)
1. Social constructionism. 2. Critical theory. 3. Feminism. 4. Social sciences—Philosophy. I. Title.
HM1093.H38 2012
300.1—dc23 2011044301
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction
3
PART ONE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
1. On Being Objective and Being Objectifi ed
35
2. Ontology and Social Construction
83
3. Social Construction: Th e “Debunking” Project
113
4. Feminism in Metaphysics: Negotiating the Natural
139
5. Family, Ancestry, and Self: What Is the Moral Signifi cance
of Biological Ties?
158
6. Social Construction: Myth and Reality
183
P ART TWO GENDER AND RACE
7. Gender and Race: (What) Are Th ey? (What) Do We Want
Th em to Be?
221
8. Future Genders? Future Races?
248
9. You Mixed? Racial Identity without Racial Biology
273
10. A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race
298
11. Oppressions: Racial and Other
311
vi Contents
PART THREE LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE
12. What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and
Normative Epistemology
341
13. What Are We Talking About? Th e Semantics and Politics of Social
Kinds
365
14. What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social
Kinds
381
15. “But Mom, Crop-Tops A re Cute!” Social Knowledge, Social Structure,
and Ideology Critique
406
16. Language, Politics, and “Th e Folk:” Looking for “Th e Meaning” of
‘Race’
429
17. Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground
446
Index 4 79
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Although writing philosophy is usually a solitary business, doing philosophy is a
collaborative process, whether we acknowledge it or not. Th e collaboration can
happen in face-to-face conversations, or through reading or listening to others. I
began writing the essays in this book twenty years ago. Th e ideas and arguments
that appear here depend on input from many others, including students, col-
leagues, friends, conference participants, interlocutors at colloquia, well-known
and little known authors, and random acquaintances whom, at this point, I
cannot even name. So fi rst, and importantly, I want to express my gratitude for
my communities—both academic and non-academic—that enable rich and chal-
lenging conversation, and the willingness of so many to share their thoughts
with me. I regret that I cannot give each of you the individual credit that you
deserve.
Most of the chapters in this volume were published separately and have their
own acknowledgments, so rather than trying to list everyone who has helped me
with this project, I want to use this opportunity to express special thanks to a few,
with the understanding that whatever I say here barely scratches the surface.
I have known Charlotte Witt since I was in graduate school at Berkeley, and
for thirty years she has been a wonderful friend, colleague, and collaborator. She
has pushed me when I needed pushing, supported me when I needed support,
and been an invaluable interlocutor on personal, professional, and philosophical
issues. Her input has not only made my feminist work better, but has made it
possible.
Rae Langton, my close friend and colleague at MIT, has also been an impor-
tant part of my life since the late 1980s. Her ideas have inspired me, her writing
has moved me, and her friendship has sustained me. She shows by example all
that feminist philosophy can be and d o . I feel privileged to know her and am
forever grateful for her friendship.
Years ago at I supervised Elizabeth Hackett’s dissertation on Catharine
MacKinnon’s epistemology. Not only was it a joy to work with Beth, but the hard
vii
viii Acknowledgments
work we did together enabled me to appreciate much more deeply than I had
before the philosophical richness of MacKinnon’s work. Beth became a good
friend and colleague, and years later we collaborated on a textbook Th eorizing
Feminisms (Oxford 2005). Beth’s insights into feminist method and the goals of
feminist theorizing have infl uenced me deeply, and her commitment to philo-
sophical feminism, and making space for it within academia, has helped me keep
hope alive during hard times.
Louise Antony is another close friend who has been a companion from the
start in doing analytic feminism: my fi rst feminist publication was a response to
Louise and Charlotte’s invitation to contribute to A Mind of One’s Own . Her high
standards, incisive intelligence, and political intensity challenge me in the best
way and keep me up at night searching for answers. She has been invaluable in
working on this book, and in so much else.
When I was at the University of Michigan, Abigail Stewart was the Director of
Women’s Studies. Abby was my fi rst feminist mentor. Th e most precious gift—
of many—that Abby gave me was the awareness that feminist theory is its own
interdisciplinary intellectual project and that even I, a philosopher, was qualifi ed
to do it. Such work is answerable to rigorous intellectual standards, but diff erent
standards than those represented in philosophy. Abby unyoked my thinking
from the burdensome cart of academic philosophy and gave me a voice. She has
also been an inspiration and role model in working on gender equity issues in
the academy. I admire her beyond words, and I would not be where I am today
without her guidance, vision, and support.
