Renewing Liberalism

526 Pages·2016·5.03 MB·English

by  James A. Sherman (auth.)

James A. Sherman
Renewing
Liberalism
Renewing Liberalism

James A. Sherman
Renewing Liberalism
James A. Sherman
Department of Ethics, Society, and Law
Trinity College
Toronto , Ontario , Canada
ISBN 978-3-319-28276-3 ISBN 978-3-319-28277-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28277-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016937710
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For Lorelei
Qui novit, neque id quod sentit exprimit,
perinde est ac si nesciret.

Acknowledgements
This book began as my dissertation in the Department of Philosophy at the University
of Texas at Austin. My fi rst debt of thanks is to my supervisor, Dan Bonevac, the
keenest c onservative intellect I know, whose patience and encouragement enabled
me to chase down my hunches and follow my arguments wherever they took me,
and who was always ready and waiting with trenchant criticism when I got there.
Jonathan D ancy w as a sure-footed guide through some of the more rarefi ed terrain
of ethical theory, and Al Martinich shared what was only a fraction of the impres-
sive breadth and depth of his insight into philosophical, political, and intellectual
history. Steve White ignited my interest in Aristotle’s ethical and political philoso-
phy and taught by example the virtues of rigorous scholarship. It was in his seminar
on A ristotle’s writings on justice, during my fi rst year of graduate school, that the
thought dawned on me that a good liberal could be a good Aristotelian. The late
David Braybrooke showed me how much there was to left-wing political theory
beyond the work of Rawls. Brian Leiter helped me to see the complexities involved
in interpreting and defending Mill’s H arm Principle, and Sahotra Sarkar helped me
get my bearings in the world of decision theory . Many years ago, my fascination
with social and political thought was fi rst cultivated by John Connelly at Regis High
School in New York City, and Eric MacGilvray at the University of Chicago.
I began working on this project in the winter of 2008, which I spent at the
University of Oxford. Many of my views began to take shape at that time, stimu-
lated by the wonderful discussions held at the weekly Moral Philosophy Seminar
and the Jurisprudence Discussion Group. While I was there, Joseph Raz offered
some illuminating commentary and well-timed encouragement for my work on
moral rights and political authority. Some of the material in Chaps. 1 4 and 1 5 are
taken from work done during this period and published as J Sherman (2010a) “A
New Instrumental Theory of Rights” E thical Theory and Moral Practice 13:2, 215–
228; and J Sherman (2010b) “Unresolved Problems in the Service Conception of
Authority” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30:3, 419–440.
vii
viii Acknowledgements
From 2011 to 2013, I benefi tted greatly from receiving a postdoctoral fellowship
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which I held
at the University of Toronto. The Centre for Ethics at Trinity College, Toronto, was
an i deal h ome d uring t his period, and I learned a great deal from my colleagues
there, particularly Joseph H eath and Thomas H urka. The surest way to get clear on
an idea is to teach it, and I have been fortunate to have had excellent students in my
course on d istributive justice in Trinity College’s Program in Ethics, Society and L aw.
M y views on the wide range of topics covered in this book have been profoundly
shaped by the many challenging and enriching conversations I have had with friends
and colleagues in Toronto, Austin, Oxford, Chicago, and New York City. A short
list, undoubtedly leaving out many, would include Reid Blackman, Francis Fallon,
Joseph Forte, Conor Johnston, Maris Köpcke Tinturé, Grant Madsen, Anna-Sara
Malmgren, Matt O’Brien, David Palmer, Carla Saenz, Michael Sevel, and Neil
Sinhababu. Two who stand out for special mention are Blinn Combs and Eric
Hochstein.
Seven years is not a short time to be engrossed in an intellectual project, and the
unfailing patience and support of my wife, Jennifer Neilson, has been the sine qua
non of its completion. The encouragement of my parents, Joan Caiazzo and Arthur
S herman, has also been indispensable. And my faithful dog Asta kept me company
throughout the entire writing process. Though I have been actively at work on this
book since 2008, and the seeds of the project were planted over a decade ago, my
determination to write it stretches back even further. I grew up surrounded by liberals ,
and did not encounter a cogent and precise articulation of c onservative principles
until I went away to university. It was then that I realized that I did not have a good
answer to the question of why I was a liberal . Whether the argument of this book
provides a good reason to be a liberal is something others will judge; but it does
provide the best account I can give of why I count myself as one.
Trinity College, Toronto James A. Sherman
6 January 2015
Contents
1 Historical Introduction ........................................................................... 1
References ................................................................................................. 8
Part I Liberty: Autonomy
2 Liberty: Autonomy – Introduction ........................................................ 11
References ................................................................................................. 14
3 Autonomy and Practical Reasoning ...................................................... 15
1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 15
2 The Standard Philosophical Model of Instrumental Reasoning ......... 17
3 Specifi cation and Practical Induction ................................................. 19
4 Decision Theory: Ramsey and Beyond .............................................. 23
4.1 Preferences, Preference-Rankings, and Valuations ................... 23
4.2 Valuation, Subjective Probability and Expected Value.............. 31
4.3 Desirability, Evidence, and Causation ....................................... 41
4.4 Advantages and Alleged Disadvantages
of a Ramsey-Style Decision Theory .......................................... 44
5 Relevant Recent Developments in Decision Theory .......................... 49
5.1 Meta-preference......................................................................... 49
5.2 Preference for Flexibility ........................................................... 50
5.3 Reasons-Based Preference ........................................................ 51
References ................................................................................................. 53
4 Autonomy and Rational Deliberation About Ends .............................. 55
1 Understanding Means and Ends ......................................................... 55
2 An Aristotelian Theory of Ends .......................................................... 56
3 A Formal, Endogenous, Dynamic Model
of Rational Deliberation about Ends .................................................. 64
3.1 Preferences, Evidence, and Updating ........................................ 64
3.2 Forms of Ends-Deliberation ...................................................... 83
3.3 Modeling Deliberation about Ends as a Dynamic System ........ 86
ix