Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States

317 Pages·2000·1.69 MB·English

by  Matthew Krain (auth.)

Repression and Accommodation
in Post-Revolutionary States
Matthew Krain
For Gary and Arlene Cooper—
parents,friends,inspirations
REPRESSIONANDACCOMMODATIONINPOST-REVOLUTIONARYSTATES
Copyright © Matthew Krain,2000.All rights reserved.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2000 978-0-333-92991-9
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.For information,address St.
Martin’s Press,New York,N.Y.10010
ISBN 978-1-349-42580-8 ISBN 978-0-312-29953-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780312299538
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Krain,Matthew.
Repression and accommodation in post-revolutionary states / Matthew Krain.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Latin America—Politics and government—1948 2. Iran—Politics and
government—1979 3. Revolutions. 4. Elite (Social sciences) 5. Political
persecution. I. Title.
JL960.K7 2000
323’.044—dc21 99–045159
Design by Letra Libre,Inc.
First edition:June,2000
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
List of Figures v
List of Tables vii
Acknowledgements ix
Part I
Developing a Model of the Post-Internal War State
Chapter 1 Studying the Post-Internal War State 1
Chapter 2 Repression and Accommodation
in Post-Internal War States 11
Chapter 3 You Say You Want a Revolution:
Selecting Test Cases 27
Part II
The Causes of Repression and
Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States
Chapter 4 Charting Policy Mix Choices:
Event Data and the Historical Process Model 37
Chapter 5 The Use of Repression and Accommodation
in Post-Revolutionary States 75
Part III
The Consequences of Repression and
Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States
Chapter 6 Responding to Revolution:Opposition
in Post-Revolutionary States 97
Chapter 7 Sharing the Cake:
Political System Development
in Post-Revolutionary States 133
Chapter 8 Only the Good Die Young:
Political Survival of Revolutionary Elites 153
Part IV
Conclusion
Chapter 9 What Is To Be Done?:
Concluding Thoughts on Political
Dynamics in Post-Internal War States 171
Appendices
Appendix A Survey of Experts on Repression
and Accommodation 185
Appendix B PIWAR Data Project Coding Sheet 189
Appendix C PIWAR Data Project Codebook 191
Appendix D Elite Perceptions of Security/Vulnerability
(Coding Instruments,Sources,
and Summary Statistics) 199
Appendix E Opposition Activity Coding Instruments 208
Notes 211
Bibliography 279
Index 306
Figures
Figure 2.1 Historical Process Model of the Causes and Consequences
of Repression and Accommodation in Post-Internal War
States
Figure 4.1 Historical Process Model of the Causes and Consequences
of Repression and Accommodation in Post–Revolutionary
War States
Figure 4.2 Yearly Number of Uses of Repression
Figure 4.3 Yearly Uses of Repression,Weighted Events Squared
Figure 4.4 Yearly Uses of Repression—Iran
Figure 4.5 Yearly Uses of Repression—Cuba
Figure 4.6 Yearly Uses of Repression—Nicaragua
Figure 4.7 Yearly Uses of Repression—Bolivia
Figure 4.8 Yearly Number of Uses of Accommodation
Figure 4.9 Yearly Uses of Accommodation,Weighted Events Squared
Figure 4.10 Yearly Uses of Accommodation—Iran
Figure 4.11 Yearly Uses of Accommodation—Cuba
Figure 4.12 Yearly Uses of Accommodation—Nicaragua
Figure 4.13 Yearly Uses of Accommodation—Bolivia
Figure 5.1 Hypothesized Relationships
Figure 6.1 Total Opposition Activity
Figure 6.2 Opposition Activity—Iran
Figure 6.3 Opposition Activity—Cuba
Figure 6.4 Opposition Activity—Nicaragua
Figure 6.5 Opposition Activity—Bolivia
Figure 6.6 Observed Relationships between War and Opposition
Activity in Type III Case (Nicaragua)
Figure 6.7 Observed Relationships between War and Opposition
Activity in Type I Case (Iran)
Figure 7.1 Historical Process Model of the Causes and Consequences
of Repression and Accommodation in Post–Revolutionary
War States
Figure 8.1 Historical Process Model of the Causes and Consequences
of Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary
War States
Figure 9.1 Mapping a Historical Model of the Political Outcomes of
Internal Wars
Tables
Table 2.1 Case Types
Table 3.1 Cases To Be Examined (by Key Independent Variables)
Table 4.1 Sources—Policies of Repression
Table 4.2 Sources—Policies of Accommodation
