Table Of ContentRESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND
METHODOLOGY
Series Editors: Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle,
Ross B. Emmett and
Marianne Johnson
Recent Volumes:
Volume 24A: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: A Research Annual; Warren J. Samuels,
Jeff E. Biddle and Ross B. Emmett; 2006
Volume 24B: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology:FurtherDocumentsfromF.TaylorOstrander;
Warren J. Samuels; 2006
Volume 24C: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: Documents From and On Economic
Thought; Warren J. Samuels; 2006
Volume 25A: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: A Research Annual; Warren J. Samuels,
Jeff E. Biddle and Ross B. Emmett; 2007
Volume 25B: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: DocumentsFromThe History ofEconomic
Thought; Warren J. Samuels; 2007
Volume 25C: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: Further Documents From The History Of
Economic Thought; Warren J. Samuels; 2007
Volume 26A: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: A Research Annual; Warren J. Samuels,
Jeff E. Biddle and Ross B. Emmett; 2008
Volume 26B: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: Further Documents From F. Taylor
Ostrander; 2008
Volume 26C: Research in the History of Economic Thought and
Methodology: Further Documents From and On The
History Of Economic Thought; Warren J. Samuels,
Marianne Johnson and Kirk Johnson; 2008
RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
AND METHODOLOGY VOLUME 27-A
RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY
OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
AND METHODOLOGY
A Research Annual
EDITED BY
WARREN J. SAMUELS
Department of Economics, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
JEFF E. BIDDLE
Department of Economics, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
ROSS B. EMMETT
James Madison College, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, MI 48825, USA
United Kingdom – North America – Japan
India – Malaysia – China
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The editors wish to express their gratitude for assistance in the review
processandotherconsultationtothemembersoftheeditorialboardandto
the following persons:
Jack Amariglio
Spencer Banzhaf
Alan Bart
Kathryn Blanchard
Christopher Coyne
Shelia Dow
Zouhair Ghazzal
Dan Hammond
Marianne Johnson
Randall Juris
Laura Kovacek
Harro Maas
Doug McKenzie
Perry Mehrling
Phil Mirowski
Ryan Muldoon
Rachel Penn
Robert Prasch
Ayman Reda
David Ruccio
Neil Skaggs
Matthew Stuart
Anthony Waterman
xiii
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Daniele Besomi Independent researcher. C.p. 7, 6950 Gola di
Lago, Switzerland
Stewart Davenport Department of History, Pepperdine
University, USA
John B. Davis Department of Economics, University of
Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Department of
Economics, Marquette University, USA
Arthur M. Diamond, Jr. Department of Economics, University of
Nebraska at Omaha, USA
Andrew Farrant DepartmentofEconomics,DickinsonCollege,
USA
Luca Fiorito Department of Politics, Law and Society,
University of Palermo, Italy
Willie Henderson Alworth Institute for International Studies,
University of Minnesota, Duluth, USA
Bruce E. Kaufman Department of Economics, Georgia State
University, USA
Andrea Maneschi Department of Economics, Vanderbilt
University, USA
David Mitch Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, Baltimore County, USA
Sebastiano Nerozzi Department of Politics, Law and Society,
University of Palermo, Italy
Scott Newton Department of History and Welsh History,
Cardiff University, Wales, UK
Robert Pahre Department of Political Science, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
ix
x LIST OFCONTRIBUTORS
David L. Prychitko Department of Economics, Northern
Michigan University, USA
Robert Van Horn Department of Economics, University of
Rhode Island, USA
EDITORIAL BOARD
William Breit Alon Kadish
Trinity University, USA Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel
Bruce J. Caldwell
Duke University, USA S. Todd Lowry
Washington and Lee University,
John B. Davis USA
Marquette University, USA
and University of Amsterdam, Howard J. Sherman
The Netherlands University of California, Riverside,
USA
Craufurd D. Goodwin
Duke University, USA Andrew S. Skinner
University of Glasgow, UK
Robert F. He´bert
Auburn University, Vincent J. Tarascio
USA University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, USA
Abraham Hirsch
Brooklyn College, John C. Wood
USA Edith Cowan University, Australia
xi
TWO RELATIONAL CONCEPTIONS
OF INDIVIDUALS: TEAMS AND
NEUROECONOMICS
John B. Davis
I have argued that taking atomistic individuals to be interactive beings in
some way or another does not produce an adequate conception of the
individual, because the subjectivism of these approaches does not permit
interaction to overcome the deep problems in the atomistic conception
(Davis,2003).Suppose,then,thatindividualsaredefinedfromtheoutsetas
interactive beings, rather than as atomistic individuals who are secondarily
interactive. I characterize this as a ‘‘relational’’ type of conception of the
individualandinvestigateithereinconnectionwithtwodifferentapproaches
that define individuals in terms of their relation to and interaction with
others.Relationalconceptionsoftheindividualare‘‘externalist’’ratherthan
‘‘internalist’’conceptionsinthattheydonotattempttoindividuatepersons–
show how they are individual or are independent and distinct beings – in
terms of fully private characteristics but rather in terms of their place in
structuresofsocialrelationships.Theythusavoidthecircularityandquestion-
beggingofusing‘‘ownpreferences’’asameanstoindividuatingpersons,but
they encounter their own individuation problem by having to explain how
individuals are independent and distinct when they are defined in terms of
relationships to others. This latter challenge is a serious one, but in my
argument,itinvolvesadecidedlybetterstateofaffairsthanthecircularitythat
internalist approaches involve. The further challenge externalist relational
AResearchAnnual
ResearchintheHistoryofEconomicThoughtandMethodology,Volume27-A,1–21
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ISSN:0743-4154/doi:10.1108/S0743-4154(2009)00027A005
1
2 JOHN B. DAVIS
accounts encounter concerns the re-identification problem or how you re-
identify a person shown to be individual across change in that individual’s
characteristics. Internalist accounts of the individual do not even get to this
problem, because they cannot individuate persons in the first place. For
externalist relational accounts, re-identification is a problem if persons are
individuated narrowly in terms of particular social relationships that
are transitory. Persons who are individuated in terms of one set of social
relationships may not be in terms of another set; that is, those social
relationships that are individuating may not be long-lasting. Thus, relational
conceptionscanovercomesomeofthedifficultiesoftheatomisticconception
but end up still not being adequate to our ordinary view of individuals as
enduring beings.