Elizabeth Anderson and I were colleagues at the University of Michigan, and
it was the fi rst time I had a colleague in my own department doing feminist
work. Liz’s work has had a huge infl uence on me, and her straightforwardness,
confi dence, and integrity gave me strength in times of doubt. While Abby freed
me from the artifi cial constraints of academic philosophy, Liz took for granted
that philosophical feminism i s philosophy. Th e combination allowed me to form
a new, less fragmented, intellectual identity and the courage to own it.
Since moving to Cambridge, I have had the good fortune to have Lawrence
Blum as a friend. Larry’s commitment to doing and teaching philosophy in ways
that matter nourishes me and keeps me grounded in my own values. His unqual-
ifi ed willingness to take up hard issues, his attention to detail, his thoughtful
self-refl ectiveness and his appreciation of the importance of philosophical
community have made a huge difference to how and why I still identify as a
philosopher.
For the many ways they have helped me over the years and inspired me, I’d
like to thank: Linda Martín Alcoff , Anita L. Allen, Nancy Bauer, Robert Gooding-
Williams, Kimberly Leighton, Elisabeth Lloyd, Charles Mills, Jennifer Saul, Jacque-
line Stevens, and Ronald Sundstrom. Th anks especially to Mary Kate McGowan
who, in addition to her insight and friendship over the years, read through and
Acknowledgments ix
gave me excellent comments on an early version of the manuscript when I was
still trying to turn it into a monograph.
Special thanks to Ásta Sveinsdóttir and Ishani Maitra who were my grad stu-
dents at MIT and helped me found the Workshop on Gender and Philosophy in
2000. Ishani and Ásta created a warm and welcoming feminist space for me at
MIT and have been fabulous feminist interlocutors. And they have given me the
greatest gift by going on to do such great work. More recently, Kate Manne and
Kenneth Walden have given me valuable feedback on the material in this collec-
tion and have been a great pleasure to work with.
To all those who have participated in the Workshop on Gender and Philos-
ophy, I am very grateful. WOGAP has sustained me and given me so much to
think about over the years. Special thanks to the regulars, including Candice
Delmas, Heidi Lockwood, Alice MacLachlin, Alison McIntyre, Charles More, Ser-
ena Parekh, Ronni Sadovsky, Suzanne Sreedhar, Jacqueline Taylor, Catherine
Wearing; and to my assistants over the years (who have also contributed to my
thinking in many ways), including Dylan Bianchi, Rachael Briggs, Jennifer Carr,
Helena deBres, Tom Dougherty, Romelia Drager, Roxanne Fay, Lyndal Grant,
Elizabeth Harman, Jerome Hodges, Ginger Hoff man, Adam Hosein, Kate Manne,
Sarah McGrath, Melissa Schumacher; and to other regular participants already
mentioned. Th e Philosophy Section in the Department of Linguistic and Philos-
ophy at MIT is a great place to do philosophy and I feel privileged to have been
part of the community since 1998. Th anks to all the faculty and graduate stu-
dents who have overlapped with me there.
For the wonderful conversations and comments over the years that have infl u-
enced my thinking, thanks to: Alia Al-Saji, Luvell Anderson, Anat Biletzky, Susan
Brison, Sylvain Bromberger, Joshua Cohen, Ann Cudd, Tracy Edwards, Catherine
Elgin, Janet Farrell-Smith, Heath Fogg-Davis, Jorge Garcia, Joshua Glasgow,
Heidy González, Elizabeth Harman, Diana Henderson, Emily Hipchen, Jules
Holroyd, Richard Holton, Adam Hosein, Alison Jaggar, Karen Jones, Evelyn Fox
Keller, Christine Koggel, Roxanne Kurtz, Mika Lavaque-Manty, Christopher
Lebron, Kimberly Leighton, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Annabelle Lever, Koffi Maglo, Ron
Mallon, Kate Manne, Lionel McPherson, Ifaenyi Menkiti, Maria Morales, Stephen
Nathanson, Ruth Perry, Anne Phillips, Ryan Preston, Margaret Rhodes, Mark
Richard, Sarah Richardson, Lisa Rivera, Gideon Rosen, Ronald Sandler, Naomi
Scheman, Laura Schroeter, Tommie Shelby, Susan Silbey, Sarah Song, Quayshawn
Spencer, Robert Stalnaker, Natalie Stoljar, Ronald Sandler, Judith Th omson,
Manuel Vargas, David Velleman, Kenneth Walden, Ralph Wedgwood, Andrea
Westlund, Ajume Wingo, David Wong, and Christopher Zurn. Randal Parker and
Kayley Vernallis were among my earliest conversation partners on feminist issues
and I am deeply grateful for their enduring friendship and inspiration.
Over the years I have received two fellowships that have given me valuable
time to work. In 1995–1996 I was a fellow at the National Humanities Center;