Table 4.3 Experts’Weighted Scores—Policies of Repression
Table 4.4 Experts’Weighted Scores—Policies of Accommodation
Table 4.5 Weighted Scores for Policies of Repression
Table 4.6 Weighted Scores for Policies of Accommodation
Table 4.7 Historical Case Materials Used in Step 3 of the Coding
Process
Table 4.8 Repression and Accommodation:Total Number of Events and
Correlation between Uses of Repression and Accommodation
Table 5.1 Elite Perceptions of Their Own (In)Vulnerability—
Word/Phrase List
Table 5.2 Elite Perceptions of Security—Total Documents Coded and
Score Received (by Year)
Table 5.3 Test of Poisson Distribution of the Dependent Variable
Table 5.4 Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test of Negative Binomial Models vs.
Poisson Models
Table 5.5 Negative Binomial Model of Factors Affecting the Use of
Repression (by Month)
Table 5.6 Negative Binomial Model of Factors Affecting the Use of
Accommodation (by Month)
Table 5.7 Factors Affecting Elite Perceptions of Their Own (In)Vulner-
ability
Table 6.1 Test of Poisson Distribution of the Dependent Variable
Table 6.2 Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test of Negative Binomial Models
vs.Poisson Models
viii • Repression and Accommodation
Table 6.3 Negative Binomial Model of Factors Affecting Total Opposi-
tion Activity (using total number of repression and accom-
modation events)
Table 6.4 Test of Poisson Distribution of the Dependent Variable
Table 6.5 Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test of Negative Binomial Model vs.
Poisson Model
Table 6.6 Negative Binomial Model of Factors Affecting Violent Oppo-
sition Activity
Table 6.6a Negative Binomial Model vs.Poisson Model of Factors Af-
fecting Violent Opposition Activity in Bolivia
Table 6.7 Negative Binomial Model of Factors Affecting Nonviolent
Opposition Activity
Table 6.7a Negative Binomial Model vs.Poisson Model of Factors Af-
fecting Nonviolent Opposition Activity in Cuba and Iran
Table 8.1 Truth Table of Factors Affecting Elite Survivability in
Post–Internal War States
Table 9.1 Historical Process Tracing of the Political Dynamics of
Post–Internal War States
Table A.1 Experts Polled to Create Weighting Scales or Repression and
Accommodation
Table D.1 Summary Statistics:Speeches
Table D.2 Summary Statistics:Interviews
Table D.3 Summary Statistics:Total
Acknowledgements
S
cholars dispute whether Louis XIV actually uttered the famous dec-
laration “I am the state.”There can be no dispute as to whether or
not I alone am this book.This project has benefited from the exper-
tise,comments,advice,and support of many people.Without their assis-
tance this book would not have been possible.
Chief among those to whom I am indebted is Karen Rasler,whose in-
fluence on my work goes beyond that of a former advisor.She has been
perhaps the important force in my career thus far.Her advice is always
honest and useful, and her guidance has been invaluable. Perhaps more
importantly,the example she sets as a thoughtful,productive,and thor-
oughly professional scholar is one that I can only hope to emulate over
my own career. I am equally indebted to William R.Thompson, upon
whose knowledge and expertise I have drawn more often than he may
care to remember.
During my time at Indiana University I sought out the expert advice
of such talented scholars as Jack Bielasiak, Marjorie Hershey, Robert
Huckfeldt, Michael McGinnis, Robert V. Robinson, and John Williams.
Over the life of this project I also received valuable feedback from David
Cingranelli,Christian Davenport,David R.Davis,Andrew Enterline,Scott
Gates,Ted Robert Gurr, Roy Licklider, Michael D. McDonald,Will H.
Moore,and T.David Mason.All were incredibly helpful!
Moreover,I was lucky enough to have had graduate student colleagues
of unparalleled excellence.First among these is Marissa Myers—colleague,
erstwhile coauthor,and valued friend.I can only describe her assistance as
above and beyond the call of duty.Additionally,I must thank the members
of the “Breakfast Club”—Marilyn Grobschmidt,David Kelly,Lisa Raupp
Laverty,Anas Malik,Sheila Noojibail,Amanda Rose,and Sander Valyoc-
sik—whose discussions of our works-in-progress always provided for hon-
est,accurate,and constructive criticism.I would also be remiss if I did not
tip my cap to Richard Tucker,who patiently endured numerous sessions