In part, the recent relational approaches to the individual have been
inspired by problems in standard decision theory and associated doubts
about the atomistic individual conception. But there is also an empirical
foundation for these alternative approaches in the Easterlin paradox and
thevoluminousliteraturethathasfollowedinthepastthreedecades.Using
individuals’ subjective self-evaluations of happiness, Richard Easterlin
argued that cross-sectional country data and within-country time-series
showthatthereisnoclearrelationbetweenwealthandhappiness(Easterlin,
1974,2001).Ashasbeendemonstratedmanytimessince,happinessappears
to rise with income and wealth until basic needs are met, and thereafter
greater income and wealth appear to have little or diminishing effect on
happiness (Layard, 2005). But more important, not only are ‘‘the effects of
wealth are not large ... [but] they are dwarfed by other influences, such as
those of personality and social relationships’’ (Diener & Seligman, 2003, p.
10). Indeed, Easterlin originally attempted to explain his results as James
Duesenberry(1949)hadusingarelativeincomehypothesis,andothershave
proposed relative consumption hypotheses, both of which emphasize the
role of social relationships (Scitovsky, 1976; Hirsch, 1977; Frank, 2005).
Happiness or being happy, of course, is not the same thing as being an
individual, but as happiness surveys are the product of individuals’
subjective self-evaluations of happiness, happiness is closely connected
to one’s sense of being an individual. Thus, since social relationships are
an important source of happiness, we have good reason to investigate
individuals from a relational perspective.
But what does a relational conception of individuals involve? Outside
of being a departure from the atomistic conception, there is obviously
considerable ambiguity regarding what ‘‘relational’’ can mean, though one
thing is clearly that it bases the account of the individual on social
Two Relational Conceptionsof Individuals 3
interaction. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to examine two representative
views within this general framework. In the first section, I begin with
theoriesofteamsandteamreasoningthatusesocialidentitytheoryandare
developedwithinagame-theoreticframework.Thesecondsectionmoveson
to game-theoretic neuroeconomic accounts of the individual and distin-
guishestwodifferenttypesofrelationalconceptionoftheindividual.Abrief
conclusion closes the paper.
TEAMS AND TEAM REASONING
Recentworkonthetheoryofteamsandteamreasoningingameinteractive
settingsisdueprincipallytothelateMichaelBacharach(Bacharach,2006),
who offers a conception of the individual as a team member, and also to
Martin Hollis (1998) and Robert Sugden and Natalie Gold (Sugden, 2000;
Gold & Sugden, 2007), and is motivated by the conflict between what
ordinary experience suggests people often to do and what rationality pre-
scribesforthem,suchasinprisoner’sdilemmagameswhereindividualscan
choosetocooperateordefect.Thesourceoftheconflict,theysuggest,isan
ambiguityinthesyntaxofstandardgametheory,whichistakentoposethe
question individuals in games ask themselves as, ‘‘what should I do?,’’ but
which might be taken to pose the question, particularly when individuals
are working together with others as, ‘‘what should we do?’’ When taken in
thelatterway,eachindividualchoosesaccordingtowhatbestpromotesthe
team’sobjectiveandthenperformstheroleappropriateasamemberofthat
team or group. Bacharach understood this change in focus in terms of the
different possible cognitive frames that individuals use to think about the
world and developed a variable frame theory for rational play in games in
which the frame adopted fora decision problem determines what counts as
rational play (Janssen, 2001; Casajus, 2001).
Inordertoexplainhowsomeoneacts,wehavetotakeaccountoftherepresentationor
modelofhersituationthatsheisusingasshethinkswhattodo.Themodelvarieswith
thecognitiveframeinwhichshedoesherthinking.Herframestandstoherthoughtsasa
setofaxesdoestoagraph;itcircumscribesthethoughtsthatarelogicallypossiblefor
her(notever,butatthattime).(Bacharach,2006,p.69)
Sugdenunderstandsthisframingideaintermsofthetheory offocal points
following Thomas Schelling’s emphasis on the role of salience in
coordination games (Schelling, 1960), and his theory similarly ties
decision-making to the way the game is understood (Sugden, 1995). This
